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Preface 
Writing a PhD thesis is necessarily the documentation of a personal journey.  I wish to 
explain the journey which led me to the Mekong Region as it provides the context for 
my subsequent, evolving research and action agenda, one product of which is this thesis. 
I had a fortunate upbringing in rural south-east Australia which provided me with many 
opportunities.  However, reflecting back on the initial formal education system which 
processed me, triggers mixed emotions.  I was marched through high school, and for no 
particular reason other than that I could cope with it, was expected to persist with the 
standard fare of chemistry, physics, pure and applied mathematics, with a dash of 
English studies, and perhaps an over-emphasis on sport.  From such a base, the tertiary 
pathways which were then most obvious were in the natural sciences domain. 
I then enrolled in an undergraduate degree in agricultural sciences at University of 
Melbourne during the 1980s, absorbing and reproducing scientific facts and 
methodologies, at a time when molecular biology was in its infancy and agricultural 
economics was somewhat surreally detached from anything other than its rationalist 
foundations. 
Subsequently a career unfolded in agribusiness, commencing in the second half of the 
1980s, which required an enhanced understanding of technical options, risk, finance and 
people.  My work involved property operation, enterprise selections, pursuing decent 
returns on invested capital, boosting net worth, land purchasing, succession planning 
and facilitating discussion groups for collective learning. 
During the 1990s this evolved into a specialisation in public policy attempts to 
‘manage’ Australia’s natural resources where old paradigms of industry support and 
laments about the fickleness of unlevel export market playing fields, were being added 
to by new paradigms of community-based Landcare and environmental sustainability.  
This was a part of the elusive quest by natural resources users and managers for 
profitability, satisfaction and protection of wider public interests.  Increasingly I became 
involved as an analyst and actor in the politics of natural resources management. 
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During this time I was also becoming increasingly interested in the progress and 
challenges confronting Australia’s East Asia neighbours and was travelling in countries 
such as China and Cambodia.  In the mid 1990s I was fortunate to find my way to The 
Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra to complete Masters studies in 
environmental management and development with an always remembered, diverse 
group of multi-national scholars.  The return to ANU was in part driven by the 
inspiration gained from participation in 1995 at a Coffs Harbour meeting of ‘ecological 
economists’.  This eclectic gathering provided me with a renewed surge of interest in 
the prospects of interdisciplinary approaches in helping societies deal with many of the 
intractable problems of our times.  The subsequent return to reflective study was my 
first exposure to experiential learning approaches within a formal university setting. 
At this time I was also fortunate to begin an association with the Cranlana Programme, 
an initiative committed to the development of leadership and an active citizenry, closely 
associated with the Melbourne-based philanthropic organisation, The Myer Foundation.  
Participation in several of their activities profoundly affected my approach to learning.  
The Cranlana Colloquium processes provide a skilfully moderated opportunity for 
learning and reflection on selected writings of great philosophers from all periods and 
from Western and Eastern traditions.  As one alumni noted: “The Colloquium combines 
the familiar rational and analytical processes of judgement with artistic, emotional and 
social processes that also form, conform and sometimes reform our views”.  The 
interaction with Cranlana was serendipitous.  I was ready to explore new areas and 
approaches to governance.  It gave impetus to my subsequent work, and further opened 
my mind to the lessons from history. 
The last years of the 1990s saw me working in an interactive study of sub-national 
regionalisms working with people around Australia who are attempting to improve the 
community, economy and environment of ‘their region’ – employing processes which 
we referred to as Sustainable Regional Development (SRD) initiatives.  The research 
included analysis of global and Australian trends influencing the institutional landscape, 
and context-setting examination of Australia’s systems of governance. 
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We examined SRD in thirty sub-national regions to see what could be learnt about the 
persistence of government support, or lack of it, which had characterised many regional 
efforts.  We also observed the varying degree to which regional efforts had a clear 
purpose, entrenched by mandate, or, on the contrary, whether they had been quick fixes 
to political problems, or ways for the various spheres of government to perpetuate a 
regular joust.  It was also clear there was vastly different levels, and types (social, 
economic, biophysical, ‘scientific’, cultural, ‘local’, indigenous, national, global) of 
underpinning information which had been available to inform regional communities 
participating in various initiatives. 
We documented rich experiences of the ways in which different social groups had been 
enabled (or not) to participate in regional organisations and processes.  And, we noted 
the ways in which regional initiatives had been able to evolve (or not), expanding or 
limiting their mandate, changing their focus as deemed necessary after learning and 
adapting processes.  The final phase of this research distilled an analysis of themes 
central to the success or failure of regional initiatives – governance, power, process, 
time. 
The SRD process in Australia was instructive, but I now wanted to use a PhD 
opportunity to investigate similar issues, at depth, in what I knew were the vastly 
different supra-national regional contexts of East Asia. 
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Abstract 
This thesis explores the research question:  How can water governance be fairer and 
more effective in Mekong Region and beyond?  In doing so, it examines the theory and 
practice of deliberative water governance, informed and illustrated in a region that 
comprises Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and China’s Yunnan 
Province. 
Water governance can be understood along a spectrum, from a means to achieve pre-
determined objectives to a social process of dialogue, negotiation and decision-making.  
This thesis is most interested in the latter conception, in the context of ‘the Mekong’, 
where choices are being made about using and sharing transboundary waters.  These 
choices might produce more energy; both increase and decrease food production; 
sustain or threaten livelihoods; and, maintain or degrade vital ecosystems and their 
services, upon which societies depend. 
An introductory chapter (Part A, Chapter 1) contextualises and explains the logic of the 
research.  I next explore contested waterscapes (Part B, Chapters 2-5) focusing on the 
complex tapestry of Mekong regionalisms and governance, hydropower expansion, and 
a marginalised Mekong River Commission.  The analysis confirmed that significant 
scope exists for improving water governance, and that deliberation – debate and 
discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions – has been in short 
supply. 
Deliberation deficits observed and reported in Part B provoked exploration of 
deliberative processes (Part C, Chapters 6-11) as a potential pathway to improving 
water governance.  I examine firstly international practice, including still-topical issues 
from the World Commission on Dams, and the potential of multi-stakeholder platforms.  
I then examine Mekong practice and the efficacy of multi-stakeholder platforms as a 
governance tool; and the politics of deliberation, scales and levels.  The final chapter of 
this section introduces a framework for analysing transboundary water governance 
complexes and distils suggestions for making water governance more deliberative and 
as a consequence, fairer and more effective. 
Deliberative Water Governance 
x 
Part C analyses a range of governance challenges, and provides evidence that 
deliberative processes, where inserted into political arenas, are making water 
governance fairer and more effective, by reducing power imbalances among 
stakeholders and assisting negotiations to be more transparent and informed. 
In the final section and chapter (Part D, Chapter 12), I summarise and reflect on my 
practice and exploration of the topics.  Drawing together the lessons from my research, I 
present my aspirational vision of Deliberative Water Governance – a new frontier in 
the field of deliberative governance: Constructive engagement that enables fairer 
and more effective water governance through inclusive, deliberative processes that 
emphasise different perspectives, learning, analysis and institution-building. 
The vision is inspired by promising examples, from the Mekong Region and elsewhere, 
examined in the thesis chapters, which demonstrate the need for and added-value 
provided by deliberation when it is information-rich, flexibly facilitated and actively 
promotes analysis of different views.  In conclusion, I contend that, via its action 
research and publishing orientation, this thesis has contributed uniquely to both the 
theory and practice of Deliberative Water Governance in the dynamic Mekong Region 
and more widely. 
John Dore 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the principal research question, the research approach, the 
research methods, the connecting logic and organisation of the thesis. 
1.1 Principal research question 
This thesis explores the research question:  How can water governance be fairer and 
more effective in Mekong Region and beyond?  Each part of the question is defined so 
that my interpretation of each term is clear from the outset.  This section introduces 
Mekong Region, water governance, fairness and effectiveness. 
Mekong Region 
To a certain extent, all regions are imagined, however, the Mekong ‘region’ is 
increasingly becoming a reality.  In this thesis the Mekong Region is taken to 
encompass the territory, ecosystems, people, economies and politics of Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and China’s Yunnan Province (Figure 1).  The research 
for this thesis has been undertaken throughout the Mekong Region. 
There are many Mekongs.  The Mekong Region is more than Mekong River, and more 
than Mekong River Basin.  It is a social and political construct with wider scope and 
implications.  The river flows for approximately 4800 km, drawing waters from its 
basin of 795000 km2 and is home to about 70 million people (MRC, 2010).  The 
Mekong River Basin is a geographic subset of the Mekong Region.  The Mekong 
Region covers 2.3 million km2 and is home to more than 240 million people (ADB and 
UNEP, 2004). 
There is a view that the Mekong Region’s abundant natural resources, such as water, 
forest, fisheries, biodiversity, minerals and energy (in the form of coal, petroleum, gas 
and hydropower), provide enormous wealth creation opportunities.  Those who hold this 
view see alluring economic benefits from the continued exploitation of these resources.  
However, the appropriateness of different development pathways is vigorously 
contested by others who argue that current modes of development, risk-bearing and 
benefit-sharing are inequitable and unsustainable. 
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Figure 1 Map of Mekong Region 
 
Mekong Region is taken to encompass the territory, ecosystems, people, economies and politics of 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and China’s Yunnan Province. 
SOURCE: Based on Map No. 4112, Rev. 2. January 2004. UN Cartographic Section, New York. 
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Early in the research for this thesis I participated in extensive collaborative social 
research (Kaosa-ard and Dore, 2003) and examined social challenges for the region, 
including: increasing regionalism, multi-faceted globalisation, improving relationships 
between Mekong states and people, supporting the disadvantaged and less-empowered, 
harnessing business, using natural resources more equitably and sustainably, and, 
enhancing regional governance. 
In this thesis I use regional in an encompassing way meaning region-wide and/or 
transboundary and/or transborder and/or crossborder and/or of particular significance to 
various parts of the region (but not necessarily all the region).  The regional context is 
being shaped by a wide range of historical and contemporary forces.  Partly as a 
consequence of relative peace, there is increasing regionalism propelled by quests for 
greater investment, employment, trade, business profits and general economic growth. 
The surge in regional connections is led either by the state, business or civil society.  
State elites desiring political solidarity are driving regional forums focused on economic 
development, such as the Greater Mekong Subregion economic cooperation initiative 
(ADB, 2011).  Ecosystem concerns drive regional conservation initiatives, for example, 
highlighting Indo-Burma as a biodiversity hotspot (Tordoff et al., 2007).  There is 
evidence of increased ethnic solidarity and cultural appreciation transcending borders 
(Xu and Mikesell, 2003), but discrimination against minorities and migrants also 
remains (Harima et al., 2003).  There are also regional connections between those 
focused on local livelihoods and local rights-based approaches to development.  
Advocacy campaigns, such as Save The Mekong (discussed in Chapter 11), also cross 
borders and influence regional water resources development debates (Yong and 
Grundy-Warr, 2012).  Chapter 2 of this thesis further examines the theory and practice 
of regionalism in the Mekong Region (Dore, 2003a). 
This thesis focuses on the present and potential role of deliberation – debate and 
discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions – as a part of 
Mekong Region water governance.  The key examples I use have regional dimensions 
to their politics and governance processes, but also local dimensions to which I have 
given less attention. 
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The choice to focus on regional governance reflected a need to keep a manageable 
scope to the writing, and also my comparative advantage in being able to travel freely, 
and access information in all six Mekong countries.  This privilege is not available to 
many researchers, including many of my colleagues.  Notwithstanding these points, it 
must be made clear, as the chapters show, that the regional space is critical, and impacts 
on the national and local options set available in all countries.  Therefore, I hold that it 
is an important level, which also has many cross-level nuances, not all of which have 
been possible for me to explore. 
Other levels are also important and are worthy topics of research.  For example, Miller 
may be quite right when she suggests, in a Mekong context, that “cumulative, iterative 
changes in the natural environment which lead to more subtle forms of conflict between 
neighbours, communities and countries” (2003:4) – at the local level – may be just as 
important an aspect of Mekong Region water politics.  I acknowledge that different 
scales and levels are important, as are the relationships between them.  That said, my 
focus has been regional. 
Water governance 
Water governance can be understood along a spectrum, from a means to achieve pre-
determined objectives to a social process of dialogue, negotiation and decision-making.  
This thesis is most interested in the latter conception, in ‘the Mekong’, where choices 
are being made about using and sharing regional waters.  These choices might: produce 
more energy; both increase and decrease food production; sustain or threaten 
livelihoods; and, maintain or degrade vital ecosystems upon which societies depend. 
For the Global Water Partnership: 
Governance is about effectively implementing socially acceptable allocation and 
regulation and is thus intensely political.  Governance is a more inclusive concept than 
government per se; it embraces the relationship between a society and its government.  
Governance generally involves mediating behaviour via values, norms, and, where 
possible, through laws (Rogers and Hall, 2003:4) 
and 
Water governance refers to the range of political, social, economic and administrative 
systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of 
water services, at different levels of society (from GWP, cited by Rogers and Hall, 
2003:7). 
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My own working definition of governance, including but also beyond water, attempts to 
better capture the inherent dynamism that I have observed and the importance of 
prevailing norms and the institutional context: 
Governance refers to the multi-layered interplay of water-related negotiations, 
agenda-setting, preference-shaping, decision-making, management and 
administration between many actors (including organisations) in the State-society 
complex, at and between different levels and scales, vying for authority or 
influence, and constrained or enabled by evolving norms and institutions. 
[My definition]. 
This definition recognises the many water governance actors of the Mekong Region 
(Figure 2), including: political leaders, water and energy planners, the people in river 
basin organisations and community-based water user associations, storage and delivery 
authorities, military, agricultural irrigators, energy generators, fishers, navigators, 
ecologists, urban and rural dwellers, non-government organisations, financiers, the 
media, policy research institutes, universities and networks. 
Figure 2 Water governance actors in the Mekong Region 
 
SOURCE:  Actors map in Chapter 11 (Dore et al., 2012:6) 
Fairer and more effective 
By fair I mean just or appropriate in the circumstances.  Fairness encompasses notions 
of equitableness, fair dealing, honesty and impartiality.  While nothing may ever be 
entirely fair from the perspective of some, the pursuit of fair outcomes and fairness is 
nevertheless a worthy, explicit, guiding principle for governance.  Elster (2006:365) 
suggests that the concept is used in two main ways: fair division, and fair response to 
the behaviour of others.  Both resonate in water governance. 
5 
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Fair division does not necessarily mean equal division.  People have different 
perceptions of what constitutes fair division, prioritisation and distribution.  For Elster, 
this is due to people subscribing to different norms that guide their allocation 
preferences and behaviour (2006:365).  For example, Karl Marx is remembered for 
popularising the slogan ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs’ (Marx, 1875) which is anathema to others who might favour alternatives such as 
‘return should equate to effort’ or ‘return should equate to value-created’ (Rand, 1957).  
These different perspectives resonate with debates surrounding water allocation with 
different arguments observable that prioritise either need, equality of opportunity, or 
economic efficiency that flows into different policies about preferred uses, users and 
pricing. 
Elster’s examination of fair behaviour is noteworthy as we are setting the scene for an 
examination of water governance.  He argues that there is a need for catalytic, 
unconditional cooperators who act ‘fairly’ according to their dominant moral norms in 
particular circumstances, as this then draws in others.  These ‘others’ may be motivated 
to also act ‘fairly’, but for different reasons.  For example, by a desire to appear fair, or 
by a subscription to quasi-moral norms of conditional cooperation or reciprocity, each 
of which require some demonstration of ‘fair behaviour’ to be kick-started.  In short, 
there are nuances to fairness, and fairness behaviour, which need to be considered in 
strategising any shift toward fair governance. 
By effective I mean producing a desired or intended result.  Global Water Partnership 
authors suggest principles of effective water governance (Rogers and Hall, 2003:27-29).  
They suggest that approaches should be: open and transparent, inclusive and 
communicative, coherent and integrative, equitable and ethical.  Moreover, that 
performance and operation should be: accountable, efficient, responsive and sustainable.  
It is impossible to judge as effective, governance arrangements that treat hydro-
meteorological data as secret, restrict access to and evaluation of social and 
environmental impact assessment documentation, and declare as off-limits public 
enquiry into financial, economic and contracting arrangements that relate to use of 
public assets.  These types of flaws, that result in ineffective governance, have been 
constantly encountered in this Mekong Region research. 
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I have no quarrel with the principles of Rogers and Hall, however, I choose to use ‘fair 
and effective water governance’ rather than ‘effective water governance’.  Regardless of 
the dictionary definition, ‘effective’ is usually construed as a very rational word, as with 
efficiency and coherence.  By explicitly adding ‘fair’ I am highlighting the importance 
of moral norms.  These are included in the Rogers and Hall list of principles – for 
example: equitable and ethical – but my intention is to explicitly elevate their profile. 
1.2 Research approach 
If you know exactly what you are going to do, what is the point of doing it? – Pablo 
Picasso 
Soon after embarking on this research, “the point of doing it” became very clear, but 
knowing exactly what to do, and how to do it, was a reflexive process which took much 
longer to crystallise.  Decisions have had to be taken about the research place, subject, 
analytical approach, appropriate research methods and source material.  True to the 
desirable sentiment expressed so well by Picasso, the approach has evolved. 
Place and subject 
An early decision was to focus in the Mekong Region examining natural resources or 
environmental governance, in which I had already accumulated experience in Australia 
(Dore, 1999; Dore and Woodhill, 1999; Dore et al., 2003).  This was based on an 
assumption, later proven correct, that the region would provide under-researched arenas 
within a fertile, political dynamic.  It was a deliberate choice to focus on the region, 
rather than on one or other country.  Primarily, this was to ensure full opportunity to 
explore transboundary dimensions and associated international relations.  This was also 
to ensure important issues were not unnecessarily and undesirably omitted from scrutiny 
and debate.  I focused subsequently on water governance and later still on deliberative 
processes, as a pathway to fairer and more effective water governance, initially inspired 
by Dryzek (1990; 2000; 2006) and Mekong field evidence. 
Key ideas that underpinned my analytical approach for my research and this thesis are 
Hay’s critical political analysis (2002), and Layders’ adaptive theory (1998).  As the 
research progressed I gravitated towards Deliberative Water Governance, introduced 
briefly in this section and elaborated in Chapter 12. 
Deliberative Water Governance 
8 
Critical political analysis 
This thesis is a critical political analysis of some of the politics and governance of water 
in the Mekong Region.  This perspective, outlined and defended by Hay (2002), is 
situated within the international relations school(s) of ‘constructivism’, and the political 
science school of ‘new institutionalism’.  This is in the middle of the spectrum of logics 
that fall between the extremes of deductive rationalism and inductive behaviouralism.  
This approach accepts that some complex theory, or at least ideas, may be needed to 
guide empirical exploration and that analysis should proceed as an interplay between 
theory and evidence, studying the real-life interplay between actors, ideas and 
institutions. 
Hay’s political analysis is critical insofar as it is scrutinising and driven by a desire for 
enhancing change.  This type of analysis is interested in “progressive social and 
political change and in holding actors accountable for the consequences of their 
actions” (Hay, 2002:254).  I too, through this thesis and other endeavours, am motivated 
to undertake research which has a constructive impact, expressed by Hay as follows: 
For any normative and critical political analyst, the question of change is far from a 
complicating distraction – it is, in essence, the very raison d’étre of political inquiry.  
Stated bluntly, critical political analysis is motivated by the desire for change.  Its aim 
is to expose existing institutions, relations and practices to critical scrutiny as a means 
of promoting alternatives and bringing those alternatives to fruition (Hay, 2002:138). 
Hay’s political analysis seeks to be empirical but not empiricist.  Description is seen as 
the starting point “from which interpretation and explanation must build” (2002:252).  
Having said that, this thesis has sought to avoid the trap of being highly descriptive, rich 
in detail, but low in explanation. 
Bowing to its constructivist heritage, critical political analysis is “sensitive to the 
potential causal and constitutive role of ideas in social, political and economic 
dynamics” (Hay, 2002:251) which are shaped by, but in turn may shape the context.  In 
the political analysis in this thesis I examine the interplay between actors/agents and the 
institutional framework/structure, the latter being simply the sum of all institutions.  I 
see as plausible the structuration and reflexivity theory of Giddens (1979; 1984) in 
which both individual agency and social forces are accorded respect.  Hay’s critical 
political analysis is compatible with these ideas, presuming neither structural 
determinism nor agential voluntarism.  Most chapters in this thesis examine the role of 
actors and structure, and their influence in the situations being studied. 
John Dore 
9 
Undertaking critical political analysis in the Mekong Region, as elsewhere, is itself a 
political act: 
Social and political analysts may come to play an active role in the reproduction and 
transformation of the very conduct that forms the focus of their attentions (Hay, 
2002:79) 
Thus, as soon as we move from the realm of mere description to that of explanation we 
move from the realm of science to that of interpretation.  In this realm there are no 
privileged vantage-points, merely the conflict between alternative and competing 
narratives premised on different ontological, ethical and normative assumptions (Hay, 
2002:88). 
My position has been, and remains, that I must be explicit about articulating my own 
beliefs and biases, prior assumptions, and the normative and ethical bases that motivate 
my work.  An example is my commitment to neither over- nor under- privilege state 
representatives in multi-stakeholder processes. 
Adaptive theory 
I have found the adaptive theory of Layder (1998) to be equally compelling in its logic, 
and liberating in the subsequent freedom it has permitted my research enquiry.  
Compatible with the ontological assumptions of critical political analysis, the adaptive 
theory approach explicitly permits the use, modification, discarding or production of 
theory in tandem with empirical research. 
In essence: 
The word ‘adaptive’ is meant to convey that the theory both adapts to, or is shaped by, 
incoming evidence while the data itself is simultaneously filtered through, and is thus 
adapted by, the prior theoretical materials (frameworks, concepts, ideas) that are 
relevant to their analysis (Layder, 1998:5). 
…adaptive theory encourages, and as far as possible ensures, the continual checking 
and revising of emergent theory as the research progresses.  In this sense the validity of 
theory so generated is not divorced from empirical evidence but is rather inherently 
bound up with it (Layder, 1998:176). 
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Following Layder (1998) and Bawden (2002) I have adopted an adaptive/reflexive 
approach to theory and practice.  Put simply, this committed me to continue exploring 
potentially helpful theory, in combination with extensive field research.  In that way, I 
was also committing to empirical research, that is, informed by experiences and 
‘evidence’ from the real world.  This does not mean I am a strict empiricist.  I am not.  
More accurate, would be to say that I am committed to better understanding how we 
might use theories to better inform our practice, and how our everyday experience might 
better inform our theory-making.  For Bawden this reflects a commitment to praxis – “a 
human ‘property’ which ‘emerges’ through the constant everyday interplay between 
theory (or understanding) and practice (or action)” (2002:3).  Throughout this thesis I 
have used theory that seemed to have explanatory or normative potential. 
Deliberative Water Governance 
Throughout the research for this thesis I have investigated and analysed water 
governance practice, and have interrogated normative and explanatory theory to develop 
my understanding, and to seek pathways to fairness and effectiveness.  Eventually I 
have concluded that more Deliberative Water Governance would be beneficial, by 
which I mean: 
Constructive engagement that enables fairer and more effective water governance 
through inclusive, deliberative processes that emphasise different perspectives, 
learning, analysis and institution-building. 
[My definition: elaborated in Chapter 12]. 
Deliberative processes are explored in Part C of the thesis and Deliberative Water 
Governance is elaborated in Chapter 12.  
1.3 Research methods 
A range of research methods have been used, which are in harmony with the chosen 
analytical approach.  As Layder noted: 
Social research should operate on the basis of a methodological pluralism and not in 
terms of a rigid adherence to a single or limited set of techniques and protocols 
(Layder, 1998:178) 
…the adaptive theory approach “encourages a multi-pronged strategy” to research 
methods and techniques in order to “maximise the potential for theory-generation” 
(Layder, 1998:42). 
The main methods used have been: orienting concepts, participatory action research, 
documentary analysis, and active interviewing. 
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Orienting concepts 
As an initial step in theory making, or ideas formation, I found it useful to follow 
Layder’s approach and identify key orienting concepts: 
As an initial stimulus for theoretical rumination, the use of orienting concepts helps 
general conceptual thinking about the data that is being, or has been, collected and the 
empirical area from which it develops (Layder, 1998:129). 
The search for ideas to help in understanding the politics of water in the Mekong 
Region revealed many different orienting concepts.  With this in mind, material was 
found and examined in the light of ongoing learning.  For example, at an early stage I 
became interested in the questions and research agenda of a new regionalisms school of 
enquiry, in which Goteborg University was very active (Hettne and Soderbaum, 1998; 
Hettne et al., 1998-2001; Schulz et al., 2001).  These scholars were asking pertinent 
questions about the multi-dimensional phenomena since the 1980s of action at the 
regional (supranational) and transnational scales.  This gave me an analytical departure 
point for subsequent Mekong-centred inquiry.  As my research continued, deliberation, 
and deliberative water governance, emerged as the more compelling umbrella concept. 
Participatory action research 
I have engaged in a lengthy period of action research between 2000-2012, punctuated 
by periods of full-time employment during which research writing was not possible, 
although reflective contemplation of ideas continued. 
Action research acknowledges the researcher has a normative purpose and a 
commitment to an adaptive, learning-based approach.  In the words of McNiff: 
The elegance of action research is that it possesses within itself the ability to 
incorporate previous approaches, simply because its focus rests on the enquirer rather 
than his methodology (McNiff, 1988:8). 
For Carr and Kemmis (1986), action research is a form of self-reflective enquiry 
undertaken by the researcher in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own 
practices, their understanding of these practices, and the situations in which these 
practices are carried out.  Concerned that “the term ‘action research’ is used to describe 
almost every research effort and method under the sun that attempts to inform action in 
some way” (McTaggart, 1997a:1) has led to increasing use of the term ‘participatory 
action research’.  I concur with McTaggart’s view that: 
Participatory action research is systematically evolving, a living process changing both 
the researcher and the situations in which he or she acts; neither the natural sciences nor 
the historical sciences have this double aim (the living dialectic of researcher and 
researched). 
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Participatory action researchers all seek understanding of people’s subjective 
experience of their institutional situation and at the same time try to give working 
accounts of the contexts in which meanings are constituted.  They also use the views of 
others to engage their own experience and to discipline their own subjective 
interpretations. 
Information is collected in the usual naturalistic research ways, for example, participant 
observation, interview, the compilation of field notes, logs, document analysis, and the 
like.  Validation is achieved by a variety of methods, including triangulation of 
observations and interpretations, participant confirmation, and testing the coherence of 
arguments being presented. (McTaggart, 1997b:37, 40) 
My research process has changed me.  In turn, I have influenced the water governance 
practitioners and research community I have joined, and the Mekong water governance 
context.  Moreover, understanding and validation has been sought in a variety of ways, 
and my analysis and arguments have been tested with many actors. 
Documentary analysis 
My research has required constant searching for relevant literature related to orienting 
concepts and various Mekong Region policies, practices and commentaries.  The 
literature includes a wide mix, from the formally refereed and published, to the more 
prolific grey literature, and relevant contributions found in the mass media.  Legal 
documents, government policy statements, proceedings of negotiations, reports from 
multilateral organisations and transnational companies have all contributed to my 
analysis.  My EndNote library as I conclude this thesis contains more than 3,700 
references. 
Active interviewing 
Active interviewing has played a key part in my research.  Saying this implies an 
acceptance by the researcher that interviews involves a construction of understanding or 
knowledge between the interviewer and the interviewee.  More colourfully, Holstein 
and Gubruim (1995:4) say “respondents are not so much repositories of knowledge – 
treasuries of information awaiting excavation – as they are constructors of knowledge 
in collaboration with interviewers” and quote Pool (1957:192) “every interview 
[besides being an information-gathering occasion] is an interpersonal drama with a 
developing plot” (1995:14). 
Conca (2006) might simply call these ‘conversations’.  In the acknowledgements of his 
recent book on water governance, he thanks the many people willing to discuss the 
relevant issues with him, in an unstructured – which is not to say unfocused – way, 
devoid of questionnaires and formality.  In effect, these were active interviews that 
formed the “soul” of his learning and analysis: 
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I think of the various documents, statistics, and scholarly works in the pages that follow 
as the supportive skeleton and tissue of the argument presented here, and of these 
conversations as its soul (Conca, 2006:xvi). 
Much of my learning has also been through active interviewing, as a purposeful process 
of discussing issues with people prepared, and often enthusiastic, to actively engage in 
an exchange of information and views. 
From analysis to prescription 
‘Where should the analyst start and stop?’ is a question that logically arises in the 
process of conducting participatory action research: 
It is of course possible to delimit an analysis of social relations to how things are and 
why.  But the real challenge lies in going a few steps further and trying to analyse how 
things ‘ought’ be, explain how this can be justified, and finally sketch out how it can be 
achieved – to prescribe change!  This is possible if social constructivism is accepted 
(Baaz, 1999:469). 
In Baaz’s view, an analysis of social relations, such as Mekong Region water politics, 
should “combine normative and empirical analysis in a constructive way” (Baaz, 
1999:469).  I concur with this view and, as such, I outline a practical agenda for change 
in several chapters. 
1.4 Material 
The empirical substance has been drawn from my exposure in a series of rich 
experiences between 2000 and 2012 which have provided the opportunity to interact 
and learn from and with a wide range of people.  I have had multiple roles ranging from 
full-time student, project manager, specialist engaged to deal with particular issues, 
appointed research fellow, contracted researcher/facilitator/co-ordinator, program 
manager, program director, and program advisor.  Each of these roles has impacted on 
the final shape of this thesis. 
Mekong Regional Environmental Governance project 
In mid 1999 I came into contact with the Resource Policy Support Initiative (REPSI) 
which was co-managed by the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the Stockholm 
Environment Institute.  By the end of 1999 I had accepted an invitation to collaborate 
with REPSI, via the WRI Institutions and Governance Program.  In early 2000 I 
relocated from Australia to Chiang Mai in northern Thailand to work as a Research 
Fellow with a REPSI component, the Mekong Regional Environmental Governance 
project. 
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The project provided resources and a space for a series of dialogues and peer-supported 
research.  My initial reflections on useful theory to better understand my observations of 
environmental governance practice in the region was published (Dore, 2001) as part of 
the project outputs.  This engagement provided me with detailed understanding of the 
regional environmental governance context, and initial network building opportunity, 
particularly with actors in regional organisations. 
Strategic Environment Framework for the Greater Mekong Subregion 
During 2000/2001 I also accepted an invitation to assist Stockholm Environment 
Institute with the development of a Strategic Environmental Framework for the water 
resources and transport sectors in the Mekong Region (SEI et al., 2002).  I contributed 
critiques of the institutional arrangements for environmental management in each of the 
six Mekong Region countries.  I also contributed a case study from Cambodia focusing 
on the national and regional threats to the Tonle Sap Lake ecosystem, problems with 
institutional arrangements and an assessment of current plans for changes (Dore, 2002).  
This engagement provided me with detailed understanding of national contexts in the 
fields of environment and development, the inner workings of the Asian Development 
Bank, and an expanded set of working relationships with state officials. 
Social Challenges for the Mekong Region 
From mid-2001 until mid-2003 I relocated to join Chiang Mai University’s Social 
Research Institute as a new base for my field research, and to further build an 
understanding of the regional context.  I was soon designing, managing and editing a 
research and writing effort involving scholars from all countries of the Mekong Region.  
The issues researched, within a Mekong Region context, included: international 
economic integration, the rise of transnational civil society, the relationships between 
Mekong states and external powers, changing geopolitics, poverty, government policies 
affecting ethnic minorities, gender inequity, industrialisation, labour migration, human 
rights, HIV/AIDS and drug use, biotechnology impacts on agriculture, uplands land use, 
fisheries disputes, access to natural resources, state approaches to sustainable 
development, and the governance of Mekong River and regional infrastructure 
‘development’ projects.  This engagement substantially deepened my understanding of 
the region, and many transnational social challenges, in addition to expanding my 
network with regional academia.  Chapter 2 (Dore, 2003a) is a product of that period, 
as is Annex A (Dore, 2003b). 
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Another focus of early research was Yunnan hydropower.  I was supported in this work 
by Green Watershed.  Chapter 3 (Dore et al., 2007) was a result of this partnership.  
The commitment of Yu Xioagang – the leader of Green Watershed – to deliberative 
water governance has been recognised in various ways, most notably in the awarding of 
the 2006 Goldman Environment Prize for Asia. 
M-POWER regional research network 
I had become increasingly convinced of the need for collaborations between 
independent researchers.  This has led me to invest much time and energy into co-
developing the M-POWER (Mekong Program on Water Environment and Resilience) 
regional research network from an intellectually challenging and supportive base at 
Chiang Mai University’s Unit for Social and Environmental Research.  Researchers 
from more than thirty partner organisations with bases in the six countries of the 
Mekong Region have committed to spend part of their time ‘working together’ under 
the umbrella of the M-POWER network.  Much experience has been gained from the 
lessons learned with M-POWER colleagues.  Chapters 4, 5, 10 and 11 (Dore and 
Lazarus, 2009; Dore and Lebel, 2010a; Grumbine et al., 2012; Dore et al., 2012) have 
all been M-POWER collaborations.  Annex B (M-POWER, 2011) is a succinct 
statement of the network’s agenda. 
Interest in multi stakeholder platforms (MSPs) led to an involvement with the Dams and 
Development Project, an initiative based at the United Nations Environment Program 
head office in Nairobi, charged with advancing the efforts of the World Commission on 
Dams (WCD) – perhaps the most internationally renowned, recent example of such a 
platform.  This research focus was extended by work for the Water Alternatives journal 
in producing a special issue on the WCD legacy.  Chapters 6 and 7 (Dore and Lebel, 
2010b; Moore et al., 2010) resulted from this engagement. 
Interest in the possibilities provided by social learning approaches to governance took 
me to Wageningen University in the latter part of 2003, and led to an increasing 
involvement in formal Dialogues and other forms of MSPs.  This led to links with the 
Dialogue on Water for Food and Environment, manifest in both Mekong Region and 
Indonesia, and associated writing.  I have become extensively involved in dialogues 
research, design, convening and support.  Chapters 8 and 9 (Dore, 2007; 2010) and 
Annex C (Dore et al., 2010) and Annex D (IUCN et al., 2007) are part of the result. 
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IUCN Asia Water Program 
Joining the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) also had a 
substantial influence on this thesis.  In a world where governance is no longer a purely 
state-centric construct, the Union’s structure is well positioned to have more impact, 
now and in the future, giving extra space for both state and non-state actors to engage in 
political processes.  In 2004 I accepted an invitation to lead the IUCN’s Asia water 
work.  IUCN is a competent water actor in many different domains, such as: water 
infrastructure decision making, flow regime negotiations, wetlands conservation, 
wetlands livelihoods, hydropower, irrigated agriculture, groundwater, and in supporting 
local adaptation to the impact of climate change and climate variability.  In Asia, the 
regional and national water team members have extensive working relationships with 
state water-related players, civil society organisations, and other international actors.  
My IUCN engagements influenced many of the chapters in this thesis. 
AusAID Mekong Water Resources Program 
Since 2008 I have been working with the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID), as senior advisor to the Australian Mekong Water Resources 
Program.  This program has an emphasis on contributing to fairer and more effective 
water governance.  The approach is to support activities that strengthen institutions, 
increase the availability of reliable knowledge, and assist in the making of more 
informed decisions.  My core responsibilities include identifying and undertaking 
governance research for development, and engaging in policy dialogue with a wide 
range of water governance actors. 
1.5 Organisation and overview 
The thesis is presented as a series of ten published works – five peer-reviewed journal 
articles, and five peer-reviewed book chapters – together with this introduction and 
conclusions.  An overview of the thesis is shown in Figure 3.  The connections between 
and contributions of each thesis chapter are shown in Table 1.  Four additional 
documents, referred to earlier in this chapter, are included as annexes (see Table 2) to 
provide further illustration of the candidate’s analysis and engagement in water 
governance practice. 
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Table 1 Thesis organisation and overview: questions, practice, theory. 
Part A.  Introduction 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Question How can water governance be fairer and more effective in Mekong Region 
and beyond? 
Part B.  Contested Waterscapes: an assessment of water governance in Mekong 
Chapter 2 The governance of increasing Mekong regionalism 
Sub-Question What is the general state of water-related governance in the Mekong Region? 
Theory Use of new regionalisms and governance theory, to explore different regional 
governance tracks and their dominant logics.  Also, a set of questions are 
presented as a means to assess governance. 
Practice Detailed analysis of Mekong Region governance processes, including: 
Mekong River water use negotiations, the Mekong River ‘channel 
improvement’ project, and an initial exploration of the Lancang (Upper 
Mekong) hydroelectric dams in China. 
This chapter is an early example of joint writing and publishing with local 
Mekong researchers.  It was published in a multi-authored book, co-edited by 
the candidate (Annex A). 
Citation Dore J (2003) ‘The governance of increasing Mekong regionalism’. In: M 
Kaosa-ard and J Dore (eds.) Social Challenges for the Mekong Region. White 
Lotus, Bangkok, 405-440. 
Chapter 3 China’s energy reforms and hydropower expansion in Yunnan 
Sub-Question What is driving hydropower expansion in Yunnan and what are associated 
governance issues arising? 
Theory Exploration of links between economic globalisation and the creation of 
quasi-public entities with state rights but lacking state accountabilities. 
Practice Detailed analysis of Yunnan hydropower expansion – to that point, opaque to 
China outsiders – on the Salween (Nu), Mekong (Lancang) and Yangtze 
(Jinsha) rivers. 
This chapter is another example of joint writing and publishing with Mekong 
researchers, and the first major publication from the M-POWER regional 
research network (Annex B).  It was published in a multi-authored book, co-
edited by the candidate. 
Citation Dore J, Yu X and Yuk-shing Li K (2007) ‘China’s energy reforms and 
hydropower expansion in Yunnan’. In: L Lebel, J Dore, R Daniel and Yang 
Saing Koma (eds.) Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong Region. 
Mekong Press, Chiang Mai, 55-92. 
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Chapter 4 Mekong hydropower: drivers of change and governance challenges 
Sub-Question What is driving hydropower in Lower Mekong and what are associated 
transboundary governance challenges? 
Theory Exploration of hydropower expansion, impact assessment and transboundary 
water governance. 
Practice Quantifying large-scale drivers – demography, human development, food 
security, economic investment and trade, climate change – in the Lower 
Mekong context, and providing a concise update on the Xayaburi Dam in 
Laos, based on the candidate’s participation in the debate surrounding the 
project, and his interviews with key actors in government, banking, the 
hydropower industry, and oppositional civil society. 
Citation Grumbine RE, Dore J and Xu J (2012) ‘Mekong hydropower: drivers of 
change and governance challenges’, Frontiers in Ecology and the 
Environment 10:2, 91-98. 
Chapter 5 Demarginalizing the Mekong River Commission 
Sub-Question What is the transboundary water governance practice and potential of the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC)? 
Theory An early signalling of the candidate’s vision for more deliberative water 
politics and governance.  The identification of the tensions facing the MRC 
are of interest to transboundary water governance scholars and practitioners 
from other regions.  Reference to a vision for more deliberative water 
politics.  Identification of tensions within the MRC, including: whole-of-
basin or mainstream-focused; serving governments or wider society; 
knowledge broker or investment promoter. 
Practice Framing and analysis of existing MRC challenges within the context of its 
recent history.  The candidate commences by reflecting on a series of major 
transboundary water governance controversies where the MRC has been 
underutilised.  Also discussed is the MRC’s ambiguous role in a proposed 
hydropower project at Don Sahong in southern Laos. 
Citation Dore J and Lazarus K (2009) ‘Demarginalizing the Mekong River 
Commission’. In: F Molle, T Foran and M Kakonen (eds.) Contested 
Waterscapes in the Mekong Region: Hydropower, Livelihoods and 
Governance. Earthscan, London, 357-382. 
Part C.  Deliberation Deficit: an assessment of existing and potential use of deliberative 
processes 
Chapter 6 The World Commission on Dams + 10: Revisiting the large dam 
controversy 
Sub-Question Is the World Commission on Dams (WCD) still relevant? 
Theory The ideas clustered in this guest editors’ paper, included: diverse perspectives 
about water and energy futures; new drivers of dam development, including 
climate change and new financiers; the continued pursuit of environmental 
and social justice; new assessment tools; advances in participation and 
accountability; negotiation, and the role of multi-stakeholder platforms for 
informing and shaping agreements. 
Practice A reflection on the legacy of the WCD, an experiment in multi-stakeholder 
dialogue and global governance concerned with a subject area – large dams – 
that was fraught with conflict and controversy. 
Citation Moore D, Dore J and Gyawali D (2010) ‘The World Commission on Dams + 
10: Revisiting the large dam controversy’, Water Alternatives 3:2, 3-13. 
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Chapter 7 Gaining public acceptance: A critical strategic priority of the World 
Commission on Dams 
Sub-Question What are critical issues in ‘gaining public acceptance’ for key decisions? 
Theory Expanding the justice principles that underpin ‘gaining public acceptance’, by 
emphasising distributional principles, in addition to the WCD focus on 
procedural justice.  Presentation of ideal state-society elements conducive to 
the gaining of public acceptance. 
Practice Unraveling of many thorny issues that were prominent in the WCD about 
meaningful public participation.  Lesson-drawing from past initiatives to gain 
public acceptance through participatory exercises. 
Citation Dore J and Lebel L (2010) ‘Gaining public acceptance: A critical strategic 
priority of the World Commission on Dams’, Water Alternatives 3:2, 124-141. 
Chapter 8 Multi-Stakeholder Platforms 
Sub-Question What is the practice and potential of water-related multi-stakeholder 
platforms, globally? 
Theory Elaboration by the candidate of his conceptual framework for MSPs which 
emphasises context, process, content and outcomes.  Introduction of the 4Rs 
(rewards, risks, rights, responsibilities) – building on the ‘rights and risks’ 
approach developed by WCD. 
Practice Ten cases from around the world are presented in the published chapter.  A 
total of twenty-four cases were contributed or prepared and loaded onto the 
IUCN website to provide a resource for MSP practitioners.  All part of a 
larger book, edited by the candidate, on water-related negotiation (Annex C). 
Citation Dore J (2010) ‘Multi-Stakeholder Platforms’. In: J Dore, J Robinson and M 
Smith (eds.) Negotiate: Reaching Agreements Over Water. IUCN, Gland, 37-
58. 
Chapter 9 Mekong Region water-related MSPs: Unfulfilled potential 
Sub-Question What is the practice and potential of multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) in 
the Mekong Region? 
Theory Defining MSPs and articulating their desirable characteristics to best 
contribute to water negotiations. 
Practice Examination of Mekong MSPs, including new experiments with 
transboundary Mekong dialogues (Annex D). 
Citation Dore J (2007) ‘Mekong Region water-related MSPs: Unfulfilled potential’. In: 
J Warner (ed.) Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water 
Management. Ashgate, Aldershot, 205-234. 
Chapter 10 Deliberation and scale in Mekong Region water governance 
Sub-Question How do the politics of deliberation, scales and levels influence water-related 
governance? 
Theory The candidate uses the context-content-process-outcomes framework 
introduced in chapter 8 to explore how a set of Mekong engagements have 
been affected by, and responded to, the politics of scales and levels. 
Practice Cases examined are: creation of the MRC, basin-based water resources 
planning, basin-based banking, regionalised energy planning and power 
trading, multi-level water dialogues, and Tonle Sap in Cambodia. 
Citation Dore J and Lebel L (2010) ‘Deliberation and scale in Mekong Region water 
governance’, Environmental Management 46:1, 60-80. 
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Chapter 11 A framework for analysing transboundary water governance complexes, 
illustrated in the Mekong Region 
Sub-Question How can transboundary water governance complexes be better understood? 
Theory The chapter presents a heuristic framework for analysing transboundary water 
governance complexes, that portrays the importance of, and connections 
between: context, drivers, arenas, tools, decisions and impacts.  Key drivers 
discussed are interests, discourses and institutions.  Tools are defined broadly 
as being predominantly for deliberation, technical support, or advocacy.  
Practice Drawing on the findings of extensive research and active engagement with 
policymakers, the chapter introduces the wide range of Mekong water 
governance actors and explores the role of decision tools in allocation 
decision-making.  Normative governance improvements are suggested. 
Citation Dore J, Lebel L and Molle F (2012) ‘A framework for analysing 
transboundary water governance complexes, illustrated in the Mekong 
Region’, Journal of Hydrology 466-467, 23-36. 
Part D:  Conclusions 
Chapter 12 Conclusions 
Contributions Synopsis of the research findings and contributions from Parts B and C. 
Vision Articulating a vision for Deliberative Water Governance, a new frontier in the 
field of deliberative governance. 
Reflections Final reflections from the candidate. 
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Table 2 Annexes 
A Kaosa-ard M and Dore J (eds.) (2003) Social Challenges for the Mekong Region. 
White Lotus, Bangkok, 448.  Introduction, 1-12. 
This book was an output of collaboration with Professor Mingsarn Kaosa-ard at 
Chiang Mai University’s Social Research Institute, to pursue a deeper understanding 
of transboundary Mekong Region social issues and associated politics.  The candidate 
managed this multi-disciplinary study that examined many topics, including: HIV-
AIDS, migrant workers, gender, agricultural biotechnology, ethnic minorities, 
economic globalisation etc.  Most authors wrote in their non-native language, with 
some requiring extensive conceptual and writing support.  The candidate wrote this 
Introduction that framed and synthesised the research, and contributed his own 
chapter on ‘The governance of increasing Mekong regionalism’ (Thesis Chapter 2). 
© White Lotus and Chiang Mai University’s Social Research Institute 2003 
B M-POWER (2011) ‘M-POWER Strategic Guide 2011: Action-researchers, 
dialogue facilitators, knowledge brokers’. Mekong Program on Water 
Environment and Resilience, Vientiane, 15. www.mpowernetwork.org  
This strategy document articulates the purpose and modus operandi of the M-POWER 
network, a collaboration between Mekong researchers with an interest in transnational 
and transboundary water-food-energy-environment governance.  The candidate served 
as Program Director from 2004-2009, and Steering Committee Chair until 2012. 
© M-POWER 2011 
C Dore J, Robinson J and Smith M (eds.) (2010) Negotiate: Reaching Agreements 
Over Water. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland, 120.  http://www.iucn/org/water 
A book that emphasises constructive engagement and encouraging space in 
negotiations for deliberation, hearing multiple perspectives and consensus-building – 
translated into Khmer, Vietnamese, Lao, Chinese, Spanish.  The candidate inherited 
the idea for the book from IUCN colleague Ger Bergkamp, and then worked with 
Julia Robinson and Mark Smith to make it happen.  The candidate is co-author of 
Negotiate Chapters 1 and 2, and sole author of a core chapter ‘Multi-Stakeholder 
Platforms’ (Thesis Chapter 8).  The book is being translated into Spanish, Lao, 
Vietnamese, Cambodian and Chinese language. 
© IUCN 2010 
D IUCN, TEI, IWMI and M-POWER (2007) Exploring Water Futures Together: 
Mekong Region Waters Dialogue. Report from regional Dialogue, Vientiane, Lao 
PDR, The World Conservation Union, Thailand Environment Institute, 
International Water Management Institute, M-POWER (Mekong Program on 
Water Environment and Resilience), 75. 
Report from a Mekong transboundary water governance experiment aiming to 
demonstrate high-quality, multi-stakeholder deliberation.  The candidate was the co-
convenor of the dialogue whilst leading the IUCN Asia Water Program, and co-author 
of the report. 
© IUCN 2007 
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The governance of increasing Mekong regionalism
John Dore
___________________________________________________________
Recent years have seen an upsurge in regional interaction between the
governments and civil societies of the Mekong Region.  In the era of
contemporary globalisation – post-Asian crisis – there are powerful inter-related
forces driving freer trade, infrastructure installation and new uses for the Mekong
River.  These projects are regional1 in nature.  As I shall discuss, there is also an
active, critical resistance to each of these linked projects.  As such, the regional
governance of these projects is crucial.
In this chapter2 my aim is to describe the changing nature of regional
governance, the enhancement of which is a major social challenge for the
Mekong Region.  The chapter focuses on how states and critical civil society
interact under the deceptively narrow-sounding banner of environmental
governance, taking four case studies as examples:
1. Wide-ranging economic cooperation by governments of the six Mekong
Region countries – Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and
Vietnam.
2. Negotiations over Mekong River water use by the four governments of the
Lower Mekong countries – Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam.
3. Mekong River ‘channel improvement’ by the governments of the four most
upstream countries – China, Myanmar, Lao PDR and Thailand.
4. Unilateral decision making by China’s government to proceed with extensive
dam-building on the Upper Mekong River in Yunnan Province
A synthesis of challenges emerge from this empirical analysis, central to which is
Mekong Region realpolitik; the associated restrictions on civil society’s
‘political activity’ enforced by various states; and the corresponding, generally
exclusive, nature of national and regional decision making.
The chapter presents the following arguments.  First, to fully understand the
relatively recent changes requires new conceptual frameworks for governance
and regionalism which recognise that social geography is changing, and that
                                                
1 In this chapter I use regional in an encompassing way meaning region-wide and/or transboundary
and/or transborder and/or crossborder and/or of particular significance to various parts of the
region (but not necessarily all of the region).
2 I wish to acknowledge the support of colleagues at the Australian National University’s School of
Resources Environment and Society and Chiang Mai University’s Social Research Institute, plus
two research organisations: Land and Water Australia, and the National Research Council of
Thailand.
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state-centric modes of analysis no longer suffice, if they ever did.  Second, the
regional governance landscape is being substantially reshaped by the efforts of
many different actors, including an emerging critical civil society.  Despite this
emergence, in the Mekong Region states still dominate, but some states more
than others.  Third, regional governance in the Mekong – if ‘environment and
development’ governance is any indication – in many ways is lagging, unable to
approach governance ideals, and inadequate to equitably or sensibly govern far-
reaching regional change.  Greater political support from Mekong country state
leaders is required for practical enhancement of environmental governance.
Misplaced and ultimately problematic interpretations of ‘authority to rule’ and
sovereignty are hindering what many see as a required transformation.  Fourth,
enhanced regional governance is possible and essential for there to be more
equitable and ecologically sustainable development in this extraordinary and
diverse part of the world.  This is critical, as to reiterate, the overall standard of
regional governance currently falls short of what could reasonably be expected
by the peoples of the region.
Governance
What do I mean by governance?  Governance “has become something of a
catch-all to describe the ways in which the activities of a multitude of actors,
including governments, non-government organisations (NGOs) and international
organisations, increasingly overlap.  It describes a complex tapestry of
competing authority claims” (Mehta et al. 1999:18).  Beneath this catch-all view
there are various other concepts, focusing on administrative management,
corporate activity or the processes of government.
In this chapter I use the term to mean the structures and processes chosen or
imposed on society to debate and create policy directions and manage its affairs.
This includes the wide realm of multi-layered negotiation and decision making
processes, involving interplay between many individuals and institutions.3
People usually attempt to distinguish between local, national, regional and global
politics and governance.  However, this does not match the reality of the
aforementioned ‘tapestry’.  Domains of authority are not always clear-cut; rather
they regularly overlap and are contested.  This is certainly true of regional
governance in the Mekong Region where many issues seem to be somewhere in
the “messy middle” (Mehta et al. 1999:18).
There is increasing growth in or about the Mekong Region of what Scholte
(2000) has called supraterritorial relationships between people.  A dimension of
this transformative globalisation is an empowering form of new connectedness
between critical civil society groups – located both within and outside the region
                                                
3 By institutions I mean “persistent, reasonably predictable, arrangements, laws, processes,
customs or organisations structuring aspects of the political, social, cultural, or economic
transactions and relationships in a society; although by definition persistent, institutions constantly
evolve” (Dovers 2001).
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– wishing to have more say in Mekong decision making.  A changing social
geography, evident in a more critical, relatively more deterritorialised, civil
society contributes to this ‘messiness’ and in doing so challenges current state
notions of ‘appropriate’ political space, sovereignty and citizenship.
The emerging theory of nodal governance (Shearing and Wood 2002) helps to
explain the regional situation in the Mekong Region.  Rather than institutions
and frameworks, which imply a certain amount of order, this theory speaks of
nodes within a loose (or tight) governance web where “no set of nodes is given
conceptual priority” (2002).  These can be formal and relatively easily
discernible, for example: states, critical civil society, militaries, and the corporate
or business sector.4  There are also other, less formal, groups influencing various
governance processes, such as unrepresented civil society and organised crime:
The relationship between nodes range from active cooperation, through
indifference, to strenuous opposition.  These relationships change and shift over
time, space and across arenas of governance.  Nodes that cooperate at one point
in time and space in relation to one governance concern might be indifferent to
or actively resist each other’s agendas at another (Courville and Shearing
forthcoming).
Whilst fully acknowledging the presence and importance in the Mekong Region
of the wide range of different ‘nodes’, the environmental governance examples
discussed later in the chapter focus on state and critical civil society.  Even
though states in the Mekong Region are dominant, the concept of nodal
governance reflects the increased empowerment of non-state groups and the
possibilities for governance created by the increased globalisation and
regionalism of critical civil society.
                                                
4 Whilst nodes are able to be differentiated at the conceptual level, it is acknowledged that in
practice individuals and groups often have multiple affiliations (eg. business and military, state
functionary and member of civil society etc.).
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Regionalism
Whilst there have been previous waves of regionalism5 – in the Mekong Region
and elsewhere – the subject has again become prominent since the 1990s.  There
is now a plethora of regionalisms around the world with multiple-motivations
and forms.  Examples include: government regionalism embodied in the
European Union; trading bloc regionalism embodied in Mercosur6 and its
equivalents; and civil society regionalism apparent in various ‘new social
movements’ such as the Third World Network.  Much effort is being put into
characterising and understanding the many facets of contemporary regionalism
(Gamble and Payne 1996, Hettne and Soderbaum 1998, Boas et al. 1999, Breslin
and Higgott 2000, Hveem 2000, Mittelman 2000, Soderbaum 2002) which is an
important element of the changing world order.
Some regionalism is ‘old’ style.  Such activities are usually state-centric and
grounded in state interventions in trade-related economic activity (see Table 1).
However, other regionalisms appear to be qualitatively different and ‘new’.
These include some being led by disparate civil society organisations forcing
changes to the previously state-ordained regional governance script.
The point has been made elsewhere that, as both ‘old’ and ‘new’ regional forms
may be present in any particular part of the world, it makes “the identification of
new patterns (co-existing with older forms) more relevant than identifying a new
era” (Hettne 1999:8).  In the Mekong Region this is particularly salient.  Actors
in old and new regionalisms are learning how to co-exist, compete or combat
with each other.  Regional forums and processes have been growing in the
Mekong Region for a number of reasons.  These include: maintaining or
obtaining peace; a desire for economic growth and East Asian elites’ political
solidarity; infrastructure installation; wealth seeking; a desire to take an
ecosystem approach to development and governance; and civil society
responding to the new importance of the regional scale, and/or seeking political
space.
I will now briefly describe each of these.
                                                
5 Increasing region-ness can be considered conceptually (following Schulz et al. 2001) as an
upsurge in both regionalism and regionalisation.  Schulz and his colleagues think of regionalism as
being the “urge to merge” (2001:6) or operate at a regional scale, whether by state or non-state
actors.  This drives corresponding empirical processes of regionalisation.  There is some
conceptual difference between the three terms – region-ness, regionalism and regionalisation – but
to avoid confusion, in this chapter I will conflate them and use regionalism to refer to the overall
phenomenon.
6 The Spanish acronym Mercosur is derived from the Mercado Comun del Sur – the Southern
Common Market, formed in 1991, including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.  Since that
time Bolivia and Chile have joined.  A recent estimate of the combined Gross National Product
was US$750 billion, making it the fourth largest economic bloc in the world.
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Peace
Some regionalisms are focused on peace between states and reaping whatever
benefits can be gained.  Maintaining the peace is presumably high on the agenda
of the militarily oriented Regional Security Forum of the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which involves many Mekong Region analysts
and state representatives.  To a large extent ‘peace benefits’ are constructed, at
least by government and business leaders, as opportunities for increased
‘economic development’ which has become embodied in freer trade agendas.
Economic growth
The ASEAN and China-ASEAN free trade areas are notable Mekong Region
examples indicative of, and fostering, increasing economic regional activity.
They openly embrace economic globalisation and its perceived opportunities.
Elsewhere, various economic regional formations have been more resistant,
portrayed critically as more ‘closed’ or ‘protectionist’, reducing the perceived
risks to national economies from an unfettered economic integration between
states and business actors with different ‘agency’ or power.  The increased
impetus of ASEAN, evidenced in particular by the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN-
China dialogues, was initially cast in such a negative light by primarily American
critics.  The critics missed the point that anxieties about US domination and
‘globalisation’, the latter catapulted to prominence by the East Asian crisis, has
reinvigorated Dr Mahathir’s previously floated idea of an East Asian Economic
Caucus.  Increased willingness by European leaders to respect the decisions of
Asian leaders to come together without US etc. membership has also ensured that
these new forums, including Dr Thaksin’s Asian Cooperation Dialogue, are
being given an opportunity to prove their worth.  For the most part these new
forums7 are being pushed by East Asian elites riding and exploring new waves of
political solidarity.
Infrastructure installation
Freer trade requires increased infrastructure to facilitate the transfer of people,
goods and services, provide energy and communication tools etc.  Installing this
infrastructure has been the regional focus of the Greater Mekong Subregion
(GMS) economic cooperation initiative, chaperoned by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB).  Of course, it must be remembered that the Manila-based ADB is
only one actor amongst many in the ‘aid’ and ‘development’ game.8
                                                
7 The development of ASEAN-China dialogue, whether in or outside of ASEAN+3, is perhaps the
most important recent development.  Although Dr Mahathir wants it institutionalised, many of the
ASEAN members prefer to maintain it as a dialogue in which they can use their newfound
solidarity to offset the power of China.
8 There are substantial investment flows between countries in the region, such as between China
and southern neighbours to enhance transport links.  Regional infrastructure is also being funded
by funds originating from outside the region.
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Wealth seeking
Wealth seeking opportunism is another force for regionalism in the Mekong
Region.  Increasingly regional business interests – legal and illegal, obvious or
obscured – are also apparent.  These include the ‘post-peace’ activities of
resource extractors operating as part of, or in partnership with governments,
business elites and militaries.  An obvious example is logging bans in China and
Thailand which have created enormous financial wealth for a few and destructive
spillover effects for many in the neighbouring Mekong countries of Cambodia,
Lao PDR and Myanmar (Hirsch 1995).
Ecosystem approach
An ecosystem reasoning drives other regionalisms.  For example, the river basin
unit is often seen as ‘obvious’ by advocates of integrated land and water
management.  Wildlife managers may favour transboundary protected areas
systems etc.  In theory the Mekong River Commission (MRC) is born out of an
ecosystem perspective focused on the Mekong River Basin; however,
international politics pre- and post- various wars have been the greater driver.
Strengthening civil society
Finally, there is an abundance of civil society activities at the regional scale.
Some of these are opposing the ‘development’ directions evident in various
country and regional development plans.  Other critical civil society regionalisms
offer more direct challenge to existing state-dominated political systems, and in
so doing of course find themselves in very sensitive relationships with state
actors.  Others are grounded in re-emerging crossborder ethnic solidarity of
particular ‘nationalities’.  Different again are coalitions around particular issues,
such as Mekong Region mountain peoples’ networks advocating new approaches
to public policy affecting upland livelihoods.  Due to suppression of ‘domestic’
critical civil society in most Mekong Region countries, many find more space for
expression at the regional scale than at national or subnational levels.
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Regional governance
At the risk of oversimplifying, in the following paragraphs I make some
observations about the evolving situation regarding regional governance, using
the terminology of Tracks 1-4.  Several of the governance forums mentioned are
discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  A brief overview of what this
typology means for the Mekong Region is presented in Table 1.
Track 1
Track 1 refers to the state-centric official inter-government forums such as, in the
Mekong Region, ASEAN9, the GMS economic cooperation initiative and the
MRC.  For the most part, these are guided by rationalist theories of international
relations – realism and institutionalism.
The realism philosophy underpinning these ‘old’ regionalisms holds that states
are the key political actors, states are uni-viewed, states are rational and focus on
balances of power and security (Katzenstein et al. 1998:658).  State authority is
considered paramount and governance is largely restricted to interest-based
bargaining between states.  The influence of institutionalism is seen in the
emphasis given to norms and rules, embodied in formal institutions or ‘regimes’
(Haggard and Simmons 1987).  Governance becomes structured and to an extent
depoliticised (ignoring for now the politics inherent in rules construction).
Not surprisingly, given their theoretical underpinnings, discussions between
states in the Mekong Region at the regional scale have thus far shown themselves
to be unwilling or unable to deal adequately with many of the social challenges
treated in this book.  States have regularly shown themselves to be hypersensitive
about difficult issues, retreating behind veneers of sovereignty and falling back
on an elitist consensus of non-interference.  This has often stifled necessary
debate and action on regional social issues.
Track 1 inter-government Mekong regionalism is being largely driven by
increased Asian solidarity, particularly in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis;
continued faith in economic growth via various East Asian development models;
and conviction that a regional approach and presumed economies of scale are
more likely to attract foreign investment.  Most of the state-led examples of
regionalism show ongoing commitment to outward-oriented neoliberalism.
                                                
9 The most important changes in the 1990s for ASEAN in relation to the Mekong Region were, of
course, its acceptance of Vietnam (1995), Lao PDR (1997), Myanmar (1997) and finally Cambodia
(1998) as full members.  The new post-Cold War geopolitics had led all to seek membership in the
regional organisation.
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Table 1 Mekong regional governance forums
Track 1 ‘old’ Track 2 ‘new’ Track 3 ‘new’ Track 4 ‘new’
Players State-centric, inter-
government forums
State-civil society
interactive forums
aiming to enhance the
effectiveness of states
Civil society
leading, less
impeded by and
less subordinate to
states
Civil society
supporting local
communities, low
expectations of
states
In eyes of
states….
Official Semi-official Unofficial Unofficial
Dominant
logic
Realist, institutionalist:
for the most part
implicitly accepting of
rationalist theories of
international relations
Constructivist:
emphasising the value
of new ideas and
learning
Constructivist,
activist, optimistic
about the power of
multi-stakeholder
dialogues and other
discursive forums.
Constructivist and
realist, activist,
localist, sceptical of
dialogues; concerns
about domination,
co-option
Examples Formal inter-
government processes
of Association of
Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN),
ASEAN+3 (South
Korea, China and
Japan), ASEAN-China,
Economic & Social
Commission for Asia
and the Pacific
(ESCAP), Mekong
River Commission
(MRC) and Asian
Development Bank
(ADB) which attempt to
control negotiations
over:
▪ Free trade areas
▪ Water use including for
dams, hydropower,
transport and irrigation
▪ Greater Mekong
Subregion (GMS)
economic cooperation
(Boxes 3 & 4)
▪ Crossborder
environment
assessment (EA)
protocols
▪ Crossborder movement
of people, goods &
services
▪ Commercial navigation
agreement
Institutions and
processes with semi-
formal links to
governments such as:
▪ ASEAN Human Rights
Working Groups
▪ ESCAP-coordinated
GMS Business Forum
▪ Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM) Social Forum
▪ Fledgling ADB NGO
Network (ADB-led)
▪ ESCAP/ADB/UN
Environment
Programme
coordination of civil
society inputs to World
Summit on Sustainable
Development 2002
▪ Southeast Asia
Regional Dialogue on
Water Governance,
Bangkok, November
2002
▪ Asia Pacific Taskforce
on Forest Law
Enforcement &
Governance (involving
5 of the Mekong
countries), Jakarta,
February 2003
Activism associated
with the different
issues on the
agenda of: Focus
on the Global
South, Asian
Migrant Centre,
Asia Pacific Forum
for Women Law &
Development, ADB
NGO Forum, Global
Witness, and
activities of various
international NGOs
and philanthropists.
Specific dialogue
examples include:
▪ World Commission
on Dams
▪ Regional university
and policy research
institute coalitions
hosting policy
debates eg.
Resource Policy
Support Initiative
(REPSI), Regional
Environment Forum
(Box 7)
▪ Mooted Mekong
forestry governance
forum
Much of the
substantive work of
regional, or
regionally-linked
local organisations
and initiatives such
as:
▪ Towards Ecological
Recovery and
Regional Alliance
(TERRA) (Box 1)
▪ Dialogue on River
Basin Development
and Civil Society in
the Mekong
(coalition of Oxfam
Mekong Initiative,
TERRA, PER and
Australian Mekong
Resource Centre)
(Box 6)
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It is acknowledged that some Track 1 processes now have more involvement by
civil society and other non-state groups.  However, this inclusiveness is certainly
a ‘new’ feature.  Whilst too early to be sure of their merits, examples from 2002
onwards might include the ADB’s implementation of its GMS Strategic
Environment  Framework (SEF) and the MRC’s basin development planning
process.  Each of these is supposed to ensure or proactively take a more
participatory approach.
Track 2
Track 2 regionalism refers to state-civil society interactive forums.  It is evident
in the emergence of complementary/parallel forums which generally aim to
enhance the effectiveness of state processes.  There is an increasing number of
‘semi-official’ Track 2 forums involving the Mekong Region in which states
interact with business actors and ‘social and environmental’ civil society
organisations.  Examples include: the GMS Business Forum coordinated by
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP); and recent
efforts by ADB, ESCAP and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
to coordinate regional inputs to the World Summit on Sustainable Development.
At least in theory, these give greater emphasis to the value of new ideas and
learning.  This implies a belief in constructivism, deliberative/discursive
processes where actors are given an equal opportunity to participate in effective
debate to learn about matters of common interest.10  Not all Track 2 forums
approach the ideal.  Often Track 2 debates have focused on regional issues to
better inform state policy makers about a wide range of issues such as military
security, promotion of business links etc.  For the most part the state has
remained a privileged actor.
Track 3
Loss of faith in Tracks 1 and 2 has led to the emergence of Tracks 3 and 4,
neither of which privilege state involvement and both may proceed without it.
Track 3 is characterised by civil society leading, less impeded by and less
subordinate to states.  Track 3 governance forums includes multi-stakeholder
dialogues and epistemic communities, (which should be) firmly rooted in
constructivism.  Multistakeholder dialogues include the World Commission on
Dams (WCD) and the Dialogue on Water Food and Environment (DWFE); each
have included the Mekong Region (or parts thereof) in their associated activities.
They are intended to be inclusive, information-rich and flexible processes which
actively promote presentation and analysis of different views.  Dialogues have
been defined as “a contrived situation in which a set of more less interdependent
stakeholders in some resource are identified, and invited to meet and interact in
                                                
10 In an ideal deliberative process, participants are open to changing their opinions through
persuasion, rather than by bargaining, coercion, manipulation, manufactured consent or deception.
Such processes are also characterised by respect, sharing of information and allowing all actors to
be freely able to participate and capably communicate their views (Dryzek 2000:1).
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a forum for conflict resolution, negotiation, social learning and collective
decision making towards concerted action” (Roling and Woodhill 2001:iii).
Epistemic communities refer to “network(s) of professionals with recognised
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992:3).
There are epistemic communities functioning in the Mekong Region providing
policy researchers and advocacy groups some ‘thinking space’ to share and
expand the regional knowledge base, and refine opinions.  Examples of relevance
to ‘environment and development’ have been the Resource Policy Support
Initiative (REPSI) (Box 7) and various other issue-based network initiatives.
Track 4
Track 4 refers here to the emerging regionalism of localists, increasingly
prominent in Mekong Region ‘environment and development’ governance.
Whether by choice or not, Track 3 and 4 processes are currently marginal to the
dominant state political decision making in the Mekong Region.
In general, localists assert the significance of the rural community as an
opposition to discourses propounding economic growth, urbanisation and
industrialism (Hewison 2001:22).  Localists have a greater emphasis on self
sufficiency and lower expectations of government intent or capacity, given
historical performance of urban-based technocratic, political or military elites.
Localists often believe that states and dominant elites are neither sufficiently
legitimate, competent or inclined to adequately represent local community
interests.  Grassroots resistance is an option, much discussed by people such as
James Scott who writes of ‘arts of resistance’, ‘infra-politics’, ‘seeing like a
state’ and ‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott 1976, 1985, 1990, 1998).
Localists only support activity at the regional scale in the following instances:
solidarity lobbying to support other local groups who may have restricted
national space; or to deal with genuine transboundary or region-wide issues
where solidarity or a ‘whole of region’ perspective could help; or to take
advantage of regional platforms, or to counter what are seen as illegitimate and
inappropriate regional agendas.
Localist leaders in the Mekong Region, such as Towards Ecological Recovery
and Regional Alliance (TERRA) (Box 1), and elsewhere, are concerned that
some external actors (eg. co-opted NGOs) unwisely and unjustly support trade-
offs which ignore the rights of local people already being trampled by
authoritarian elites pursuing a conventional ‘development’ paradigm.
Nevertheless, to have their agendas heard, localists have also had to scale up
from grounded local action to regional and global arenas.
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Box 1 Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (Track 4 actor)
Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA) describes itself as “the
sister organisation of Project for Ecological Recovery (PER), registered together as the
Foundation for Ecological Recovery.  PER established in 1986, works to support the
local communities in Thailand in protecting rivers, forests, land and livelihoods.  In
1991, TERRA was established to focus on issues concerning the natural environment and
local communities throughout the Mekong Region.”  The Bangkok-based group “works
to support the network of NGOs and people’s organisations in Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand and Vietnam, encouraging exchange and alliance-building, and drawing on the
experience of development and environment issues in Thailand” (TERRA 2001).
TERRA’s environmental agenda is inseparable from its views on social justice, rights,
development, sustainability and the role of civil society in the debate about these issues.
It has critically analysed the discourses surrounding many subjects including civil
society, public participation and sustainable development.  It explicitly criticises neo-
liberal dominance and associated conceptions of what is good or bad economic
development.  They are publicly critical of any development paradigm which accepts
winners, losers and compromises as an inevitable outcome of economic pursuits.
TERRA literature consistently promotes approaches to environment and development
decision making which are grounded in a respect for indigenous rights and knowledge.
The organisation is also very actively engaged in political awareness training and
developing activists and strategic activism throughout the region.  Reservations about
wasting effort or of being co-opted limit the extent to which it actively seeks a direct
dialogue with others, such as regional inter-government organisations, the private sector,
or multilateral banks.  Regional NGOs such as TERRA have worked hard to create a
political space in which to operate, at times providing/finding a regional opportunity for
activism which does not exist within most of the Mekong countries.  The formation of
the regional NGOs has undeniably led to more inclusive deliberative11 regional debates.
For environmental governance this has been aided by the inherent regional nature of
many issues, coupled with international support.
Fears of co-option are real and each non-government organisation (NGO) has the
right to choose how it can most strategically engage.  NGOs foregoing
independence in order to cooperate with other actors may be making a bad trade-
off by “depleting oppositional civil society” (Dryzek 2000:137).  The trade-off
can be particularly poor if the concession is made to a regional inter-government
organisation which may be relatively weak anyway, and basically under the
control of member states.  World-wide many strong NGOs choose to remain
“passively exclusive” (Dryzek 2000:138) which helps to retain more robust
democratic debate in various political arenas.
                                                
11 Dryzek, an advocate of critical debate, praises NGOs for contributing to more ‘unruly and
discursive’ policy making processes, challenging various development paradigms and agendas.
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Environmental governance of the Mekong Region
To examine an aspect of regional governance in more detail, I wish to narrow the
scope to environmental governance.  This refers to the management of a wide
realm of matters such as water use, flooding, pollution, land use, forest use,
timber trade, non-timber forest products trade, fisheries, biodiversity
conservation, ecosystem health, infrastructure development, impact assessment,
access to natural resources and access to information.  Of course, in the Mekong
Region as elsewhere, the governance of these issues is politically charged
Box 2 Environmental governance questions
Power12
What power relationships and interests contextualise the governance process?
Sustainability13
What sustainability perspective and values underpin the positions of actors?
Holism
Are social, cultural, economic, ecological and transboundary issues considered?
Participation
Does the governance process demonstrate a high level of diverse stakeholder
representation and involvement via genuine participatory process that are safe, non-
threatening, culturally appropriate, non-coercive, predictable and maintained over time?
Transparency
Is the governance process open, informed and informing; gathering, using and sharing
the best available information; and building the knowledge and research base?
Equity
Are ethical and rights dimensions central to decision making, eg. How are the rights of
individuals and communities considered vis a vis governments and business interests?
Accountability
How are different actors and institutions in the governance process held accountable; to
whom are they responsible?
                                                
12 A political ecology perspective aims to “think in terms of the role of various actors in relation to
a politicised environment characterised by unequal power relations” (Bryant and Bailey
1997:188).  There is widespread recognition of complex power inequalities in the politics of
environment, globally (Mehta et al. 1999), in the Third World (Bryant and Bailey 1997), or in
Southeast Asia (Hirsch 1995; Parnwell and Bryant 1996; Rigg 1997; Hirsch and Warren 1998).
13 There is a vast array of perspectives on sustainability, underpinned by different values.  Suffice
to say here that opinions differ markedly on issues such as: the extent of threats to ecosystems and
the invocation of the ‘precautionary principle’; substitutability of natural capital; the primacy given
to economic growth (and its measurement) versus the conservation of biological diversity and
ecological integrity; faith in ecological modernisation to yield cleaner industries; relationships
between human wealth, human well-being and ecosystem impacts; intrinsic rights of nature; the
importance of aesthetics; and, the importance and validity of entrenched cultural practices (see
Woodhill 1999).  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore each of these points.
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Commonly mentioned principles relevant to environmental governance include
sustainability, holism, participation, transparency, equity and accountability.
Each of these, along with inquiry about the powers and interests at play, can be
framed as questions (Box 2).  In the following pages I peer through the empirical
window of several major Mekong Region environmental governance processes,
providing background and reflections on how they measure up against some, but
not all, of these questions.
The first process is the GMS economic cooperation initiative.  The next three
processes relate directly to ‘water resources development’: Mekong river water
use negotiations, Mekong river ‘channel improvement’ project; and the regional
governance surrounding the Upper Mekong hydroelectric dams in China.  All
four are related.  The discussions focus on the role of state actors and critical
civil society.  State actors have thus far dominated the governance surrounding
each of these actual or proposed interventions.  However, the role of critical civil
society regionalism is significant and increasing.
Greater Mekong Subregion economic cooperation
Background
The GMS economic cooperation initiative, embodied in the ADB GMS
programme, started in 1992.  It brought together the six countries to focus on the
coordinated development of infrastructure.  Many ‘master plans’ have been
completed which are either unrealistic dreams or visionary guides – or
somewhere in between, depending upon your point of view.  The 10th GMS
Ministerial Conference, held in Yangon in November 2001, endorsed a new
strategy, since adjusted and released in 2002.  The state-state negotiated
agreements embedded in the strategy are supposed to guide GMS cooperation as
the GMS programme enters its second decade.  The newly endorsed goal
statement is as follows:
GMS countries envision a Mekong subregion that is more integrated,
prosperous and equitable….The GMS programme will contribute to realising
the potential of the subregion through (i) an enabling policy environment and
effective infrastructure linkages that will facilitate crossborder trade,
investment, tourism and other forms of economic cooperation; and (ii)
developing human resources and skills competencies…..To ensure that this
development process is equitable and sustainable, environment and social
interests will be fully respected in the formulation and implementation of the
GMS programme (ADB 2001a).
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Box 3 GMS summit declaration 2002 (Track 1 outcome)
The first summit of the Heads of State of the six countries of the Mekong Region
occurred in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on 3 November 2002.  Following are excerpts from
the Joint Statement issued by the leaders (Heads of Mekong Region governments 2002):
…we will integrate GMS development programs in our respective national agenda.
…we will complete the infrastructure investments needed to strengthen productivity and
competitiveness in the GMS.
…we will complete the transport corridors critical to linking the subregion and
promoting trade and investment.
…we will coordinate our strategies to ensure that transport corridors evolve into
economic corridors, enabling agricultural diversification, industrialisation and the
creation of employment opportunities.
…we will expedite the full implementation of the Framework Agreement for the
Facilitation of Crossborder Movement of Goods and People.
…we will facilitate pilot-testing of single-stop customs inspection with a view to
implementing this procedure at our shared borders.
…we will accelerate energy development through mutually beneficial initiatives,
including implementation of the Intergovernmental Agreement on Regional Power Trade
in the GMS.
…we will develop basic telecommunications infrastructure linking the subregion, in
accordance with respective national circumstances, together with the formulation of
policy and regulatory frameworks conducive to information and communications
technology.
…we view the private sector as the engine of growth for the GMS.  We will continue to
create a favourable trade and investment climate to foster private sector initiative and
participation, especially for small and medium enterprises.
…we will pursue initiatives to further enhance trade and investment.  An action plan on
trade and investment facilitation should be formulated including information sharing and
capacity building.  This will also support the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and the
process of trade liberalisation and economic integration of ASEAN.
…we will strive to meet the millennium goal of halving the incidence of poverty by
2015.  We will take joint action to address other areas in developing human potential,
including the protection from trafficking of women and children, and combating the
spread of HIV/AIDS and illegal drug production and trade.
…we must and will better protect our environment.
…we will take responsibility and leadership for the sustainable management of our
national and shared resources.
…we strongly endorse the Ten Year Strategic Framework for the GMS programme, and
the Eleven Flagship programmes, the key means through which closer economic
cooperation and prosperity will be achieved.
The GMS programme was thoroughly endorsed at the November 2002 summit
meeting of the political leaders from each of the Mekong Region countries (ADB
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2002c) (Box 3).  The forward workplan outlines ‘flagship projects’ requiring
more than $900 million in investment financing and almost $30 million in
technical assistance,14 which are intended by ADB to be “multi-disciplinary,
large-scale interventions with high visibility and significant economic impact on
the GMS economies” (ADB 2001b:15).  There are 11 projects relating to: north-
south, east-west and southern economic corridors (roads plus associated
infrastructure); completion of a regional telecommunications ‘back bone’;
regional power grid completion plus power trading arrangements; private sector
‘participation and competitiveness’ boosting; cross border trade and investments
support; implementing a region-wide Strategic Environmental Framework (SEF)
(discussed later, also see Box 4); and supporting country efforts to control floods
and ‘manage’ water resources; and tourism.
Environmental governance of the ADB-GMS processes
The ADB has had to review its approach to ‘environment’ – ecological and
social dimensions – in response to a sharpened social and environmental ethic,
criticisms of past Bank approaches, the demands of shareholders and research
advocating alternatives.  A number of the technical assistance (TA) projects in
the Mekong Region have had a specific social and environment focus.  Social
TAs have related to cooperation in employment promotion and training;
prevention and control of HIV/AIDS; health and education needs of ethnic
minorities; malaria control; and drug trafficking.  Environment TAs include that
which led to the development of the Strategic Environment Framework (SEF)
(Box 4) which has an initial focus on the transport and water resources sectors
(SEI et al. 2002).
Expectations are now increasing amongst GMS Ministers that environmental
problems – particularly those of a transboundary nature – can be at least partly
resolved via the regional TAs, in combination with national efforts and other
regional initiatives by actors such as MRC.  The GMS summit declaration (Box
3) included commitment by state leaders to “better protect the environment” and
“take responsibility and leadership for the sustainable management of our
national and shared resources” (Heads of Mekong Region governments 2002)
and a pledge to implement international agreements, including those from the
Johannesburg 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development.  That sounds
fine, but how does the ADB specifically intend to play its part?  What tools and
processes does it have to support its stated intentions?
                                                
14 As at 30 June 2002, the ADB had assisted GMS loan projects for roads (especially in Yunnan,
but also from Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh etc.), hydropower (Theun Hinboun in Lao PDR) and
the Siem Reap airport in Cambodia.  The total cost of the projects classified as being either
‘national projects with subregional dimensions’ or ‘purely subregional projects’ is listed as almost
US$2 billion.  Of this amount, 10 ADB loans tallied US$772 million.  In addition, in the 10 years
to 2002 ADB has coordinated 56 Technical Assistance projects costing $58 million, mostly paid
for by US$32 million from the ADB’s Japan Special Fund.  Supporters of the GMS programme
expect it to now shift from the initial planning to a substantial implementation phase, under the
slogan ‘Building on Success’ (ADB 2002a).
ANU page 41
John Dore
420
The ADB adopted a new Environment Policy in November 2002.  Several
features of this are potentially quite significant for the GMS programme and
general operations by the Bank in each Mekong Region country.  Critical and
detailed evaluation of environmental issues is now required before country
strategy and associated programmes are finalised (ADB 2002b:6).  The screening
process in the Bank previously categorised loan projects into three groups, each
requiring a different level of environmental review: category A (potentially
serious environmental impacts) which require environmental impact assessment
(EIA); category B (potentially significant environmental impacts) which require
an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) analysis but not an EIA; and
category C (unlikely to have significant environmental impacts) which do not
require any type of environment assessment (EA).15 The recent creation of
category FI also ensures EA of projects which indirectly involve the Bank, such
as those that the Bank may be planning, but which are being implemented using
non-Bank finance.
The GMS programme must now adhere to the new policy and be guided by its
own Strategic Environment Framework (SEF).  The first phase of the SEF was
optimistically expected to resolve methodological and political dilemmas
concerning “cumulative environmental and social effects of hydropower projects
and the implications of economic corridors”.  More realistically, it was asked to
“outline practical steps for addressing key transborder environmental issues”
(ADB 2000b:7), which are considered by the Bank (ADB 2000a:22) to be
deforestation; downstream hydropower development impact; biodiversity losses
and trade in wildlife; encroachment on protected areas due to transport projects;
and pollution of waterways.
Advocacy (discussed below) has sensitised at least some Bank governors and
staff to the concerns of critics  There has been progress made towards more
holistic thinking and improving internal systems.  The GMS initiative has
acknowledged the deficiency of transboundary impact assessment arrangements.
And, there is increased transparency relative to earlier years.
                                                
15 There are many forms of assessment which are often collectively called EA. These include
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Social Impact Assessment (SIA), Cumulative Effects
Assessment (CEA), Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) and Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA).
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Box 4 Strategic Environmental Framework for ADB (Track 2 outcome)
The ADB-specific guidelines accepted by Mekong Region governments as part of their
endorsement of the first SEF for the transport and water resources sector projects of the
GMS economic cooperation initiative and the directly linked Bank GMS programme, are
as follows:
1. ADB-supported projects will consider the Pareto+ principle; not only will no one be
made worse off by dam/hydropower and roads programmes and projects but design
and implementation will ensure that all potentially disadvantaged peoples are made
absolutely better off.
2. All GMS dam/hydropower and roads programmes and projects supported by the
ADB should have a valid public involvement process involving active information
exchange and learning between stakeholders, from the beginning of the planning
process.
3. Informed decision making should lead to improved decision making, so the ADB
should make a major investment in improving the baseline data and information
available to all levels of GMS decision makers.
4. Information disclosure and transparency of decision making will be fundamental
characteristics of ADB activity.
5. The ADB should only consider financing hydropower development projects if
compatible with an endorsed river basin management plan.
6. The ADB should only consider financing road projects when proposals contain an
acceptable justification and adequate plan for enhancing access to social services by
people in the impact area.
7. Dam/hydropower and road projects in the Mekong Region, if they are to be
supported by the ADB, should contain a strategy for ensuring that local affected
peoples share substantially in project benefits, with particular attention paid
specifically to the poor, ethnic minorities and women (SEI et al. 2002).
The acceptance by the ADB of this framework indicates a significant step forward in
ADB commitment to environmental governance, and provides a leverage point for
groups monitoring ADB activity.  The ADB should now expect to be held accountable to
the framework.
ADB is one of a range of influential regional actors16 lending in the order of
US$5 billion per annum.17  These monies are keenly borrowed by developing
                                                
16 Discussion of the Asian Development Bank and Mekong River Commission is not meant to
imply they are particularly powerful regional actors.  Other actors such as the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund and Japan Bank of International Cooperation are all the subject of
useful scrutiny.
17 This figure is for all countries in the Bank’s sphere of operations.  A total lending in 1999 of
US$4,979 million included US$88 million for Cambodia, US$195 million for Vietnam, <US$50
million for Lao PDR, and US$363 million for Thailand.  China is the major client for the ADB.
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country members18as they represent relatively cheap finance; hence the ADB’s
general leverage opportunities, especially via credit conditions, are very
significant.  Many question the general validity of this level of influence of
international financial institutions and donors (Stokke 1995, Crawford 1997).
The dangers of over-influence and coercion are much discussed by lender critics,
but also by lenders themselves (World Bank 1998).  Notwithstanding these
comments, credit conditions are an entrenched part of global financing and there
are well-argued views that environmental governance can be enhanced by
nuanced pressure from lenders (Hyden 1999).
Critical civil society
The approach of the ADB and its shareholders has been the subject of increased
scrutiny by Mekong Region civil society actors (see Cornford and Simon 2001).
Research prepared for and presented at conferences in Chiang Mai 2000, Sydney
2000, Tokyo 2000, Shanghai 2002 and Phnom Penh 2002 has analysed and
challenged the performance of the ADB.  Civil society organisations have
criticised what they have seen as non-participatory Bank processes which have
led to non-transparent, inequitable decision making.  Particular projects have
been targeted for advocacy, for example, the Samut Prakarn waste water
treatment plant in Thailand.  The environment policy and the acceptance of the
SEF are positive improvements, for which civil society can claim much catalytic
credit.  Nevertheless, trust between many elements of critical civil society and
the Bank remains low.
Lower Mekong water use negotiations
Background
The MRC facilitates water use negotiations between the four governments of the
Lower Mekong River: Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam (Box 5).
Disputes exist, and others are looming, over extractions, diversions, pollution,
changes in flow regime and consequent impacts on hydrology, ecology,
economies and societies.  The Water Utilisation Programme (WUP) being
undertaken between 1999–2005 by the MRC is intended to provide a framework
for dealing with these issues. The MRC member governments agreed on data
sharing protocols in 2001.  Note that this has taken more than 40 years to
achieve.  Since then MRC has also succeeded in arranging for basic river data to
be regularly provided by, and shared with, China.19   
                                                
18 The monies are also ‘keenly loaned’ as internal ADB processes do keep pressure on staff to keep
loan funds moving out in synchrony with the way they arrive at the Bank – as of course, the Bank
itself borrows the funds from the global money market.
19 China is now providing information during high flow periods as a contribution to ‘flood control’.
However, dry season flow information – which is of critical importance to downstream countries –
remains unavailable and outside the terms of the present agreement.  It is the changes to dry season
flow, and consequent ecological and livelihood impacts, caused by Yunnan dam building which are
of most concern to dam sceptics.
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The WUP process is being forced along by the principal suppliers of the
US$16.3 million operating funds,20 the Global Environment Facility, and their
insistent agents the World Bank.  The first major outcome demanded by the
World Bank oversight team was for the MRC member countries to agree on data
and information exchange and sharing ‘rules’.
Box 5 The Mekong River
The Mekong River runs for about 4,800 kilometres, and is the 8th largest (in terms of
amount of water) and 12th longest river in the world.  It begins in mountains on the
northeastern rim of the Tibetan Plateau at approximately 5,500 metres above sea level.  It
flows for 2,161 km through the Chinese territory of Qinghai, Tibet and Yunnan.  It
travels for another 2,719 km through Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia and
Vietnam, ending at the South China Sea.  The river basin has an area of 795,000 km2,
representing a very small percentage of China’s territory, 4% of Myanmar, 97% of Lao
PDR, 36% of Thailand, 86% of Cambodia and 20% of Vietnam.  The Upper Mekong
countries contribute (on average) 18% of the total flow: 16% from China and 2% from
Myanmar.  The remaining 82% comes from the Lower Mekong countries: Lao PDR
35%, Thailand 11%, Cambodia 18% and Vietnam 11%.  There is significant contrast
between the ‘wet’ and the ‘dry’ season.  Highest flows are usually from September-
November, lowest flows are usually February-April.  The flood ‘season’ may account for
85-90% of the total flow, of which the peak month (on average September) may account
for 20-30%.  There are about 70 million people living in the basin.
The 1995 Mekong River Agreement – parties to which are the governments of Thailand,
Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia – created a Track 1 governance forum by committing
signatories to cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilisation, management
and conservation of the water and water-related resources of the Mekong River Basin,
including but not limited to irrigation, hydropower, navigation, flood control, fisheries,
timber floating, recreation and tourism.  Article 5 commits members to reasonable and
equitable utilisation of the waters of the Mekong River system.  Article 6 commits
members to maintenance of flows on the mainstream.
The specific challenge for the WUP is to put the principles of Articles 5 and 6
into practice.  Article 26 requires MRC to prepare water utilisation rules to
enforce Articles 5 and 6.  However, as has been pointed out by senior MRC
personnel, these articles are “interlinked with the totality of the 1995 Agreement,
especially Article 2 ‘Projects programmes and Planning’, Article 3 ‘Protection
of the Environment and Ecological Balance’, and Article 7 ‘Prevention and
Cessation of Harmful Effects’” (Pech Sokhem 2002).
                                                
20 Of the total budget, almost US$11 million is from the Global Environment Facility, US$2.8
million from co-donors (Japan, Finland and France), US$1.24 million from national Mekong
Committees and US$1.25 million from the Mekong River Commission secretariat.
ANU page 45
John Dore
424
It is the challenge of the WUP team to facilitate negotiations which move beyond
‘interest based bargaining’.  It has never been expected that this would be easy as
it is recognised that “…international water management is a long-term, dynamic
and often contentious process.  The objective of the WUP and the process of
river basin management will be evolutionary and may take a long time to
mature” (WB 2000).  No doubt the MRC is pleased that the World Bank clearly
understands the WUP challenge.
Environmental governance of the WUP processes
A recent change in direction by MRC from executing projects to more holistic
river basin management is significant.  This refocus is enabling MRC to build
some credibility with the wider basin community, many of whom have seen the
organisation in the past as uncritically wedded to the large dam development
paradigms embodied in what became known as ‘the Mekong Project’ (Huddle
1972, Jacobs 1998, Mitchell 1998, Ojendal 2000).  The new commitment is to
being a “learning organisation and a centre of knowledge and information
exchange…(with a) strong commitment to improving the livelihoods of the
people in the Mekong region” (MRC 2001b).
The MRC recognises they need to bring other actors and subject matter into the
mainstream of their processes and provide a mechanism for the expression and
exchange of what may be widely and fundamentally differing views about
upstream and tributary development, inter-basin diversions etc.  The Annual
Report 2000 acknowledges it is “important that decisions on development
include a ‘bottom-up’ process and are not confined to a ‘top-down’ approach.
The voice of the people directly affected, and of other stakeholders such as
community groups or NGOs, must be heard”.  Moreover, it admits that it “has
virtually no experience in this vital field” and that it must “drastically accelerate
activities to promote public participation” (MRC 2001a:23).
MRC’s lack of achievement thus far in genuine public participation is complex.
The youth of the new version of the organisation, the sustainability orientation
and mindset of some of the agencies which dominate the national Mekong
Committees, the politics between the member states, stinging criticisms by
NGOs, realisation of limited successes to this point and operating rules which
limit engagement with the wider basin community are all relevant.  Collectively
this has resulted in the MRC lacking confidence and being constrained in the
extent to which it has proactively engaged with the large range of Mekong
Region actors outside of the MRC family.  In relation to hydropower and the
WUP, there has been a hyper-sensitive wariness of member country inter-
governmental politics.  There is also some resistance to being ‘lectured’ at by
NGOs and past and present Mekong country experiences of being ‘directed by
donors’.
To be legitimate in the eyes of civil society the WUP needed to bring other actors
and subject matter into the process at an early stage and consider fundamentally
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differing views of upstream and tributary development and other sensitive issues
such as the rationale and justification for inter-basin diversions. Other MRC
programmes will, and should, be more heavily scrutinised.  For example, the
basin development planning process, launched in 2002, can be conceptualised in
at least two ways: a plan to identify possible ‘development’ projects for each
member country (with minimal public debate), negotiated as priorities, packaged
and presented to potential financiers – investors or donors; or a planning process
to explore the basin development options by the basin community, allowing
debate which acknowledges different points of view.  Many state actors want it
to be the former, a simple uneventful process which enables all countries to have
a ‘collect’ from external donors, whilst leaving their own national development
planning independent of regional scrutiny.
The new management regime and organisational structure at MRC provide an
opportunity for enhanced transborder/regional governance – in at least the
Mekong River Basin part of the larger Mekong Region.  Despite its
imperfections, the MRC framework remains an excellent opportunity for
peaceful learning and cooperation between all six Mekong riparian countries.
However, to a large extent the MRC itself remains marginalised from the
national decision making processes of its members.
Critical civil society
Civil society is not waiting for MRC to decide what it wants to do about
participation in the WUP or any of its other programmes.  Between September
and November 2002 MRC was the specific focus of a Track 4 initiative, the
Dialogue on River Basin Development and Civil Society in the Mekong,
organised by a coalition of NGOs and universities (Box 6).  Increased scrutiny of
MRC by critical civil society is forcing it to refine and articulate its stance on
many issues, including whether or not it is in the business of conflict resolution,
or whether it is focused on providing ‘impartial’ advice to policy makers in
national governments, whilst taking fewer policy positions of its own.
Mekong River ‘channel improvement’
Background
In 2001 an Agreement on Commercial Navigation on the Lancang-Mekong
River between Simao (Yunnan) and Luang Prabang (Lao PDR) was signed by
transport officials from China, Lao PDR, Thailand and Myanmar.  River trade
between Thailand and China is already reported to have increased, with about
2000 vessels calling at the Chiang Saen port in 2001, double the number from
the previous year (Woranuj Maneerungsee and Saritdet Marukatat 2002).
China is funding river dredging to allow the passage of larger vessels. There are
also associated plans to remove islets by blasting with explosives.  The aim is to
facilitate easier river transport for trade and, later, tourism.
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The plans have evolved over several years of discussions in various forums in
China, and also the GMS economic cooperation initiative.  Phase 1 of the project
plans to remove 11 major rapids and shoals, plus 10 reefs along a 331 km stretch
of the river.  Navigation markers and winches will ensure that the river is
navigable for vessels of 100-150 dwt (dead weight tonnage) for about 95% of the
year.  Phase 2 plans to remove a further 51 rapids and shoals to allow 300 dwt
vessels to traverse the river 95% of the year.  Phase 3 plans to deepen the channel
to allow 500 dwt vessels to traverse 95% of the year (SEARIN et al. 2002).
Box 6 Declaration by local communities in Thailand 2002 (Track 4 outcome)
Representatives of ‘local communities of the river basins in Thailand’ gathered near the
Mun River in Thailand’s Ubon Ratchathani province between 9-12 November 2002 for
the ‘Dialogue on River Basin Development and Civil Society in the Mekong Region’.
Following the meeting, a declaration was publicly released which claims that the
practical implementation, thus far, of inter-government cooperation via the Mekong
River Agreement limits ‘civil society’ involvement in decision making, to “the groups
that provide monetary assistance to support the expansion of economic growth in the
Mekong River Basin”.
The declaration asserts that the Mekong River agreement has “excluded local
communities from making decisions about the Mekong River Basin and development”.
The declaration questions “the very nature of this ‘development’ that has emerged from
this ‘cooperation’ as well as the ‘development assistance’ that is being provided by ‘civil
society’”.  It further asserts that “local communities are being sacrificed in the name of
‘development’….(which) is destroying the lives, livelihoods, cultures and natural
ecosystems of the local communities of the Mekong Region”; marginalising,
dispossessing and disempowering local people.
The declaration concludes with a call for advocacy which ensures that “community rights
over natural resources becomes the guiding principle for development in the Mekong
Region” (Local people 2002).
This is an extremely significant intervention in the natural system of the Mekong
River which will obviously have an impact on river ecology and local
communities.  Local organisations along the river are being supported by the
Southeast Asian Rivers Network (SEARIN) in a struggle to stop what they see as
unnecessary and short-sighted ecological destruction (SEARIN et al. 2002).
Environmental governance of the channel improvement project
Any discussion of environment governance can be relatively brief.  In short,
there has been very little.  It is remarkable how such scant attention can be paid
by governments to potentially very significant negative impacts.  All emphasis is
on the positive benefits expected to be gained – doubtless there will be some
beneficiaries – with minimal investigation of potential problems.  In situations
where political momentum is behind a project, participatory EA processes
become problematic navigation obstacles themselves.
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Associated with the signing in 2001 of the inter-government agreement on
commercial navigation, a feasibility study was completed in late 2000 which
supported, in principle, the proposed alterations to the river, including rapids and
reef removal.  By September 2001 an EIA, coordinated by the Chinese, had been
prepared and sent to each of the other three government signatories to the
Agreement.  Thailand’s government approved the EIA in January 2002, and Lao
PDR in April 2002 (SEARIN et al. 2002).  Their own river basin management
organisation, the MRC, was not used by either Thailand or Lao PDR to inform or
actively participate in the initial agreement negotiations.  It has become involved
‘after the event’ in offering to conduct an independent EIA of the project (an
offer not taken up) and in commissioning evaluations which have been extremely
critical of the existing EIA (Cocklin and Hain 2001, Finlayson 2002, McDowall
2002).  Each of the evaluations noted the inadequacy of the information base
upon which decisions of ‘no impact’ or ‘acceptable impact’ had been made; one
succinctly concluded that the EIA was “substantively inadequate and in many
places fundamentally flawed” (Cocklin and Hain 2001:2), another that
consideration of the river’s biological values was “seriously deficient” (Finlayson
2002:9).21 And yet, this EIA was initially deemed adequate by all governments to
approve the project.  In fact, the ‘impediments’ inside China’s borders have
already been removed.  In 2002 work started along the part of the river bordered
by Myanmar and Lao PDR.
The environmental governance of this process compares poorly against the
comparative principles summarised earlier.  The ‘channel improvement’ project
– if the EIA is the benchmark indicator – has given scant consideration to the
ecological risks of the project, and the likely impact on the livelihoods of river-
using communities.  Governance to this point has been characterised by an
absence of any holistic approach to analysis.  Formal participation by local
communities, or others likely to have an alternative view, has been deemed
unnecessary.  The eventual public availability of the EIA has provided a base of
information for initial analysis.  But once again, project opponents find
themselves in reactionary mode having been largely excluded from presenting
their arguments at earlier stages of the decision making process.
Critical civil society
The environmental governance channel improvement debate has undoubtedly
been opened up by the activities of the NGO SEARIN, which includes high-
profile Thai academics on its board of management, and employs keen activist
researchers to pursue and piece together information that is otherwise slow to
find its way into the media.  SEARIN supports concerned Thai people’s
organisations who provide much of the river-specific local knowledge essential
for an advocacy campaign.  In turn they are supported by regional NGOs such as
                                                
21 After many months of being largely unknown, excerpts from the reports were distilled for media
distribution and advocacy by Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA 2002).
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TERRA, and international NGOs such as Oxfam and the International Rivers
Network.  Other activists are passing SEARIN information on the progress of the
project and concerns from people in Myanmar, Lao PDR and Yunnan.  A debate
which has previously been restricted to pro-project inter-government and ADB
discussions has now spilled out into the larger civic domain.
Local people are having to scale up their advocacy to the regional scale in order
to challenge increasing regionalism driven primarily by trade liberalisation
between China and Thailand.  Local Thai NGOs and villagers made a submission
to the Thai Environmental Senate Committee in May 2002 calling for a halt to
the project, at least until an ‘opposing case’ can be heard.  This lobbying may yet
prove to be decisive.  All governments of the region were petitioned in July 2002
by a coalition of “76 organisations along with 16 individual academics from 25
countries” (SEARIN et al. 2002:22).  At the time of writing, the entry of civil
society, supported by the work commissioned by MRC, is changing the political
momentum of what would otherwise be a fait accompli.  The wisdom of the
project is being reconsidered by elements of government in both Thailand and
Lao PDR.
Upper Mekong hydroelectric dams in China
Background
Dam construction for hydroelecticity production is a super-sensitive issue in the
Mekong Region.  A long list of projects has become the subject of national, and
in some cases regional and international, controversies.  Examples include
Vietnam’s Se San, Sre Pok and Son La dams; Lao PDR’s Theun Hinboun and
Nam Theun 2 dams; Thailand’s Pak Mun dam; and Myanmar’s water resources
development projects on the Salween River.  The driving paradigms and
extremely political governance processes of each are the subject of intensive
debate.  The construction, operation and associated impacts of dams in China’s
Yunnan Province are also, rightly, the subject of intense interest.
The dams are being built by the Chinese government in the upper reaches of the
Mekong River – known in China as the Lancang (Table 2).  Mostly referred to as
the Upper Mekong (Lancang) dam cascade, this super-project has been
conceived to take advantage of an 800 metre drop over a 750 kilometre river
section by building eight dams (Plinston and He Daming 2000, McCormack
2001, Moreau and Ernsberger 2001).
The cascade offers an alternative source of energy to coal, via its unquestioned
hydroelectric power generating potential, calculated as being up to 25,500
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megawatts.22  The electricity produced will be able to enter the Mekong Region
electricity grid which governments of the region have formally agreed to
establish via their signing, at the 2002 GMS leaders’ summit, of an inter-
government agreement on regional power trade.
It also has the potential to offer limited flood control, more assured dry-season
flows, increased navigation options, reduced saline intrusion and create extra
irrigation opportunities for downstream countries like Thailand.  Moreover, it has
been argued that it could facilitate a “reprieve for the forests, fields and villages
that would otherwise be submerged under dams in the (other) Mekong riparian
countries” (McCormack 2001:17).
Table 2 Upper Mekong (Lancang) Dam Cascade
Dam name Elev’n Active
storage
Power
capacity
Annual power
output
Height of
dam wall
Status
metres asl million m3 megawatts 108 kwh metres
Gonguoqiao 1,319 510 710 41 130 Design
Xiaowan 1,240 151 4,200 189 292 2002-12
Manwan 994 11 1,500 78 126 1986-96
Dachaoshan 899 9 1,350 67 110 1996-03
Nuozhadu 812 223 5,500 238 254 Prefeasibility
Jinghong 602 12 1,500 81 118 Feasibility
Ganlanba 533 ? 150 8 ? Design
Mengsong 519 ? 600 34 ? Design
Source: (Plinston and He Daming 2000, McCormack 2001)
On the other hand, there is huge concern in the regional and international
community about the impacts of the dams on riverine ecosystems and local
livelihoods (Roberts 2001, IRN 2002).  There are major worries about the
impacts of altering the natural flow regime of the river in a way which will
increase the downstream dry-season flows and decrease the normal flow
downstream of nutritious sediments.  Negative impacts may also include
increased downstream erosion, serious disturbance to fisheries ecology23 and
devastation of annual river bank gardening enterprises.  These concerns do not
appear to have been addressed.  Those who stand to lose out include millions of
                                                
22 The hydroenergy potential of the Mekong River in Yunnan is estimated at 25,500 megawatts,
with an exploitable hydropower capacity of 23,480 megawatts.  This data is taken from a report on
the website of the International Commission on Large Dams.  The report concentrates on the
Dachaoshan dam, but in general terms speaks of the Yunnan stretch of the Mekong River as being
a “rich, rare hydropower mine for its prominent natural advantages in abundant and well-
distributed runoff, large drops and less flooding losses of the reservoirs” (ICOLD 2001).
23 Fisheries production in the Mekong is fundamental to local livelihoods.  Current estimates are
that almost 2 million tonnes are harvested each year from the Mekong fishery – 1.75 million tonnes
from the ‘capture fisheries’ valued at US$ 1.45 billion, plus another 250,000 tonnes from
aquaculture (MRC 2002).
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people downstream – mostly beyond the Chinese border – reliant on fishing and
river bank farming.
Manwan dam has comprehensively solved Yunnan’s short term electricity crisis.
However, the overall economic benefits to China may have been substantially
over-estimated by information presumably used as a basis for decision-making.
The useful life of the dams may be much less than has been (presumably)
expected and factored into economic calculations.  Whilst estimated construction
and operating costs per unit of power produced may be attractive, sedimentation
inflows into the first-completed Manwan dam are much higher than anticipated
(Plinston and He Daming 2000).  There are now concerns that it may only be
able to function as a power-producer for less than 20 years (Roberts 2001:150).
Construction of the further upstream Xiaowan now seems ‘necessary’ to avoid
Manwan having an almost absurdly brief useful life.
The Upper Mekong (Lancang) dam construction has presumably been driven by
immediate pressures of domestic energy shortages; long term estimates of
domestic and regional needs; and an ongoing commitment to a water resources
development paradigm which sees large dams as integral (McCormack 2001).
Elsewhere in the world this approach is being seriously challenged, most
publicly in the outputs of the World Commission on Dams (WCD 2000).
However, this paradigm is obviously still thriving in 21st century China where
about 280 large dams were under construction in the late 1990s (WCD 2000:10),
against a national backdrop of about 80,000 large and medium dams, most of
which have been built since the success of the Mao-led revolutionaries in 1949
(Kattoulas 2001).  Energy production has been prioritised.
Environmental governance of Yunnan dam construction
So how then does this example measure up against the previously mentioned
governance ideals?  In relation to sustainability, it seems that regional ecological
and social sustainability is being traded off for national economic development.
There are clear threats of serious or irreversible damage; the precautionary
principle has certainly not been invoked.  Environmental degradation has long
been associated with China’s economic development (He Baochuan 1991, Smil
1993, Marks 1996).  The cascade will probably continue the trend, but in this
case, most of the negative impacts fall to other people in other countries.
Amongst other deficiencies, many possible transboundary impacts have been
‘externalised’ from consideration.
The ecology of the system will alter, with biodiversity losses inevitable.  The
value of the resources to many users, for example fish, sediment and variability
in seasonal flows, has either been ignored or outweighed.  Regional holism has
been redefined and scoped down to national energy needs.  The decision making
process, prior to committing to at least the first three dams in the cascade, has
excluded any meaningful participation by downstream, presumably affected
parties.  The project has lacked transparency.  Publicly available data to inform
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debate remain relatively scarce.  What information there is has emerged in a
piecemeal fashion from various sources – academic foraging, ADB-funded
studies and quietly undertaken local research.
Thus, the cascade, so far, is a textbook case of bad environmental governance.  It
has epitomised non-transparency, non-provision of information and non-
involvement of the public in learning about and influencing decision making.  It
also exemplifies disinterest in international or regional principles of cooperation,
agreements, or rules.  It represents a complete failure of international civil
society and downstream nations to engage with China in any meaningful way
prior to plans becoming fixed in internal domestic political agendas.  At this
point the governance process regarding the Upper Mekong dams appears to
breach each of the aforementioned environmental governance principles.  If we
agree those features are desirable, then we must conclude that this is a clear case
of institutional failure.
The Upper Mekong (Lancang) dam cascade is a classic project, the most
significant human intervention ever made in the natural order of the Mekong
river ecosystem, with substantial and undoubtedly complex transboundary
ecological, social, cultural, economic and political impacts.  The
regional/transborder nature of ecosystems requires regional/transborder political
cooperation.  China’s non-membership of the MRC has precluded discussion in
that forum.  Other tools, such as transboundary Environment Assessment (EA)
protocols, and UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses have also been ineffective in either fostering or
forcing more extensive ‘cooperation’ or ‘dialogue’.  Article 8 of the 1997 UN
Convention lays down a general obligation for riparian states to cooperate “in
order to attain optimal utilisation and adequate protection of an international
watercourse” (cited and discussed by McCaffrey 2001).
A few final remarks seem appropriate.  The economic growth imperatives of the
Chinese Develop the West and Gateway to Southeast Asia policies obviously
require energy and understandably, the engineers and policy decision makers are
drawn to the mathematical possibilities presented by the Lancang.  However, the
lack of dialogue with neighbours typifies the unequal relationship between China
and the downstream states.  If negative transboundary impacts have been
considered, they have been dismissed, without discussion, as undesirable but
necessary consequences of essential, national economic development.  If there
are positive impacts for downstream nations, they are being undersold.  But of
course, this is speculation as there remains a relative paucity of information on
the Chinese position.  Clearly, there is acceptance by several states that the
cascade will be built.  Downstream countries also have their own dam-building
agendas and/or energy demand projections.  For example, Thailand has already
signed a Memorandum of Understanding to purchase up to 3,000 megawatts
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from the Jinghong component of the Yunnan cascade24 from about 2015,
indicating de facto acceptance, if not support for the project.  Support for the
project has also been voiced by a part of the Thai bureaucracy which shares the
dominant Chinese dam-building paradigm.25
The failure of Lower Mekong countries to engage with China on this issue is
indicative of the geo-realpolitik.  China is independent and is seeking to retain
that independence partly via water resources development and new energy
production from hydropower.  The concerns of downstream nations do not
appear to have registered on Beijing’s political Richter scale.  But this is no
surprise given the reticence of any of the downstream government elites to make
any serious representations to their more powerful upstream neighbour, and in
several cases, increasingly important patron.
Critical civil society
In relation to the Upper Mekong dams cascade, state actors of many different
types have been unable to ensure anything approaching a thorough discussion of
the project alternatives and likely impacts.  It was linkages between Chinese and
international academics, particularly from the mid 1990s (Chapman and He
Daming 1996), which first brought project information into the wider public
arena, although the rosiness of the possible scenarios they presented were greeted
with wry suspicion by some (Hinton 2000).  An International Rivers Symposium
in Kunming in 1999 also aided outsiders to gain some insights into the Chinese
perspective (He Daming et al. 2001).  This is not to say that there haven’t been
many people and organisations who tried either before or since.  The Economic
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) has attempted to
facilitate more informed debate about this particular project.  In its post-1999
phase, the MRC has also called for more public debate (Kristensen 2001).  An
ADB project on the sustainable development of the Yunnan part of the Lancang-
Mekong Basin was also provocative and intensified the debate (Landcare
Research New Zealand 2000).
                                                
24 Memorandum of Understanding on Purchasing Electric Power from the People’s Republic of
China for the Kingdom of Thailand between Thailand’s Prime Minister’s Office and PRC’s
Economic and Trade Commission, signed 12 November 1998 (cited by Xiao Peng n.d).
25 The Director-General of Thailand’s Department of Energy Promotion and Development, Pradesh
Subatr saw the cascade as a boon to Thailand providing extra justification for completion of the
extensive Khong-Chi-Mun irrigation and Mekong river water diversion project in Isaan (Kanittha
Inchukul 1997).
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Box 7 Regional Environment Forum statement 2002 (Track 3 outcome)
On 14-15 November 2002, a group of 35 independent researchers and civil society
advocates from Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and China met in Phnom
Penh at the First Annual Regional Environmental Forum.26  The purpose of the Forum,
organised by the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, the Thailand
Environment Institute and the World Resources Institute, was to discuss environmental
governance challenges in the Mekong Region.   Specific recommendations from
participants in the REF were directed to governments, multilateral institutions, private
corporations, and civil society groups with the objective of strengthening environmental
governance in the Mekong Region.  The recommendations related to:
? enhancing regional environmental governance;
? increasing public access to environmental information;
? improving environmental impact assessment; and
? enhancing enforcement of environmental regulations.
It was acknowledged by the REF participants that “action on these recommendations will
require significant political will, strengthened capacity, as well as financial resources,
and increased collaboration across national and sectoral boundaries” (REF participants
2002).
The Oxfam organisation, amongst others, has since supported the work of
independent Chinese researchers to analyse the details of the project.  More
recently, hard-hitting advocacy groups such as the International Rivers Network
have also become involved.  The efforts by the more critical civil society groups
are extremely valuable, but the providers of the information have to be quite
careful, for fears of being charged with acting against the ‘national interest’.  In
these circumstances, a news-seeking at least semi-independent international
media has become vital.  There is now a steady stream of reports on the Mekong
River development (for example, see: Moreau and Ernsberger 2001, Kazmin and
McGregor 2002), essential in maintaining pressure for more explanation and
examination of a controversial project with far-reaching impacts.
Synthesis of regional environmental governance challenges
It was uncontroversially suggested earlier that ideal environmental governance
processes would demonstrate a serious commitment to sustainability, holism,
participation, transparency and equity.  More contestable is the assertion that
regional environmental governance in the Mekong Region is, in general, inching
towards, but still far from regularly applying these principles in practice.  Despite
the changes wrought by globalisation and regionalism, the examples point to a
range of governance challenges for the Mekong Region related to the principles
and other associated issues.
                                                
26 The REF was a follow up to the Resource Policy Support Initiative (REPSI) environmental
governance work coordinated by World Resources Institute (see Badenoch 2001)
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Dominance of national interest
Some degree of regional environmental governance is vital because many issues
have region-wide and/or transborder dimensions which are best managed via
regional protocols and rules.  However, at present national interests are
considered far more important than regional interests.  For example, national
representatives in processes like the Mekong River water use negotiations are
guided by their perception or instructions concerning national interests.  The
much vaunted Mekong ‘spirit of cooperation’ often seems optimistically over-
stated.  Unless some flexibility and a regional ecosystem perspective can be
fostered, such exchanges are really vested interest negotiations rather than
regional cooperation.
Reticence by states to ‘cede’ any sovereignty
The region’s countries have relatively young political regimes.  Taking even a
‘short’ 50 year view back through Mekong history is a reminder of the struggles
to obtain and retain sovereignty.  Given this recent history it is understandable
that states are reluctant to do anything which could be seen as ceding any
sovereignty to the regional level.  Existing regional ‘cooperation’ between states
usually enshrines sovereign rights and non-interference; ASEAN is an obvious
case.  The GMS-ADB economic cooperation initiative, particularly whilst
focusing on planning, has also not posed great threats to sovereignty.  However,
more substantial implementation of the infrastructure plans would be quite
different and require agreements to be finalised which safeguard investments.
Absence of holistic approaches
In ‘environment and development’ governance processes there must be thorough
assessment of expected impacts of proposals and alternative options.  At present
this does not happen.  Ministers participating at the annual GMS-ADB economic
cooperation meeting in 2000 agreed to the need for transboundary EA
procedures.  The MRC has since been working on these.  However, the process is
extremely slow and at the time of writing in late 2002, formal transboundary EA
in the Mekong Region was still practically non-existent.  Much higher quality
EA is needed which takes account of monetary and non-monetary costs, benefits
and risks of the options – and specifically who is likely to win or lose.
Restricted access to information
There remains a significant gap between the rhetoric and reality of Mekong
Region cooperation when it comes to data sharing and general access to
information.  This subject is at the core of Principle 10 of Agenda 21 to which
Mekong Region countries are signatories.  In other parts of the world
environmental accountability is being embodied in regional agreements.  Two
European protocols are being examined by both Mekong Region governments
and civil society groups as potentially useful models for adaptation.  The first of
these is the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
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Transboundary Context, commonly known as the Espoo Convention (UNECE
1991, Tesli and Husby 1999).  The general Espoo objective is to prevent or
reduce adverse transboundary impacts of proposed activities.  The second is the
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making,
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, commonly known as the Aarhus
Convention (Petkova and Veit 2000) on environmental accountability.
Creating space for civil society to participate in decision making
Universal rhetoric in governance discourse, often embodied in the operating rules
of states (via their constitutions) and other organisations (by their respective
governance charters) is to encourage ‘participation’.  But of course this means
different things to different people.  A serious commitment to participation seeks
and achieves diverse stakeholder representation and involvement via genuine
participatory processes that are safe, non-threatening, non-coercive, predictable
and maintained over time.  This principle is particularly problematic for Mekong
country governments, and their regional organisations, who have fundamentally
different conceptions of what constitutes genuine public participation.
Concluding remarks
Enhancing governance is a key social challenge for the Mekong Region.  Many
of the other social challenges discussed in this book would be greatly assisted by
improved governance processes.
There is increasing regionalism in the Mekong Region, but it would be a mistake
to construe all of this as ‘cooperative’ and ‘good’.  Much of the state-led
cooperative regionalism is focused on economic growth, freeing up trade and
installing infrastructure to facilitate increased interaction and economic activity.
The ADB GMS economic cooperation and surrounding processes are the most
obvious embodiment of this claimed ‘unity’.  However, the other examples are a
reminder of the limits of inter-government regional cooperation.  It is within this
context that Track 3 and 4 regional governance becomes so important.
Within an often oppressive context, finding mechanisms in each country to allow
civil society to genuinely participate in decision making remains a significant
challenge.  Whilst slow change is evident, states still prefer top-down approaches
which are often formal and intimidating to all but the most self assured.
Nevertheless, as a tribute to persistence, and aided by some aspects of
globalisation, there has been an emergence of a critical civil society in the
Mekong Region.  It is playing an important role in challenging and contesting
governments of the region to improve and more robustly scrutinise each others’
performance and approaches.  Much of this is being done under the cloak of
environmental governance but it should be seen as a direct challenge to the
development paradigms and decision making processes of the ruling elites in
each state.
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CHAPTER 4
CHINA’S ENERGY REFORMS AND 
HYDROPOWER EXPANSION IN YUNNAN
John Dore, Yu Xiaogang, Kevin Yuk-shing Li
Introduction
Energy sector reforms in China have unleashed an explosion in power 
industry development proposals across the country. Nationwide there is 
an intention to almost double hydropower capacity by 2010. The reforms 
have led to a national surge in competition between corporate generators 
to secure actual and potential power-producing “assets.” Nowhere are 
dam builders aspirations’ greater than in the south-west, especially Yunnan 
Province.
In the past Yunnan has been seen as a peripheral province—both 
geographically and sociopolitically. However, in terms of both the Mekong 
region and China, Yunnan is an increasingly important part of the water 
governance story.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief update on what is 
happening in Yunnan—looking at the Nu, Lancang and Jinsha rivers—and 
then situate this within the wider context of China’s changing political 
economy.
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Yunnan Province
Yunnan has a population of approximately 43 million people (2,000 
population census). It is one of three Chinese provinces with an ethnic 
minority population of over 10 million people. In 1990, of China’s officially 
recognized fifty-five ethnic groups, fifty-one were living in Yunnan, 
accounting for a third of the province’s population. Of these, twenty-five 
ethnic groups were living in “compact communities” with a population of 
less than five thousand. It is China’s most culturally diverse province, with 
fifteen of the ethnic groups being indigenous to Yunnan—the Bai, Hani, 
Dai, Lisu, Wa, Lahu, Naxi, Jingpo, Bulang, Pumi, Nu, Deang, Dulong and 
Jinuo. It is the eighth largest province in China, covering an area of 394,100 
km2 that is 4.1 percent of the country’s mainland area. Yunnan shares 4,060 
km of border with Myanmar [Burma], Lao pdr and Vietnam. It is divided 
administratively into sixteen prefectures and 126 counties. Eight of the 
prefectures have the status of ethnic minority autonomous prefectures—
including the Nujiang Lisu Nationality Autonomous Prefecture.
In recent years Yunnan has rapidly industrialized, with the formal 
economy increasing markedly during the 1990s. Core industries are 
tobacco, machinery, metallurgy, agricultural products, chemicals and 
building materials. The main border trade partner is Myanmar—recently 
estimated as accounting for 80 percent of cross border trade. In 2002 cross 
border trade was valued at usd 371 million. However, overall imports 
and exports were usd 2.23 billion, 80 percent of which was with asean 
economies (Rungfapaisarn 2003).
Agricultural production, whether for trade or subsistence, is still 
dominates the provincial economy. While the economy is growing 
fast, in 1997, 36 percent of the population was still classified by China’s 
government as living in poverty (annual income less than usd 77). Despite 
the recent transformation in Yunnan, the economic gap between China’s 
eastern and coastal regions and the western parts of the country has 
increased. This is for many reasons, including the coast’s more attractive 
geographic location for investors and the willingness of the state to cede 
some control and encourage private sector-led economic development in 
eastern and coastal provinces.
As part of a general effort to reduce this gap, the national government 
is promoting the Western Region Development Strategy (adb 2002), 
which includes Yunnan. The provincial government is promoting 
its cultural diversity, biodiversity, mineral endowments and strategic 
location as a “gateway to South East Asia.” Boosting production of “clean 
green” hydropower is seen as a strategically vital sunrise industry to aid 
development of the province and country.
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Hydropower and World Natural Heritage and local 
livelihoods
Yunnan has over six hundred rivers forming six major river basin systems: 
Dulong (Irrawaddy), Nu (Salween), Lancang (Mekong), Jinsha (Yangtze), 
Zhu (Pearl), Honghe/Lixian Jiang (flows into the Red in Vietnam). Rivers 
have multiple uses and are valued for many different reasons. In this 
section we wish to introduce the Yunnan hydropower context, but also 
make mention of World Natural Heritage sites and local livelihoods.
SOURCE: World Agroforestry Centre (icraf) & Centre for Biodiversity & Indigenous 
Knowledge (cbik), Kunming
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Map 4.1  Yunnan’s major rivers
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By one method of calculation, Yunnan is seen as having 24 percent of 
China’s hydropower potential for medium- and large-sized projects. In 
terms of pure hydropower potential, Yunnan has more than any of the 
other five countries of the Mekong region. Each of the Nu, Lancang and 
Jinsha are in China’s “top six hydropower rivers” (tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3).
Substantial hydropower expansion is part of national planning and 
Yunnan’s role is a key one. One industry source claims that “China has 
planned to construct over 50 large and super large hydropower stations 
in the next 20 years” (Alexanders Oil and Gas Connections 2003). A 
deputy-director of the State Power Corporation, Chen Dongping, is 
reported as saying that China intends to spend nearly usd 40 billion by 
2010 to double its hydroelectric capacity (China Economic Review 2002). 
This would involve increasing capacity to 150,000 mw by constructing 
the equivalent of another four dams the size of the Three Gorges dam. 
Chen Dongping assumes this is necessary to reduce current dependence 
on coal and to thereby “improve the environment.” This remark is, to 
some extent, understandable given that one-third of China’s territory is 
reported as being affected by sulphur dioxide (so2) related “acid rain” and 
about 40 percent of the contributing so2 emissions comes from coal-fired 
power plants (He Jing 2002). The seriousness of the acid rain problem was 
acknowledged in 1994 when the central government launched a seven-year 
spending initiative aimed at keeping so2 emissions at or below 15 million 
tonnes per annum. It was recognized that up to three thousand highly 
polluting plants would need to be closed, with their output replaced by 
more efficient generation units (World Bank 1998).
Table 4.1  Hydropower potential of major rivers in China
River Potential installed capacity 
(mw)
Percent of the  
“top 18” Chinese rivers
Jinsha/Yangtze 210,810 49
Yalung Zangbo 54,960 13
Yellow 35,770 8
Lancang (Mekong) 28,930 7
Zhu (Pearl) 25,760 6
Nu (Salween) 30,410 7
Heilong (in China) 11,530 3
Subtotal 398,170
Rivers 8–18 30,440 7
Rivers 1–18 428,610 100
Yunnan 103,130 24
SOURCE: State Power Corporation data for “medium- and large-sized hydropower projects” 
(He Jing 2002)
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Table 4.2  Hydropower production versus potential— 
China, Western Region, Yunnan
Territory Actual 
(twh)
Potential 
(twh)
Exploitable 
(gw)
China 73 1,923.3 378.5
Western Region 38.4 1,567.8 290.9
Yunnan 6.9 394.5 71.2
Western Region (as percent of China) 52.6 81.5 76.9 
Yunnan (as percent of Western Region) 18.0 25.2 24.5 
Yunnan (as percent of China) 9.5 20.5 18.8 
SOURCE: Data for 1999 from adb report analyzing Western Region Development Strategy 
(adb 2002: table 7-4)
Table 4.3  Mekong region hydropower potential
Country/region Developed  
(twh/year)
Potential  
(twh/year)
Percent of 
potential already 
developed
Yunnan 7.9 450 1.8 
Cambodia 0 41 0.0 
Lao pdr 1.1 102 1.1 
Myanmar 1.1 366 0.3 
Thailand 4.6 49 9.4 
Vietnam 5.8 82 7.1 
Total 20.5 1,090
NOTES: The figure for Yunnan is higher than the figure in table 5.2. The data set used in table 
5.3 is older and from an adb gms energy sector study published in 1995. It refers to what is 
theoretically possible and is indicative only. What is practically and economically feasible is 
somewhat less.
SOURCE: Plinston and He Daming (1999, 26)
Although there has been an upsurge of plans for national and Yunnan 
hydropower-related dam building, there was already ample demonstration 
of China’s commitment to a water resources development paradigm which 
sees large dams as integral (McCormack 2001). Elsewhere in the world this 
approach is being seriously challenged, most publicly in the outputs of the 
World Commission on Dams (wcd 2000). However, this paradigm is still 
thriving in twenty-first century China where about 280 large dams were 
under construction in the late 1990s (wcd 2000, 10), against a national 
backdrop of about eighty thousand large and medium dams, most of 
which were built since the success of the Mao-led revolutionaries in 1949 
(Kattoulas 2001). Hydropower has long been a component of China’s 
energy strategy and the new surge should be seen as an upscaling rather 
than as a new policy emphasis.
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Table 4.4  China’s projected supply of primary energy 2000–2020
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Total (Mt, coal equivalent) 1092.7 1277.6 1481.1 1727.9 2016.4
Hydropower & nuclear (twh) 227.8 320.2 435.1 544.1 682.0
Hydropower & nuclear 
(percentage) 
20.8 25.1 29.4 31.5 33.8
Growth from 2000 levels 
(percentage)
16.9 35.5 58.1 84.5
Growth in hydropower & 
nuclear (percentage)
40.6 91.0 138.8 199.4
NOTE: He Jing (2002) notes the share of hydropower in 2000 had reached 24.8 percent.
SOURCE: 1) Data from 1999 in Asian Development Bank (adb) report analyzing the Western 
Region Development Strategy (adb 2002: Extract from tables 7-7, 7-8, 7-9). 
However, rivers are more than just flows of water with hydropower 
generation potential. For example, the San Jiang or Three Rivers region 
is part of the upper watersheds of the Nu, Lancang and Jinsha. In July 
2003 it was declared a World Natural Heritage site of the United Nations 
Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (unesco) in recognition of 
its rarity, beauty and ecological importance. Of course, rivers are also 
resources for local communities, dependent upon them—to a greater and 
lesser extent—to meet their livelihood and other needs. Conceivably, both 
hydropower development and unesco listing could provide a boost for local 
livelihoods but it does not automatically follow in either instance, unless 
priority is attached to local rights and development aspirations. Yunnan’s 
hydropower development could provide increased local opportunities 
and prosperity; however, the threat to the livelihoods of millions in river 
dependent communities, mostly downstream, is also real. Recognition of 
opportunities and threats, and a more cautious approach, is required.
Driving forces for hydropower expansion
Key drivers for Yunnan hydropower expansion include the push for, and 
direction of, economic growth, China’s associated energy security concerns, 
the Western Region Development Strategy and a political environment in 
which energy entrepreneurs have strong incentives to push ahead with 
expansion plans.
Globalization
The extensive medium and large dam building throughout China, 
especially in the past fifty years, and the new surge in Yunnan dam building 
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can be seen as a by-product of the globalization1 context in which it has and 
is taking place. Jan Aart Scholte (2000) argues that full-scale globalization 
from 1960s to the present has been grounded in four interdependent 
causes. First, the ascendancy of rationalism as the dominant form of 
knowledge that has privileged people over nature, science and solution-
seeking. Second, capitalism: Scholte agrees with the Marxist analysis 
that capitalism, defined as structures of production focused on surplus 
accumulation, is the basic engine of globalization. As capitalist impulses 
have been given more freedoms, so the rate of globalization has increased. 
Third, technological advances: undeniably, there have been continued 
extraordinary improvements in engineering, transport, communications 
and data processing which have provided the infrastructure, or the 
“hardware,” for globalization. Fourth, specific policy and regulation choices 
by which the dominance of arguments for removing business restraints, 
encouraging trade, and focusing on exports has shaped globalization. 
To a significant extent, these have been due to decisions taken by states, 
often willingly, but sometimes because they have perceived there were no 
plausible policy alternatives. Each of these causes also applies to China and 
has impacted on the focus and directions of development.
International economic integration and investors looking to 
China
International economic integration—just one part of globalization—is 
a highly significant factor, particularly in relation to providing the capital 
necessary for expensive hydropower development. A report publicized in 
August 2003 by the United Nations Committee on the Development of 
Trade noted that between 1980 and 2002 the world “stock” of Foreign 
Direct Investment (fdi)2 increased more than tenfold to usd 7.1 trillion. Of 
this amount, in 2002 the Chinese mainland share was reported as being usd 
448 billion (Beijing Review 2003b). This places China fourth worldwide in 
terms of receiving external investment, whether it is relatively fixed direct 
investment, or relatively mobile portfolio investment. In 2002 it absorbed 
usd 52.7 billion in fdi (Beijing Review 2003c). Chinese capital appears 
to have funded most of the large dams around the country. However, 
domestic and foreign investors are now more easily found to finance large 
hydropower. This is an important trend because by some predictions China 
will need to invest usd 800 billion for new power generating capacity over 
the next thirty years (iea 2002b).
More than a shift to a market economy
The most recent wave of international economic integration wave, 
from 1980 to the present, has been an era dominated by neoliberalism, and 
Beijing’s policies are no exception. Two significant elements include:
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• Corporatization/privatization of public utilities implemented 
vigorously wherever possible due to a fundamental belief in 
greater business efficiency of the private sector. A first step of 
corporatizing public utilities would almost invariably proceed 
to partial or full privatization of ownership and management. 
Many countries that have embraced the neoliberal agenda—either 
willingly or reluctantly due to a shortage of other options—have 
proceeded rapidly to privatize many public utilities.
• Deregulation in the sense of removing impediments to business. 
Neoliberal regimes around the world have implemented 
competition policies which have invariably focused on economic 
issues such as: limiting anti-competitive conduct of firms, reforming 
monopolies to facilitate competition (for example, by restructuring 
energy utilities), compulsory competitive tendering of government 
contracts, etc.
This type of agenda has rapidly lead to the emergence of very new types 
of public-private partnerships being shaped, at least in part, by the activities 
of agents such as the World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility (ppiaf). In recent times ppiaf activities in China have focused on 
telecommunications reform, natural gas reforms and electricity generation. 
In each instance, the focus is on exploring ways in which the role of the 
private sector can be significantly expanded.3 Chinese public policy-makers 
remain wary of unbridled privatization, and hence the efforts to retain state 
ownership and regulatory control. However, traditional ideas about what 
constitutes “public” and “private” are blurring and it is no easy matter for 
the state to find efficient and effective mechanisms for regulatory control.
Energy demand, trade and security
A key driver of Chinese government energy policy is the domestic 
demand estimates of key organizations such as the State Reform and 
Development Commission (srdc). The srdc’s Energy Research Institute 
(srdc-eri) has released analysis in 2003 of three different scenarios. Coal 
demand is forecast to rise to somewhere between 2.1 to 2.9 billion tonnes 
per annum with the upper limit almost twice the current production 
capacity.4 Oil demand is predicted to rise to 450 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent. Natural gas consumption is forecast to increase five-fold 
current levels, rising to 160 billion m3 (People’s Daily Online 2003b).
Domestic energy demand is entwined with energy imports and exports. 
Imports are mostly oil, and more recently gas. Exports are mostly coal, but 
have an increasing hydropower component.
Earlier srdc-eri data published by the Asian Development Bank (adb) 
presented a less nuanced picture portraying only one scenario. Domestic 
energy supply was projected to increase by 85 percent by 2020 (adb 
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2002). Even if such massive increases in production were achieved, further 
imports would be necessary.
The International Energy Agency (iea), working in cooperation with 
srdc, expects that China will become an even greater importer of oil and 
gas: “By 2030 Chinese oil imports will equal the imports of the United 
States today, while imports will meet 30 percent of the country’s gas 
demands” (iea 2002b). China is already a major actor in the global energy 
market as the largest oil importer outside the oecd. After the United 
States and Japan, it is the third largest consumer of oil (iea 2002a). On 
the other hand, some parts of the country will continue and expand their 
international energy exports. It should be remembered that China is now 
the second largest coal exporter in the world, whereas only ten years ago it 
was primarily focused on supplying its domestic market (Ball et al. 2003).5 
And, as the plans for Yunnan’s energy development come to fruition, the 
province will become a significant exporter of hydropower to other parts of 
China, Southeast Asia, and possibly South Asia. Entrepreneurs producing 
energy will sell to purchasers either inside or outside the country.
In addition, energy security for China, as for all other countries, remains 
an important influence on national policy (for still-relevant discussions 
see Medlock and Soligo 1999, Gao Shixian 2000, Stares 2000). The point 
being made is that not all of the planned increases in energy production are 
to meet domestic demand.
Box 4.1  Energy demand management options for China6
1. Imposing environmental taxes on dirty fuels
2. Further promoting electricity time-of-use tariffs
3. Reforming two-tiered pricing system for natural gas
4. Further regulation, upgrading and/or closure of inefficient power 
plants and coal mines
5. Promotion of clean coal technologies
6. Using advanced, combined-cycle technology in power generation
7. Promoting co-generation
8. Promoting renewable energy resources and technologies (including 
wind, geothermal and solar)
9. Promoting energy conservation
10. Encouraging more research and development in the energy industry
11. Phasing out hidden subsidies
Given its significance as a policy driver to those concerned about 
energy security and continued economic growth, it is important that the 
demand projections data, and their assumptions, are thoroughly analyzed. 
For example, does the data reflect the successful implementation of any 
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demand management policy measures, or the development or wider 
adoption of new technologies?7 It is important to clarify whether demand 
estimates are unnecessarily high and being used as justification to permit 
headlong expansion of energy production, perhaps with an over-emphasis 
on obsolescent technology.
China has rich potential in renewable energy sources, such as wind, solar, 
biomass (bio-gas and bio-fuel), geothermal, wave and tidal and etc. The 
Renewable Energy Promotion Law was approved in 2005 and enacted in 
March 2006, in order to respond to the increasing energy demand, diversify 
the energy sources and ensure energy security. However, the major power 
companies monopolize the renewable energy potential and the rights to 
develop. At present this is hindering investment and technology transfer 
from European countries with more experience in this area. For example, 
Guangdong Province alone could exploit as much as 20,000 mw of wind 
power potential by the year 2020. For the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period 
(2006–2010), the official government target is 6,000 mw.
However, even with this huge wind potential and the state’s new law and 
policy, at present there is insufficient incentive to localize the technology 
and commence extensive production of wind turbines. The potential of 
wind energy will not be realized until there are more people in China 
familiar with the technology, and more local manufacturers engaged in 
turbine production. For renewables, including wind, it will be necessary 
for the same focused training and exchanges between countries which 
occurred in the past, for example with large hydropower production, 
from the 1950s between engineers of the former Soviet Union and China. 
Energy policy needs to have many elements, and all the options mentioned 
in box 4.1 have a role to play.
Western Region seen as key to increased energy production
Most evident to this proposed rapid and vast expansion of China’s 
energy production is the importance of the Western Region. In short, 
“Rising demand for energy is a very significant factor in the economic 
development of the prc, especially the Western Region” (adb 2002, 147). 
The Western Region is intended to become an increasingly significant 
energy supplier.
The Western Region comprises the provinces of Sichuan, Guizhou, 
Yunnan, Shaanxi, Qinghai and Gansu; the autonomous regions of Tibet, 
Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi and Xinjiang; the municipality of 
Chongqing. In 1999 the Western Region contained 28.8 percent of China’s 
population, 61.9 percent of total land area, but accounted for only 15.8 
percent of gross domestic product (adb 2002).
The Western Region Development Strategy 2000–2020 was adopted 
by the national government in February 2000 and was a key component 
of the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005). Its stated aims are to combat 
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poverty, industrialize the western provinces, including all mountain areas, 
and promote the transfer of science and technology from the centre to the 
periphery (adb 2002). It is focused on conventional economic development. 
The strategy stresses the need for infrastructure investment in the middle 
and western provinces of China with special emphasis on transport, 
telecommunications, pipelines, electricity and the national power grid 
and water conservation. In particular, transport investment is expected to 
focus on better economic integration between western, central and eastern 
China, and also on improving economic linkages with Southeast Asia.
Energy exports from the Western Region to the Eastern Region are 
projected to quadruple between 2000–2020, with coal accounting for 
91 percent of the increase. Electricity will be a much smaller, but still 
significant, component of the exports. After allowing for more than a 
doubling of electricity demand within the Western Region from 394 to 878 
twh, it is still projected that exportable electricity supply would increase 
from 102 to 365 twh (adb 2002,155).
The dual objectives of the Western Region Development Strategy are 
“development” (of the West) and “transfer” (to the East). An example 
of what is proposed is that authorities intend to be transmitting 8 gw of 
power per annum from Yunnan to Guangdong by 2015, derived from both 
coal-fired plants and hydropower from various sites.
As the data being produced by srdc-eri shows, the planned energy 
production and transfer from West to East is significant. Already one-
quarter of China’s energy derived from coal and half from natural gas 
comes from the Western Region. These proportions are to be increased 
as policy-makers search for the energy believed required to sustain China’s 
(primarily eastern and coastal) economic growth.
It is within this context that Yunnan hydropower production is being 
pushed along by national policy makers, local authorities, designers, 
construction groups, lenders and business entrepreneurs. The province 
already provides about 10 percent of China’s hydropower but exploitable 
reserves are considered to be ten times larger than current generation. 
If this potential is exploited, Yunnan could eventually supply closer to 
20 percent of national hydropower production, to be fed into national 
or regional grids. For example, Guangdong Province is now assigned to 
purchase power, mostly hydropower, from western provinces, namely 
Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi. Power purchase agreements have been 
signed to ensure power transfers during the implementation of the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010).
In summary, China’s economic reforms, coupled with the development/
transfer priority being attached to the Western Region, have catalyzed 
a substantial increase in the dam building aspirations of developers in 
southwest China. This is being enabled by wide-ranging reforms to the 
power industry, to which we now turn.
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Table 4.5  Projected supply of primary energy 2000–2020
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
China
Total (Mt, coal equivalent) 1092.7 1277.6 1481.1 1727.9 2016.4
Hydropower & nuclear power 
(twh)
227.8 320.2 435.1 544.1 682.0
Hydropower & nuclear8 
(percentage)
20.8 25.1 29.4 31.5 33.8 
Total production growth from 
2000 (percentage)
16.9 35.5 58.1 84.5 
Hydropower & nuclear growth 
from 2000 (percentage)
40.6 91.0 138.8 199.4 
Western Region
Western Region (Mt, coal 
equivalent)
286.4 392.7 539.0 696.0 889.7
Western Region hydro &- 
nuclear (twh)
104.0 165.0 260.0 342.0 446.0
Hydropower & nuclear 
(percentage)
36.3 42.0 48.2 49.1 50.1 
Total production growth from 
2000 (percentage)
37.1 88.2 143.0 210.6 
Hydropower & nuclear growth 
from 2000 (percentage)
58.7 150.0 228.8 328.8 
Shares of primary energy supply from Western Region 
Coal (percentage) 66.6 59.4 55.3 52.7 49.4 
Oil (percentage) 13.8 12.7 11.8 11.9 12.4 
Gas (percentage) 6.2 12.1 14.0 14.0 12.7 
Hydro & nuclear (percentage) 13.3 15.3 17.9 17.9 18.3 
Renewable (percentage) 0.1 0.4 1.4 3.5 7.1 
100  100 100 100 100 
Projected electricity supply
prc  1233.1  1729.3  2292.4  2995.5  3822.5
Western Region 281.1 495 693 956.3 1242.2
Western Region (as percentage 
of prc)
22.8 28.6 30.2 31.9 32.5 
SOURCE: Energy Research Institute data published by Asian Development Bank (2002 Extract 
from tables 7-7, 7-8, 7-9, 7-11).
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Table 4.6  Energy production 1999
Coal 
(mt)
Oil 
(mt)
Gas 
(gl)
Hydro 
(twh)
Total 
Power 
(twh)
China 1,045 160 25.2 196.6 1,239.3
Western Region 267 27.7 13.4 103.6 278.6
Yunnan 26.6 0 0.1 18.5 29.8
Western Region as 
percentage of China
25.6 17.3 53.2 52.7 22.5 
Yunnan (as percentage of 
Western Region)
10.0 0.0 0.7 17.9 10.7 
Yunnan (as percentage of 
China)
2.5 0.0 0.4 9.4 2.4 
SOURCE: Data in Asian Development Bank report analyzing the Western Region Develop-
ment Strategy (adb 2002: Extract from table 7-2).
China’s energy industry reforms
China’s energy industry reforms are the result of the government policy put 
in place to foster competition and marketization, via corporatization that, 
especially for the power generation companies, is almost indistinguishable 
from privatization. The formation of the State Power Corporation (spc) 
was the first main step. With registered capital of usd 20 billion, it was a 
giant monopoly, one of the hundred largest businesses in the world. By 
2000 it was working as a consulting company in more than forty countries. 
At the time its break-up was announced in late 2002, spc had in the vicinity 
of 2 million employees, and owned 46 percent of the nation’s electricity 
generation and 90 percent of the electricity supply assets (Alexanders Oil 
and Gas Connections 2003).
The start of the spc reorganization has involved separation of spc’s 
actual and potential (such as the Nu River) generation and distribution 
assets and designation of eleven enterprises to “acquire” these assets (box 
4.2). The next step involved creating a competitive market, which includes 
pooling and pricing reforms, plus grid creation. To keep oversight of the 
reform process, the State Electricity Regulation Commission (serc) has 
been formed, responsible for making proposals on power pricing and 
issuing and managing power service licenses.
Chapter04.indd   67 4/11/07   2:04:48 PM
ANU page 75
68
JOHN DORE, YU XIAOGANG, KEVIN YUK-SHING LI
Business competition
Prior to the current reforms, large-scale hydropower development had 
already become characterized by complex ownership and financing 
arrangements. Examples from Huaneng and Three Gorges illustrate the 
scale of the business operations, diversity of funding sources and aspirations 
of their corporate leaders.
Since the major energy industry reforms were announced in late 2002 
there has been a stampede by the big groups including the Three Gorges 
Development Group—to secure their assets, principally coal-related, and 
move to develop their new assets, including “rivers for hydro” in various 
types of partnership with local authorities. In the words of Business Week, 
“newly established power conglomerates are scrambling to construct 
generating plants across China” (2003). Enterpreneurial dam developers 
are in hot competition: for example, Huadian, Guodian, Datang and China 
Power Investment Company have, in partnership with Hong Kong’s clp 
Power Asia Limited, announced new investment of usd 4.89 billion to 
build thermal and hydropower plants in the southern region of Guangxi 
(China Daily 2003b).
Why the current scramble? The past increases in energy demand and 
projections for further huge requirements are acknowledged. State policy 
support and sector reform has also been mentioned. But the rush into 
hydropower is also being fuelled by the relative ease with which many social 
and environmental costs can be externalized from “return on investment” 
equations, and the competitive need for companies—in the new business 
operating environment—to retain market share and steadily expand 
generating capacity.9 While some in government, such as the chairman of 
the State Electricity Regulation Commission (serc) are reported as having 
“hinted that the government is considering slowing down the building 
boom in power plants” and noting that government should have a clearer 
overall plan for power plant construction (People’s Daily Online 2003d), 
thus far there is no evidence of either. The authority of the serc is limited 
to promoting market competition, endeavouring to ensure transparency 
and supervising service licences. Decision-making about electricity prices 
and approving construction and expansion of power plants remains with 
the State Reform and Development Commission (srdc).
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Box 4.2  China energy industry reforms: Critical steps  
between 1996–2003
1996 Electric Power Law passed which required reforms, 
including the creation of separated power producers 
and retailers in a competitive market. The law also 
stipulated that power prices should reflect all production 
costs, profit, tax and contribute to transmission costs 
and situations where some subsidy may be necessary 
to ensure supply. Part of the rationale was to ensure 
that the industry would become attractive to non-state 
investors.
1997 Jan 16 Establishment of State Power Corporation (spc) to 
represent the state as owner of government-owned 
assets. This occurred around the same time as the 
passage of the Electricity Law and the abolition of 
the Ministry of Electric Power, dividing its functions 
between existing agencies.
2002 Apr 11 Announcement by what is now the State Reform and 
Development Commission (srdc) of next phase of 
energy industry reforms.
2002 Dec 29 End of spc monopoly with announcement that spc 
assets are to be acquired/transferred to five independent 
electricity generating, two transmission and four 
consultant/construction companies. The impending 
creation of an industry regulator was also signalled. Not 
all energy assets were included in this restructure.
Power generation companies
Huaneng, Datang, Huadian, Guodian, China Power 
Investment Company
Distribution (grid) companies
State Power Grid Company that controls the operation 
of five regional power grid companies in the North, 
Northeast, East, Central and Northwest.
State Power Grid Company was also authorized to 
oversee the orderly transfer of five hundred power 
plants under the management of provincial power 
corporations as part of the reform commitment to 
separate generation from distribution (see below).
Southern Power Grid Company which controls the 
operation of the Southern Power Grid formerly 
controlled by spc, plus the formerly Province-controlled 
Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Hainan and Guangdong 
grids.
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Between 2011 and 2030, Southern Power Grid is priori-
tizing hydropower development on the Nu, Lancang, 
Jinsha,Wu; and aiming to expand connections with sur-
rounding grids (e.g. China’s central and north, also the 
proposed Mekong region grid).
Consultant/construction companies
Hydraulic Power Designing Institute
Electric Power Designing Institute
China Water Conservancy and Hydropower 
Construction Group
China Gezhouba Group
Regulator
State Electricity Regulatory Commission (serc). 
2003 Jul 31 serc announces its intention to create six competitive 
regional power markets across China within three years 
in the East, North, Northeast, Central, Northwest and 
South.
Sep 3 Example: Signing of MoU to transfer power plants in 
Jiangsu Province to Guodian.
Sep 19 Example: Connection of the north and central China 
power grids (now world’s largest). The grid spans 4,600 
km across fourteen provinces and municipalities, with a 
combined installed capacity of 140 million kilowatts.
Sep 23 Example: Signing of mou to transfer to state shares to 
Huaneng in thirteen power plants (total capacity 4,640 
mw). Huaneng becomes major shareholder in twelve 
of them.
SOURCES: China Daily 2002, Alexanders Oil and Gas Connections 2003, China Daily 
2003a, People’s Daily Online 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2003, 
Xinhua News Agency 2003.
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Hydropower status of the “Three Rivers”
It is the Nu River dams that, at time of writing, are the most controversial 
both within and outside of China. Decisions about the future of the Nu 
are taking place now; the Lancang dams are being built; the planned Jinsha 
dams are extra dams on an already significantly modified Chinese river. 
Our scope is restricted to the Nu, Lancang and Jinsha rivers. These are 
only a part of the Yunnan transformation, and we stress that Yunnan needs 
to be seen as part of the larger Chinese picture.
Nu River
The future of the Nu River remains in the balance. In the last months 
of 2003 and early 2004 much information filtered into the public domain 
outlining the extensive hydropower development proposed for the Chinese 
section of this river which—upper, lower and middle—extends for 2,018 
km. There are advanced plans for a cascade of up to 13 dams10 on the 
middle and lower Chinese reaches which, if built, would profoundly alter 
this presently undammed, almost pristine river. Some supporters of the 
dams are focused on local development needs, which they hope the dams 
will assist. Others are focused more on the energy production and income 
potential for other people and places. Opponents of the dam are doubtful 
about the need for such radical development and fear the irreversible 
changes that a cascade will have on the current, mostly undeveloped area. 
There are many different positions in the debate. The total installed 
capacity of these dams would be 23,320 mw. By 2004 a site office was 
operating, and road building had commenced to facilitate the construction 
of the Liu Ku dam.
There are also three dams being promoted for the lower section of the 
river downstream of China. The Ta Sarng site is within Myanmar and 
the other two are planned for further downstream where the Nu/Salween 
forms the border between Myanmar and Thailand (For a review featuring 
concerns, see Daniel 2003).11
The chief promoter of the proposed Nu River development in Yunnan 
is the China Huadian Corporation, a wholly state-owned enterprise, and 
the controlling shareholder of the Hong Kong-listed Huadian Power 
International Corporation Limited. It is one of the “big five” power 
generation companies receiving assets from 2003 onwards, which were 
previously owned by the State Power Corporation (spc). The right to 
develop the Nu River is seen by Huadian as one of the transferred assets 
now in their “portfolio.”
Pre–2003 the Chinese central government had funded preparatory 
planning and design work by the Kunming Hydropower Design and 
Planning Institute. But the real action took place after the major energy 
industry reforms were announced in December 2002. By mid June 2003, 
Huadian was able to announce the formation of the construction entity, 
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Yunnan Huadian Hydropower Development Company, with registered 
start-up capital of 200 million yuan (approx. usd 24 million). At this time, 
the shares were split between China Huadian Corporation (51 percent), 
Yunnan Development Investment Co (20 percent), Yunnan Electricity 
Group’s Hydropower Construction Co (19 percent) and the Yunnan Nu 
River Electricity Group (10 percent).
A development proposal was submitted to the State Reform and 
Development Commission (srdc) in Beijing. srdc convened a meeting, 
attended by about 140 people from various ministries and elsewhere, which 
reviewed the proposal and approved it, in principle, in mid August 2003. 
This was just prior to the new Chinese Environment Impact Assessment 
(eia) law taking effect on September 1. Since then, the proponents have 
been vigorously promoting the proposal.
The Beijing-based State Environment Protection Administration 
(sepa) convened an expert panel, reviewed the proposal in more detail, 
and in early September 2003 announced that it had serious reservations 
related to: the world class canyon which would be irreversibly altered, 
threats to the largely unexplored rich biodiversity, the loss of an extremely 
valuable wild rice gene pool, and geological instability which raised 
serious safety concerns. More general concerns related to the expected 
cultural disruption, a lack of faith that promised poverty alleviation 
would necessarily result from dam construction, and disappointment that 
alternatives to hydropower, such as ecotourism, are not being genuinely 
considered. Nevertheless, the Yunnan and prefecture governments were 
keen to proceed and attempted to counter the sepa opposition via a 
provincially convened “Yunnan experts” meeting in September 2003. Given 
the pre-meeting attendee selection process and the general pressure being 
brought to bear, it was unsurprising when this group found that concerns 
were manageable and damming should proceed. sepa then had further field 
visits While being courted by Yunnan provincial and prefecture officials. 
Further expert meetings took place in Beijing and Yunnan, prior to a joint 
meeting held in Kunming, October 20–21, 2003. In the week before this 
meeting, Yunnan newspapers were used to actively promote the scheme, 
putting additional pressure on the sepa opposers.
As the plans entered the public domain, broader civil society—beyond 
the usual, officials, business operatives and experts—became very involved. 
For example, in Beijing, a public petition calling for the protection of the 
Nu was organized in October 2003 by the China Environmental Culture 
Association. This was signed by sixty-two people—including prominent 
artists, journalists, environmentalists and well-known public figures 
—and widely circulated. This was a small, early sign of a resistance that 
has since grown. In November 2003 in Kunming, the nongovernmental 
organization (ngo) Green Watershed12 used their regular Environment 
Dialogue forum to share information and stimulate wider public awareness 
and debate. Discussions of alternative development pathways are also 
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being held within the Nujiang Lisu Nationality Autonomous Prefecture. 
In December 2003 a forty-five-minute television documentary was 
prepared by Central China Television (cctv) which presented both 
sides of the debate. This documentary was shown nationally three times, 
including on Saturday and Sunday morning prime time in early March 
2004. Universities in Chongqing and Kunming also became involved in 
“Save the Nu” campaigning. In sum, the case attracted significant media 
attention, fostering a much wider public debate than the proponents had 
ever envisaged.
Meanwhile in Bangkok, the Chinese Ambassador was petitioned on 
December 16, 2003 by more than eighty environmental, human rights 
and ethnic groups from Thailand and Myanmar voicing their concerns 
and calling for the inclusion of downstream country perspectives in the 
decision-making process. This effort was coordinated by the South East 
Asia Rivers Network (searin), a regional ngo based in Chiang Mai. A 
wider international petition was organized in January 2004, coordinated 
by the International Rivers Network (irn), an international ngo based in 
California. Learning exchanges between Thai, Burmese and Chinese ngos 
have also taken place.
The various spheres of Chinese government—with the exception of 
some of the perspectives convened by sepa—and the developers remain 
firmly committed to the cascade, with only peripheral changes to the July 
2003 plan being countenanced. However, it is now clear to the developer 
that more detailed impact assessment work will need to be done, and 
resettlement plans prepared and made public. This already represents a 
considerable achievement by sepa and others who are yet to be convinced 
of the wisdom of the proposal. Resistance to the plan, the decision-making 
rationale and the original governance process has been surprisingly strong 
and has rapidly gained momentum.
In April 2004, the Premier Wen Jiabao chose to intervene and suspend 
the plans for the Nu development until such time as a proper impact 
assessment process was undertaken. This was a remarkable intervention, 
and was claimed as a great victory by those committed to more informed 
and transparent governance. Since then, the optimism of opponents has 
been dampened by the impossibility of obtaining access to the impact 
assessment documentation. This is considered top secret and is unavailable 
for public scrutiny, even to an official unesco World Heritage site 
inspection team that went to the province in early 2006. At the time of 
writing, the development of hydropower in the Nu remains the dominant 
scenario, but there may be substantial changes made to the original 
development plan. The governance process remains unclear, with many 
actors—including various Chinese government ministries—unclear of 
their role, and Chinese civil society actors frustrated by the unwillingness 
of authorities to share information in the public domain.
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Lancang River
The Lancang River flows for nearly 800 km in Tibet before entering 
Yunnan where it flows for another 1,247 km. The Lancang cascade is 
a huge project designed to take advantage of an 800 m drop over a 750 
km river section in the middle and lower sections of the Yunnan stretch 
(Plinston and He Daming 1999). For dam builders this part of the river has 
been described as a “rich, rare hydropower mine for its prominent natural 
advantages in abundant and well-distributed runoff, large drops and less 
flooding losses of the reservoirs” (icold 2001). The cascade is no longer 
speculation, but rather a fact. Regardless of whether all eight proposed 
dams are built, Manwan and Dachoashan are already constructed, Xiaowan 
is under construction and Jinghong is soon to commence.
Proponents argue that the dams have the potential to offer flood control, 
more assured dry-season flows, increased navigation options, reduced 
saline intrusion and create extra irrigation opportunities for downstream 
countries like Thailand. In addition to the rapidly expanding grid system 
within China, the electricity produced will be able to enter the Mekong 
region electricity grid.13 A particularly sanguine view is that “upstream 
development of hydropower will not sharpen the conflict of multi-objective 
competitive uses and will give benefits to downstream for the development 
of irrigation, navigation, and hydropower, and for flooding control” 
(Plinston and He Daming 1999). However, the conclusion that the cascade 
will not “sharpen the conflict” between upstream and downstream users 
is wrong. For example, there was significant tension in the first months 
of 2004 in northern Thailand’s river-dependent communities who are 
concerned at the very low flows in the river, and apparent fluctuations. 
At that time, there was a drought and so natural flows were already low, 
but the Thais were also unsure as to what effect the river flow is being 
altered by China’s upstream dam managers. More information exchange is 
essential if cross border understanding and trust is to be built.
The first dam constructed on the Lancang mainstream was Manwan, 
finished in 1996. As of October 2003, the second dam, Dachaoshan, is in 
full operation, with each of its six 225 mw generators now installed. The 
third dam being constructed is Xiaowan, seen as an iconic project for the 
Western Region Development Strategy. The power production from 
Xiaowan is considered an essential element of the West to East energy 
transfer. It is the second largest dam in China after Three Gorges. When 
completed and filled, scheduled for 2013, its reservoir will stretch back 169 
km from its 292 m high wall.
Huaneng is the dominant actor, having been granted the majority of 
the development rights on the Lancang, and the upper and middle reaches 
of the Jinsha. Huaneng is already operating Manwan and Dachoashan; 
Xiaowan will also be under Huaneng’s management.
Chapter04.indd   77 4/11/07   2:04:51 PM
ANU page 85
78
JOHN DORE, YU XIAOGANG, KEVIN YUK-SHING LI
Box 4.3  Huaneng Power International (HPI)
In November 2001, Huaneng Power International (hpi)—at the time 
China’s largest independent power generator—announced it intended to 
list on China’s domestic sharemarket. The parent Huaneng International 
Power Development Company had already been incorporated as a Sino-
foreign joint venture in 1985. After incorporation, the hpi offspring had 
been listed on the New York exchange in 1994, followed by a listing on 
the Hong Kong exchange in 1998. In July 2003, the parent hipdc held 
43 percent of the shares. As of September 12, 2003, the share price had 
increased to 115 percent from the previous year. A valuation (02/01/2004) 
listed hpi as the thirty-eighth largest company on the Hong Kong exchange, 
with its H-class shares being valued at hkd 20 billion. Li Xioapeng, 
chairman of the Huaneng Group, wants Huaneng to be the world’s leading 
electricity producer, aiming to double its generating capacity by 2010 to 
60,000 megawatts, and make it into the Fortune 500 list of the world’s 
largest companies (China Daily 2003c).
The dominant developing entity for the remainder of the construction 
is the Yunnan Huaneng Lancangjiang Hydropower Company (yhlhc) 
Limited. In February 2003, the shareholders were Huaneng (56 percent), 
Yunnan Development Investment Company (31.4 percent) and Yunnan 
Hongta Investment (12.4 percent).14 The predecessor to yhlhc was Yunnan 
Lancang River Hydropower Development Company Limited, created in 
February 2001. The original shareholders were State Power Corporation 
(27 percent),15 Yunnan Electric Power Group Company Limited (29 
percent), Yunnan Provincial Development & Investment Company 
Limited (24 percent) and Yunnan Hongta Investment 20 percent. As the 
numbers show, the shareholding has changed, with Huaneng now the 
major player.
To fund Xiaowan’s construction, in February 2003 yhlhc borrowed 25 
billion yuan (usd 3 billion) from several banks: China Development Bank 
15 billion yuan (usd 1.8 billion) (cdb 2003), Construction Bank of China 
six billion yuan (usd 725.5 million), and Industrial & Commercial Bank 
of China four billion yuan (usd 483.6 million). Effectively this fully funds 
Xiaowan as the total investment is expected to be 27.7 billion yuan (usd 3.3 
billion) (China West News 2003b).
The next dam is Jinghong, which commenced construction in 2003, 
albeit without yet having been fully approved by state authorities. Both 
Chinese and Thai officials and experts have been involved in all stages of 
planning since the early 1990s. It is expected to be built by yhlhc at a cost 
of about usd 1.2 billion and be fully operational within seven years. The 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (egat) has already entered 
into agreements to purchase power from the station. The Jinghong dam is 
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yet to receive official approval to do anything more than site preparation 
(road building, communications establishment, water and electricity 
supply), but regardless it has already commenced dam construction 
earthworks.
Gonguoqiao, Nuozhadu, Ganlanba and Mengsong are designed but 
yet to commence—the last three would also be Huaneng-built dams. The 
Gonguoqiao, or Dali, dam is particularly interesting. As the most upstream 
dam in the cascade, its synchronous operation with those downstream is 
obviously important. A private company believed it had already negotiated 
prior development rights that were contested by Huaneng. The dispute 
highlights the problems that could arise on any river if there are different 
ownership/operation regimes in place, each seeking to maximize their 
revenue in the new competitive era.
While the hydropower potential is unquestioned, there also huge 
concerns about the impacts of the dams on riverine ecosystems and local 
livelihoods (Roberts 2001, irn 2002). There are major worries about 
altering the natural regime of the river in a way which will increase flow 
fluctuations, increase average downstream dry-season flows and decrease 
the normal flow downstream of nutritious sediments crucial for fisheries 
and agriculture production. When the cascade is completed, it has been 
suggested that dry season flows may increase downstream by up to 90 
percent at Chiang Saen, 80 percent in Luang Prabang, 70 percent in 
Vientiane and more than 1,600 km from the cascade, 40 percent at 
Mukdahan. Predicting impacts in a complex system is difficult, but 
obviously this will flood large reaches of river rapids, integral to fisheries 
and radically alter the normal regime of seasonally flooded forests (Blake 
2001, terra 2002). Large amounts of sediment will be trapped by the new 
dams, depriving the lower Mekong of its normal load. Negative impacts 
may also include increased downstream erosion, serious disturbance 
to fisheries ecology and the devastation of annual riverbank gardening 
enterprises. Those who stand to lose out include millions of people 
downstream— mostly beyond the Chinese border—reliant on fishing and 
riverbank farming (box 4.4).
While an international river, inter-state actors of many different types 
were unable to ensure anything approaching a thorough discussion of the 
project alternatives and likely impacts. It was linkages between Chinese and 
international academics, particularly from the mid 1990s (Chapman and 
He Daming 1996), which first brought project information into the wider 
public arena, although the rosiness of the possible scenarios they presented 
were greeted with wry suspicion by some (Hinton 2000). An International 
Rivers Symposium in Kunming in 1999 also aided an exchange of 
perspectives (He Daming et al. 2001). An adb project on the sustainable 
development of the Yunnan part of the Lancang-Mekong Basin was also 
provocative and put new information into the public domain (Landcare 
Research New Zealand 2000).
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Transboundary Environment Assessment (ea) protocols, and the un 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses have been ineffective in either fostering or forcing more 
extensive cooperation or dialogue. Thus far, other intergovernment 
forums such as the asean-China dialogues have also ignored the issue. 
The concerns of downstream nations do not seem to have been taken 
into account but “this is no surprise given the reticence of any of the 
downstream government elites to make any serious representations to 
their more powerful upstream neighbour, and in several cases, increasingly 
important patron” (Dore 2003). Moreover, in the case of Thailand, egat 
and government officials have been participating in at least a part of the 
cascade development for about a decade, signing various Memorandums of 
Understanding (mous).
For related reasons, the regional member states have rendered the 
Mekong River Commission (mrc) relatively impotent as an intergovernment 
forum for addressing cross border disputes. However, it should be 
acknowledged that in the Kristensen era of 1999–2003 when he was head 
of the mrc, the secretariat tried harder than previously, for example via 
carefully worded indirect appeals through the international and regional 
media. Since 2004 there is no criticism of China permitted to emerge from 
the mrc secretariat, with the strategy shifted towards more constructive 
engagement, and downplaying of development risks. Others have also 
noted the general silence of the neighbouring state leaders in raising 
any objections to China’s Lancang dam building program. In the case 
of Cambodia, with China now the major financial patron of the country, 
Prime Minister Hun Sen has specifically banned any criticism or public 
deliberation about the risks to the Great Lake (Tonle Sap).
Challenging the rationale and speculating about the possible negative 
consequences have been left to Thai, Cambodian and international ngos 
and policy research groups. This has greatly enhanced knowledge and 
awareness, but has had no substantive impact on the implementation of 
the scheme.
The spokesperson from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Liu Lichao, 
and the Deputy Governor of Yunnan Province, Bai Enpei, have both made 
public statements in response to the downstream concerns. They have 
reiterated China’s position is to avoid harm to downstream countries in 
front of the friendship tie with neighbouring Southeast Asian countries. 
However, the statements have as yet not been followed by mechanisms to 
ensure full information exchange, and joint analysis of how the dams might 
best be managed so as to avoid harmful impacts. China does continue to 
engage as a dialogue partner with mrc and the annual meeting agenda is 
becoming increasingly substantive, after many years of discussing only 
peripheral issues.
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Box 4.4  Fish and Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake
There is a rich diversity of fish in the Mekong system. While the taxonomy 
is still being sorted out, most experts agree that there are more than a 
thousand freshwater species. Fisheries are vital to the livelihoods of most 
of the 12 million rural households in the lower Mekong (mrc 2003). 
Current estimates are that almost two million tonnes are harvested each 
year from the Lancang/Mekong fishery—1.75 million tonnes from the 
capture fisheries valued at usd 1.45 billion, plus another 250,000 tonnes 
from aquaculture (mrc 2002). It is assumed the dam cascade will harm the 
fishery due to the new flow regime, migration disruption, and temperature 
and sediment load changes. The Tonle Sap Lake (tsl) area includes the 
largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia. The functioning of this unique 
hydrological and ecological system is critical to the fisheries and rice fields 
production—and therefore the livelihoods and economy—of Cambodia 
and southern Vietnam. The area also has other ecological values that are 
deemed to be of national, regional and international importance. The depth 
varies from 1 to 2 meters in the dry season to 9 to 11 meters in the flood 
and its surface area varies from 250,000 to 300,000 hectares in the dry to 
900,000 to 1,600,000 hectares depending on the extent of the wet season. 
At high water level the tsl covers up to about seven percent of the area of 
Cambodia. The lake is connected to the Mekong River at Phnom Penh by 
the Tonle Sap River. In the dry season the Tonle Sap River empties into 
the Mekong River, whereas in the wet season the river reverses direction 
and flows back towards the lake. More than 60 percent of the floodwater of 
the tsl comes from the Mekong River, the remainder from the catchment 
areas of the lake. At full flood the tsl temporarily stores about 72 billion 
m3 of water, which equates to 16 percent of the average annual discharge of 
the Mekong River (mrc et al. 1998). The present annual fish catch from tsl 
is estimated at 235,000 tonnes, depending on the season (van Zalinge et al. 
2001).
The Lancang/Mekong provides 70 percent of the sediment load received 
by the tsl. The closure of the Manwan dam in 1993 halved the sediment 
load in the Mekong River water at Chiang Saen in northern Thailand. 
It is uncertain as to the extent to which sediment loads will be further 
reduced when Xiaowan and others in the cascade are completed, and how 
far downstream these effects will be measured. The relationship between 
source of sediment and nutrient availability is also unclear. However, 
the researchers producing this data are convinced of the threat. They 
summarize: “regional developments utilising the Mekong water, such as 
extensive damming of tributaries and the main river (in China), as well 
as irrigation, may lead to lower downstream flood levels and extensive 
trapping of sediments, and thereby have a negative effect on the fertility of 
the Tonle Sap system, which appears to depend on high flood levels with a 
high sediment load” (Sarkkula et al. 2003, 45).
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Jinsha River
The Jinsha is the largest river in Yunnan and refers to a stretch of about 
2,300 km from Yushu in Qinghai Province to Yibing in Sichuan Province. 
More loosely, it refers to the Yangtze upstream of the Three Gorges Dam 
project. The upper Jinsha refers to the 994 km reach from Yushu down to 
Shigu in Yunnan’s Lijiang Prefecture. The last 360 km are within Yunnan. 
Before the famous first bend of the Yangtze16 at Shigu the river heads 
south in parallel with the Nu and the Lancang, thereafter it winds its way 
generally eastwards, splitting China in two between “the wheat-growing 
North and the rice-growing South” (Winchester 1996). There are no 
serious plans for hydropower in the upper Jinsha but plans for the middle 
and lower reaches have been worked up over the past ten years.
Box 4.5  Financing the Three Gorges project
The Three Gorges project is a flagship, national project costing usd 
22 billion. The China Yangtze Three Gorges Project Development 
Corporation (cytgpdc) is responsible for the construction phase, which 
began in 1994 and is scheduled for completion in 2021. Finance has been 
found from a range of sources. In 1992 the Beijing government imposed a 
levy on power producers across the country of between 0.004–0.007 yuan 
per kwh. The project was also granted the revenues from the Gezhouba 
power plant. Over an extended period, China Development Bank has thus 
far contributed usd 3.6 billion. With rising confidence in the project over 
time, the managers have been able to raise usd 2.3 billion from bond issues 
on the domestic market for periods of fifteen, twenty and thirty years. A 
further usd 1.3 billion has been borrowed from commercial banks including 
the China Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, and the Bank of Communications (Beijing Review 2003a). The 
managers are confident that future funds will be found as required, with all 
options—domestic or international—open to consideration.
Not content with waiting to finish this gigantic project before starting any 
other, ctgpc has already announced plans to build four new hydropower 
plants further upstream on the Jinsha that will provide twice as much 
generating capacity as the existing Three Gorges. To manage power 
generation, sales and management, the China Yangtze Electric Power 
Corporation (cyepc) has been created. This entity was gifted assets of the 
aforementioned Gezhouba to aid in its start-up. It obtained permission 
from the government’s corporate regulator to list on the domestic stock 
market in November 2003. 29.6 percent of the company was sold with the 
share price rising 44 percent on the first day from the initial offering price. 
The offering was heavily oversubscribed and raised usd 1.2 billion.
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From Shigu to the junction with the Yalong River is the 563 km middle 
Jinsha, most of which runs through northwestern Yunnan Province. 
There are major development plans for this stretch, with eight dams 
proposed. Huaneng is the main player, having effectively been allocated 
the concession for this section of the river, which is considered ideal for 
hydropower development. They are intending to develop seven of the 
proposed dams. An eighth is planned by the private company Huari, which 
had commenced negotiating with Lijiang prefecture and Yunnan provincial 
governments prior to the spc break-up and asset distribution.
The lower Jinsha runs for 768 km to Yibing. Most of this section forms 
the border between Sichuan Province and Yunnan Province. A further four 
dams are planned for the lower Jinsha by the China Yangtze Three Gorges 
Project Development Corporation (cytgpdc). These huge stations are 
reportedly planned to have an installed capacity 38,500 mw, which would 
be twice as much as the existing Three Gorges project (China West News 
2003a). So, it would seem that there will be one river with three different 
owners, potentially making flow management more complex.
Issues
Particular dam projects in Yunnan appear to have taken on a life of their 
own, well beyond the visions/strategies emanating directly from the Beijing 
or Yunnan governments. The momentum now acquired makes it difficult 
to modify the development agenda, partly because government is now “less 
empowered” and/or compromised by its linkages with private investment. 
The lines between public and private have become extremely blurred, 
whether via formal or informal public-private partnerships. New forces 
for development are pushing projects, such as: international financiers and 
the increasingly empowered natural-assets rich state-controlled power 
companies. The political economy has shifted. Formal state policy and 
planning may no longer be the key driver as capitalist forces have been 
substantially unleashed. In such a situation, the regulatory role played by 
state and civil society becomes critical.
Consider the following statement: “In the view of some experts, 
repetitive construction is a natural problem occurring in the development 
of a market economy, so it should be dealt with by the market itself, rather 
than through administrative interference such as loan suspensions and 
banning projects” (Feng 2003). While made with particular reference to the 
electrolytic aluminium and iron and steel industries, reflect for a moment 
on its relevance to the hydropower industry. Imagine the consequences of 
unrestrained, over-zealous “repetitive construction” in the hydropower 
industry. Imperfect markets can be wasteful and destructive.
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Investment driven by competition, supported by easily accessible finance 
and almost free access to public land and water assets may not yield net 
public benefit (regardless of how it is defined). It would seem that there 
is a dangerous brew of unrestrained competition policy, confusion about 
the regulatory role of the state, freely available investment funds and easy 
access to rivers that could lead to unnecessary and irreversible damage to 
ecosystems, natural and cultural heritage and local livelihoods. Many within 
China are concerned about this current headlong pursuit of hydropower 
development. Other values are being discussed, other decision-making 
processes suggested, and the sensibility of intense competition between 
energy business giants is being challenged.
Several key questions require revisiting:17
• What type of development is preferred? This strikes at the heart of de-
velopment directions—the “conventional” economic development 
of modernity, or more sustainability-oriented conceptions where 
different values are prized? While pursuing economic growth for 
job creation and poverty reduction is still paramount, the “New 
and Scientific Concept of Development” being actively promoted 
by President Hu Jintao explicitly acknowledges other goals— 
human development, more efficient resource use and less pollution 
(China Daily 2004a). Within this new context a review of national 
energy policy, including the hydropower component, would be 
appropriate.
• How are development goals to be achieved? This is essentially about 
modalities and roles that should be taken by the state, business and 
general citizens. The current phenomenon where capitalist entities 
are assuming monopoly control over state-owned natural resources 
requires rapid review and adjustment. More detailed analysis is 
required of the impacts of China’s energy reform policies and the 
related surge for substantial Yunnan hydropower expansion. There 
seem to be many risks associated with these recent policy changes. 
There are serious concerns about the impact of the policies that 
have led to the current competition between the large energy 
consortiums. It is not simply a case of healthy competition between 
business competitors within a framework which guarantees overall 
public benefit. Water resources are being monopolized by the 
large companies via the partnerships being negotiated with various 
national and local authorities. The wisdom of policy that permits 
this degree of control and exploitation by profit-driven entities is 
now being challenged.
• How are decisions about setting and striving for these goals to be made? 
This is about the concept of governance which “encompasses 
the complex and open network of authorities by which the life 
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of society—its institutions, bodies, souls, canons, knowledge, 
news—is monitored and managed”18 (Lambropoulos, 1996). When 
thinking about the directions taken by society, the governance 
processes by which we deal with conflict are what really matter. 
Are they adequate?
Hydropower development is a sensitive issue, not just in China, but 
also throughout the Mekong region. Numerous projects have become 
the subject of national, and in some cases regional and international 
controversies. Examples include: Vietnam’s Se San, Sre Pok and Son La 
dams; Lao pdr’s Theun Hinboun and Nam Theun 2 dams; Thailand’s 
Pak Mun Dam; the Yunnan dams, and those further downstream on the 
Nu/Salween into Myanmar. In the Mekong region, as elsewhere, it seems 
that many costs of hydropower development are ignored or excluded from 
analysis and debate.
Advocates of hydropower tout its positive features: renewable energy, 
pollution-free, relatively low generating cost, flood reducing, navigation 
improving and increased irrigation opportunities. However, an assessment 
of large dams by the World Commission on Dams found that performance 
is very variable, with many dams falling short of economic expectations 
and most having large impacts, more negative than positive, on rivers, 
watersheds and aquatic ecosystems. They also found that resettlement and 
compensation schemes had often been inadequate, impoverishing millions 
of people. Moreover, they noted that “Since the environmental and social 
costs of large dams have been poorly accounted for in economic terms, the 
true profitability of these schemes remains elusive” (wcd 2000, xxxi).
In China and the other Mekong countries, the large dam paradigm 
remains a respected pillar of the energy industry and key offices within 
government. New construction is deemed essential to meet national and 
regional energy demands. Nevertheless, there is a series of key issues 
that have emerged around the world, which should also be considered by 
Mekong region decision-makers (box 4.6). There was an initial expectation 
world wide that Impact Assessment (ia) would be a key mechanism to solve 
development project problems and address many of these issues. However, 
as practiced, it has not met expectations.
Hydropower governance should be inherently inter-disciplinary and 
perspectives from the social and physical sciences, government and civil 
societies should all have a place. China’s highest political leadership has 
endorsed more participatory forms of governance (China Daily 2004b). 
Therefore it would seem that a necessary national review of hydropower 
governance, presently rooted in a closed rather than open network, while 
difficult, is politically possible.
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Box 4.6  Central issues in the dams debate: Past and present
• Performance: costs and benefits—much depends on how completely costs 
are internalized, and who bears particular costs compared to how the 
benefits are shared.
• Environmental impacts and sustainability—fundamental controversy 
centers on how environmental considerations are valued against 
immediate human development needs.
• Social impacts and equity—much concern about the basis on which 
trade-offs, such as potential benefits to many at the cost of hardship 
for a few, are invoked and decided.
• Economics and finance—controversy also surrounds the limits and the 
ability of methods for economic assessment to fully capture and reflect 
the various social and environmental impacts and values.
• Governance and participation—at the heart of debate is the degree of 
involvement of affected people and wider groups of stakeholders in 
needs assessment and project-level decision-making.
• Wider development impact of dams—controversial issues go beyond the 
impact of the project itself and touch upon wider regional or national 
development choices.
• Alternatives to dams—are alternatives to large dams genuinely 
considered?
• Cross-cutting issues—which actors are the most powerful and most 
influential in decision-making processes? What and whose rights are 
prioritized?
SOURCE: Dams and Development (wcd 2000)
Environmental Impact Assessment (eia) is only one component of 
governance, but due to the attention it receives, for good reasons, some 
comment is required here. There are standard issues raised in criticism 
of eia, as it is usually undertaken. Most eia tends to focus on individual 
projects and is therefore relatively narrow in its scope. Impact zone analyses 
often stop at national borders.19 eia often occurs at a relatively late stage in 
the decision-making process, when choice of alternatives has already been 
limited and significant project investment has taken place. eia often occurs 
when there have already been significant positions taken in terms of project 
advocacy or opposition. eia often occurs after political decisions have 
already been taken to proceed. The project-eia then becomes an exercise in 
ameliorating negative impacts rather than an exploration of possibly more 
suitable alternatives. Moreover, “environment” is used in a more and less 
encompassing way in different countries—sometimes excluding social and 
economic issues, sometimes including one or other of these realms.
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These standard criticisms resonate when reflecting on the current 
eia process for the Nu River development. There have been Chinese 
regulations about environmental protection since the late 1970s. A 
framework has evolved, the latest step being the law on eia, which came into 
effect on September 1, 2003. Effort has also been put into Environmental 
Impact Assessment (eia) by other Mekong region countries, with the 
exception of Myanmar. 
The overarching term of Impact Assessment (ia) is conceptually 
preferable, as it reduces the likelihood of externalising important 
factors. ia may involve evaluation of economic, social, cultural, political, 
environmental/biophysical/ecological, transboundary and cumulative 
impacts. But key to being truly useful is that ia occurs before final 
decision-making, and at a time when alternative options can be genuinely 
considered.
A suggestion voiced by experts attending the ground-breaking January 
2004 Beijing hydropower forum was that “like everything else, hydroelectric 
plants and dams have their pros and cons…only when the comprehensive 
impact in economic, social and cultural terms is calculated objectively 
can assessment be made” (Chen Hong 2004). This ideal has not yet been 
evident in Yunnan’s massive hydropower expansion push. Neither has it 
been common in other parts of the Mekong region. A few examples will 
suffice to show that ia needs to be more rigorous.
Economic impacts of Yunnan’s hydropower development are unclear 
and may have been substantially overestimated by information used in 
decision-making. The useful life of the dams may be much less than has 
been (presumably) expected and factored into economic calculations. 
While estimated construction and operating costs per unit of power 
produced may be attractive, sedimentation inflows into the first-completed 
Manwan dam are much higher than anticipated (Plinston and He Daming 
2000). There are now concerns that without drastic corrective landcare 
measures, it may only be able to function as a power-producer for less 
than twenty years (Roberts 2001,150). Without the upstream construction 
of the sediment-trapping Xiaowan, the Manwan dam would have a very 
brief working life. The economics of the Yunnan dams need to be properly 
evaluated, and that evaluation widely shared. 
Cross border social and environmental impacts in downstream Myanmar, 
Lao pdr, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam have yet to be factored into 
China’s plans. Cross border cooperation protocols for dam operation will 
be necessary for ecological damage to be minimized. Almost inevitably 
this would require energy production to be less than the pure economic 
optimum. How will this be negotiated?
One new approach has been presented in the report by the Commis-
sioners of the World Commission on Dams (wcd) which they released 
at the end of the process (wcd 2000, Dubash et al. 2001). The wcd was 
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a multi-stakeholder dialogue process that heard many different opinions. 
Ultimately, the Commissioners wrote their own opinion and have offered 
it as their contribution to the large dams debate and to those with respon-
sibility for influencing or making large dam decisions (box 4.7).
Box 4.7  A new framework for decision-making on large dams
The World Commission on Dams (wcd) process and the report are 
continuing to make a significant contribution to worldwide large dams 
debates. A key conclusion of the Commissioners was that it is imperative 
“to bring new voices, perspectives and criteria into decision-making” 
(wcd 2000,197), hence their advocacy for a process which “gives all key 
stakeholders a voice and a full opportunity to participate in decision-
making, seeks the broadest reasonable consensus, and is transparent in the 
criteria used for reaching a decision” (ibid., 209).
The Commissioners advocated, as a starting point, clarifying the rights 
context by undertaking a transparent assessment of the constitutional, 
customary, international, human, ecological, etc. rights held by interested 
and affected parties. They pointed out that this is best undertaken in tandem 
with a substantial assessment of the risks borne voluntarily by “risk takers” 
and involuntarily by “risk bearers.” They proposed a decision-making 
framework which pays close attention to the following priority areas:
• Gaining public acceptance which advocates genuinely participatory 
decision-making processes
• Comprehensive options assessment which advocates genuine consideration 
of alternatives, rather than just focusing on impact assessment and 
amelioration/mitigation of negatives
• Addressing existing dams acknowledging that there are many decisions 
which have to be made about managing existing dams
• Sustaining rivers and livelihoods is primarily concerned with protecting 
ecosystems
• Recognizing entitlements and sharing benefits is primarily concerned with 
human justice
• Ensuring compliance concentrates on checking that all commitments 
made in negotiations are subsequently adhered to
• Sharing rivers for peace, development and security is endeavoring to see 
that transboundary, crossborder or “between country” issues are 
acknowledged, recognising that all riparian states and their peoples 
may be stakeholders.
SOURCE: Dams and Development (wcd 2000)
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The wcd framework is a useful guide increasingly being considered by 
different groups within China. Translation and dissemination of the wcd 
report is ensuring that the issues raised in the wcd process are being more 
widely discussed. This is a positive step forward, and could greatly aid any 
review of existing Chinese dam decision-making processes.
The rapid Yunnan hydropower expansion is already having a major 
impact on the national and provincial economy, the finance sector, the 
rivers and the people of the province. A detailed review and debate is 
urgently needed of the rationale, the processes, the options and the 
implications for the entire Mekong region.
Recommendations
First order—China Energy Policy and Energy Development 
Governance
There are two key messages this chapter seeks to deliver. First, there 
is a need for China to revisit the energy policy, including the hydropower 
component, in the light of the new direction signalled in the New and 
Scientific Development Concept announced in 2003 by China’s political 
leadership, and reinforced by President Hu Jintao at the Tenth National 
People’s Congress (npc) meeting in March 2004. Second, there is a need 
to overhaul energy development governance processes including: option 
formulation, debate, evaluation, negotiation and monitoring. The approvals 
and impact assessment processes are key areas requiring strengthening.
Second order—Yunnan Hydropower Governance
Current controversy over proposed Nu River development provides 
opportunity to enhance the quality of Yunnan hydropower governance. 
The following Nu assessments would, if undertaken and widely shared, 
contribute sorely needed new elements to China and Mekong region 
governance forums. Similar analyses on the Lancang and Jinsha would also 
be beneficial.
Decision-making process assessment
It is nothing new to note that ia processes should contribute to decision-
making and approvals processes, rather than follow afterwards as a “rubber 
stamp” to legitimize a decision already taken, perhaps making minor 
changes to implementation plans. The influence exerted when selecting 
and using “expert panels” also needs examination. Possibilities for more 
participatory, informed and informing processes should also be explored. 
Closed processes that have to be painstakingly prised open are surely 
not the best way to go. Detailed analysis of the current Nu development 
decision-making process would be instructive.
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Political economy assessment
Further clarification of the substantial shift in the political economy of 
Yunnan hydropower is required. Research should particularly focus on the 
relative power relationships between and within states; and between states, 
business and civil society. Production and public debate of this analysis is 
necessary for more informed and equitable and decision-making.
Economic assessment
The economics of Yunnan dams need proper evaluation from different 
perspectives, but in a way which takes account of the reality of the new and 
fierce competition between developers, and improves upon past analytical 
approaches which have regularly externalized many costs and benefits, and 
hidden or ignored particular winners and losers.
Social/cultural impact assessment
Social and cultural impact assessment is not common in China or 
the rest of the Mekong region, but has been done recently (albeit only 
retrospectively) for Manwan dam. Entrenching this type of analysis before 
committing to particular development pathways would be a step forward.
Ecological/natural heritage risk assessment
There are conflicting arguments presented by Yunnan dam proponents 
and critics about the risks to ecosystems and the natural heritage of affected 
areas. Clarification of the risks is required.
Transboundary, cumulative and multiplier effects assessment
More consideration needs to be given to transboundary effects. Impact 
assessment should not stop at national borders. Consideration should also 
be given to cumulative and multiplier effects.
Notes
The chapter was first produced as a Working Paper in 2004 by Dore and Yu, with 
the financial support of the Swedish Environment Secretariat in Asia (sensa), a 
part of the Swedish International Development Agency (sida). The authors are 
grateful to many people who assisted us with information for this chapter, and for 
recent careful reviews by m-power colleagues, Rajesh Daniel and Tira Foran, and 
by Kevin Yuk-shing Li who contributed as a co-author of this updated chapter.
The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors who alone are 
responsible for errors that remain. The chapter does not necessarily represent the 
views of sida or sensa. Our purpose is to provide a brief update on happenings in 
Yunnan, within the wider context of China’s energy policy, energy industry reforms 
and changing political economy.
1 Globalization is used here in the sense of a compression of space and time in 
a new era of interconnectedness, where there is less local control (Giddens 1992).
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2 The method of reporting foreign direct investment (fdi) still differs between 
countries and organizations. According to Dunning (1988) fdi comprises activities 
controlled or organized by firms (or groups of firms) outside of the nation in which 
they are headquartered and the principal decision-makers are located. When re-
porting foreign investment, Asian Development Bank (adb) datasets separate direct 
investment (what Dunning calls fdi) and portfolio investment. This is not and has 
not always been done at the country level. To an extent direct investment is fixed, 
and hence considered more likely to be productive capital investment. Portfolio 
investment refers to supplying capital and/or taking a shareholding, but with de-
batably less control/fixed stake and more investment mobility. Portfolio investment 
can be seen as potentially more speculative. The fdi figures quoted here for China 
represent direct investment plus portfolio investment in China-based, exchange-
listed companies, such as Huaneng and Huadian.
3 In November 2003, there was a workshop held in Kunming on Private Sec-
tor Participation (psp) Options in Water and Electricity. The workshop was jointly 
organized by the World Bank and the Yunnan Provincial Government and paid for 
with a usd 120,650 grant from the Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility (ppiaf).
4 About 80 percent of China’s known coal reserves are buried in the north and 
northwest region (Jia Mulan 2003).
5 China both imports and exports coal. In 2002, China imported 10.8 million 
tonnes, nearly 1.0 percent of its total consumption. In the same year it exported 84 
million tonnes, mainly to Korea, Japan and Taiwan (Ball et al. 2003, 42–43).
6 The demand management suggestions for China policy makers (box 4.1) 
are taken from an adb report which overviews the Western Region Development 
Strategy (adb 2002).
7 The evocatively named “Power to the People”(Vaitheeswaran 2003) provides 
an inspiring analysis of the impending “energy revolution.” The author argues that 
promising new technologies, such as fuel cells and micro turbines, will lead the way 
to a revolution in micro power—putting small clean power plants close to homes 
and factories—which will displace grids which deliver power from big plants to 
often distant consumers. This recent addition to the literature builds on other work 
which reports on promising progress with new energy technologies for developing 
countries (for example, see Forsyth 1999).
8 China has been constructing nuclear power plants for more than twenty 
years. The China Atomic Energy Agency plans that by 2005, with capacity set to 
increase to 8.7 million kilowatts, nuclear plants will be providing 3 percent of the 
total national energy output (People’s Daily Online 2003a).
9 The economic argument of analysts Guotai Junan Securities Co (discussed 
in Business Weekly 2003), and others, is that as electricity price drops generating 
capacity must increase if company profits are to remain stable. In an example they 
worked through, for a 3.55 percent price drop, based on an average national tariff 
of 3.4 us cents per kilowatt-hour, generating capacity needs to increase five percent 
to maintain profit-levels.
10 The Bing Zhong Luo component of the cascade does not actually involve 
a “dam,” rather being designed as “run-of-river,” hence there is no “inundation 
area.”
11 During October 2003, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(egat) was told by the Thai Ministry of Energy to suspend talks on this delicate 
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subject until after the apec show had exited Bangkok (Watcharapong Thongrung 
2003). However, egat confirmed in November 2003 that it is prepared to finance 
the entire project, although it would prefer to explore some form of partnership 
with the Myanmar military junta and Chinese government (Nareerat Wiriyapong 
2003).
12 Green Watershed has contributed to lifting the standard and inclusiveness 
of the Nu River debate in several ways, via its own hosting of public meetings 
and discussion with officials in Kunming and Nujiang Prefecture, support to 
the tv documentary makers, radio spots, and co-organising with the Centre for 
Environment and Development and others, under the China Academy of Social 
Sciences (cass), a Beijing symposium January 8–9, 2004 focused on reconsidering 
the place of dams in national development. The authors have also jointly presented 
the substance of this research paper in Kunming, and in November 2003 to the 
Southeast Asia Water Forum held in Chiang Mai, and a meeting of development 
agencies in Bangkok.
13 At the Phnom Penh 2002 gms leaders’ summit, Mekong region governments 
signed an intergovernment agreement which paves the way for regional power 
trading. This should also be considered within the context of the so-called asean 
grid being promoted by egat
14 The original Yuxi Tobacco Factory in Yunnan Province was established 
in 1956. A major reorganization in 1995 led to the creation of the Yuxi-Hongta 
Tobacco Group (Hongta), which is China’s biggest tobacco grower and cigarette 
producer. As part of its wto obligations, from 2003 China has begun opening its 
tobacco market to foreign firms by abolishing special retail licences and reducing 
import taxes. Since its formation, Hongta has diversified into many different areas, 
including power production. Hence, it was no surprise to see it take an initial 20 
percent stake in the original Yunnan Lancang Jiang hydropower development 
company when it formed in 2001. With the advent of Huaneng and the morphing 
into the Yunnan Huaneng Lancangjiang Hydropower Company Limited, Hongta 
reduced its share to 12.6 percent (as at February 18, 2003).
15 The assets transferred from the State Power Grid Company to Huaneng 
on September 23, 2003 include their 27 percent share in the Yunnan Huaneng 
Lancangjiang Hydropower Company Limited.
16 Winchester (1996) provides a brief account of the significance and mythol-
ogy of the rock barrier (Yun Ling or “Cloud Mountain”) which changes the course 
of the river, at the beginning of his book The River at the Centre of the World.
17 These were triggered by and adapted from similar questions posed by a 
journalist (China Power News 2004).
18 A narrow conception may focus on: administration, business practice, legal 
formalities or government.
19 The four lower Mekong countries are slowly developing a transboundary eia 
protocol, based on the European Espoo Convention. The process is being facili-
tated by the Mekong River Commission (mrc) secretariat.
Chapter04.indd   92 4/11/07   2:04:55 PM
ANU page 100
246
REFERENCE LIST
Yodmani, S. 2001. “Disaster Risk Management and Vulnerability Reduction: Protecting the 
Poor.” In Asia Pacific Forum on Poverty. Manila: Asian Development Bank (adb).
Online sources and electronic material
Appleton, B., ed. H. van Schaik, and P. Kabat. (2003). “Climate Changes the Water Rules: 
How Water Managers can Cope with Today’s Climate Variability and Tomorrow’s 
Climate Change.” Delft, The Netherlands, Dialogue on Water and Climate, http://www.
waterandclimate.org/report.htm.
Dudgeon, D. 2005. “River Rehabilitation for Conservation of Fish Biodiversity in Monsoonal 
Asia.” Ecology and Society 10 (15), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss12/art15/.
Lebel, L., J. M. Anderies, B. Campbell, C. Folke, S. Hatfield-Dodds, T. Hughes, and J. 
Wilson. 2006a. “Governance and the Capacity to Manage Resilience in Regional Social-
Ecological Systems.” Ecology and Society 11 (1): 11–19, http://www.ecologyandsociety.
org/vol11/iss11/art19/.
Seng, N. 2004. “Flood Documentary Maker Arrested.” Irrawaddy, July 30, http://www.
irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=3756&z=24 (accessed on November 17, 2006).
chapter 4
China’s energy reforms and hydropower expansion in Yunnan
Asian Development Bank (adb). 2002. “The 2020 Project. Comprehensive Report Describing 
the Western Region Development Strategy.” Manila: adb.
Ball, A., A. Hansard, R. Curtotti, and K. Schneider. 2003. “China’s Changing Coal Industry.” 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural Economics (abare) eReport 03.3. Canberra: abare.
Beijing Review. . “Makeover for Takeovers.” August 28.
———. 2003. “Beyond Three Gorges.” September 3.
———. 2003. “China No. 4 in fdi Stock.” September 4.
Blake, D. 2001. “Proposed Mekong Dam Scheme in China Threatens Millions in Downstream 
Countries.” World Rivers Review, June, pp. 4–5.
Business Weekly. 2003. “Power Companies Rushing to Build New Plants.” March 26.
Chapman, E.C. and D. He. 1996. “Downstream Implications of China’s Dams on the 
Lancang Jiang (Upper Mekong) and their Potential Significance for Greater Regional 
Cooperation, Basin-Wide.” In Development Dilemmas in the Mekong Subregion edited by 
B. Stensholt, pp. 16–24. Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute. 
Chen, H. 2004. “Hydropower Generates Debates.” China Daily, January 15.
China Daily. 2002. “Power Monopoly Broken Down, Electricity Regulatory Commission to 
set up.” December 30.
———. 2003. “State Run Power Grid Reforms Underway.” September 4.
———. 2003. “Monopoly Grid Switches to Private Firm.” September 24.
———. 2003. “clp Power to Invest in Thermopower Plants in Guangxi.” October 15.
———. 2004. “Leaders Stress Development.” March 6.
———. 2004. “New Way of Thinking Bodes Well for the Future.” March 6.
China Economic Review. 2002. “China’s Hydro Capacity to Double.” December 2002/January 
2003, 6.
China Power News (translated by Kevin Li). 2004. “Economic Vision: Hydropower Faces 
Dilemma again in China.” February 10.
China West News. 2003. “China Plans Four Hydropower Plants on Drichu Source.” February 
1.
———. 2003. “Loan for Key Hydropower Project.” February 19.
Daniel, R. 2003. “Thailand’s Salween Dams to Fuel Southeast Asian Regional Power Grid at 
the Cost to Ethnic Communities Forests and Rivers.” Watershed 9 (1). terra.
Dore, J. 2003. “The Governance of Increasing Mekong Regionalism.” In Social Challenges for 
the Mekong Region edited by Mingsarn Kaosa-ard and J. Dore. Bangkok: White Lotus.
Chapter11_biblio.indd   246 4/11/07   2:14:25 PM
ANU page 101
247
REFERENCE LIST
Dubash, N. K., M. Dupar, S. Kothari, and T. Lissu. 2001. A Watershed in Global Governance? 
An Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams. World Resources Institute, 
Lokayan and Lawyer’s Environmental Action Team.
Dunning, J. H. 1988. Explaining International Production. London: Unwin Hyman.
Feng, J. 2003. “What a Waste.” Beijing Review 46 (36): 12–15.
Forsyth, T. 1999. International Investment and Climate Change: Energy Technologies for Developing 
Countries. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Deringer, F. B. 2003. “Restructuring China’s Power Sector.” China Notes, March.
Gao, S. 2000. “China.” In Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia edited by P. B. Stares. Tokyo: 
Japan Centre for International Exchange.
Giddens, A. 1992. Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
He, D., G. Zhang and H. T. Kung, eds. 2001. “Towards Cooperative Utilization and 
Coordinated Management of International Rivers.” Proceedings of International 
Symposium, June 25–30, 1999, Kunming, China. New York & Tokyo: Science Press & 
United Nations University.
He, J. 2002. “A Research on the Development Strategy of the 21st Century’s Hydropower in 
China.” Electricity 13 (1).
Hinton, P. 2000. “Where Nothing is as it Seems: Between Southeast China and Mainland 
Southeast Asia in the ‘Post-Socialist’ Era.” In Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social & 
Cultural Change in the Border Regions edited by G. Evans, C. Hutton and K. K. Eng, pp. 
7–27. Bangkok: White Lotus. 
International Energy Agency. 2002. “Press Release (02)32 on China’s Oil Needs.” December 
12.
———. 2002. “Press release (02)24 on China’s Energy Purchases and Infrastructure Needs 
to 2030.” September 26.
International Rivers Network (irn). 2002. “China’s Upper Mekong Dams Endanger Millions 
Downstream.” Briefing paper 3. Berkley: irn.
Kattoulas, V. 2001. “Witnesses to a Crisis.” Far Eastern Economic Review. September 27.
Lambropoulos, V. 1996.  “Nomoscopic Analysis.” South Atlantic Quarterly 95 (4): 855–879.
Landcare Research New Zealand. 2000. “Policies and Strategies for the Sustainable 
Development of the Lancang River Basin. Final Report of adb ta 3139–prc.” Landcare 
Research New Zealand for the Asian Development Bank, Manila.
McCormack, G. 2001. “Water Margins: Competing Paradigms in China.” Critical Asian 
Studies 33 (1): 5–30.
Medlock, K. B. and R. Soligo. 1999. “China and Long–Range Asia Energy Securities: An 
Analysis of Political, Economic and Technological Factors Shaping Asian Energy 
Markets.” Rice University’s James A Baker Institute for Public Policy.
Mingsarn Kaosa-ard and J. Dore, eds. 2003. Social Challenges for the Mekong Region. Bangkok: 
White Lotus.
Mekong River Commission (mrc). 2002. Annual Report 2001. Phnom Penh: mrc.
———. 2003. State of the Basin Report. Phnom Penh: mrc.
Mekong River Commission (mrc), United Nations Development Program (undp), Cambodia 
National Mekong Committee (cnmc), nedeco and midas (1998). “Natural Resources-
Based Development Strategy for the Tonle Sap Area, Cambodia: Final Report, Volumes 
1–3.” Phnom Penh: mrc.
Nareerat Wiriyapong. 2003. “Egat wants China and Burma to Join in Huge Hydropower 
Project.” The Nation, November 16.
Oil, A. and G. Connections. 2003. “Profile of China’s Electric Power Industry.” News and 
Trends: East and Southeast Asia 8 (2).
Plinston, D. and D. He. 1999. “Water Resources and Hydropower.” Report for adb ta-3139 
Policies and Strategies for Sustainable Development of the Lancang River Basin. Manila: 
Asian Development Bank.
Chapter11_biblio.indd   247 4/11/07   2:14:25 PM
ANU page 102
248
REFERENCE LIST
———. 2000. “Water Resources and Hydropower in the Lancang River Basin.” Final Report 
of adb ta-3139 Policies and Strategies for Sustainable Development of the Lancang 
River Basin. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Roberts, T. R. 2001. “Killing the Mekong: China’s Fluvicidal Hydropower-cum-Navigation 
Development Scheme.” Natural History Bulletin of the Siam Society 49: 143–159.
Rungfapaisarn, K. 2003. “Yunnan Eyes S.E. Asia Trade & Investment.” The Nation, October 
22.
Sarkkula, J., J. Koponen, and others. 2003. “Modelling Tonle Sap for Environmental Impact 
Assessment and Management Support.” Final report. Finnish Environment Institute and 
eia Ltd., Helsinki and Espoo.
Scholte, J. A. 2000. Globalisation: A Critical Introduction. London: Palgrave.
Stares, P.B., ed. 2000. Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia. Tokyo: Japan Centre for 
International Exchange.
Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (terra). 2002. “Creating Catastrophe: 
China and its Dams on the Mekong.” Watershed 8 (2).
Vaitheeswaran, V. 2003. Power to the People: How the Coming Energy Revolution will Transform 
an Industry, Change our Lives, and maybe even Save the Planet. New York: Farrar Straus and 
Giroux.
van Zalinge, N., Nao Thuok and Sam Nuov. 2001. “Status of the Cambodian Inland 
Capture Fisheries with Special Reference to the Tonle Sap Great Lake.” Cambodia 
Fisheries Technical Paper Series Volume 3. Phnom Penh: Inland Fisheries Research & 
Development Institute of Cambodia.
Vatcharasinthu, C. and Babel M. S. 1999. “Hydropower Potential and Water Diversion 
from the Salween Basin.” In workshop on Transboundary Waters: The Salween 
Basin. Organized by ait Regional Environmental Management Centre, Oregon State 
University, University of Victoria, Chiang Mai, September 13–16, 1999.
Watcharapong Thongrung. 2003. “egat Told to Suspend Dam Talks.” The Nation, October 
27, 2003.
Winchester, S. 1996. The River at the Centre of the World: A Journey up the Yangtze and Back in 
Chinese Time. London: Penguin Books.
World Commission on Dams (wcd). 2000. Dams and Development: A New Framework for 
Decision Making. Cape Town: wcd.
Xinhua News Agency, 2003. “World’s Biggest Power Grid built in China.” September 23.
Online sources and electronic material
China Development Bank (cdb). 2003. “China Development Bank Offers Loan of rmb 15 
billion in Support of the Construction of the Xiaowan Hydraulic Power Station,” http://
www.cdb.com.cn (accessed on October 14, 2003).
People’s Daily. 2003. “Regulator Sets Target for China’s Power Sector Reform.” March 26.
———. 2003. “China Steps up Development of Southern Power Grid.” March 27.
2003. “Nuclear Energy to take 3 percent of China’s Total by 2005.” April 10.
———. 2003. “Energy Demand Set to Double by 2020.” November 19.
———. 2003. “China’s Grid Giant gives Shares to Huaneng Company.” September 24.
International Commission on Large Dams (icold). 2001. “A Brief Introduction to 
Dachaoshan Hydropower Project.” icold Web site, December 15, http://www.icold-
cigb.net/. 
Mulan, J. 2003. “Overview of Power Industry.” March 10, http:// tdctrade.com.
World Bank (wb). 1998. China-East China (Jiangsu) 500kV Transmission Project, World 
Bank Infoshop Web, http:www.worldbank.org.cn/Chinese/content/81811198523 (ac-
cessed January 2, 2004).
Chapter11_biblio.indd   248 4/11/07   2:14:25 PM
ANU page 103
ANU page 104
91
© The Ecological Society of America www.frontiersinecology.org
As it flows through Cambodia, the Lao People’sDemocratic Republic (hereafter Laos), Thailand,
and Vietnam, the Lower Mekong (LM) River remains one
of the world’s last great stretches of undammed river. Since
the 1990s, however, China has developed extensive
hydropower infrastructure along the Upper Mekong (UM)
River, with 17–19 projects in operation, under construc-
tion, or under consideration (Magee 2012). Downstream of
China, much development is taking place along the
Mekong’s tributaries but, as yet, there are no hydropower
projects on the mainstream. However, these LM countries
are now exploring their options, with up to 12 mainstream
projects under consideration. These would generate sub-
stantial energy and wealth, especially for Cambodia and
Laos, while also making dramatic changes to the river itself.
Proposals for LM mainstream hydropower projects have re-
emerged in the past decade, encouraged by rising regional
power demand and enabled by the increasing number of
existing and planned Chinese dams along the UM. These
current and upcoming projects will change river flows at the
same time as new sources of investment capital and associated
prospects for substantial profits incentivize the dam-building
industry that is already active on Mekong tributaries.
In September 2010, the Laotian government advised the
Mekong River Commission (MRC) – an intergovernmen-
tal organization that was created to coordinate water
resources development between LM countries – of its
desire to build the Xayaburi Dam, the first of the proposed
projects for the LM mainstream (Figure 1). A series of
dams along the LM will exacerbate changes to natural flow
patterns that already occur as a result of dam building in
China. Substantial disruption to fisheries, as well as nega-
tive implications for the millions of people who depend on
the Mekong River for their livelihoods, is likely. However,
our understanding of the Mekong ecosystem is far from
complete. For example, landings from the multispecies
inland freshwater capture fishery are estimated at 2.2 mil-
lion metric tons per year (Hortle 2009), but it is unclear to
what extent the estimated catch is dependent on the LM
mainstream channel remaining unobstructed (KG Hortle
pers comm). Moreover, little is known about designing fish
lifts and ladders that would be appropriate for the diversity
and magnitude of the fishery (Dugan et al. 2010).
In this paper, we highlight the primary drivers of change
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Mekong hydropower: drivers of change and
governance challenges
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The Mekong River is the longest watercourse in Southeast Asia. Although China has an extensive hydropower
program underway on the Upper Mekong, as yet there are no dams on the river’s lower mainstream. However,
as many as 12 additional projects, which would generate substantial energy and wealth especially for Cambodia
and Laos, are currently in the proposal stage for the Lower Mekong (LM). The cumulative effects of the LM
hydropower projects – if built, and together with existing Chinese dams – will transform the Mekong by alter-
ing natural flow patterns and disrupting fisheries and other ecosystem services, to the detriment of the millions
of people who depend on the river for their livelihoods. Proposals for new dam construction are driven by
several factors, including changing human demographics and development needs, energy and food security
concerns, economic cooperation, and climate change. We link these social, ecological, economic, and political
forces to ongoing regional governance issues and discuss how to improve the quality of Mekong hydropower
decision making in a complex, transboundary setting.          
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In a nutshell:
• The Mekong River is under intense development pressure,
with multiple upstream dams under construction and down-
stream dam proposals that, in combination, would dramati-
cally alter ecosystems and human livelihoods
• Major drivers (eg demographics, human development, water
and food security, economic integration, climate change) and
other factors (eg new dam financiers, inadequate governance,
sectoral decision making) create momentum for new Mekong
hydropower projects
• Impact assessments in the region are often focused solely on
the country that carries them out, upstream and downstream
impacts are not considered cumulatively, and ecological and
social factors are often downplayed 
• More deliberative water governance could improve decision
making by contributing to more informed national and trans-
boundary negotiations
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in the LM. Focusing on hydropower, we link these forces to
a general assessment of basin governance. Finally, we discuss
specific actions for improving the quality of hydropower
decision making in both the upper and lower Mekong Basin.
We wish to encourage more informed and collaborative
water governance by Mekong countries, while they simulta-
neously pursue improvements in livelihoods, maintenance
of ecological functions, food production, and energy supply.
nMany Mekongs
The Mekong River – the eighth largest river in the world in
terms of mean annual discharge (475 km3) – is at the heart
of the debate over water resource development in Southeast
Asia. The river begins on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau in
China and flows almost 2200 km through Qinghai, Tibet,
and Yunnan Provinces – where it is called Lancangjiang in
Chinese. The river then winds for an additional 2700 km
through Myanmar and the LM countries (Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam) before emptying into the South
China Sea (Figure 1). On average, 18% of the river’s mean
annual water discharge originates in the UM countries
(China and Myanmar); the remaining 82%
comes from the LM countries (MRC 2010).
However, these summary data conceal impor-
tant nuances. For example, 30% of dry season
flows originate from the UM. Key features along
the length of the Mekong include: numerous
tributary rivers; Cambodia’s Tonle Sap, the
largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia, which
is critical to Cambodian food security; one of
the major freshwater capture fisheries in the
world; acclaimed biodiversity and cultural val-
ues; and the Mekong delta, the primary rice
growing area of Vietnam, the world’s second
largest exporter of the grain. About 60 million
people live within the Mekong River Basin
(MRC 2011a) in LM countries, with about
another 10 million residing in the UM, mostly
in Yunnan Province. 
While new scientific research can resolve many
technical issues, there remain “many ‘Mekongs’ –
river, basin, and various regional framings” (Dore
and Lebel 2010). Likewise, the waters provide a
range of vital benefits: drinking water, freshwater
food supplies, biodiversity hotspots, agricultural
irrigation, and industrial uses.
n Interconnected drivers of change
Both the LM and the wider region are changing
rapidly, and there is much uncertainty associ-
ated with the complex interplay of the major
drivers along the entire Mekong, including
demographic shifts, human development needs,
energy and food security concerns, increasing
investment and trade, and climate change.
Demography
Three demographic trends stand out in the LM countries:
population growth, the large cohort of young people, and
migration from rural to urban areas. Even though the pop-
ulation growth rate in the region is falling, the four coun-
tries are projected to increase cumulatively by 33 million
people by 2025 (PRB 2010). This growth is set to con-
tinue well into the future, as about 30% of the population
of LM countries are 15 years old or younger (PRB 2010).
Furthermore, the ongoing movement – from rural to
urban areas – of people seeking work means that an addi-
tional 17 million or so will likely be living in LM cities by
2025 (Figure 2; UNESCAP 2009). Taken together, these
trends will increase pressure on states to provide assistance
with employment, education, energy, and water resources.
Human development
The Mekong River flows through a region characterized
by high poverty and limited development. Much pro-
Figure 1. Map of hydropower projects in the Mekong Basin.
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gress has been made, as regional
poverty levels (defined as earnings of
less than US$1.25 per day) fell from
48.4% in 1990 to today’s average rate
of about 19% (CIA 2010; PRB 2010).
However, about 21% of LM residents
do not have access to clean water,
and over 30% do not use closed sani-
tation systems. The governments of
the LM countries spend less on edu-
cation than the average across other
countries in Asia, while health care
expenditures are even lower (UNDP
2010). Investment in upland areas is
disproportionately lower than that in
the lowlands. Combined expendi-
tures to meet UN Millennium
Development Goals, such as provid-
ing clean water and sanitation and
improving education standards, have
never been tallied in the wider
Mekong region.
Food security
Against this backdrop of population and development
issues, regional food demand is expected to double by
2050 (FAO 2010). Three factors bear on this projection.
First, there is decreasing investment in traditional agri-
culture, as well as a substantial reduction in agricultural
lands under irrigation, mainly as a result of the cata-
strophic impacts of the 2010 drought (Qiu 2010; FAO
2011). Second, farmers across the wider Mekong region
are moving, or are being directed by governments, away
from subsistence farming and toward plantation agricul-
ture (rubber, biofuels, and other cash crops). Incomes are
rising, but these changes have ecological implications;
monocultures threaten biodiversity, reduce total carbon
biomass, and deplete groundwater (Ziegler et al. 2009).
Farmers are increasingly subject to fluctuations in global
commodity prices, and this leads to a third factor: market
volatility. In 2010, food-price inflation prevented some
20 million people in the Asia Pacific region from escap-
ing poverty (UNESCAP 2011).
Economic investment and trade
Since 1992, the main strategy adopted by governments in
the Mekong region in reaction to the issues outlined above
has been to pursue economic linkages, connect infrastruc-
ture, and promote cross-border trade and collaborative
responses to social and environmental problems. Up to
early 2010, the Asian Development Bank and its partners
had allocated US$11 billion for investment in roads, rail,
shipping ports, hydropower, and transmission lines, with a
focus on three cross-border economic corridors. Con-
sequently, from 1999–2008, regional economic growth was
twice that of the world’s average (CIE 2010). However,
governments and multilateral development banks must
now focus not just on increasing the flow of goods but also
on the types of goods that are produced and how they are
produced, as well as on who benefits and who is vulnerable.
There are also questions about the extent to which new
economic development, including additional hydropower
projects, may further impair the provision of ecosystem
services, upon which other measures of prosperity depend.
Climate change
While degrees of uncertainty characterize all of the forces
for change discussed above, climate change is the “wild-
card” driver in the LM. By 2050, projected regional impacts
of climate change include decreasing overall water avail-
ability, increasing temperatures and flood likelihood,
decreasing food production capacity, and rising sea level in
the Mekong delta (Cruz et al. 2007; Mainuddin et al. 2010).
Specific impacts will vary by location (Kingston et al.
2011). Extreme events such as droughts – together with
impacts resulting from land-use change (eg rubber planta-
tions) – are already contributing to cumulative effects on
watershed streamflow (Guardiola-Claramonte et al. 2010;
Qiu 2010). Regional rice production may decline sharply
(Rerkasem 2011), and sea-level rise could submerge
19–38% of Vietnam’s Mekong delta, which currently pro-
duces 25% of the country’s gross domestic product or GDP
(Thuan 2011). Climate change may also trigger techno-
logical innovation in the hydropower sector; for example,
there is potential in pumped storage hydropower to better
manage increased climatic variability (Pittock 2010). Until
recently, however, LM dams have been planned under the
assumption that baseline water flows will remain un-
changed, with limited consideration of models that com-
bine hydropower impacts with future climate projections.
Figure 2. Bangkok, Thailand – the ultimate destination for much of the hydro-energy
produced along the Mekong River.
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Taken together, these large-scale drivers certainly influ-
ence development (including hydropower) in the
Mekong region, though there may be few precise causal
connections to any specific project. If regional population
growth were flat, human development levels average,
food and water needs stable, economic growth static, and
climate impacts projected to be beneficial, then there
would be less pressure to build dams to solve some aspects
of these problems. However, none of these are true for the
Mekong region.
n Hydropower expansion and the Xayaburi Dam
The scale of Mekong hydropower expansion makes it a crit-
ical driver of change in the LM in its own right, whereas the
proposed Xayaburi Dam project highlights several more
specific drivers of change in action. First, the governments
of LM countries are recognizing increased opportunities to
proceed with large-scale development because of their
decreasing dependence on multilateral funding provided by
international institutions, such as the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank. This is due to a combination of
factors, including greater national creditworthiness,
improved regional relations, and an associated willingness
among private financiers to supply capital (Middleton et al.
2009). So far, most private hydropower investors have
demonstrated limited commitment to environmental
review, mitigation, or human livelihood safeguards, though
this is slowly changing. Second, although there are con-
siderable differences between individual countries, in gen-
eral, all LM countries have substantial room for improve-
ment in filling knowledge gaps and in implementing legal
regimes and other public policies. Compliance with
national environmental regulations is not always enforced,
and current transnational private-sector protocols are
mostly advisory, non-binding, and experimental (Foran
2010). Finally, there is little delibera-
tive governance in the region, where
various stakeholders come together to
discuss issues and debate competing
claims. Instead, public policy decisions
are often taken that serve narrow eco-
nomic interests without seeking sub-
stantive input from those segments of
society that will be most affected. As a
result, high-quality, integrated assess-
ments and associated deliberative
processes involving stakeholders are
still the exception rather than the
norm (Grumbine and Xu 2011). 
However, in response to the 12
proposed LM mainstream projects,
the MRC commissioned a Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA) to
assess their associated cumulative
impacts, costs, and benefits (ICEM
2010). The SEA portrays the projects
as having major benefits but also substantial costs. If all
LM projects were to proceed, they could generate 6–8%
(~65 terawatt-hours [TWh] per year) of the projected
power demand (~325 TWh per year) in LM countries by
2025. Gross income from hydropower generation could
total US$3.7 billion per year. Operators and investors
(including governments) would garner most of this
income during the first 25 years of dam operations. Laos
and Cambodia, two of the poorest countries in the
Mekong region, could gain annual income equivalent to
some 18% and 4% of their 2009 GDP, respectively.
The risks to livelihoods and food security posed by these
12 hydropower projects would also be very high. More
than 100 000 people would need to be resettled, and a fur-
ther 2.1 million would be at high risk of indirect, negative
impacts, such as diminished river-bank agricultural and
fishing opportunities (Barlow et al. 2008). Dams would
turn more than half of the length of the main river chan-
nel into reservoirs characterized by slow-moving water
conditions, thereby increasing the risk of water-borne
diseases like schistosomiasis and opisthorchiasis (Andrews
and Sithithaworn 2011). Despite the migratory nature of
many Mekong fish species (Figure 3), only three of the
proposed dams currently incorporate fish ladders, none of
which, according to fisheries experts, are likely to be ade-
quate for local species (Dugan et al. 2010). In addition,
existing and planned mainstream dams in China would
have the largest impact in terms of decreasing sediment,
given that more than 60% of the Mekong’s suspended sedi-
ment load originates from this part of the river. Models
project that at least 50% of total basin sediment load will
be trapped annually by the Chinese dams (Figure 4;
Kummu et al. 2010). Proposed dams in the LM would trap
even more sediment, with substantial negative impacts
expected in Cambodia (including within the entire Tonle
Sap system) and parts of the Mekong delta in Vietnam.
Figure 3. Jullien’s barb (Probarbus jullieni), one of several migratory fish species
common near the proposed Xayaburi Dam.
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Thus, the SEA team concluded that
the immensity of risks was beyond the
current capacities of regional govern-
ments to address, and recommended
deferring all LM mainstream dam
building for at least 10 years (ICEM
2010). However, the SEA is for infor-
mational purposes only and is not
binding on decision makers.
n Transboundary water
governance in the Mekong
The MRC acts on behalf of LM gov-
ernments through the 1995 Agree-
ment on the Cooperation for the Sus-
tainable Development of the Mekong
River Basin to “cooperate…in the
sustainable development of the Mekong River basin…in
a manner to optimize…benefits…and to minimize harm-
ful effects” (MRC 1995). The Agreement was an impor-
tant milestone in LM water governance and, since the
1990s, the MRC has negotiated other integrated river
basin management policies to guide its operations. 
Yet, for much of its existence, the MRC has been mar-
ginalized by its member states from major basin develop-
ment decision making. At the same time, it is often criti-
cized by non-governmental organizations and civil
society for not being responsive to human livelihood con-
cerns, nor to demands for a more transparent and partici-
patory decision-making process (Dore and Lazarus 2009).
Much of this criticism is due to negotiated elements of
the 1995 Mekong Agreement and subsequent Procedures
and Guidelines for action. Member states have, until
now, been able to discount the work of the MRC when it
served their interests to do so. This, in combination with
the major and more specific change drivers discussed
above, has resulted in underdevelopment in the Mekong
region of well-known elements for effective transbound-
ary cooperation – trust, converging interests, strong
regional identity, government institutions, and a vibrant
civil society (Hirsch and Jensen 2006; Sneddon and Fox
2007; Molle et al. 2009b). 
Nevertheless, there are prospects for improvement in
transboundary water governance in the LM, as much
recent effort has been put into allowing the MRC to play
a more prominent role in decision making. Three actions
have been particularly noteworthy. First, in April 2010,
the inaugural MRC Summit was convened, which
brought together the Prime Ministers of Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam with high-level representatives
from China and Myanmar. This Summit succeeded in
giving the MRC greater legitimacy. Second, the SEA
raised the MRC’s profile in terms of information produc-
tion and debate facilitation. Subsequently, the organiza-
tion gained the necessary political traction to complete
this work, a signal achievement in a region where data
are rarely released for public scrutiny. Finally, the MRC
facilitated discussions between LM countries about Laos’
proposed Xayaburi Dam. External pressure for disclosure
was very high, and by the end of the designated period,
sufficient information had been shared for the MRC to
release a high-quality advisory report (MRC 2011b).
Consequently, the MRC’s Joint Committee of agency
leaders decided, in April 2011, to send Laos’ proposal to
the ministerial level. This decision was no surprise,
because there had already been numerous bilateral meet-
ings between the countries, during which the Xayaburi
project had been discussed. Nevertheless, “preparatory”
work has continued, with at least the dam developer gam-
bling that permission to proceed will eventually be given.
An MRC Xayaburi working group has been convened
under the auspices of the Procedure for Notification, Prior
Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA), which is
designed to ensure that MRC countries engage in informed
“prior consultation” about any proposed water use that may
have major impacts on water quality or flow regimes along
the Mekong (MRC 2003). Neither the 1995 Mekong
Agreement nor the subsequently negotiated PNPCA pro-
vides a right to veto or a unilateral right to “use”– in this
case, to build and operate a hydropower project that will
likely have transboundary impacts. However, signatories
are bound to consult with each other and take into
account each others’ interests in the pursuit of equitable
and reasonable utilization of the Mekong’s water resources.
If Laos is unable to reach agreement with its neighbors, the
country may yet choose to go ahead with the Xayaburi pro-
ject (and other, similar developments; Figure 5). The deci-
sion regarding the Xayaburi Dam will either represent the
initiation of high-impact LM mainstream hydropower devel-
opment or lead to a postponement of such development, as
recommended by the SEA. Either way, further studies that
will contribute to more integrated transboundary river basin
understanding and management will be performed.
The SEA for all mainstream dams and the first imple-
mentation of the PNPCA for Laos’ Xayaburi proposal are
Figure 4. Jinghong Dam on the Lancang–Mekong mainstream in Yunnan Province,
China.
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important steps. The next step will be to build on these
processes, to better ensure that high-quality impact
assessments are implemented for such projects in the
future. To that end, the MRC has drafted a transboundary
environmental impact assessment framework that may
become a backbone of regional cooperation in the LM.
However, this new framework has yet to be approved.
Despite its absence, in December 2011, ministers from
LM countries agreed that further studies would be under-
taken to clarify the potential transboundary impacts of
the Xayaburi Dam and other LM projects. 
n Improving transboundary governance
There are inextricable links between water, food, energy,
and all the drivers of change in the countries that share
the Mekong River. Connections exist across different
scales and sovereign state boundaries, and efforts to nur-
ture trust-building between and within LM countries, as
well as between LM and UM countries, could turn envi-
ronmental and social risks into development and security
opportunities. There are many specific transboundary
water governance actions that could further improve
cooperative relations across the entire basin; here, we
highlight just a few. 
The MRC must persist with efforts to help nations
negotiate water resource issues through joint exploration
of specific development scenarios to quantify uncertain-
ties. In addition to the PNPCA, there are other proce-
dures that focus on data information and exchange,
water-use monitoring, real-time flood forecasting, main-
tenance of flows along the river, and water quality. Some
of this important work is hampered by ambiguity in the
1995 Mekong Agreement, where several terms – such as
“significant tributaries” and “acceptable minimum flow”
– are poorly defined (MRC 1995). This ambiguity is due,
at least in part, to the fact that both the Agreement and
the subsequent negotiated Procedures
and Guidelines were the best outcomes
that could be agreed upon at the time
(Browder 2000; Radosevich 2010).
In the near term, as negotiations
continue, further data sharing and a
culture of pilot program experimenta-
tion employing more stakeholder dia-
logue need to be encouraged through-
out the Mekong region. This could
include wider use of: the sub-basin-
focused Rapid Basin-wide Hydropower
Sustainability Assessment Tool, which
supports river basin management by
providing a structured set of questions
to aid planning (MRC et al. 2010); a
new, multifaceted Sustainability Pro-
tocol from the International Hydro-
power Association, which assesses pro-
ject performance in planning, con-
struction, and operation phases (IHA 2010); and envi-
ronmental flow assessments (Dyson et al. 2003) that pro-
vide opportunities for interdisciplinary, multi-stakeholder
engagement (Lazarus et al. 2012). These will all require
more deliberative approaches to negotiation, given that
stakeholders still have few opportunities to participate in
decision making in the region (Dore and Lebel 2010).
To support this process, we argue that it will be neces-
sary to strengthen Mekong governance and knowledge
networks across borders. Numerous opportunities for col-
laboration exist, including risk management, benefit-shar-
ing, alternative energy futures, power trading, quality
aspects of production and trade, improving livelihoods of
people affected by the project, multipurpose management
of dams, and nuanced adaptation to climate change.
Formal intergovernmental cooperation is complemented
by the emergence of transboundary knowledge networks,
such as the Mekong Program on Water, Environment and
Resilience (M-POWER), which focuses on improving
water governance through published research (Lebel et al.
2007; Molle et al. 2009a; Lazarus et al. 2011), encouraging
dialogue between stakeholders and governments (IUCN
et al. 2007; Dore et al. 2010), and assembling independent
panels of experts (Sokhem et al. 2010). Experience from
other transboundary river basins has shown that national
policy makers need to improve their capacity to better
engage in transboundary/transnational policy analysis and
integrated problem-solving (Howlett and Joshi-Koop
2011); this is also true for the Mekong region.
There is also an essential need to establish or
strengthen genuine local engagement in “higher” level
public policy making and monitoring. When transbound-
ary decisions impact water supply, food security, and other
critical social goods and services that are difficult to
replace, affected citizens should be given the opportunity
to participate directly in decision-making processes
(Folke et al. 2005; Arthur et al. 2011). This is necessary
Figure 5. Site of the proposed Xayaburi Dam on the Mekong mainstream, Laos.
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for Mekong decision making to advance toward a trans-
boundary framework capable of addressing multiple eco-
logical functions entwined with human livelihood goals
(Lemos and Agrawal 2006).
Progress is being made on many fronts – poverty reduc-
tion, power provision, food security, cross-border trade,
biodiversity protection, and climate-change adaptation –
in the Mekong region. Yet in an era of rising uncertainty
and declining resilience, each Mekong country must
understand that sovereign security increasingly depends
on cooperative environmental decision making. Hope for
the future of the Mekong lies with new definitions of
what constitutes “reasonable and equitable” utilization,
crafted within a context of informed regional diplomacy.
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De-marginalizing the Mekong 
River Commission
John Dore and Kate Lazarus
INTRODUCTION
A new water governance paradigm is needed in the Mekong region to assist societies 
in making better choices about how to share and manage water for the production 
of food and energy. On mainstreams and tributaries, disputes exist, resulting 
from interventions to natural fl ow regimes and overt or default management 
decisions. These interventions are justifi ed on the grounds of fl ood control, more 
irrigation for food or fi bre production, urban or industrial supply, improving ease 
of navigation, or boosting energy production via hydropower. There are associated 
disputes about altered sediment and nutrient loads, groundwater use, water 
reuse and diversions (inter-state, intra-state, inter-basin and intra-basin). New 
regional water governance is vital because these issues have territorial, ecological 
and political dimensions that need to be managed via regional protocols, rules or 
benefi t-sharing processes.
Numerous dams and water diversions are on the agendas of mobile private 
and quasi-public-sector developers, transnational capital providers, and the six 
governments of the region: Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar/Burma, Thailand 
and Vietnam. A recent count found 82 existing and 179 potential hydropower 
projects in the wider region (King et al, 2007) (see Chapters 1 and 2), many 
on Mekong River tributaries.1 Planned dams and diversions will transform the 
waterscapes of the region.
Our vision is for a more deliberative water politics in the Mekong region. To 
be clear, when speaking of deliberation, we mean: 
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Deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, 
well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise 
prefer ences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by 
fellow participants. Although consensus need not be the ultimate aim of 
deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their interests, an 
overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as justifi -
cation to all affected) ideally characterizes deliberation. (Chambers, 
2003, p309)
Thus far, deliberation has been in short supply. This is partly because proponents 
of deliberation meet resistance from actors who prefer to reinforce contexts that 
are unfriendly to deliberation and favourable to pursuance of their vested interests. 
Many actors still believe, or at least rhetorically pretend or are instructed, that 
domestic criticism of public policy is unpatriotic. There is often an unhelpful 
confl ation where dissent is mistakenly seen as synonymous with disloyalty. Enquiry 
or criticism of water resources development plans, which impact across state 
borders, is seen by many as encroachment on hard-won state sovereignty and 
legitimate national security concerns. Hence, the resistance to transnational 
deliberative politics should not be underestimated.
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is mandated to engage in water 
resources development in the so-called ‘Lower’ Mekong part of the region – the 
Mekong River Basin in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Different people 
call on the MRC to be  a social and environmental guardian of the basin; a platform 
for information exchange; a knowledge producer, synthesizer and broker; an 
investment facilitator; and convenor of multi-stakeholder processes demonstrating 
high-quality deliberative practice. Can it play all these roles simultaneously?
Since 1995, the MRC (and its predecessors since the 1950s) has been and 
remains the focus of substantial organization-building efforts. During recent years, 
the MRC has received much attention from people intent on using, improving, 
empowering or criticizing it. This chapter refl ects on the practice and potential of 
the MRC at a time when all Mekong region governments need to make informed 
decisions about whether, or how, to proceed with major projects that will have 
dramatic, transformative, national and transboundary impacts.
UNDERUTILIZED
The Mekong River Commission has a contested governance mandate – embodied 
in the 1995 Mekong River Agreement – for the mainstream, tributaries and 
the lands of the basin within the territories of the Lower Mekong countries 
(Governments of Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam–Thailand, 1995; Browder, 2000; 
Öjendal, 2000). It is often referred to as a ‘regional’ initiative and endeavours to 
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include China and Myanmar in some of its activities and outreach. This Mekong 
cooperation was originally catalysed via the United Nations and has a 50-year 
history (Bui Kim Chi, 1997; ESCAP, 1997).
Article 1 of the agreement commits the four member countries to cooperate 
in all fi elds of sustainable development, utilization, management and conservation 
of the water and water-related resources of the Mekong River Basin in fi elds such 
as irrigation, hydropower, navigation, fl ood control and fi sheries.
The implementing organization for the agreement is the MRC, led by a 
governing Council at ministerial level, which meets once per year, and a Joint 
Committee (JC) of senior government offi cials, which meets formally twice per 
year, but increasingly now meets informally as the need arises (see Figure 14.1). The 
Council and JC are serviced by the MRC Secretariat (MRCS), which is responsible 
for implementing Council and JC decisions, advising and providing technical and 
administrative support. The MRCS is currently located in Vientiane, Laos.
Although not specifi cally mentioned in the agreement, there are also National 
Mekong Committees (NMCs) established in each member country, set up 
differently in each country depending upon national government preferences. The 
heads of the NMCs represent their countries on the Joint Committee. NMCs are 
serviced by NMC Secretariats (NMCSs). It is important to note that there is a 
political dynamic between each of these fi ve parts – that is, there is no homogeneous 
single ‘MRC’. Any joint position needs to be collectively negotiated between the 
Council and JC members. Moreover, the MRCS must also manage its working 
relationships with the NMCSs, who are quick to object if they feel left out of 
MRCS activities, or if they perceive the MRCS to encroach into their national 
space. In turn, the NMCSs also have to establish their own role and working space 
within their national polities, with their functional power much less than key 
water-related ministries and agencies in each country.
The MRC also recognizes ‘development partners’ that include international 
lenders and donors – who at this stage still provide most of the finance for 
the MRC to function – international fi nancial institutions (IFIs) such as the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and other ‘internationals’ 
such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI). More recently, knowledge networks involving various regional 
universities, policy research institutes and civil society organizations, such as the 
coalition implementing the Mekong Programme on Water, Environment and 
Resilience (M-POWER), are also increasing their engagement with the MRCS. At 
the national level, the NMCs and NMCSs have historically had less engagement 
with non-state actors or civil society organizations, particularly if these articulate 
alternative development narratives.
As in any large family, it is not possible for all the interaction to be smooth. 
The vaunted ‘Mekong spirit’ of cooperation often seems optimistically overstated; 
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but that is not to deny the importance of doing everything possible to encourage 
a constructive spirit between the countries.
It is apparent that for much of its brief history, the MRC has been underutilized. 
In refl ecting on this, it is important to look at all members of ‘the family’, rather 
than just using the blanket term of MRC. Which parts of the MRC have been 
excluded or marginalized, why and by whom? Why have member governments 
chosen not to use their own river basin organization to engage in many of the major 
river basin development issues of this era? At present, individual national interests 
dominate over regional interests (Hirsch and Mørck-Jensen, 2006). Supporters of 
the MRC hope that it can become more a part of the solution to problems such 
as those illustrated in the following examples.
Sesan
On 4 March 2000, the water level in the Sesan River (a transboundary river 
fl owing through Vietnam and Cambodia) rose suddenly, causing deaths and 
Figure 14.1 Mekong River Commission structure
Source: www.mrcmekong.org
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loss of livelihoods of fi shers and farmers in north-eastern Cambodia’s Ratanakiri 
Province. The unexpected surge was caused by a release of water from the Yali 
Falls Dam in Vietnam. Cambodian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and local communities brought forward details of the damage and encouraged the 
national and international public to consider the implications of this transboundary 
incident. During the incident, the fl ow of information between Cambodian and 
Vietnamese offi cials was minimal, and there was virtually no communication 
between the provincial governments on either side of the border (Badenoch, 
2001, p1). The MRC did not become involved before or in the tense immediate 
aftermath, despite having a mandate to do so.
Five years on, the topic of development on the Sesan, Sekong and Srepok 
rivers (often collectively referred to as the 3S) was still considered so sensitive that 
it was removed from the agenda of an MRC-convened conference on integrated 
water resources management (IWRM) that was held in tandem with the tenth 
anniversary of the signing of the 1995 Mekong Agreement. Eventually, the MRC 
has engaged in the process, principally via the NMCSs of Cambodia and Vietnam. 
More recently, the two countries are trying to better manage the hydropower 
operations on the Sesan in order to minimize the downstream impact upon local 
communities; but this has taken extensive advocacy by affected local communities 
and their supporters. There is now even an effort, facilitated by the ADB, to 
establish a new transboundary, sub-basin organization to ‘manage development’. 
For a long time MRCS had been an onlooker, but it is now engaging more with 
ADB in this new initiative.
Commercial navigation
A commercial navigation agreement was signed by transport offi cials from China, 
Laos, Thailand and Myanmar in 2001 for the stretch of the Mekong River between 
Simao (China’s Yunnan) and Luang Prabang (Laos). River trade between Thailand 
and China has since rapidly increased. Associated with the signing, a feasibility 
study was completed in late 2000, which supported, in principle, proposed 
alterations to the river, including rapids and reef removal. By September 2001, 
an environmental impact assessment (EIA), coordinated by the Government 
of China, had been prepared and sent to each of the other three governments. 
Thailand’s government approved the EIA in January 2002 and it was subsequently 
approved in Laos in April 2002 (SEARIN et al, 2002). The MRCS was not used 
by either Thailand or Laos to inform or actively participate in the initial agreement 
negotiations. The secretariat became involved afterwards in offering to conduct 
an independent EIA of the project (an offer not taken up) and in commissioning 
evaluations that were extremely critical of the substandard EIA (Cocklin and Hain, 
2001; Finlayson, 2002; McDowall, 2002). The intervention by the MRC was 
ineffective and extensive modifi cation, via blasting, of the Mekong mainstream has 
since taken place in the northern reaches. The MRCS has played no substantive role 
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in this ‘Upper’ Mekong navigation; however, at the time of writing, it is becoming 
more involved, and so this could change.
Thailand Water Grid
In 2003, then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra relaunched the idea of a 
Thailand water grid, which would triple the area of irrigation in the country and 
require diversion of water from the Mekong River, and possibly other rivers in Laos 
and Cambodia, into northeast Thailand. For a time, the whole process was treated 
as a national secret by the Government of Thailand, with senior water academics 
fearful of the consequences to their funding and employment of criticizing or 
sharing any information about the scheme. There was no public deliberation within 
Thailand, and the MRCS was conspicuously silent, having been excluded from the 
process. Molle and Floch (2007) have observed that Thaksin’s ‘war on poverty’ was 
presented as an unquestionable meta-justifi cation used to silence opposition despite 
the fact that most water experts, commenting off the record, thought the rationale 
dubious and the scale of the scheme completely unrealistic. At the time of writing, 
the MRC (all parts) remains publicly silent about the merits or failings of touted 
water diversions by Thailand from the Mekong River, siphoning under the Mekong 
River from Laos, or, as some pundits remark, ‘siphoning under the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement’. The grid, as well as every other Thailand water resources development 
scheme on the shelf, was relaunched in 2008 by the government of Prime Minister 
Samak Sundaravej (see Chapter 10 for more details). To our knowledge, no 
substantive information about this has been shared with the MRCS.
Mainstream dams
Construction since the mid 1990s of the Upper Mekong (Lancang) Dam cascade in 
Yunnan is so far the most signifi cant human intervention ever made in the natural 
order of the Mekong River ecosystem, with substantial and undoubtedly complex 
transboundary ecological, social, cultural, economic and political impacts (Dore, 
2003, p431). The regional/transborder nature of ecosystems requires regional/
transborder political cooperation. China has plans to build up to 15 mainstream 
dams. Despite the MRC having an annual consultation with Chinese water 
offi cials, the MRCS has not noticeably affected China’s construction agenda. Real- 
time fl ood data is now provided by China, and future consultations could fruitfully 
examine hydropower operation regimes in order to minimize negative downstream 
impacts – negotiations to do just that were propelled in 2008 by serious fl oods 
along the Mekong River, with the fl ood level reaching a height not seen since 1966. 
The impact of the Chinese dams is now included in MRC cumulative impact 
assessments and scenarios work; but dialogue by the MRC with Chinese offi cials 
has, to this point, been very limited. At least until 2008, exchanges have been 
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more substantial beyond the MRC. Outside the MRC processes there has been 
increasingly substantive cooperation between Chinese colleagues and southern 
neighbours discussing many aspects of the Chinese mainstream development. This 
has included visits to Cambodia by Chinese water scientists, hosted by Cambodian 
non-state organizations. Increasing the depths of these types of dialogues and 
exchanges may be of critical importance in demonstrating the constructive 
possibilities of greater international understanding and perspective-sharing.
China’s unwillingness to seriously engage with MRC has been problematic 
enough; but what is worse is when member country governments also choose 
not to use the MRC to share their own national water resources development 
intentions. More recently, there is renewed interest by all of the MRC member 
countries in building or investing in dams on, or diversions from, the Mekong 
River mainstream (see Chapter 2). At the time of writing, the only government to 
formally submit information to the MRCS about mainstream developments has 
been the Government of Laos, which in June 2008 advised that it is investigating 
eight dams on the mainstream. Despite the MRC Joint Committee having formally 
approved the Procedures for Notifi cation, Prior Consultation and Agreement 
(PNPCA) in November 2003, there has thus far been only very modest compliance 
by member countries. The MRCS is hopeful that this action by Laos signals a 
new openness to sharing information about possible projects, and that the other 
member countries choose to take similar steps.
TENSIONS
The most recent strategic overview of the MRC that took place in 2006 involved 
much rewriting and negotiation before being fi nally endorsed by the JC and 
accepted by the Council. By this time there was something in the strategy for 
everyone, and the organization was assigning itself multiple, sometimes confl icting, 
roles. At the aspirational level of the text, there was little disagreement between 
stakeholders. It is hard to fi nd anyone who disagrees with the stated goals and 
‘strategic IWRM’ directions which frame the plan, although Molle would remind 
us to be wary of a ‘nirvana concept’, such as IWRM, which can ‘obscure the political 
nature of natural resources management’, and the fact that some of the goals may 
be ‘frequently, if not always, antagonistic’ (hence, the confl icts and the fact that 
‘trade-offs are necessary and hard to achieve’) (Molle, 2008).
The differences that emerged were in the details and the intended emphases. 
The strategic plan preparatory process highlighted some of the tensions evident 
within the MRC and its wider constituencies, to which we now turn.
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Territorial domain: Mainstream only, or including the 
tributaries, basin wide?
Article 1 of the Mekong Agreement is clear that the territorial domain of the MRC 
is the entire Mekong River Basin. Acting in the China and Myanmar parts of the 
basin is diffi cult as these countries are not members, but multi-country overview 
BOX 14.1 GOALS AND STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS OF 
THE MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION STRATEGIC PLAN 
(2006 TO 2010)
The goals of the Mekong River Commission Strategic Plan are stated as follows:
• Promote and support coordinated, sustainable and pro-poor development.
• Enhance effective regional cooperation.
• Strengthen basin-wide environmental monitoring and impact assessment.
• Strengthen the integrated water resources management (IWRM) capacity and 
knowledge base of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) bodies, the National 
Mekong Committees (NMCs), line agencies and other stakeholders.
The ‘strategic IWRM’ directions of the plan are summarized as:
• Economic development and poverty alleviation: promote economic growth through 
the use and development of joint water resources in a manner that signifi cantly 
alleviates poverty.
• Integration through basin planning: implement a participatory multi-sectoral basin 
planning process that integrates economic, social and environmental concerns 
across the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB).
• Social development and equity: ensure equity in the allocation of water resources 
and services across different economic and social groups; reduce confl ict and 
promote socially sustainable development.
• Regional cooperation: integrate and coordinate water resource development and 
management between countries to optimize benefi ts from the joint resource and to 
minimize the risk of water-related confl icts.
• Governance: further and implement open, transparent and accountable institutions 
and regulatory frameworks that will promote IWRM at all levels.
• Environmental protection: protect the environment, natural resources, aquatic life 
and conditions, and the ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin from harmful 
effects of development.
• Climate variability: prevent, mitigate or minimize people’s suffering and economic 
loss due to climate variability.
• Information-based management: ensure that water resource management decisions 
are based on best available information.
Source: MRC (2006)
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of development in the LMB has also proved to be very diffi cult. At the time of 
the strategic planning process, many were disappointed that the MRCS had not 
been more involved in analysing and contributing to decision-making about 
development in the tributaries. The political role of the MRC had seemed reduced 
to mostly research and discussions about mainstream cooperation, with speculative 
emphasis on the impacts of Chinese mainstream developments, but with tributary 
development mysteriously scoped out of formal Council and JC discussions. Now 
mainstream projects are back on the agenda, and the MRC cannot again be silent. 
The MRCS recognizes this.
The Precautionary Principle: To apply or not?
Article 3 relates to the protection of the environment and ecological balance. It 
is of concern to many that the MRC has been too often subdued about the risks 
associated with many development projects – risks often borne involuntarily by 
those not clearly benefi ting (or potentially benefi ting) from project X, Y or Z. This 
silence has extended to the non-mention of the Precautionary Principle.2 Instead, 
the mantra from the secretariat has been ‘meeting the needs, keeping the balance’ 
and acceptance of an ever-changing baseline. It is important to ask: whose needs, 
and what risks or trade-offs are considered acceptable in the quest for balance?
Constituency: Governments or wider society?
There was much discussion of the MRC mandate and expectations during the 2006 
to 2010 strategic planning process. It was clear that the MRC did need to clarify 
its constituency and decide how much scope to give the MRCS to engage with a 
wider constituency than just the parts of the member state governments that have 
been tasked with MRC representation.
The fi nal plan refl ects the dominant attitude of the MRC towards engagement 
with non-state actors, suggesting that ‘improved stakeholder participation can be 
accomplished by working through the NMCs who are best able to implement 
improved participation, including civil society and NGOs (MRC, 2006, p43). 
Many civil society organizations beg to differ as engagement between them and 
the state-centric NMCs has been at a very basic level, although this is now being 
stepped up. Many donors and consultants have had far easier access to the MRC 
than local civil society and Mekong academia.
Many people who have been involved in the MRC over the past decade 
have recognized that they need to bring other actors and subject matter into 
the mainstream of their processes and provide a mechanism for the expression 
and exchange of what may be widely and fundamentally differing views about 
upstream and tributary development, inter-basin diversions, etc. The 2000 annual 
report acknowledged that it is ‘important that decisions on development include a 
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“bottom-up” process and are not confi ned to a “top-down” approach. The voice of 
the people directly affected, and of other stakeholders such as community groups 
or NGOs, must be heard.’ Moreover, it admitted that it ‘has virtually no experience 
in this vital fi eld’ and that it must ‘drastically accelerate activities to promote public 
participation’ (MRC, 2001).
Soon afterwards, one of the authors of this chapter wrote that the MRC’s lack 
of achievement thus far in genuine public participation is complex. The youth of 
the new version of the organization, the sustainability orientation and mindset 
of some of the agencies which dominate the National Mekong Committees, the 
politics between the member states, stinging criticisms by NGOs, realization of 
limited successes to this point, and operating rules that limit engagement with the 
wider basin community are all relevant. Collectively, this has resulted in the MRC 
lacking confi dence and being constrained in the extent to which it has proactively 
engaged with the large range of Mekong region actors outside of the MRC family. 
In relation to hydropower and the Water Utilization Programme (WUP), there 
has been a hypersensitive wariness of member country intergovernmental politics. 
There is also some resistance to being ‘lectured’ at by NGOs and past and present 
Mekong country experiences of being ‘directed by donors’ (Dore, 2003, p424).
The drastic acceleration did not eventuate. At least until 2008, progress in this 
area has been slow. For example, the consultants who undertook an organizational 
review (discussed below), several years later, noted: 
The Strategic Plan describes the importance of public involvement, 
public opinion, the civil society and NGOs in ensuring the success of 
inte grated water resources management of the Mekong River Basin. 
However, it is the impression of the Review Team that the present atti-
tudes and practices in MRC regard the member governments as the 
pri mary, if not the only, stakeholders that should be involved with 
MRC. A clear commitment and strategy for involving the civil society 
is lacking. (Hawkesworth et al, 2007, p16)
Knowledge broker or investment promoter?
The approach to knowledge-sharing or knowledge-broking has varied during the 
fi rst 13 years of the MRC. During this period the organization has had four chief 
executive offi cers (CEOs), punctuated by caretaker leadership.
During the Matoba-era of 1995 to 1998, the MRCS was a closed, state-
centric organization, lacking in confi dence and capacity, and with its potential 
constrained by the management style. It gave the impression of being a house for 
often independently operating donor projects.
Under the subsequent leadership of Joern Kristensen during 2000 to 2003, there 
was a clear shift towards being a ‘knowledge broker’, which implies enabling the 
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constituency to both contribute to and receive knowledge. The new commitment 
was to being a ‘learning organization’ and a centre of knowledge and information 
exchange with a strong commitment to improving the livelihoods of the people of 
the basin. There continued an understandable privileging of state members – after 
all, it is an intergovernmental organization; but there was also a new openness 
to knowledge contributions from a wider set of actors beyond states. Kristensen 
restructured the operations of the secretariat into programmes and insisted that all 
those working in the secretariat building were accountable to him. These were all 
positive changes. Morale within the secretariat noticeably improved.
After a lengthy caretaker period during which the secretariat transferred from 
Phnom Penh to Vientiane, Olivier Cogels took up the CEO position for 2004 to 
2007. The new leader was convinced that he would be the one to build the working 
relationship with China which had eluded his predecessors. Soon into his tenure 
he denounced any role of the MRCS being a ‘watchdog’ and launched a new push 
for the MRCS to be an investment promoter or facilitator. Both of these moves 
brought him into confl ict with the knowledge-brokering role, as the promoter/
facilitator was uninterested in any bad news about possible negative impacts of 
upstream, downstream or tributary development. Information exchanges, peer 
reviews and contestation, and characteristics of knowledge-building became 
more constrained. Morale within the MRCS staff dissolved as much analysis or 
commentary deemed counter-productive to the new mission – smooth sailing with 
the China relationship or investment promotion – was restricted. This tension was 
palpable during the strategic planning process. The authors’ own observation of this 
situation was similarly detected by the organizational Review Team, who noted: 
MRCS is starting to become known (among civil society organizations, 
scientifi c organizations) as an institution that will not release informa-
tion that may illustrate negative environmental and social consequences 
of development projects. This is a threat to the credibility of the organiza-
tion. (Hawkesworth et al, 2007, p20)3
Preparing projects for investment or assisting societies to 
evaluate proposals?
MRCS engagement in project preparation was assumed during the drafting 
process for the strategic plan to be part of the new development promotion role. 
An alternative perspective was that a better role for the MRCS would be for it to 
support national actors (state and civil society) in order to examine development 
projects, their likely impacts, and their claimed merits and costs. It is this latter 
role that the MRCS has attempted to play with the Don Sahong Dam discussed 
below.
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In any event, most perspectives about what the MRC should be doing ended 
up being included in the strategic plan, which in due course was adopted and 
quickly overtaken by the transformation in the region, part of which was the new 
avalanche of potential projects. A mid-term review of the MRC Strategic Plan 
2006–2010 is scheduled for late 2008. To the extent that it is possible, it is hoped 
this will remove some of the current ambiguities and, perhaps, make the roles of 
the various parts of the MRC a little clearer.
CASE STUDY: LAOS HYDROPOWER, DON SAHONG 
AND THE MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION (MRC)
No current development project better encapsulates the challenges facing the 
MRC than the present controversy over the Don Sahong Dam in southern Laos. 
If built, it would be the fi rst dam on the mainstream in the LMB.
Hydropower
Laos is at the centre of the current hydropower surge in the Mekong region. 
According to the Power Development Plan in Laos (as of May 2008), there are 77 
live hydropower projects: 10 are operational, 7 are under construction, 16 are 
under research and the remaining 44 have memoranda of understanding (MoUs) 
signed to move forward (see Chapter 2). There is a complex set of reasons driving 
the current surge. For the MRC, the explosion is a response to market demand: 
the increasing importance of regional trade and investment fl ows, rapidly growing 
energy demands (particularly in China, Thailand and Vietnam) and opportunities 
of an emerging regional power market have stimulated a new era of hydropower 
development in the basin, now mainly driven by private-sector actors (MRC, 
2008, p37).
Soaring (albeit fl uctuating) global energy prices and national commitments 
to energy security are also important drivers. Others include the ready availability 
of capital, at least until the advent of the global fi nancial crisis; a new boldness 
by Mekong governments to move ahead; and very attractive concession terms 
for developers. Another driver that is now taking effect is the recognition of the 
changes that large new storage dams in China will have on the fl ow regime of the 
Mekong mainstream. When the Xiaowan and the Nuozhadu dams are completed 
in Yunnan, the dry season river fl ow will increase signifi cantly and this will also 
make the LMB mainstream ‘run of river’ fi nancially more attractive.
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Fish
The Don Sahong story (see below) is not all about fi sh, but they are central; so 
before proceeding it is worth ensuring that the reader is familiar with the scale of 
the Mekong fi shery (see also Chapters 9 and 12).
Recent MRCS research has estimated the LMB annual consumption of inland 
fi sh to be about 2 million tonnes by a population of 56 million people. About 
90 per cent of the fi sh consumed in the LMB is from the wild-capture fi shery. In 
addition, about 0.5 million tonnes of other aquatic animals (OAA) are consumed. 
Collectively, the inland fi sh and OAA are estimated to provide 47 to 80 per cent 
(country range) of the animal protein of the people of the basin (Hortle, 2007). 
This equates to about 17 per cent of the total global freshwater fi shing catch and is 
worth in the order of US$2 billion. Other work by the MRC Fisheries Programme 
is showing that the bigger the fl ood (both in height and duration), the more fi sh 
you catch (in tonnes); and related to the previous point, the bigger the fl ood, the 
bigger the fi sh.4
These are extraordinary fi gures, showing massive reliance on a huge fi shery. 
However, this data and information about threats to the fi sheries seem to be having 
little impact upon river development policy-making (see Chapter 12). Bringing in 
fi sheries is proving to be a challenge for local livelihood champions, economists, 
fi sheries scientists and concerned political operators at all levels of decision-making. 
If it cannot be done at Don Sahong, it will be extraordinarily diffi cult anywhere 
else.
Don Sahong
In March 2006, the Government of Laos signed an MoU with a Malaysian 
engineering company, Mega First Corporation Berhad, to carry out a feasibility 
study for the run-of-river Don Sahong Hydro Energy Project (DSHEP) in the 
Khone Falls area, just north and upstream of the border between southern Laos 
and Cambodia.
In May 2007, a public letter from concerned scientists to governments 
and agencies responsible for managing and developing the Mekong River drew 
atten tion to and summarized ‘grave environmental impacts, particularly on fi sh 
and fi sheries but also on tourism and other signifi cant aspects of economy and 
livelihood, causing damage that will far exceed the net returns from the project’. 
In their view: 
While a degree of mitigation is sometimes feasible for some dams, the 
fi sheries impacts of the Don Sahong Dam simply cannot be mitigated. … 
There is no prospect that a fi sh pass could make a signifi cant difference 
to the blocking effects of this dam. (Baird et al, 2007)
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In June 2007, the concern about DHSEP was again summarized in a WorldFish 
Centre science briefi ng paper: 
Khone Falls is a key site for all Mekong fi sh resources. At the falls, the 
Mekong drops some 20m to 30m from the Khorat Plateau to the Mekong 
Plain. Here the river forms a complex network of narrow braided 
channels, named hoo in Lao. … Of special signifi cance are the 28 
scientifi c studies that show how it serves as a bottleneck for fi sh migration 
in the basin. Hoo Sahong, the site of the proposed dam, is especially 
important as it plays a unique role in Mekong fi sh migration. … A 
dam on the Hoo Sahong would block the only deep channel that allows 
fi sh to migrate through the falls year round. This could effectively block 
dry season fi sh movements between the Lower Mekong plains and the 
Mekong basin upstream. … Data on the economic value of the Mekong 
fi sheries, and on the impact of dams on fi sh migration, suggests that 
the economic costs from lost fi sheries production could outweigh the 
expected economic benefi ts of the dam. This analysis suggests that if 
the proposed dam is to be considered further, a comprehensive scientifi c 
assessment would be required to evaluate the costs and benefi ts in the 
larger context of Mekong fi sheries. (Baran and Ratner, 2007)
In July 2007, a ‘fi nal draft’ EIA report for DHSEP was completed and soon after 
submitted for evaluation by Lao authorities.5
The MRCS challenge
In September 2007, the MRCS was formally invited by the Government of Laos 
to contribute to its review of the EIA. This was a big step for Laos to include the 
MRCS in its internal processes. The staff within the MRCS supplied their best 
advice to Laos about the ‘completeness, accuracy and adequacy’ of the Mega First’s 
consultants report, fi nding it defi cient in many areas. Their report, prepared in 
November 2007, provides a clear critique of the EIA and offers objective advice to 
Laos. Included in their response, the MRCS pointed out the following: 
• The geographic and economic extent of the impact on fi sheries of the DHSEP 
has been underestimated.
• The proposed mitigation to allow upstream movement of fi sh cannot be proven 
to be effective prior to the DHSEP being built; and moreover the outfl ow from 
the turbines will attract fi sh to the blocked Hoo Sahong channel.
• The mortality of fi sh (all life history stages) that will be entrained through the 
turbines has been overlooked (MRC Secretariat, 2007, point 69).
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The JC has encouraged the MRCS to be responsive to governmental requests for 
technical advice. In this Don Sahong case, the MRCS has responded to an in-
confi dence request from the Government of Laos.  The MRCS analysis has not 
been released to the public, nor even shared with all member States. This is quite 
different to how the MRCS should be expected to act, as a transparent servant to 
all member countries. 
In November 2007, the representatives from the Government of Cambodia 
pointed out their concerns about a Khone Falls Dam at the annual meetings of 
the full MRC, held that year in Siem Reap. Just prior to the MRC meetings, 201 
citizens’ groups and individuals from 30 countries wrote to the MRC demanding 
that it uphold the 1995 Mekong Agreement and that it protect the river and its 
people from the resurgent threats posed by the proposed mainstream dams. Also 
released at this time was a statement by MRC donors calling on the MRC to ‘fully 
utilize its capacities, tools and mandate to assess hydropower development plans, 
with a view to transboundary environmental, economic and social impacts’ (MRC 
Donors, 2007). The donors followed up with another letter in December, signed 
by the German ambassador to Cambodia, again asking for information about how 
the MRC procedures for ‘timely notifi cation, prior consultation and agreement’ 
are being applied (Mann, 2007). The MRC Procedures for Notifi cation, Prior 
Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA) were adopted by the MRC Council in 
November 2003 (and are discussed below).
In February 2008, Mega First signed a project development agreement with 
the Government of Laos and announced that its studies show the project to be 
viable. None of these studies have yet been publicly released.
In March 2008, 51 citizens’ groups and individuals from the Mekong region 
wrote to the MRC asking it to engage more substantively and publicly in decision-
making about development of the Mekong River. Premrudee Daoroung, director of 
the regional NGO Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA), 
had this to say: 
The new CEO must clearly state what steps the MRC will take in 
response to widespread concerns over the proposed mainstream dams. It 
can start by immediately releasing to the public all analyses relating to 
the Don Sahong Dam undertaken by the MRC. (TERRA, 2008) 
The new CEO responded in April 2008 that the MRCS would continue to work 
to develop a multifaceted understanding of the existing river system, prepare 
objective analysis of future development scenarios, provide advice on individual 
project proposals when requested by the member countries, and administer 
the procedures developed and negotiated (mostly during the Water Utilization 
Programme between 2000 and 2007) (Bird, 2008b).
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In a recent interview, refl ecting on the hydropower explosion, an analyst and 
campaigner for International Rivers acknowledged there is a ‘catch-22’ and that 
pleasing everyone is just not possible: 
If the MRC provides advice to government agencies that is perceived as 
critical of proposed hydropower projects, this advice could be unwelcome, 
ignored, and then no longer sought, undermining the MRC’s relevance 
in the eyes of the government agencies it considers itself primarily answer-
able to. Yet, by not providing this objective analysis and releasing it into 
the public domain, as it should do, the MRC faces a crisis of legitimacy 
in the eyes of the wider public that it is also intended to serve. (Nette, 
2008, interviewing Carl Middleton) 
The analyst says ‘as it should do’, and we would agree; but under the current 
norms of MRC behaviour, without the permission of the Government of Laos, 
the MRCS could not publicly release its Don Sahong analysis and advice without 
being seen as having betrayed the trust of its member state. The MRCS technical 
staff would be delighted if their analysis and advice were put in the public domain, 
but would prefer that it was done by the Government of Laos. Many Lao offi cials 
would also be more comfortable if the Don Sahong decision-making process was 
more transparent and deliberative.
The Don Sahong is not yet built, and there may yet be more twists in the 
tale; but it is salutary to refl ect on just how decisions actually get made about such 
projects. An actor in the Don Sahong case, who should not be identifi ed because 
it is not possible to speak openly about matters like this, is concerned: 
Development decisions in this region are almost entirely political. Tech-
nical matters play very little and sometimes no role in them. Water 
developments enable transfer of a dispersed, generalized wealth with 
no title  – or, more correctly, traditional public title – into a focused 
economic resource with private title. This is a very attractive proposition 
for people in positions of power.
A fi sheries scientist searching to be effective suggested: 
The real nature of politics and governance in the region is, indeed, 
one of the reasons why fi sheries are not on the agenda, and that can be 
depressing to the citizens we are; however, that should not spare us from 
a critical analysis of our contribution, as scientists, to the development 
process.
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Another colleague very familiar with the interdependencies between ecosystems and 
local livelihoods refl ected and recognized the need for more open deliberation: 
Decision-making processes on dams are not based on rational assessments, 
and certainly not infl uenced by sound science regarding fi sheries and 
their values. The irony is that we have had ten years of excellent research 
that has highlighted the importance of fi sheries – and that this evidence 
(much of which comes from MRCS) is widely accepted. So we have had 
a great research success – but a failure in terms of infl uencing policy. I 
do not think science alone will have much infl uence – although good 
research, evidence and arguments are necessary. What is clearly lacking 
is an open discussion of the options and implications – and a process 
that draws on case study experience in this region (plenty to draw from) 
and opens up the debate to include people who are directly impacted.
The Don Sahong example forces one to ask the question: how is it possible to 
have constructive, well-informed, deliberative processes before critical decisions are 
taken about water resources development? Thus far, the MRC has not been able to 
provide such a service to Mekong region societies. But things can change.
DE-MARGINALIZING
In early 2008, the MRC Joint Committee recommended, and the MRC Council 
subsequently appointed, new Chief Executive Offi cer Jeremy Bird, whose regional 
experience and existing working relationships ensure that he comes to the job 
with a solid grasp of the water politics of the place. He has previously worked in 
the Mekong region, including supervising cumulative impact assessment work in 
the Lao Nam Ngum River Basin (a sub-basin of the Mekong), and researching 
environmental considerations for sustainable hydropower development. The new 
CEO has laid out his vision for the period of 2008 to 2011 by proposing four 
areas of focus (Bird, 2008a) – regional and riparian; relevance; responsibility; risk 
reduction – which we use as departure points for the possible de-marginalization 
of the MRC.
Regional and riparian
The highest priority is for the MRC to become more regional, which is to us, in 
some ways, transnational. By this we mean addressing issues of joint concern to 
all the countries which share the land and waters of the basin, and to the extent 
possible, transcending solely national perspectives. Connected to regionalization 
is MRCS ‘riparianization’, which refers to the transition of the secretariat to an 
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organization clearly led and directed by citizens of the MRC member countries. 
Given the commitment of the MRC to riparianization of all key MRCS positions 
by 2011, including the CEO position, it is understood by all that Bird will be 
a single-term CEO with only three years in which to make his contribution. 
All positions in the Council, JC and NMCs have always been taken by citizens 
of the member countries. However, the MRCS has been increasingly criticized 
for having too many ‘international’ (i.e. from beyond the Mekong region) staff 
in key positions such as the CEO, chief fi nancial offi cer, chief of international 
cooperation, and programme managers.
Triggered by dissatisfaction with the overall performance, an independent 
review was commissioned in 2006 of the MRCS and the NMCSs. The consultants 
repeatedly encountered concerns about the staffi ng of the MRCS. They concluded 
that the overuse of internationals by the secretariat and the inadequate selection 
and retention procedures for riparians were preventing the MRCS from getting and 
keeping the best people from the member countries. Gate-keeping and control by 
the NMCs/NMCSs was identifi ed as part of the problem. The recommendation 
was clear: 
If there is going to be a successful professionalization and riparianization 
of MRCS, then it will be necessary to attract and secure the best qualifi ed 
candidates, not just from government but from the civil society as a 
whole. The process should be managed on a strictly competitive basis 
and administered by MRCS itself. (Hawkesworth et al, 2007, p37–
38)
The key MRC donors agreed: 
We strongly support the process towards riparianization. Riparian 
leadership, management and technical expertise in the MRC is critical 
to its long-term success and sustainability. To develop as a world class 
river basin management organization, the MRC employment proce-
dures need to attract, appoint and retain the best and brightest from 
the Mekong member countries. (MRC Donors, 2008)
MRC offi cials also agree with phasing down the role of internationals, but are fi nding 
it more problematic to make the riparian selection and retention systems more 
transparent and merit based. In early 2008, the JC rejected the recommendation, 
reducing the role of the NMCs. Donors are unlikely to accept anything less. So, it 
appears that all key positions in the secretariat will be ‘riparianized’ by 2011; but 
the processes for modernizing riparian recruitment and retention are still being 
negotiated.
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Relevant and engaged
The MRC must demonstrate that it is relevant by actively engaging in development 
decisions taken in the basin. The MRC has too often been absent from, or silent 
about, substantial decisions being taken on water resources development in the 
basin. As pointed out earlier, the MRCS has had little involvement and usually 
very limited information about the hydropower development on the Mekong River 
mainstream in China, and on tributaries in Laos and Vietnam. It was excluded 
from the decision-making about ‘channel improvement for navigation and trade’ 
and the associated mainstream river blasting in the Upper Mekong above Chiang 
Saen in northern Thailand. In the past, it has also been excluded from speculations 
about possible Lao–Thai water transfers, and diversions from the Mekong to 
irrigate more of northeast Thailand. Moreover, in recent years, it does not seem to 
have been trying to engage in these important issues. In the absence of deliberative 
action by the MRC, other actors have sought to open up regional water resources 
development debates via multi-stakeholder dialogues (Dore, 2007; IUCN et 
al, 2007a, 2007b) and the establishment of transnational knowledge networks. 
That said, these previous exclusions or inactivity would look minor if the MRC 
cannot now contribute to decision-making about LMB mainstream dams and 
diversions, which is now publicly (since 2007) fi rmly back on the agendas of all 
four member countries. In the latter half of 2008, the MRC, via the MRCS, scaled 
up its engagement.
Responsible and accountable
More than ever before, the MRC is being called to account and to act on the 
mandate articulated in the 1995 Mekong Agreement: under the agreement, the 
MRC is to conduct ‘assessment for the protection of the environment and the 
maintenance of the ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin’ (Article 24) 
and should ‘make every effort to avoid, minimize and mitigate harmful effects that 
might occur to the environment … from the development and use of the Mekong 
River Basin water resources’ (Article 7) (Rivers Coalition in Cambodia, 2007)
The MRC should clearly defi ne its own responsibilities (i.e. roles, duties and 
obligations), and also understand those of other Mekong region water actors. In 
doing so, constituencies and accountabilities are clarifi ed. Key questions include: 
what are the responsibilities of all stakeholders in a particular matter? Who is 
accountable to whom and for what? Are these responsibilities contested (Petkova 
and Veit, 2000; UN, 2006)?
Risk-reducing
The new CEO has expressed his desire for MRC to be risk-reducing, while the 
member countries are capitalizing on development opportunities. For these authors, 
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risk assessment and risk management are an important element of water use and 
related development. In the past, most attention was usually given to investment 
risk by either public or private investors. There is now often a much stronger focus 
on the risks of all actors affected by a decision. Distinguishing between different 
types of risk is a good way to start.
Voluntary risk-taking includes risks taken in the normal course of business 
– for example, when a private company invests in a hydropower dam, or a public 
company invests in a water supply systems – or business partnerships between the 
public and private sectors. Involuntary risk-bearing is quite different. For example, 
people displaced by a new reservoir, or those whose water entitlement is reduced 
as the result of a reallocation, are involuntary risk bearers.
Risk analysis should not ignore voluntary risk-taking, but should also focus 
on involuntary risk-bearing (WCD, 2000, p207; Dore et al, 2004), whether it is 
fair and effective, and, if not, how can it be made so. Key questions include: for 
different options, what are the possible risks? Who are the voluntary risk takers? 
Who are the involuntary risk bearers? How might risk be equitably shared and, 
especially, how might involuntary risk be reduced?
The new CEO takes the view that: 
The Secretariat has at least three roles in assessing and advising on oppor-
tunities and risks. One relates to the analysis of implications of projects, 
including the cumulative effects of national projects. This draws on 
work under a range of our programmes and, as I mentioned earlier, 
is being brought together by assessing various development scenarios 
under the Basin Development Plan. Another is to provide advice on 
specifi c projects where requested, including through our forthcoming 
Hydro power Programme. The third relates to administering the formal 
notifi cation and consultation procedures under the 1995 Agreement, 
and, where required, providing technical advice under such procedures 
and facilitating negotiation of agreements. (Bird, 2008a)
In comparison to his predecessors, these are extremely progressive statements 
embracing the tools of cumulative impact assessment and scenario-building, 
providing specific advice on projects and commitment to using the formal 
notifi cation and consultation procedures.
Examining rewards and respecting rights
There are two other ‘Rs’ worthy of further attention by MRC. Thus far, there has 
been very little examination of rewards (winners and losers) and their distribution; 
and there has been an aversion to tread on the sensitive topic of often overlapping 
claims and rights.
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The MRC could also emphasize the importance of identifying and unpacking 
rewards. This is not just the realm of economics, but rigorous economic assessment 
would be a good start. For different options, what are the possible multifaceted 
rewards or benefi ts (Sadoff and Grey, 2002, 2005)? Who stands to win? Who stands 
to lose? How might rewards be shared? Are there ‘net’ benefi ts? What is fair? What 
might be more ecologically, socially and economically sustainable?
The MRC could also display its concerns for the development of rights over 
and above territoriality and the sovereign rights of states. At various scales, water-
sharing rights, or entitlements, may be assumed, negotiated, bestowed, contested, 
bought, sold, rented, traded, perhaps agreed upon, and sometimes ignored (UN, 
2003; Scanlon et al, 2004). Rights analysis needs to be cognizant of a wide range 
of water-sharing regimes and the likely impacts of different options. An important 
departure point can be seeking answers to questions such as what is the history of 
water-sharing/management and use in a particular place or system? What are the 
entitlement claims of all stakeholders? Are these entitlements contested and, if so, 
on what grounds? Whose rights are affected by water resources development and 
allocation? How can these sometimes overlapping entitlement rights/claims be 
respected while searching for fair and effective workable agreements?
CONCLUSIONS
Governments need to make more informed decisions about whether to proceed 
with water resources development projects, taking into account comprehensive 
options assessment examining political, social, economic and ecological impacts 
– and drawing upon scientifi c evidence, situated local knowledge, and appreciating 
complexity and uncertainty. There has been an absence of informed discussion in 
the public space about the pros and cons of dams and diversions in Lower Mekong 
countries that have re-emerged on the agendas of national governments and 
transnational capital providers and developers. There is a need for transnational, 
transboundary public examination via high-quality, well-informed deliberative 
processes. This requires competent design, convening, facilitation, knowledge 
inputs and wise use of the media.
New fl ow regimes will have to be negotiated on Mekong River tributaries and, 
perhaps, the mainstream. Relatively little attention is being paid to how river fl ows 
will be ‘managed’ post-construction. There are many different possible scenarios. 
State and non-state actors need to become more familiar with fl ow negotiation 
tools and approaches that have the potential to ensure that all relevant issues and 
perspectives are taken into account in the inevitable negotiations ahead.
The MRC must increase its engagement in these issues. This will require 
applying existing and new research to discover methods appropriate for the 
Mekong region. Other essential ingredients are great diplomatic skill and social 
capital to allow equitable and informed negotiations to proceed. The MRC has 
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deservedly received criticism for its performance thus far; but there remain many 
optimistic, latent supporters of the MRC initiative, hoping ‘the family’ will 
be enabled to capably respond to the current challenges. This will require the 
member governments, at the highest level, to ‘de-marginalize’ the MRC and its 
implementing parts, allowing them to make their best contributions.
A worthy goal is to make it normal practice in the Mekong region for important 
national and transboundary water-related options and decisions to be examined 
in the public sphere from a range of perspectives. Openness and deliberation are 
still far from being normal practice. The MRC, as mandated, has the opportunity 
and responsibility to play an important role in creating new, deliberative political 
space for learning and negotiating.
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NOTES
1 King and his co-authors acknowledge that their data-compiling projects across the 
GMS is ‘suffi cient only for scoping purposes’ as the data were ‘compiled from a 
variety of sources and is unverifi ed’. Existing projects are defi ned as: existing + those 
with fi nancial closure + those under construction. Potential projects are defi ned as: 
committed + proposed + identifi ed to any level of study. It is not implied that all 179 
potential projects are necessarily going ahead. The fi gures used by King et al (2007) 
for Laos (11 existing, 32 potential) were assembled in 2006, and differ from the 2008 
data quoted in the case study later in the chapter, which reported 77 projects at various 
stages from conceptualization/design through to operation.
2 The Precautionary Principle states that if a public action or policy may cause severe 
or irreversible harm, it should not be carried out despite the absence of full scientifi c 
certainty that harm would ensue. The burden of proof thus falls on those who would 
advocate taking the action.
3 The Review Team also noted that there was ‘some concern among the staff about the 
consequences for themselves if they are too open with ideas and constructive criticism’ 
(Hawkesworth et al, 2007, p17).
4 Presentation given by Chris Barlow, MRC Fisheries Programme coordinator, Vientiane, 
20 June 2008.
5 The EIA was light in some technical areas (e.g. transboundary impacts), but spent 
considerable space exploring whether or not the development was a mainstream 
development (it is), pursuing a bizarre line that perhaps as the river is braided at this 
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point, the development could be seen as on a tributary; and, hence, whether, when 
and how it was compulsory, or not, for the Government of Laos to notify the MRC.
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ABSTRACT: The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was an experiment in multi-stakeholder dialogue and global 
governance concerned with a subject area – large dams – that was fraught with conflict and controversy. The 
WCD Report, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making, was published in 2000 and 
accompanied by hopes that broad-based agreements would be forged on how to better manage water and 
energy development. Ten years later, this special issue of Water Alternatives revisits the WCD and its impacts, 
exploring the question: Is the WCD still relevant? The editorial team and the Guest Editors of this special issue of 
Water Alternatives have selected a range of 20 papers, 6 viewpoints, and 4 book reviews that help to illustrate the 
evolution in the dams debate. The goal of this special issue is to examine the influence and the impacts of the 
WCD on the dam enterprise, in general, and on the policies and practices of key stakeholders and institutions, and 
on the development outcomes for affected communities and environments, in particular. In this introduction, the 
Guest Editors provide an overview of the special issue, exploring the new drivers of dam development that have 
emerged during the last decade, including climate change and new financiers of dams, and describing the themes 
emerging from this diverse set of papers and viewpoints. This special issue demonstrates the need for a renewed 
multi-stakeholder dialogue at multiple levels. This would not be a redo of the WCD, but rather a rekindling and 
redesigning of processes and forums where mutual understanding, information-sharing, and norm-setting can 
occur. One of the most promising developments of the last decade is the further demonstration, in case studies 
described here, that true partnership amongst key stakeholders can produce transformative resource-sharing 
agreements, showing that many of the WCD recommendations around negotiated decision making are working in 
practice. We hope that this special issue sparks a dialogue to recommit ourselves to finding effective, just, and 
lasting solutions for water, energy and ecosystem management. It is a testament to the continued relevance of 
the WCD Report that ten years later it is still a topic of intense interest and debate, as illustrated by the papers 
presented in this special issue. 
 
KEYWORDS: World Commission on Dams, dams and climate change, resettlement, development policy 
WHY REVISIT THE WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS? 
Why revisit the World Commission on Dams? The answer, in one simple phrase: because the issues of 
contention around dams have not gone away! 
When the World Commission on Dams (WCD) was established in 1998 and its Report was released in 
2000, the hope (perhaps misplaced, but certainly overly optimistic, maybe even naive) was that 
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universally acceptable answers would be found to contentious issues and the warring parties would 
embrace each other while beating swords into ploughshares. Dam builders and dam critics are not 
anywhere near such a happy ending. At the same time, the terrain of the debate has shifted, as have 
the concerns and positions of the protagonists. The nature of the debate now is more than the 
simplistic 'small versus big' of the past. While the first set of problems focused on environment and 
resettlement impacts, there is now a set of second-generation problems that must be addressed, 
stemming from new drivers of dam development and changing political landscapes. The private sector 
and newly dominant economies like China are emerging as primary investors in dams that have 
different approaches to safeguard policies and public oversight than the traditional funders like the 
World Bank. The prospect of climate change, with promises of hydropower as the low-carbon panacea, 
or warnings that reservoirs emit substantial levels of greenhouse gases and that hydrology of the future 
will no longer be that of the past, is placing a formidable question mark on the design and economic 
evaluation methodology for future dams. And the information revolution in the Global South is bringing 
political awareness to even the most marginalized communities, empowering them to find new ways of 
engaging in decisions over dams. 
Water Alternatives is an interdisciplinary journal addressing the full range of issues that water raises 
in contemporary societies. The ambition of the Journal is to provide space for creative, critical and free 
thinking on water, fostering debate, eliciting innovative alternatives, promoting original analyses and 
constructive critiques. 
It is in this spirit that Water Alternatives decided to publish this special issue on the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD) recognizing the tenth anniversary of the publication of its Report, Dams 
and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making. The WCD – an independent, international 
commission comprised of leaders from all sides of the debate surrounding big dams – issued its Report 
in 2000 with findings about the development effectiveness of large dams globally and proposed 
guidelines for improving dam performance and governance, including – among others – principles of 
participation, equity, transparency and comprehensive options assessment. As stated by the WCD ten 
years ago, "Dams have made an important and significant contribution to human development, and the 
benefits derived from them have been considerable. In too many cases an unacceptable and often 
unnecessary price has been paid to secure those benefits, especially in social and environmental terms, 
by people displaced, by communities downstream, by taxpayers and by the natural environment". 
Despite the WCD process, the legacies and controversies of the world’s 45,000 large dams1 continue 
to cause conflict between providing hydropower, water supply, flood control, irrigation and other 
substantial benefits to many, while devastating the basic rights and livelihoods of others, and damaging 
shared rivers and ecosystems. Dams control floods and regulate irregular water regimes, generate 
hydropower, provide storage for domestic, industrial or agricultural use, and allow the development of 
recreation. But these benefits are not well distributed socially, often favouring urban dwellers, 
industries and certain types of farmers disproportionally; and they come with large social and 
environmental costs that for too long were overlooked. Few rivers remain that have been untouched by 
some type of dam. Displaced populations, estimated between 40-80 million, have frequently been 
resettled with minimal or no compensation, often in marginal lands, and in the majority of cases have 
become and remained poorer. Large-scale alteration of natural hydrologic regimes has had massive 
impacts on fisheries, water-based livelihoods, aquatic ecosystems and environmental services as a 
whole. Some scientists also believe that many reservoirs emit large amounts of greenhouse gases, up to 
4% of all human-induced GHG emissions, as reviewed in this volume by Mäkinen and Khan.2 Indeed, the 
first-ever global estimate of the number of river-dependent people potentially affected by dam-induced 
                                                          
1
 Large dams – over 15 m high or with a reservoir capacity more than 3 million m
3
 – total roughly 45,000 worldwide, not 
considering millions of smaller dams and reservoirs (WCD, 2000; in November 2000). This definition must be adapted when 
considering dams in the Himalayan region, as discussed by Dixit and Gyawali in this volume. 
2
 For this specific estimate, Lima et al., 2008. 
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changes in river flows and other ecosystem conditions is presented in this volume by Richter et al.: that 
472 million river-dependent people have had their livelihoods negatively affected by dams. 
What has happened in the decade since the WCD Report was published? The goal of this special 
issue is to examine the influence and the impacts of the WCD on the dam enterprise, in general, and on 
the policies and practices of key stakeholders and institutions, and on the development outcomes for 
affected communities and environments, in particular. While social and environmental costs and risks 
are better understood, several changes have recently emerged. Energy demand and the price of fossil 
fuel have prompted a renewed interest in hydropower; traditional development banks and developers 
have been increasingly challenged by competitors from emergent countries, often with access to public 
finance; while opponents have also become more sophisticated in their understanding of the issues and 
modes of action. An upsurge of dam projects has been witnessed during the past five years, but the 
recent global economic meltdown might temporarily slow this trend. Does the governance of these 
projects show substantial progress compared with earlier decades? Has the performance of dams 
improved? Did the WCD, or other subsequent initiatives, instil a new ethics and greater consideration of 
social and environmental impacts? Has the debate become more, or less, polarized? The overarching 
questions we explore in this issue are: What has changed in the dams and development arena in the 
last decade, and is the WCD still relevant? 
The WCD was an experiment in multi-stakeholder dialogue and global governance concerned with a 
subject area that was fraught with conflict and controversy. Its intention was to facilitate creative and 
free thinking on the topic of large dams and move beyond the impasse and conflicts that were 
prevalent in the 1990s. The editorial team and the Guest Editors of this special issue of Water 
Alternatives have selected a range of viewpoints and papers that help to illustrate the evolution in this 
debate. It is a testament to the continued relevance of the WCD Report that ten years later it is still a 
topic of intense interest and debate, as illustrated by the papers presented in this special issue. 
In creating this special issue, the Guest Editors placed a high value on the criteria of diversity and 
balance in selecting papers for publication. The process for soliciting papers included a broad call for 
submissions through a variety of networks, listservs, and web postings. To ensure a wide range – of 
topic, author, geography, perspective, and discipline – the Guest Editors also invited particular 
individuals to submit. Out of the 70 abstracts received and based on a rating system, we accepted 45 of 
these abstracts for submission of a full paper. Several people and organisations that had some direct 
involvement during the WCD process were invited to submit Viewpoints, usually briefer papers that 
present their opinions, based on their experiences in the WCD and beyond. Accounting for authors who 
did not send their full papers on time or gave up, and for papers discarded after the review process, we 
ended up with 20 scientific articles and 6 viewpoints, complemented with 4 book reviews related to 
dams. The editorial team contacted more than 200 peer reviewers – again emphasising diversity and 
balance of views amongst reviewers – to anonymously evaluate these papers, and the final selection 
was based on the ratings made by these reviewers and the Guest Editors. 
Overall, the Guest Editors have strived to publish papers of high quality, innovative thinking, and 
new analyses that have a clear link to the WCD and span geographic diversity, varied opinions, and 
multiple disciplines. 
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE WCD REPORT 
"The WCD has undertaken a rigorous, independent and inclusive global review…", claimed Professor 
Kader Asmal, WCD Chairperson (WCD, 2000). In this section we briefly revisit the World Commission on 
Dams, introduce its follow-up effort, the Dams and Development Project, and discuss the initial 
responses to the WCD Report. 
The WCD grew out of the growing controversy over the economic, social and environmental 
consequences of large dams built in the 20th century. It was established in February 1998 through a 
process of dialogue amongst all the major parties engaged in conflicts over dams: the private sector, 
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civil society, government, affected communities, scientists, and international financial institutions. The 
Chair, Professor Kader Asmal – then South Africa’s Minister of Water Affairs and later its Minister of 
Education – was selected in May 1998. The WCD’s 12 members were chosen to reflect regional 
diversity, expertise and stakeholder perspectives. Some aspects of past conflict stemmed from the lack 
of agreement on basic factual issues related to the consequences – good or bad – of large dams. 
Whenever one stakeholder group issued a report or research or evaluations, other stakeholders would 
perceive that the information presented was biased. Therefore, the WCD was created as an 
independent body, with each member serving in an individual capacity and none representing an 
institution or a country (WCD, 2000, p. xxx) To foster its independence, the WCD was supported by the 
WCD Forum (comprised of 68 institutions from 36 countries), through Partnerships and Cooperation 
with 14 organisations, and with financial donations from 53 contributors (including governments, 
international agencies, the private sector, NGOs and various charitable foundations)(ibid: p. xix- xxi). 
The WCD had two primary objectives. It sought to undertake a global review of the development 
effectiveness of large dams, and assess alternatives for water resources and energy development. It 
was also charged with developing internationally acceptable criteria, guidelines and standards, where 
appropriate, for the planning, design, appraisal, construction, operation, monitoring and 
decommissioning of dams (ibid: p. xxx). The Commissioners produced a 'consensus' report, a negotiated 
opinion, which was launched in a blaze of publicity in 2000, and evoked a range of initial responses 
from celebration to rejection. The WCD Report was promoted to all interested stakeholders through a 
variety of channels and outlets, such as this excerpt from a promotional brochure: 
Don’t plan, build, protest, operate, decommission, propose, oppose or discuss a dam without it! By 2000, 
the world had built 45,000 large dams to irrigate a third of all crops, generate a fifth of all power, control 
floods in wet times and store water in dry times. Yet, in the last century, large dams also disrupted the 
ecology of over half the world’s rivers, displaced over 40 million people from their homes and left nations 
burdened with debt.
3
 
Since its formulation and release, the 'WCD framework' (figure 1) has been evaluated for use as both an 
implementation and advocacy tool. It is complex. The Report presents three grounding Global Norms, 
five Core Values, five key Decision Points, seven Strategic Priorities, 33 associated Policy Principles, and 
26 Guidelines. The task of trying to determine how best to combine these recommendations into 
operational practices remains a challenge for post-WCD activity. 
During the WCD process, it appeared that conflict was set aside; however, the Report itself stirred 
considerable debates and reignited controversy in some quarters. Most institutions and stakeholders 
broadly accepted the core principles and Strategic Priorities, but it was concerning the 26 Guidelines 
that agreement broke down. Some believed the guidelines were unrealistic, impractical, and would 
prevent future dam construction. Others believed the guidelines were not intended as strict regulatory 
standards, but rather recommendations for best practice, which – if adapted to specific national and 
river-basin contexts – would help avoid the problems of the past. The WCD Report was accepted by 
some countries and institutions, like the German aid agencies GTZ and BMZ (German Technical 
Cooperation and German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) and the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), as the needed basis for decision making. Some private 
companies, like Harza Engineering and HSBC Bank also supported the Report. Others, like the World 
Bank, considered its principles as useful, but not binding, and generally rejected the WCD Report in 
favour of developing its own strategies. Governments like South Africa, Vietnam, and Nepal joined 
multi-stakeholder dialogues at the national level to consider whether and how to adapt the Report’s 
recommendations to their specific contexts. Still other countries, such as India and China, rejected the 
Report for fear that it could bring dam construction to a halt. Positions were not monolithic: within 
                                                          
3
 Excerpt from promotional materials created to advertise the WCD Report by the publisher Earthscan, 2000, 
www.earthscan.co.uk.  
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governments and institutions a robust debate ensued. Divergent views within the World Bank, for 
example, are highlighted in two of the Viewpoints published here. And within governments like Brazil, 
different agencies took different positions on the Report – some of the energy agencies ignored it, 
while Brazil’s National Water Agency participated in the WCD Forum and follow-on effort. 
Figure 1. WCD framework for decision-making. 
 
Source: Summary extract from WCD, 2000. 
After the WCD Report was published in November 2000, the WCD Forum – an advisory body that had 
been part of the WCD process – agreed that a follow-on effort was needed to help translate and 
disseminate the Report and continue the dialogue at different levels. The Dams and Development 
Project (DDP) was hosted by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and continued with parts of the 
work commenced by the WCD, seeking ways forward through still difficult issues. The goal of the DDP 
was to promote a dialogue on improving decision-making, planning and management of dams and their 
alternatives based on the WCD Core Values and Strategic Priorities. To achieve its goal, the DDP focused 
on: promoting and facilitating dialogue on dams and related issues at national, regional and global 
levels; networking; translating and disseminating the WCD Report, related material and DDP 
publications; and facilitating the exchange of ideas on best practices. 
There was action on many fronts, supported by the DDP Secretariat, a diverse 13 member Steering 
Committee (UNEP is a non-voting member of this committee), and an even more diverse Dams and 
Development Forum (DDF). There was not complete acceptance of all other parts of the WCD Report by 
the Steering Committee and the DDF, resulting in the negotiation and focusing of the DDP mandate. 
Moreover, in response to some specific WCD criticism, the DDP had a particular emphasis on "reaching 
out to governments" (Dubash et al., 2001). 
While it would have been unreasonable to expect unanimity on all these issues, what was not 
unreasonable was to expect that the dialogue and the constructive engagement that the WCD 
represented would be taken forward. The editors of Water Alternatives felt that the tenth anniversary 
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of the WCD was an opportunity to review and reflect on progress, setbacks, unresolved issues, and new 
challenges in the dams and development field. 
THEMES EMERGING FROM THE WATER ALTERNATIVES WCD + 10 SPECIAL ISSUE 
We worked to select a set of papers for this special issue that covers a range of topics, geographic 
diversity, and perspectives surrounding dams. Having read through all the papers, we see several 
critical and relevant themes emerging. 
THEME 1. Diverse perceptions: Perspectives differ on the impact of the WCD Report and process 
Just as opinions differed at the time the WCD Report was published and the DDP follow-on process 
began, perspectives continue to differ ten years later on the lasting impacts of the Report and process. 
Most authors seem to agree that the Report was not as fully and broadly endorsed as was perhaps 
expected at the time of its publication. The papers cite and reference numerous scholarly articles 
published during the last decade that analyse the implementation of the WCD’s policy and best practice 
recommendations. Some authors, such as Dubash in his Viewpoint, believe that the expectations on the 
WCD multi-stakeholder process to produce regulatory guidelines were perhaps misguided and that if 
judged against the expectation of a global norm-setting process to produce new ideas and encourage 
higher standards, the WCD Report and process were successful. Many authors describe how the WCD 
Report has been partially adopted by a diversity of institutions and state that the ideas continue to 
drive current policy debates. Others, such as Briscoe in his Viewpoint, argue that the WCD Report 
overreached and led to a new consensus among developing country governments that such policy 
decisions were more appropriately made at the national level primarily by the State. Yet others, such as 
Goodland in his Viewpoint, believe that the institutional responses to the WCD were sabotaged by a 
relatively small but vocal set of critics. 
Despite the WCD’s efforts to find mutual agreement about the development effectiveness of dams 
and to assemble a comprehensive knowledge base that remains unrivalled in its scope ten years later, 
fundamental disagreements remain about the costs and benefits of large dams, and about who reaps 
the benefits and who suffers the burdens of the costs. The question remains: are dams a useful 
technology to advance sustainable development or a destructive technology that only in rare cases can 
be managed successfully to avoid social and environmental devastations and produce real economic 
benefits? Facts and values remain contested, which is not unexpected. The fact that the WCD Report is 
even a topic of interest ten years later is an indication that the ideas and recommendations are still 
relevant today, if for no other reason than that there is a healthy ongoing debate about whether and 
how to adapt the WCD’s ideas into specific mechanisms for managing dams at the local, national, and 
international levels. 
THEME 2. Changing drivers 
Water and energy demands continue to rise and drive dam development 
The context for most of the papers is that human demands for water and energy continue to grow and 
that large dams remain the solution of choice for many governments, private companies, and financial 
investors. John Briscoe’s paper explores the evolution of the World Bank’s positions and policies related 
to large dams that led to the Water Resources Management Sector Strategy (World Bank, 2003) to 
support 'high risk-high reward' projects like large dams, with a recent update on the Bank’s position 
provided in Directions in Hydropower (World Bank Group, 2009). 
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Climate change is now a greater driver of hydropower expansion 
Many papers acknowledge that in the last decade, the world has focused its attention on climate 
change and that hydropower dams have been promoted as a 'clean' and 'carbon neutral' energy 
strategy, helping to further stimulate investments in both dams and in carbon trading and offset 
schemes generated by potential credits associated with large dam projects. Debate remains about 
whether large dams should be considered part of a carbon-reduction strategy or not due to significant 
concerns regarding the net greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs. The paper by Finley-Brook and 
Thomas examines the demand created for new dams in Panama associated, in part, with the value of 
selling carbon credits, and how this affects the local and national decision-making process. The value of 
possible carbon credits is also a factor considered in the economic risk analysis of the Belo Monte dam 
in Brazil, examined in the Sousa Júnior and Reid paper. The paper by Hirsch notes that environmental 
concerns are being touted both in favour of, and in opposition to dam construction, by 
opponents/proponents invoking climate change threats. Pittock argues there is a need for a greater 
focus on identifying and limiting the perverse incentives of climate change policies that are leading to 
negative impacts. Finally, the paper by Mäkinen and Khan explores the science of greenhouse gas 
emissions from reservoirs and the policy interventions that could reduce such emissions from 
reservoirs, suggesting that reservoir emissions should be treated like other anthropogenic greenhouse 
gases. 
New financiers are changing the loci and framework for decision-making processes 
In the last decade, many shifts in political power and financial muscle are changing the roles of national, 
international, and multilateral institutions. The private sector’s role in financing dams has grown, as 
have the abilities of emerging economies like Brazil, China, and Turkey to self-finance dams from their 
own coffers. Indeed, China is now a major investor in dams beyond its own borders in Africa and 
elsewhere. The paper by Hirsch explores the shifting geopolitical and eco-political landscapes in the 
Mekong river region, noting that the growth of regional economic players is fundamentally altering the 
context for energy demand, planning and investment. The Viewpoint by Smith also highlights increased 
investments in dams and new global actors involved in promoting dams – many of whom were not 
active in the WCD process – heightening the need for transnational codes of conduct to ensure that 
environmental and social safeguards are applied so that the unsatisfactory development outcomes of 
past dams will be avoided. 
Theme 3. Environment and social justice: Negative consequences of dams on the environment 
and livelihoods of dam-affected communities remain critical issues 
The WCD amassed a wealth of evidence that large dams had created environmental and social impacts 
that could no longer be considered unforeseen or acceptable, and highlighted that the cost versus 
benefit trade-off approach to decision making was inadequate to be the sole or at least the dominant 
criterion to be used when evaluating and deciding on whether projects should proceed. Ten years later, 
millions of people continue to be negatively affected by existing dams and more will be affected by 
dams in the pipeline, while we continue to lose aquatic ecosystems and biodiversity at an alarming rate. 
Even if more people, in gross number terms, benefit directly or indirectly from such dams, the costs 
involuntarily borne by others are surely unacceptable and must be avoided or mitigated. Many of the 
papers in this volume further describe the ongoing and widespread impacts of large dams. 
Richter et al. focus attention on previously neglected populations living downstream of dams whose 
livelihoods have been affected by dam-induced alterations of river flows. By substantially changing 
natural flow patterns and blocking movements of fish and other animals, large dams can severely 
disrupt natural riverine production systems – especially fisheries, flood-recession agriculture and dry-
season grazing. The paper provides a conservative estimate of 472 million negatively affected river-
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dependent people living downstream of large dams along impacted river reaches, lending urgency to 
the need for more comprehensive assessments of dam costs and benefits, as well as to the social 
inequities between dam beneficiaries and those potentially disadvantaged by dam projects. 
Dam-induced displacement and resettlement remain primarily negative consequences of dams that 
still have not been satisfactorily addressed, and many of the papers in this volume focus on this topic. 
The paper by Nga Dao explores the evolution of resettlement policies in Vietnam through a comparison 
of Hoa Binh dam (constructed between 1979 and 1994) and Son La dam (formally under construction 
since 2005), indicating that improvements in policy may bring limited improvements in planning and 
practices of dam development at the community level. In the paper by McDonald-Wilmsen and 
Webber, the authors look to the experiences in other fields of resettlement, such as refugee studies 
and migration due to adaptation to environmental change, to learn from their practices and standards 
of how to effectively settle people in new communities. 
One of the WCD’s Strategic Priorities was Comprehensive Options Assessment, which recognised 
that alternatives to dams do often exist. More evidence is accumulating, showing that effective 
alternatives do, in fact, exist. The paper by Totten et al. presents evidence from the state of California 
that shifting from a conventional focus on supply expansion to one that concentrates on efficiently 
delivering services at and near the point of use could be accomplished with investments in the range of 
US$10-25 billion annually, while obviating the need for spending hundreds of billions of dollars on more 
expensive hydropower and related infrastructural expansion projects. Such a shift to cost-effective end-
use efficiency improvements in delivering water and energy services could eliminate the need for an 
estimated half of all proposed dams globally, thus allowing for the maintenance of other ecosystem 
service benefits and offering hope for meeting basic human needs for water and energy at a more 
achievable level of investment. 
THEME 4. New assessment tools: The quest for new decision-making tools and approaches 
continues, from assessment protocols to economic analysis 
One critique of the WCD Report is that it did not succeed in providing tools that could be readily 
implemented at the operational level for evaluating, managing, and building dams. During the last 
decade, an inspiring array of tools and approaches has continued to evolve and be tested at the 
community, the river basin, the country, and international levels. The paper by Locher et al. describes 
the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum and its efforts at building on the WCD Report to 
create an operational tool for assessing large dams against an agreed-upon set of multiple criteria. In a 
contrasting view, a key message from the paper by Bosshard is that the hydropower industry would like 
to establish norms that can create greater predictability through the certification of dam projects using 
protocols like that in HSAF; yet industry is not prepared to accept binding minimum standards that 
would confer new obligations to the hydropower industry. Without agreed-upon minimum standards, 
the concern is that the worst consequences will not be avoided or mitigated. 
Tullos et al. argue that many challenges remain in evaluating the biophysical, socio-economic and 
geopolitical impacts of dams, including the diversity of stakeholder perspectives on dam impacts. Given 
the complexity of data and perceptions around dam impacts, decision-support tools that integrate the 
objective magnitude and perceived salience of impacts are required urgently. This conclusion stems 
from the authors’ own experimentation developing an Interdisciplinary Dam Assessment Model (IDAM) 
working with colleagues in southwest China. 
The WCD Report documented numerous instances where the costs of large dam projects were 
underestimated. This problem continues to plague the evaluation process, as explored in two papers. 
The Sousa Júnior and Reid paper uses an economic-risk analysis to project that there is a 72% chance 
that the Net Present Value of the benefits of the Belo Monte dam in Brazil will be zero; and the Jeuland 
paper examines the influence of varying discount rates used in an economic analysis on the final 
analysis of a dam’s overall economic value. 
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Going well beyond such technical tools as HSAF, IDAM, benefit-cost analyses, NPVs and discount 
rates, Baghel and Nüsser argue that analyses of large, complex dam projects – before, during and after 
key decisions – should use the lens of political ecology and explore the social and power relationships 
between actors, in what we know are highly politicised situations. 
THEME 5. Advances in participation and accountability: How can participation, compliance, 
accountability, and performance be ensured? 
A constant theme throughout the WCD Report was the need to improve the participation of affected 
communities in the decision-making process and to ensure compliance with policies and negotiated 
agreements so as to improve the development effectiveness of dam projects. It is the same in this 
volume, where many papers explore the roles of different stakeholders – the state, local NGOs, 
affected communities, the private sector, international NGOs, financial investors, and multilateral 
institutions – in promoting participation and accountability. The Dore and Lebel paper explores the 
WCD’s Strategic Priority on Gaining Public Acceptance, which focused on issues of 'procedural justice', 
and suggests expanding the approach to include issues of 'distributional justice'. They also revisit issues 
of participation that were raised during the WCD, present their views on necessary state attributes for 
accountability, in order to earn legitimacy and public trust. 
Embedded in the approach to gaining public acceptance and the 'rights and risks' framework put 
forward by the WCD was the key policy principle of 'free, prior and informed consent' (FPIC) for 
affected indigenous communities. This new framework included a recognition that indigenous 
communities – with recognized rights to self-determination – should give their free, prior and informed 
consent to development projects like dams that affect their livelihoods, culture, land and resource 
rights, and basic human rights. Many have questioned whether FPIC can be practically implemented or 
recognised. The Viewpoint by Cariño and Colchester, however, documents advances during the last 
decade in recognising this principle in important legal and policy arenas, including United Nations 
declarations and court decrees by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Latin America. McGee’s 
paper explores the use of community referenda in Latin America as a democratic and legally 
recognizable means of a community’s expression of its consent (or disapproval) for a proposed 
development project, such as a mine or a dam. Such mechanisms are showing promise for how 
elements of FPIC can be practically implemented. 
Moving from principles to practices, several papers and Viewpoints explore the roles of different 
stakeholders in ensuring that policies and standards are followed. The Dubash and Briscoe Viewpoints 
offer differing perspectives on the roles of the state and NGOs in fostering safeguard norms, policies, 
and regulations. The Viewpoint by Goodland, a former World Bank senior environmental advisor, 
explores reasons why the World Bank has long resisted guidelines requiring large dam projects to 
internalise the social and environmental costs of dam construction and offers suggestions for more 
humane and economically responsible Bank policies. Differences between free, prior and informed 
'consultation' versus 'consent' in Bank policies are also explored. 
Several case studies explore the role of bilateral agencies in dam development. The paper by 
Eberlein et al. on the Ilisu dam in Turkey examines the roles of secondary stakeholders – the European 
Export Credit Agencies and European NGOs – in promoting international standards for best practice and 
accountability in decision making. 
The paper by Seeger et al. describes Germany’s engagement in the promotion of participatory 
processes on dam-related issues, building on the WCD and follow-up processes at both the 
international level, through Germany’s participation in the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment 
Forum (HSAF), and at the national level, with the Ghana Dam Dialogue. Interestingly, it appears that 
smaller bilateral agencies have been better able to take up, or more interested in taking up, the WCD’s 
framework and recommendations to assess their own water resources and dam development 
programmes than the larger multilateral institutions. 
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THEME 6. Negotiation: Multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) continue to show promise for 
informing and shaping negotiated agreements that result in better sharing of the resources, 
benefits, and costs associated with dams 
The inherent complexity and diversity of interests in water resources development and energy 
production, of which dams and hydropower are a part, present considerable social and political 
challenges that must be negotiated. MSPs are an approach for constructive engagement and learning 
about complex problems where facts are disputed and values differ. Experiments with a variety of MSPs 
– some more inclusive, some less – have taken place around dams, and beyond to many other decision-
making realms. Interestingly, multi-stakeholder approaches have been used to address the legacy 
impacts of existing dams in several regions. Gosnell and Kelly describe an innovative approach to 
negotiating difficult water-sharing and dam re-licensing agreements among indigenous tribes, farmers 
and hydropower interests in the Klamath river basin, which may lead to decommissioning of several 
dams as a means of restoring important salmon fisheries. And in the Barbara Rose Johnston paper a 
process in Guatemala is discussed, where communities who suffered violence associated with the 
Chixoy dam have spearheaded efforts to document their losses and advocate for reparations to remedy 
the legacy of loss. 
MSPs can help deliberation to become routine, enabling complex water issues to be more rigorously 
examined in better, more informed negotiations, argue Dore and Lebel. A key message from Dixit and 
Gyawali, however, is that although dialogue about dams has continued over the past decade, there is 
no guarantee that this translates into improved decision making without commensurate political will. 
They discuss the case of Nepal where there was extensive, often feisty dialogue processes before and 
after WCD, and yet unsatisfactory conventional practice by the 'hydrocracy' continues to reign even 
after significant political changes that saw the rise to power of the political Left. 
A NEW WAY FORWARD 
The initiative by Water Alternatives has elicited a strong response illustrative of the widespread interest 
in the issues surrounding large dams and of the continued relevance of the WCD’s analysis and 
recommendations. 
Based on the diverse perspectives across a range of topics, the changing drivers of dam 
development, and the new financiers of dams emerging, the papers and viewpoints in this special issue 
demonstrate the need for a renewed multi-stakeholder dialogue at multiple levels. This would not be a 
redo of the WCD, but rather a rekindling and redesigning of processes and forums where mutual 
understanding, information-sharing, and norm-setting can occur. There would also be opportunities for 
renewed reflection – in light of the changing drivers of dam development, including climate change – on 
the whole approach to water storage and energy production that could include not just concrete dams 
but also other 'technologies' such as groundwater and wetlands management, water harvesting, 
conjunctive management of groundwater and surface water, renewable energies like solar, wind, and 
geothermal, decentralised and small-scale technologies, and intensive water and energy conservation, 
among others. Such dialogues would likely be necessary at local, national, and international levels. 
While one of the key drivers of dam development remains the pressure to meet human needs for 
energy and water resources, there is a continued need to better explore, promote, develop, invest in, 
and replicate the variety of non-dam and less-destructive alternatives for providing water and energy 
development. In the ten years since the WCD, there has been inadequate investment in the kinds of 
non-dam and efficiency investments outlined in several papers in this volume. 
One of the most promising developments of the last decade is the further demonstration that true 
partnership amongst key stakeholders can produce transformative results. Successes on the ground in 
Guatemala, the Klamath basin in the US, the Pangani river in Tanzania, and others described in this 
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volume demonstrate that many of the WCD recommendations around negotiated agreements are 
working in practice to foster resource-sharing agreements among the affected stakeholders. 
What is crucial at all levels is compliance and accountability – true ten years ago and today. Many 
excellent projects exist from which we can learn, but there are others that continue to have serious 
negative impacts. Ignoring either does not serve anyone’s interests – we must learn from all, make 
wiser choices and improve performance. We hope that this special issue sparks such dynamic learning 
and dialogue to recommit ourselves to finding effective, just, and lasting solutions for water, energy 
and ecosystem management. The world’s impoverished and our suffering rivers and aquatic 
environments – upon which we all depend – deserve better! 
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ABSTRACT: Gaining Public Acceptance (GPA) was a strategic priority recommended in the final report of the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD). GPA remains a central, thorny challenge for all parties interested in how society 
makes decisions about the development of water resources, the provision of energy, and the maintenance of 
ecosystems, whilst striving for social justice. The WCD’s GPA is largely about issues of procedural justice (e.g. 
inclusion and access) and proposes process-related principles. Distributional justice is also important (e.g. 
equitable sharing of benefits; and, avoiding unfair and involuntary risk-bearing). 
Several key lessons are emerging from past initiatives to gain public acceptance through participatory exercises. 
Differences in development and sustainability orientations are obvious in debates on dams and need to be 
explicitly considered and not glossed over. Politics and power imbalances pervade participatory processes, and 
require much more attention than they receive. Ultimately, the accountability and legitimacy of state and non-
state actors are crucial but complex as there are many ways to build public trust. 
To earn legitimacy and more likely acceptance of important public decisions we suggest a comprehensive set of 
'gold standard' state-society attributes for improving governance. Multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) can help 
deliberation to become routine, enabling complex water issues to be more rigorously examined. The combination 
of increased public trust, earned by the state, and high-quality MSPs to assist more informed negotiations, we see 
as being key to the gaining of public acceptance. 
 
KEYWORDS: World Commission on Dams, gaining public acceptance, public participation, procedural justice, 
distributional justice, multi-stakeholder platforms 
INTRODUCTION 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) had several objectives. It sought to undertake a global review 
of the development effectiveness of large dams, and assessments of alternatives. It wanted to create a 
framework for assessment of options and decision-making processes. It also wanted to identify 
internationally acceptable criteria and guidelines for planning, designing, construction, operation, 
monitoring and decommissioning of dams. The commissioners produced a consensus report (WCD, 
2000), a negotiated opinion, which was launched in a blaze of publicity in 2000 and has since been 
analysed by those exploring what can be learned from the process (e.g. Bradlow, 2001; McCully, 2001; 
Bandyophadhyay, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Fujikura and Nakayama, 2002; Fujikura and Nakayama, 
2009). 
The report articulated a decision-making framework for large dams, or large water projects and 
water-related energy projects. It was a guide, not a blueprint, offered by the commissioners as their 
contribution to the ongoing, worldwide debate over this type of development project. Of course, there 
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are other valuable viewpoints being expressed by governments, scholars, activists, developers and 
funders. Some of these have been used to strengthen and build upon the framework offered by the 
WCD. 
This paper concentrates on gaining public acceptance (GPA), the first strategic priority 
recommended in the WCD’s final report (WCD, 2000). The core idea is that "public acceptance of key 
decisions is essential for equitable and sustainable water and energy resource development". GPA 
remains a central, thorny challenge for all parties interested in how society makes decisions on the 
development of water resources and the provision of energy. The paper will remind readers of the WCD 
conceptualisation of GPA, and various critiques. It is meant to assist the debate on large dams move 
forward with the GPA concept by acknowledging and unpacking different points of view and suggesting 
other ways to pursue reasonable acceptance. The intention is to transcend differences, and see if 
substantial agreement can be forged. Where there is agreement, we aim for it to be genuine. Where 
differences will remain, we aim for these to be clearly identified and understood. 
GAINING PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE 
The WCD formulation of GPA 
The WCD (2000) report argued that public acceptance of key decisions is essential for equitable and 
sustainable water and energy resources development. Acceptance emerges from recognising rights, 
addressing risks, and safeguarding the entitlements of all groups of affected peoples, particularly 
indigenous and tribal peoples, women and other vulnerable groups. Decision-making processes and 
mechanisms are used that enable informed participation by all groups of people, and result in the 
demonstrable acceptance of key decisions. Where projects affect indigenous and tribal peoples, such 
processes are guided by their free, 'prior and informed consent' (FPIC). The supporting policy principles 
and guidelines for GPA in the WCD Report are outlined in box 1. 
In our view, the label 'gaining public acceptance' is, to some extent, unfortunate. In English, it can 
have the connotation of convincing the public to accept a predetermined option or selling an option or 
marketing a done deal. This was not, however, the intention of the WCD commissioners. The GPA 
strategic priority and the rest of the framework are intended to promote participatory and fair decision 
making throughout a typical planning and project cycle, including the early steps when choices are 
being made about development directions and the option set to be considered. 
GPA has important relationships to other WCD Strategic Priorities (figure 1). Two examples serve to 
illustrate this point. First, how and when benefit-sharing mechanisms are debated, explored, negotiated 
and possibly agreed upon, is key to GPA. The importance of benefit-sharing is recognised by the WCD 
strategic priority 'recognising entitlements and sharing benefits'. What should be the relationship 
between how benefits are shared and the process by which public acceptance is gained? 
Second, broadening the scope of risk assessment is also key to GPA. Risk assessment should not be 
seen as a purely technical exercise. The aggregation and high level of simplification needed for technical 
risk analysis necessarily leaves many factors out, opening the door for bias and vested interests. Hence, 
the need, as Rayner (2003) and others argue, for assessment through a political process, where risk is 
not permitted to be reduced to a set of formulae. Whilst risk assessment should be part of 
comprehensive options assessment it is also integral to GPA. Is risk analysis consistently factored into a 
transparent stakeholder analysis undertaken as a part of GPA? If not, why? 
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Box 1. GPA policy principles and guidelines. 
Policy principles 
Recognition of rights and assessment of risks are the basis for the identification and inclusion of 
stakeholders in decision making on energy and water resources development. 
Access to information, legal and other support is available to all stakeholders, particularly indigenous 
and tribal peoples, women and other vulnerable groups, to enable their informed participation in 
decision-making processes. 
Demonstrable public acceptance of all key decisions is achieved through agreements negotiated in an 
open and transparent process conducted in good faith and with the informed participation of all 
stakeholders. 
Decisions on projects are guided by adherence to the principle of free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC) of affected indigenous and tribal peoples achieved through formal and informal representative 
bodies. 
Guidelines 
Stakeholder analysis explains that such an analysis should recognise existing rights and those who hold 
them, identify those at risk – distinguishing between voluntary risk takers and involuntary risk bearers – 
and identify constraints to establishing a level playing field for stakeholder involvement. 
Negotiated decision-making processes articulate the attributes of a process which should enable 
stakeholders an equal opportunity to influence decisions, even if not actually making the decisions. 
FPIC of indigenous and tribal peoples explains that this is conceived of as a continuous, iterative process 
of communication and negotiation spanning entire planning and project cycles. 
Source: WCD, 2000. 
Figure 1. Relationship of GPA to other WCD Strategic Priorities. 
 
Dams and Development Project 
Post-WCD GPA remained a contentious issue and the Dams and Development Project (DDP) sought to 
provide more clarification and ideas to move forward. This paper was originally drafted as a background 
paper to underpin an October 2005 multi-stakeholder GPA workshop in Nairobi (DDP, 2005) that 
eventually fed into the principal DDP output, a "compendium of relevant practices" that explored not 
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only GPA – re-labelled as stakeholder participation – but also options assessment, benefit-sharing, 
compensation, social and environmental assessment, compliance and international policy (DDP, 2007). 
Despite the best efforts of the WCD and DDP, it seems to us that the WCD version of GPA requires 
further reflection and strengthening. To do just that, in the next sections we will unpack public 
participation, provide an expanded set of justice principles and see how these could improve GPA and 
governance more broadly. 
MEANINGFUL PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Integral to any analysis of GPA is the issue of public participation, one of the processes that can help 
attain public acceptance of a particular development proposal. Unpacking public participation is 
necessary if we are to better understand GPA. In this section, we address some of the key GPA issues 
that preceded WCD or have since emerged. In some places this draws on analysis submitted to the 
WCD that we consider deserved more attention and prominence in the final report produced by the 
Commissioners. 
Which decisions are open to public participation? 
Assuming a decision-making process permits public participation, many government agencies, private-
sector stakeholders, civil society and analysts have focused on who participates and at what level. Less 
attention has been placed on what part of an agenda is voluntarily offered up for debate. For example, 
Petkova et al. (2002), in a nine-country review of environmental governance found that participation 
opportunities were usually "concentrated in the middle of the decision-making cycle… tended to occur 
too late to meaningfully affect the scope and nature of the decision, and did not continue through the 
implementation phase of the decision-making cycle". The WCD commissioners’ conception of GPA 
suggests in different parts of their report (e.g. in the FPIC guideline) that communication and 
negotiation should span entire planning and project cycles. 
Who is a stakeholder? 
As already mentioned, the WCD Report recommended an approach based on recognition of rights and 
assessment of risks to identify stakeholders, and subsequently analysing and debating their interests. 
For large water and energy projects, many kinds of rights are likely to be relevant, from customary 
rights, to rights of developers and investors, through to property and constitutional rights (WCD, 2000). 
Assessment of rights, entitlements and claims that may be affected by a project or its alternatives 
should be an early key step and the basis for identifying and engaging with stakeholders. 
Hemmati (2002) equates stakeholders with individuals or organisations: "who influence a decision, 
or can influence it, as well as those affected by it". This is a highly inclusive interpretation, with which 
we agree, provided that the different stakes of actors are clearly brought out in the open via some type 
of stakeholder analysis. The WCD Report clearly acknowledged that actors have different stakes: 
Those whose rights are most affected, or whose entitlements are most threatened, have the greatest stake 
in the decisions that are taken. The same applies to risk: those groups facing the greatest risks from the 
development have the greatest stake in the decisions and, therefore, must have a corresponding place at 
the negotiating table (WCD, 2000). 
It is important in a stakeholder analysis to clarify the many, often competing, interests of stakeholders. 
Care needs to be exercised in making simplistic categorisations. For example, gender, ethnic or spatial 
(upstream, downstream, dam area) groupings assume a relative homogeneity of interests within these 
categories. State procedures of measurement and assessment are invariably homogenised and 
simplified (Scott, 1998). Those left out of these simplified portrayals of reality may well be exactly those 
whose voices need to be heard. 
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Different degrees of participation 
Participation in (dams and) development can be undertaken for quite different purposes and unfold in 
very different ways. There are several conceptualisations of what public participation constitutes. 
Central to them is the idea that people outside the bureaucratic structures of the state have a stake or 
mandate to get involved in governance processes. Participation is recognised as ranging in degree, 
typically reflecting the extent to which power over decisions, and responsibility for the management of 
development, are shared (Arnstein, 1969; Clayton et al., 1997; IAP2, 2000). 
Arnstein’s original ladder of participation (1969), described the climb from manipulation and therapy 
(non-participation) to informing, consultation, placation (degrees of tokenism) through to partnership, 
delegated power and citizen control (degrees of citizen power). Clayton et al. (1997), in work widely 
disseminated by the United Nations Development Programme, presented an expanded notion of the 
ladder. The base was again manipulation, where participation is seen as an opportunity to indoctrinate. 
One-way provision of information may then improve to consultation. Climbing higher, there may be 
interactive consensus-building approaches, possibly even collective decision making. Even higher, there 
may be risk-sharing, partnerships, and self-management. Another example, from the International 
Association for Public Participation is also useful (IAP2, 2000), and uses a spectrum instead of a ladder, 
but the key points remain the same. That is, there is a continuum from the nominal (token) to 
transformative (empowerment). 
Why be participatory? 
The rationale for using participatory approaches varies enormously (Leeuwis, 2000; Rowe and Frewer, 
2000). Some arguments are primarily instrumental, for example, focused on securing information or 
solving a problem. Others promote participatory approaches on normative grounds, for example, due 
to the belief that actors have a right or duty to be actively engaged. A political rationale can also be 
invoked, for example, to (positively) empower disadvantaged actors, or (negatively) dis-empower 
oppositional actors, perhaps by diluting their voice or in other ways weakening them. Participatory 
efforts instigated by state actors often reflect an instrumental rationale. Arguments are made that 
public participation leads to efficiency, fewer conflicts, and more and perhaps better option 
formulation. Civil society voices, on the other hand, have often argued from a normative standpoint, 
demanding greater participation as a right of citizens or project-affected peoples. 
Many participatory techniques originated as a response to inadequate research, planning and 
decision-making processes. Practice can be problematic, however, and threats of a 'tyranny of 
participation' (Cooke and Kothari, 2001) have been well documented, for example, by Hildyard et al. 
(2001) who argued that participatory development processes risk merely providing opportunities for 
the more powerful if they do not take into account relative bargaining powers. 
When considering issues of GPA and public participation, it is a common failing to inadequately 
recognise the importance of the relationships between actors and institutions, which may empower 
some, and suppress or inhibit others. A draft of the WCD thematic review of participation, negotiation 
and conflict management was rightly criticised for the absence of this type of analysis. For example, 
Hildyard (2000) was concerned about "the structural, institutional and other barriers – such as the 
privileging of certain types of expertise over others – that curtail, restrict or deny a space to 
marginalised groups for negotiation". Hildyard also referred to institutionalised racism, the pressure to 
lend, career incentives, gender imbalances, lack of accountability of some decision makers, and the 
everyday hassles related to the language and tools of formal decision making, some combination of 
which can often diminish so-called participatory processes. The final thematic report still barely 
addressed these subjects, other than including the comments as appendices. Echoing these concerns, in 
the final WCD Report, one commissioner insisted on noting that "even with rights recognised, risks 
assessed and stakeholders identified, existing iniquitous power relations would too easily allow 
developers to dominate and distort" decision-making processes (Patkar, 2000). She went on to caution 
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against granting "undue legitimacy" to particular actors, rather than respecting the "sovereignty of both 
people and the nation-state". The types of structural barriers, raised by Hildyard, and the power 
imbalances cited by Patkar, often require an oppositional civil society to create more equitable 
negotiation spaces. 
Seeking agreement or local empowerment? 
Participatory techniques have often been employed in development projects as a way to persuade 
project-affected people to agree with plans. Guttal, in submissions to the WCD, described this as 
"solutions backward" – drawing upon the case of the Nam Theun 2 dam in Lao PDR – where, in her 
view, the state assumed at the outset that it had a robust solution, and hence, participation was then a 
troublesome but necessary step backwards in order to convince the citizenry, funders, etc. that the 
project was a good idea and that a credible process has been followed. She cautions that these types of 
participatory processes are likely to be devoid of "authentic debate" about future options as the 
objective – project implementation – is already largely fixed, at least in the eyes of the dominant 
decision makers (Guttal, 2000). 
For others, the emphasis of public participation in development is enabling participants to have 
greater control and influence over their own present and future circumstances – an example of a 
normative rationale in action. In this view, participation has the goal of empowering people in terms of 
their acquiring the skills, knowledge and experience to take greater responsibility for their development 
(Clayton et al., 1997) and proactively influence decision making. 
Development participation does not have to be one or the other. Parfitt (2004) argued that it is 
difficult for participatory processes not to have an emphasis on agreement-seeking about a particular 
option when there is a specific project proposal being considered. But, he noted the challenge is to 
ensure there is a countering emphasis on empowerment, to ensure more genuine deliberation about 
options. 
Self-exclusion from public participation 
Public participation is a part of democratic process, may be a part of negotiation, and can lead to the 
gaining and sharing of information, the building of understanding and trust, and wiser decisions. In 
order to prise or keep open some situations, however, it is often the case that some actors stay outside, 
or in Dryzek’s (2000) words, choose to "remain passively exclusive and so off-limits to inclusion". This 
may be for any of the following reasons: not wishing to legitimise what they perceive as an inadequate 
or unjust process. For example, Rosien (2010) describes a consultation boycott by NGOs of a Safeguards 
Policy Review by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) driven by concerns about the review process. 
Disengagement registered the objection, led to significant change in process and content of the review 
and arguably contributed positively to the final policy rewrite. Alternatively, actors may have concerns 
that joining will deplete the ranks of oppositional civil society (Dryzek, 2000) and that by engaging in a 
process and accepting the responsibilities which follow, public awareness may be reduced and their 
own influence diminished. Or, actors may be concerned that the politics is such that participation will 
serve no useful purpose as deals are already done. 
In many places, exclusion from public decision making – chosen or forced – has led to the creation of 
resistance movements which have been shaped by, and in turn, have often changed, political 
configurations of their place. This can be due, partly, to reconceptualising participation and moving 
explicitly towards negotiation (Leeuwis, 2000) of which resistance is a part. Positive forms of expressing 
resistance include peaceful protest, lobbying, selective and limited participation, parallel forums, 
engaging policy compliance and accountability mechanisms, invoking action from ombudsman offices, 
pursuit of mediation or taking a case to the courts for arbitration and judgement. More active dissent 
and suppression, regrettably sometimes aggressive or violent, are also part of a more complete ladder 
or spectrum. Understandably, resistance actors, operating in diverse circumstances, have diverse 
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operating strategies in order to influence – or at least navigate – safely through the politics of their 
situation. Withdrawing from negotiation can also be part of a strategy. All of this is GPA context. 
LESSONS FROM PRACTICE 
Several key lessons are emerging from past initiatives to gain public acceptance through participatory 
exercises. Differences in development and sustainability orientations are obvious in debates on dams 
and need to be explicitly considered and not glossed over. Politics and power are not eliminated by 
participation, and require much more attention than they receive. Ultimately, the accountability and 
legitimacy of state and non-state actors are crucial but complex as there are many sources from which 
to draw upon to build public trust. 
Development and sustainability 
The importance of differing beliefs and values about development and sustainability should not be 
underestimated. Understanding the range of views is critical to understanding the motivations of many 
actors in highly political decision making on dams and associated public/stakeholder participation. 
Major areas where differences are apparent include assessment of the merits of different energy 
options, the extent of perceived threats to ecosystems from dam development, attitudes to the 
substitutability of natural capital, the primacy given to coarsely measured economic growth, inter-
generational equity, intrinsic rights of nature, aesthetics, and the rights to be afforded to entrenched 
cultural practices. 
Actors in the politics of dams display a wide range of orientations. These include: where short-term 
financial reward is paramount in decision making; weak sustainability leanings where economic 
concerns still dominate, but with some priority given to ameliorating social and environmental impacts; 
and, where there is an acceptance of trade-offs with high priority given to each of economic, social and 
environmental issues and there is support for attempting a balanced approach. Some actors also 
prioritise ecosystems, arguing that it is essential to integrate ecological considerations into all social and 
economic planning. Others are more anthropocentric and privilege cultural values. The point is that 
these simplified orientation categories are substantively different and drive human behavior. 
Politics and power 
When reflecting on GPA it is also necessary to consider politics and power explicitly. Miller (1962) 
described politics as "a natural reflex of the divergences between members of a society… *where+… 
there is a variety of perpetual disagreements which arise from fundamental differences of condition, 
status, power, opinion, and aim". Given the just-discussed differences in development and 
sustainability orientations that dams are political is no surprise. What is important is how the politics 
plays out: fairly, unfairly, wisely or less so. 
Power is an elusive concept but we favour the approach of Hay (1997) who thinks of power as being 
"about context-shaping, about the capacity of actors to redefine the parameters of what is socially, 
politically and economically possible for others". Having power is not the same as having legitimacy. 
Powerful vested interests often control states, agenda-setting, preference-shaping and decision 
making. Many decisions, which impact many publics, remain outside the sphere of public decision 
making. 
There is a political and power context that pervades public participation and decision-making 
processes, which cannot be avoided and is integral to GPA. For example, the blurry nature of public-
private partnerships in China’s energy industry post-break up of the State Power Corporation (Dore et 
al., 2007), in the USA energy industry, and elsewhere with transnational water utilities – often make it 
difficult to discern whether public or private interests are receiving priority. Opaque hydropower 
concession and approval processes in many countries also come to mind. Critiques exploring such 
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sensitive issues are often unwelcome. Transparency and access to information are widely held as being 
desirable attributes of any good governance regime to ensure that politics and power are able to be 
scrutinised. 
Accountability and legitimacy 
The previous discussion on politics and power brings us to accountability. In the frame should be 
decision makers, decision funders, decision finders (advisers, facilitators and negotiators), decision 
influencers, decision recipients – whether governments, bureaucrats, project-affected people, NGOs, 
developers, builders, financiers or general citizens. 
Accountability is a broad concept which refers to the extent to which people are answerable for 
their own behaviour and actions. All actors in the politics of dams have at one time or another had their 
accountability questioned. Many are taking steps to improve their accountability mechanisms. For 
example, the Asian Development Bank established a new system to replace its reactive inspection panel 
mechanism (ADB, 2003), found wanting in the case of Samut Prakarn, a waste water treatment plant 
scandal in Thailand. The panel mechanism was replaced by an Office of the Special Project Facilitator 
which equates to a relatively weak ombudsman’s office and a Compliance Review Panel. The first real 
test for the new institutional arrangement was not directly related to water infrastructure but dealing 
with conflict surrounding a transport development project in Sri Lanka. A problem is that often by the 
time the ombudsman is activated a project is well and truly committed and so the GPA context is 
already very difficult. In any event, these mechanisms were created in response to various criticisms, 
such as the following: 
Large-scale dams tend to be implemented over decades but, typically, staff in government institutions, 
private companies, consultancies and banks may only work on one project for a few years or even a few 
months. Yet the contents and consequences of their reports and decisions may not show up until months 
or years later (Colchester, 2000). 
Legitimacy is hard won, by any actor. For governments and their public sector (ministries, departments, 
etc) to obtain and retain legitimacy, they need to demonstrate good governance practice by, for 
example, clearly explaining and seeking feedback on their government and development agenda, and 
disclosing complete information, and allowing it to be independently contested. For many 
commentators, actor legitimacy is closely linked to whether they are formally accountable to, and 
represent stakeholders. Agents of the state have a formal constituency which they can usually claim to 
represent. Similarly, company executives are, or should be, accountable to shareholders they are 
entrusted to represent. This framing is, however, often used to deny bestowing legitimacy on other 
actors who do not claim to represent others, whose status as a stakeholder may be contested, but who 
have much to offer in improving the quality of, and ownership in, public decisions. Civil society groups 
are often challenged in this way. The concept of responsibility offers a way forward through any 
impasse. In the context of advocacy-oriented transnational NGOs, it has been suggested that: 
Political responsibility is a commitment to embrace not only goals in a campaign but to conduct the 
campaign with democratic principles foremost in the process. Political responsibility is a normative concept 
that differs slightly from accountability in that accountability has formal obligations embedded within its 
definition (Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2000). 
The NGO Focus on the Global South (FOCUS) is an illustrative example. FOCUS is neither bound nor 
empowered by an external mandate. For that matter, neither was the WCD. In the absence of a formal 
legitimising mechanism such as membership endorsement, they have to be clear about the interests 
they support. FOCUS’s commitment to addressing the marginalisation of large numbers of people 
throughout the South has defined their constituency; however, they do not claim to represent these 
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diverse peoples, as they recognise they have no such mandate. A formal accountability mechanism to a 
constituency, however, is not essential to legitimacy if the following argument is accepted: 
… the right to speak claimed by NGOs is not necessarily derived from a strict or formal notion of direct 
representation of particular group interests but rather from a commitment to a set of values and insights 
which form the basis for an analysis of particular situations and a strategy to act on that analysis… there 
would be no inherent contradiction for an NGO to make submissions and arguments relating to a proposed 
big dam even when no local group shares those views – the arguments should be taken up in public debate 
and dealt with on their own merits… (Greeff, 2000). 
Ultimately, public legitimacy of the wide range of state or non-state actors is based on the 
establishment and maintenance of public trust via transparency, accountability, responsible behaviour 
and competence. 
EXPANDED JUSTICE PRINCIPLES 
The WCD’s GPA is largely about issues of procedural justice and proposes process-related principles. But 
GPA should also encompass distributional justice and outcome-related principles. In figure 2 we put 
forward an expanded view of GPA. 
Figure 2. Justice principles for gaining public acceptance. 
 
Source: Procedural principles from WCD 2000, distributional principles proposed by authors. 
Procedural justice 
Inclusion of stakeholders in decision making 
The principle of inclusion is intended to foster the protection of the rights of affected people and make 
them net beneficiaries rather than just bearers of social or environmental costs. Consistent with human 
rights norms established in existing international agreements, the WCD Report proposes an approach 
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to GPA based on the recognition of rights and assessment of risks. Those with rights or bearing risks are 
considered stakeholders and should be included, or have their interests genuinely represented and 
considered, in decision making. These include rights to: self-determination; consultation in matters that 
affect their own or other peoples’ lives; democratic representation of peoples’ views on such matters; 
remedy or compensation; an adequate standard of living; freedom from arbitrary deprivation of 
property; freedom from violence; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and freedom of opinion 
and expression (WCD, 2000). 
Access to information, legal and other support 
Access to information, legal and other support is crucial. It is recognised that affected groups have often 
been disadvantaged and unable to access relevant information or other support to enable informed 
participation and exercise their rights. For example, some groups have been unaware of the extent of 
their customary and constitutional rights (Goodland, 2004). Questions of credibility of information and 
knowledge also arise (Cash et al., 2003). For example, in the case of EIA, studies have been directly 
commissioned by project proponents without really engaging many other affected and interested 
parties. Moreover, there is a difference between making information accessible and then ensuring that 
this can become shared knowledge and understanding, even if not agreement. Those from different 
cultures, comfortable in different languages, have often been placed at a disadvantage. 
The WCD was not alone in pushing for increased access. For example, this issue was prominent in 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, emanating from the UN conference in Rio de 
Janeiro: "Principle 10. States shall facilitate and encourage public access to information, awareness of 
environment and development issues and participation in decision-making by making information 
widely available. Access to judicial redress and remedy shall also be provided (UN, 1993)". 
There have been many countries that have embraced Principle 10, but many more that have not. 
The Aarhus Convention is a particularly notable, positive example which aims to implement access 
principles: 
The Aarhus Convention is an environmental treaty that turns the 1992 Rio Declaration’s vague 
commitments to the principles of access into specific legal obligations… The Convention not only 
recognizes the basic right of every person of present and future generations to a healthy environment but 
also specifies how the authorities at all levels will provide fair and transparent decision-making processes, 
access to information, and access to redress (UNDP et al., 2003). 
Demonstrable public acceptance 
The WCD (2000) argued that negotiations should result in "demonstrable public acceptance of binding 
formal agreements…" achieved via "an open and transparent process". For the WCD, a negotiated 
agreement presupposes a decision-making process that arrived at a consensus: "All stakeholder forum 
members should share a genuine desire to find an equitable solution and agree to be bound by the 
consensus reached". 
The discourse surrounding WCD often conflates consensus and negotiated agreement. These are not 
the same. What matters is the outcome of negotiations, the details of any agreement and whether this 
agreement has sufficient or demonstrable public acceptance. The WCD sought consensus, at least 
between the commissioners, driven by a common view that "without consensus, a commission will be 
seen to have reproduced divisions among stakeholders, rather than transcending them" (Dubash et al., 
2001). If it is accepted that consensus is by definition "unanimous agreement not just on a course of 
action, but also on the reasons for it" (Dryzek, 2000) then this is a misrepresentation of consensus. 
Dryzek (2000) contends that: "In a pluralistic world consensus is unattainable, unnecessary and 
undesirable. More feasible and attractive are workable agreements in which participants agree on a 
course of action, but for different reasons". Following this logic, failure to reach a consensus should not 
be seen as failure. Although the ideal of a consensus is sought, a negotiated outcome in a complex 
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situation implies compromise, and will not reflect total consensus. Too great a focus on consensus-
seeking can have undesirable effects, such as difficult issues being ignored in order to manufacture a 
pseudo-consensus. 
Free, prior and informed consent by indigenous and tribal peoples 
The principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is being increasingly reflected in contemporary 
international agreements, if not law, which explicitly recognises indigenous peoples’ rights to 
participate in decision making and to give or withhold their consent to activities affecting their land, 
territories, resources or their bundle of general rights. The principle of FPIC holds that consent must be 
freely given, obtained prior to implementation of activities and be founded upon an understanding of 
the full range of issues implicated by the activity or decision in question (MacKay, 2004). In MacKay’s 
view, articulated in a briefing note for the World Bank’s extractive industries review, but applicable also 
to the water and energy resources development debate: 
Decisions about when, where and how to exploit natural resources are normally justified in the national 
interest, which is generally interpreted as the interest of the majority. The result is that the rights and 
interests of unrepresented groups, such as indigenous peoples and others, will often be subordinated to 
the majority interest: conflict often ensues and the rights of indigenous peoples are often disregarded 
(MacKay, 2004). 
While the measured support by WCD for FPIC was significant, it was also controversial: 
WCD has restricted its attention only to the groups which are adversely affected by a dam. It has failed to 
appreciate that there are much larger sections of society for whom the dam and the water supply flowing 
from the dam are nothing short of a life line… WCD’s obsessive concern for preserving the rights of 
affected local peoples makes it distrust the entire public set up, even the legal framework of the country to 
which these people belong (Mr Gopalakrishnan, from the Central Water Commission of the Government of 
India, WCD Forum member, February 2001, quoted in Dubash et al., 2001) 
Bird (2002) – himself, a former member of the WCD secretariat – has commented that recognition of 
the special rights of indigenous peoples was not intended by the WCD commissioners to bestow a veto 
right to individuals or groups and that the WCD’s position was that the state should still have the final 
say. This may have been the majority view of the WCD commissioners, but it is not the view of many 
FPIC supporters, who do not have confidence in either the willingness or ability of state representatives 
to take adequate account of indigenous peoples’ priorities and concerns. 
Use of the term GPA and its final drafting into the WCD Report represented a compromise by the 
commissioners and a restriction of the FPIC principle. There was extensive lobbying for FPIC to be even 
more concretely embedded (Dubash et al., 2001). Inevitably, differences of opinion remain about this 
and other elements of the GPA strategic priority. It is unlikely there will ever be consensus to 
operationalise FPIC across the board. It remains a controversial element of GPA, as it was during the 
WCD learning and report preparation period. Claims of ancestral domain (i.e. seeking to establish or 
privilege indigenous peoples’ rights) continue to usually remain subordinate to government claims of 
eminent domain (i.e. the right of a government to appropriate private property for public use, usually 
with compensation to the owner). Understandably, governments invoke eminent domain to justify 
making decisions on behalf of their citizens. This is not incompatible with recognising indigenous rights, 
but it is incompatible with committing to always privilege the local or indigenous over the national. 
Distributional justice 
If a decision-making process is seen to be fair, then people may be willing to accept a future scenario 
that is sub-optimal to their own interests. Promises are, however, sometimes not kept and things do 
not always unfold as expected. In large and complex water infrastructure projects, impacts are often 
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not well understood or anticipated. With climate change, aggregate changes in land use in a basin, 
shifts in economic structures, and uncertainties with respect to benefits, risks and livelihood security 
may be increased further. Acceptance of decisions by the public can be lost without adherence to 
additional principles related to actual outcomes or distributive justice. 
Equitable sharing of benefits 
Large water infrastructure projects are built because they promise a stream of benefits, for example, 
securing water supply for rapidly growing industry and urban areas, helping store water for irrigating 
agriculture during seasonally dry periods, or diverting and controlling monsoonal flood waters, and 
producing electricity. Projects also provide employment opportunities during construction and, to a 
lesser extent, during operation. During construction, concessions for timber logging can be lucrative – 
who gets them? This principle argues that these benefits should be shared equitably rather than being 
captured by a small subset of stakeholders. If, for example, the water captured, and electricity 
produced, are for use in a distant location then these resources themselves or some of the taxes and 
fees should go to more local uses as well. The principle should apply both within and across borders 
(see Varghese, 1997). 
Lack of perceived fairness in the distribution of benefits can make finding a procedural solution to 
conflicting interests and values over projects very difficult. Examples abound, such as that analysed by 
Muradian et al. (2003) who recount the case of an ecological distribution conflict between a Canadian 
transnational mining company and a rural population in Peru. 
Although this principle of equitable sharing of benefits overlaps with the WCD strategic priority on 
recognising entitlements and sharing benefits, it should be considered a component of GPA. Successful 
implementation of benefit-sharing mechanisms, including innovations as revenue distribution oversight 
committees, is difficult but not impossible. Slack (2004) remains optimistic about the potential after 
reviewing experiences in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. In recent years benefit-sharing has become a 
prominent part of the dams’ discourse, invoked by a range of actors, from multilateral development 
banks, governments, and local and international NGOs (for example, see: Sadoff and Grey, 2005; DDP, 
2007). 
Avoiding unfair and involuntary risk-bearing 
Regarding risk, the WCD insisted on clearly distinguishing between voluntary risk-takers (e.g. private 
companies) and involuntary risk-bearers (e.g. displaced people) (WCD, 2000). The WCD noted that 
conventional practice has been to restrict risk assessment to that being borne by developers, investors 
and states in terms of threats to expected (or hoped for) returns on investments. Generally, these 
actors are voluntary risk-takers, although it is recognised that some states involuntarily shoulder more 
risk than they would prefer, as a forced condition of external financing. A significant step by WCD was 
to push for risk- assessment to be extended to include the wider involuntary risk-bearing group upon 
whom risks have been imposed. Risks for this latter group may include threats to livelihoods and well-
being for myriad reasons. 
The involuntary risks people are exposed to when a dam is constructed may be catastrophic, relating 
to dam failure and associated flooding, or operating errors as in the case of Vietnam’s Yali Falls dam 
(Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004), none of which were foreseen or included in the planning, design and 
management regime established for that hydropower facility. For many communities and ecosystems 
downstream of dams, substantial flow fluctuations become normal as its generation is linked to delivery 
schedules that focus on supplying high-value power at times of peak demand. Also common are 
seasonal flow changes and reduced sediment delivery that affect flood-plain replenishment, wetland 
productivity, water-borne diseases, bank and bed erosion, flooding and nutrient supplies to ocean 
fisheries. Projects must make information on these risks available to all and do as much as possible to 
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ensure that they avoid unfair and involuntary risk-bearing with likely negative consequences, especially 
to the poor and vulnerable. 
As noted above, risks may be transferred to ecosystems. Values attached to these vary greatly, 
depending on perspectives. There is no single set of universal green values (Hunold and Dryzek, 2002), 
however, where interests in conservation or recognition of livelihood dependence is high, even if the 
values attached are diverse, and ecosystem impact considerations also often become an important 
factor in gaining and maintaining public acceptance. 
Protection of livelihood security 
It is acknowledged that large infrastructure projects invariably, through changes in land use, water 
flows and the creation of new job opportunities, alter the context within which livelihoods are 
conducted, the entitlements on which the poor rely, and the diversity of livelihood options that they 
can take advantage of. The changes wrought by a project should not, however, be allowed to 
undermine livelihood security (for a discussion of the concept, see Chambers and Conway, 1991; 
Scoones, 1998). At a bare minimum, livelihood security implies that a population has secure and 
continuous access to the natural resources, ecosystem and other services required to maintain a living. 
Those whose livelihood security is diminished as a consequence of a policy or project should be 
prioritised when it comes to taking advantage of the new opportunities emerging as a consequence of 
the project. Differences in culture, skills, capacities and social discrimination mean that protecting the 
livelihood security of project-affected people is far from straightforward and often requires substantial 
expenditure in education, training and enterprise development. 
In cases where it is hard to uphold the previous three principles of distributive justice, there should 
be some kind of a safety net made available. Compensation for lost livelihoods, property and benefit 
streams may have to be transferred from the newly created winners to the losers. Insurances and 
welfare support may also be necessary, and just. The DDP follow-up to WCD did some work on this 
topic but more needs to be done. 
ASPIRATIONS FOR IMPROVED GOVERNANCE AND GPA 
The previous examination of public participation, distillation of lessons and expansion of justice 
principles lead us to this section that focuses on aspirations for improved governance and GPA. 
State actors, institutions and drivers 
An ideal state-society complex is conducive to just and effective GPA (figure 3) where there is a high 
level of public trust between state authorities and the people they govern. Transparency, accountability 
and competency are all attributes which contribute to trust-building and enhance the legitimacy of 
authorities. 
Institutions have a clear role to play. Critical rule-based foundations, relevant to GPA, are institutions 
such as constitutions, courts, and laws related to a huge range of issues from public safety through to 
media ownership and operation, international agreements, independent auditors, minimum standards, 
and so on. In all functioning states, there is a raft of government and bureaucratic organisations 
involved in policy creation, administration and implementation of the state-society agenda. The better 
this is functioning, the more likely that public acceptance will be gained for public decisions. For water 
and water-related energy projects, this invariably involves an array of state organisations with 
responsibilities for construction, operation, energy, irrigation, impact assessment, monitoring, etc. 
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Figure 3. Ideal state-society elements conducive to GPA. 
 
It is important to acknowledge the driving forces behind the attainment of the 'gold standards'. Our 
argument, encapsulated in figure 3 is underpinned by the assumption that for governments and their 
associated bureaucracy to fulfil their potential requires them to be proactive, guided by leaders with a 
sense of justice and fairness. Linked and complementary to this is a proactive civil society that is willing 
to constructively engage and negotiate with state representatives. This complementarity can be further 
enhanced by insights that emerge from constructive engagement. 
Multi-stakeholder platforms 
The WCD was a Multi-Stakeholder Platform (MSP). MSPs are an approach for constructive engagement 
and learning about complex problems where facts and values may be in dispute. MSPs are just a part of 
governance in which different stakeholders are identified, and usually through representatives, invited 
and assisted to interact in a deliberative forum that focuses on sharing knowledge and perspectives, 
generating and examining options, and informing and shaping negotiations and decisions (Röling, 2002; 
Warner, 2007; Dore, 2010). In the decade since WCD, there have been many more creative MSPs not 
only in the water resources domain but also in other sectors. Examples are the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment and the Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture on the 
international level. At the national level, we have seen initiatives such as the civil-society-led dialogue 
on river-linking schemes in India, the WCD follow-up processes in Nepal and Africa, and the consensus-
building process on the Everglades in South Florida. We can learn from the successes, difficulties and 
failures of such processes. 
MSPs can add value by the quality of their deliberation and discursive processes if they are inclusive, 
information-rich and flexibly operated, and actively promoting analysis of different views. In this ideal 
type, participants are open to changing their opinions through persuasion, but are not pressured or 
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coerced into a manufactured consensus, manipulated or in various ways deceived. Such platforms 
would also be characterised by respect, sharing of information and allowing all actors the freedom to 
participate and capably communicate their views (Dryzek, 2000). 
A recent study of water-related negotiation (Dore et al.; 2010) provided the following key messages: 
 Setting up an MSP requires good design and process led by credible and competent convenors. 
 High-quality process, enabling effective deliberation, increases the legitimacy of MSPs. 
 Practical steps for organising an MSP must keep in mind the final goal of producing workable 
recommendations for forward action. 
 MSPs help deliberation to become routine, enabling complex water issues to be more rigorously 
examined in better informed negotiations. 
We see MSPs as having an important role to play in GPA, but MSPs are seen by some as disrespectful 
of, and at times subversive to, existing public decision-making structures. Both WCD and other MSPs – 
particularly processes led by civil society – have been accused of being undemocratic, and too 
empowering of interest groups with policy positions which may differ from dominant policy positions 
within state governments or parts of their associated bureaucracies. Advocates claim the opposite, that 
in fact these types of processes are complementary to formal state decision-making processes and 
deepen democracy. To overcome some of these tensions, the relationship between MSPs and wider 
issues of democratic governance need to be more adequately addressed if MSPs are to create and 
maintain wide credibility. 
CONCLUSION 
It is no surprise that differences of opinion remain in the debate on large dams. As Klaus Töpfer, UNEP’s 
former Executive Director, stated "we should not be so naïve as to expect all divisions will be washed 
away" (DDP, 2003) by any single commission or its follow-up. Key issues remain, and ways forward 
continue to be sought. Given the complexity surrounding the WCD subject matter, we clearly see the 
need for pluralism as society experiments with, and sometimes learns, better ways to communicate 
with mutual respect, shared knowledge, and negotiating key decisions. 
The discussion in this paper has focused on GPA issues, distilling lessons from public participation, 
and proposing both justice principles and ideal state-society elements conductive to GPA. But, of 
course, there must still be outcome targets to ensure the 'gold standards' do not lose sight of their 
purpose. Using the case of the Traveston Crossing dam in Australia, Wasimi (2010) has used the three 
lenses of economic development, social equity and environmental sustainability to analyse a proposed 
large dam project in rural Queensland. Using the WCD and DDP guidance as a point of departure, 
Wasimi examines the contested facts and values surrounding the project that are similarly contested in 
countless other places around the world. He observed how semi-structured multi-stakeholder 
engagement has enabled the clearer articulation of very different perspectives and the overall quality 
of constructive engagement to be lifted. This may be more democratic and potentially just, but it is still 
a difficult GPA road. 
In conclusion, with constructive intent, the following ideas are offered as examples of the actions 
required to move forward with GPA. First, recognise that there is no single correct way for GPA and, 
therefore, encourage further experimentation and learning with governance processes, such as MSPs. 
Openness, transparency and fairness are best achieved through multiple avenues, by creating multiple 
arenas for dialogue and debate and channels for public input on decision making. However, it must also 
be recognised that the capacity and experience of personnel in all sectors is limited, and it is therefore 
essential in many places to build the capacity of both state and non-state actors to co-design, use, fund, 
participate in, and monitor MSP inputs to, aid decision making. 
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Second, we need to dispel the myth that public participation is wasteful of resources by highlighting 
the rights to participation, and demonstrating the value of genuine public participation to affected 
peoples, the general citizenry, investors, credit providers, and state agencies. This requires more 
sharing of GPA experiences from fields other than large-scale water and water-related energy policy, 
planning and projects. 
Third, we need to create incentives for effective partnerships to be reproduced, by praising and 
rewarding state agencies and other actors that effectively use process-based and distributive justice 
principles when consulting the public. 
Finally, we suggest effort be made to deconstruct the assumption (by some) that know-how about 
processes of governance, including for GPA, is centred in so-called mature economies and, therefore, 
encourage more openness to learning lessons of good practice from developing countries. 
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C h a p t e r  3
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs)
3.1 MSPs: a basis for fairer water governance
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) are a part of governance in which different stakeholders 
are identified and, usually through representatives, invited and assisted to interact in a deliberative 
forum that focuses on:
•	 sharing	knowledge	and	perspectives
•	 generating	and	examining	options
•	 informing	and	shaping	negotiations	and	decisions
MSPs are not the only places where deliberation takes place. MSPs and dialogues are words that 
are often used interchangeably. This may be misleading. Any ‘dialogue process’ implies delibera-
tion is central. There may be much dialogue and deliberation embedded in advocacy organizations, 
diplomacy, operations within the party room, the parliament, contract drafting, the corporate board 
room or the village committee. However, as the name specifies, MSPs refer to where deliberation is 
fostered among multiple, diverse stakeholders.
MSPs are an approach for constructive engagement and learning about complex problems where 
facts and values may be in dispute. Choices about water often involve society contesting facts, such 
as the most efficient way to supply water, recover delivery costs, and provide efficiency incentives. 
Choices about water also often involve contesting values, for example, whose priorities and needs 
matter most, when there is insufficient water to satisfy all demands.
MSPs may lead to the creation or strengthening of bridges of understanding between actors 
representing wide-ranging interests, and the satisfactory resolution of at least some differences. An 
MSP can bring into sharper focus substantive differences of approach and priorities that may not be 
easily reconcilable. By articulating these differences in the public sphere, an MSP can contribute to a 
sounder basis for negotiation and decision making.
“MSPs ARE AN APPROACH FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND 
LEARNING ABOUT COMPLEX PROBLEMS”
MSPs can be influential by bringing together stakeholders in a new form of communication and 
decision finding. In this way, they can ensure that differences are respected – or at least better under-
stood – while pursuing fair and effective workable agreements about complex issues.
Influence is different to authority. Many MSPs are not necessarily vested with, nor must they 
claim, authority to make decisions. To do so may invite resistance and be counter-productive. 
Although not all dominant political cultures support or permit MSPs, in many places MSPs are part 
of a broader trend towards new forms of governance based on collaboration that build and draw 
upon social capital.
A way of focusing the MSP contribution to water negotiations is to use the 4Rs, (introduced in 
Chapter 1) as part of a systematic and semi-structured approach. Recapping, the 4Rs refer to rewards, 
risks, rights and responsibilities. For example:
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•	 The	rewards	being	sought	 from	the	care,	use	and	further	development	of	water	 resources,	
and the distribution of the full spectrum of the possible rewards/benefits/costs of various 
options.
•	 The	involuntary	and	voluntary	water-related	risks.
•	 Water-related	rights.
•	 The	various	water-related	responsibilities of State and non-State actors.
While the 4Rs can always be useful as reference points, MSPs do not all need to follow the 
same format or structure. MSPs exist in different shapes and sizes. But, as a guide, there are desir-
able characteristics of MSPs. These are summarized in Figure 3.1 and explained in Sections 3.2–3.5 
to provide an outline for an ‘ideal type’ of MSP that can contribute to fairer, more effective water 
governance.19
“MSPs EXIST IN DIFFERENT SHAPES AND SIZES”
Figure 3.1: MSP conceptual framework and desirable characteristics
DESIRABLE PROCESS
• Deliberative
• Facilitated
• Inclusive
• Informed and communicative
DESIRABLE CONTENT
(example elements)
• Setting up
• Stakeholder analysis
• Social contract between participants
• Comprehensive assessments
• Scenarios
• Selective use of ‘deliberation-support’ tools
• Action recommendations
   ...all documented
DESIRABLE CONTEXT
• Purpose and scope clear
• Convenors credible and competent
• Appropriate scales and levels
• Sufficient resources, political support, and time
• Politics and power recognized
DESIRABLE OUTCOMES
• Political space created
• Representation and participation expanded
• Discourses and norms constructively contested
• Interdependencies recognized
• Reflection and collective sensemaking
• Deliberation made routine for complex issues
• Negotiations more informed
• Better decisions, agreements and implementation
Context
Process
Content
Outcomes
ImpactConstructiveengagement
Fairer, more effective
water governance
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3.2 Desirable context for MSPs
3.2.1 Clear purpose and scope 
The purpose of an MSP needs to be clearly articulated in terms of its political and practical 
boundaries to enquiry, the derivation, extent and duration of its mandate, and a justification of how 
the MSP might improve existing governance. 
Questions to consider include:
•	 Is	the	MSP	trying	to	shape	the	higher-level	discourse	of	the	wider	political	and	institutional	
environment,	 i.e.,	 the	 ‘big	context’?	Examples	are	MSPs	 focusing	on	climate	change	and	 its	
implications (including for the Earth’s hydrological cycle), examining global drivers and pos-
sible societal responses, such as mitigation approaches, financing adaptation, and establish-
ing equitable carbon markets. Other MSPs include the deliberations before, during and after 
global fora such as the World Water Forum and the World Water Congress.
•	 Is	the	MSP	focusing	on	building	a	policy-shaping	network	and	space	for	debate	in	a	particular	
community	or	place,	 intending	to	catalyze	reflection	and	action	on	some	shared	 issues?	An	
example is the MSP working with the many actors and institutions with a stake in improv-
ing river basin governance in Namibia and Botswana’s Okavango floodplain; or the Mekong 
Region (see Case 3.1).
•	 Is	the	MSP	focusing	on	informing	and	shaping	a	particular	negotiation	process?	For	example,	
devising a fair and effective water allocation and management regime in the irrigation sys-
tems of the Viet Nam delta; or the MSP informing the negotiation and review of the agree-
ment to enable the continuation of mining –subject to more stringent Fly River pollution 
controls, and sharing of rewards – in the western provinces of Papua New Guinea.20
Answers to these questions should determine the design of the MSP and tactics to optimize 
engagement, particularly regarding choices of convenors, facilitators, invitees, agenda and tools. 
There are more ideas on how to clarify the purpose and scope of an MSP later in this chapter.
Case 3.1: ‘Exploring Water Futures Together’ in the Mekong Region
A	new	water	governance	paradigm	was	needed	in	the	Mekong	Region	which	encompasses	Cambodia,	Laos,	
Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam and southern China.
On main streams and tributaries disputes exist resulting from interventions to natural flow regimes and overt 
or default allocation decisions. These interventions are justified on grounds of: flood control, more irrigation 
for food or fibre production, urban or industrial supply, improving ease of navigation, or boosting energy 
production via hydropower. There are associated disputes about altered sediment and nutrient loads, fisher-
ies, livelihood options, groundwater use, water re-use, and diversions (inter-State, intra-State, inter-basin and 
intra-basin).
An	alliance	of	 actors	 in	 the	Mekong	Region	 cooperated	 to	 convene	and	 implement	an	MSP	undertaken	at	
national and regional scales. The convening coalition comprised: IUCN, the Thailand Environment Institute (TEI) 
– a national organization focused on sustainability; the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) – an 
international	research	organization;	and	the	M-POWER	regional	knowledge	network	whose	core	membership	
is	from,	and	focus	is	on,	the	six	Mekong	Region	countries.
The	purpose	and	scope	has	been	to	make	it	routine	in	the	Mekong	Region	for	important	national	and	transna-
tional water-related options and decisions to be examined in the public sphere from a range of perspectives. 
The MSP aimed to demonstrate this practice.21
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3.2.2 Credible and competent convenors
Convenors are those who call people to come together and collectively engage in an issue. There 
are many possible convenors for MSPs and they can be either from within or outside of government 
(see Box 3.1). Credibility and competence are essential. Credibility will be linked to the ‘social capital’ 
of the convenor or convening coalition. Without the capacity to build new or upon existing relation-
ships, convenors will be unable to establish an MSP constituency. Without competence, convenors 
will not be able to maintain the constituency or have an effective engagement.
Box 3.1: MSPs and dialogue tracks 1, 2, 3
The terminology of dialogue tracks 1–3 is one way of differentiating between water governance fora, some of 
which are MSPs, and the different convening possibilities.
Track 1 refers to processes of governments and associated bureaucracy, including inter- and intra-State fora. 
In the eyes of States these are ‘official’ and the most legitimate. The dominant logic is, for the most part, still 
implicitly accepting of rational, self-interested behaviour, particularly in international affairs. Track 1 dialogues 
are convened by State actors for State actors. The UN General Assembly is an example. They may be delibera-
tive, but they are not multi-stakeholder.
Track 2 refers to governance processes involving State, UN family, donor/lender, civil society and business. 
These interactive forums are usually convened and led by an actor or coalition closely aligned with States 
ensuring government representatives remain privileged actors, such as with the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD). The convenors are usually focused on enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of States by widening the field of ideas and influences. Track 2 MSPs may be convened 
by State or non-State actors, but usually widen the range of stakeholder involvement.
Track 3 refers to research, dialogue and advocacy efforts led by civil society or business, less impeded by or less 
subordinate to State actors. These fora are committed to enlarging the political space and are often optimistic 
about the potential of MSPs to find and assist in negotiating better ways forward for society. The convening is 
led by non-State actors, and by design should bring in the full range of relevant stakeholders or possible con-
tributors to addressing an issue. Convening coalitions are often a useful way of aggregating the social capital 
of the individual convenors. Tracks 2 and 3 are often now grappling with the idea and practices of deliberative 
MSPs. Practice may be less than ideal, but there are many promising efforts around the world where Tracks 
2 and 3 are trying to improve the quality of their MSPs to inform and shape water-related debates, generate 
options, and inform and shape negotiations.
3.2.3 Appropriate scales and levels
Clarifying purpose and scope is a precursor to thinking about scales and levels.22 Scales are the 
spatial, temporal, quantitative or analytical dimensions used to measure, or rank, and study an issue 
(see Figure 3.2). Levels are the units of analysis that are located at different positions on a scale.
Water management is often institutionalized around the spatial scales of government (i.e., 
administrative) or hydrology. The scale of government has different levels, for example: district, 
provincial, national, regional, global. The scale of hydrology also has different levels, for example: 
well, aquifer, stream, lake, reservoir, small watershed, larger national river basin, or international 
river basin. MSP convenors must be aware that analysis and action may best occur at various scales 
and levels – single or multiple. For complex water issues it is usually multiple. A strength of MSPs is 
that they can be flexibly constructed so as to fit any scale or level, but also to enable cross-level and 
cross-scale deliberations.
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“A STRENGTH OF MSPs IS THAT THEY CAN BE FLEXIBLY
CONSTRUCTED SO AS TO FIT ANY SCALE OR LEVEL, BUT ALSO TO 
ENABLE CROSS-LEVEL AND CROSS-SCALE DELIBERATIONS”
Figure 3.2: Scales and levels
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Figure 3.223 shows some examples of typical levels on five different scales (one temporal and four 
spatial). Examples of cross-level and cross-scale interactions are given for a pair of spatial scales. Some 
multi-level processes are shown on the ecosystem scale.
Actors contest scales and levels, overtly through debates, media releases, lobbying and protests, 
and more subtly, through use and control of technologies, indicators, deliberations over measure-
ments and controlling political sites. Thus, some actors push for hydrological scales – watersheds to 
river basins – as levels correspond to manageable units in the models or infrastructure they operate. 
Others promote conventional, area-based administrative hierarchies – districts to regions – arguing 
that this is where capacity, accountability and legitimacy already exist. Differences between admin-
istrative and hydrological scales, for example, are a common source of tensions in water resource 
governance. 
Contests can arise in MSPs because different actors favour particular scales and levels in their anal-
ysis, arguments and responses. Convenors may take steps in selection of participants and format to 
ensure there are constructive exchanges and debate within and between relevant scales and levels.
The scales and levels used in an MSP should eventually be a joint product of biophysical and 
social processes. It is rarely possible, and probably undesirable, in an MSP being undertaken for a 
complex water issue, to be too strict, too early about scale and level choices.
The physics of flows, and the dynamics of ecosystems or social institutions can often be collec-
tively better understood if scale and level boundaries are not overly constrained at the beginning 
of an MSP. For example, seasonal dynamics of flow regimes are important to fish (and thus fishers) 
on different temporal levels than the operational and planning logics of hydropower generation, 
irrigation and flood risk management.
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3.2.4 Sufficient resources, political support and time
Without adequate resources – human, financial, informational and intellectual – an MSP will not 
reach its potential. Competent people will be needed to support the operation of the MSP. Costs 
will be incurred and so funding needs to be organized. Uncertainties will need to be addressed with 
information and people that have the knowledge that can help to move forward.
It is vital that any MSP has sufficient political space and momentum to permit or encourage 
establishment and support. The need for some degree of political support is unavoidable. This does 
not just refer to political support from the State, but rather is a reminder that an MSP must have 
some type of supportive stakeholder constituency with either influence or authority. In the case of 
Cape York, Australia (see Case 3.2) the political support wavered, but endured for long enough to 
ensure the MSP was given a chance to make its best contribution.
“IT IS VITAL THAT ANY MSP HAS SUFFICIENT POLITICAL SPACE
AND MOMENTUM”
Case 3.2: Breaking down the wall in Australia’s Cape York
The MSP of CYPLUS (Cape York Peninsula Land Use Strategy) was born in the 1990s after 20 years of intensify-
ing conflict about major development proposals, mining, land rights, cattle grazing and Aboriginal land rights 
in the Cape York Peninsula of north-eastern Australia. CYPLUS was an intensive and extensive MSP to develop 
a land-use strategy – not water-focused, but undoubtedly complex – in a remote area of northern Australia 
covering 137,000 km2 but home to only 18,000 people, the majority of whom are of Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander descent. All levels of government were actively involved.
People who studied CYPLUS were told by one participant: ‘Before CYPLUS there was a brick wall between 
graziers (cattle farmers), greens and aboriginal people on Cape York – they were all trying to cut the Cape up 
into little pieces for themselves but there wasn’t enough to go around. CYPLUS broke down the wall’. The 
researchers also warned of the need for a long-term commitment, which for CYPLUS was envisaged as at least 
10 years, during which time there would be (in the Australian political system) ‘at least three elections and 
countless changes in policies, programs and players involved in the effort’.
“IF THE MSP IS NOT FOLLOWED UP, OR IS NOT TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT BY DECISION MAKERS, MANY PARTICIPANTS WILL
BE DISILLUSIONED”
The saying ‘Rome was not built in a day’ also applies to MSPs which require an investment in time 
and patience, some degree of continuity, and then follow-up. If the time allowed is too short, it is 
hard for an MSP to do its job. If the MSP is not followed up, or is not taken into account by decision 
makers, many participants will be disillusioned and re-engaging with them in the future will likely 
be more difficult.24 A key lesson noted by an observer of a Canadian MSP (see Case 3.3) was that: 
‘One of the main criticisms aimed at collaborative systems of governance is that whilst they provide 
opportunities for deliberation and wider participation in decision making, they often produce imple-
mentation failures because insufficient attention is given to outputs that will have an impact on the 
problem at hand. As a result, participants may lose enthusiasm for further collaboration if there is 
little sign of their efforts having a positive effect’. 25
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Case 3.3: Balancing power in the Fraser Basin Council in Canada
The Fraser Basin spans 13 watersheds in western Canada and supports more than 2.5 million people with an 
economy based on natural resources. The need for a more integrated approach to effectively and sustainably 
managing the land and water resources has long been recognized.
The Fraser Basin Council was established in 1997 as an MSP to pursue sustainable development through inte-
grated river basin planning and management. It succeeded the Fraser Basin Management Programme, which 
was seen as being dominated by government interests.
The Council is a not-for-profit organization with a corporate structure that aims to address multi-jurisdictional 
issues to resolve disputes using a consensual rather than a legal or bureaucratic approach. It was specifi-
cally designed to complement, as opposed to duplicate, government management functions. A Charter for 
Sustainability was initially developed as a means of creating shared understanding among the diverse groups. 
The Charter outlines problems as well a vision, and articulates the values, principles and rules to guide collec-
tive action. 
The institutional set-up of the Council was carefully crafted in order to create a space for equitable delibera-
tive opportunity amongst diverse stakeholders to influence policy and programme decisions. It was recognized 
that a key challenge for collaborative governance is to provide fair representation, given that there are always 
economic and political power imbalances between groups that have legitimate interests in various facets of 
river basin management.
The Council included 36 directors drawn from three tiers of government (federal, provincial and local), First 
Nations, community groups, businesses as well as social, economic and environmental interest groups. To 
ensure fair local involvement, there were five regional committees for specific watersheds comprising repre-
sentatives from local government, First Nations and sectoral interests.
3.2.5 Politics and power recognized
When scoping an MSP it is necessary to consider politics and power explicitly.
Politics is a slippery concept. Comments from almost 50 years ago remain useful: ‘Politics is about 
policy, first and foremost; and policy is a matter of either the desire for change or the desire to pro-
tect something against change’ and ‘Politics is a natural reflex of the divergences between members 
of a society… [where]… there is a variety of perpetual disagreements which arise from fundamental 
differences of condition, status, power, opinion, and aim’.26 Water sharing is not just about technical 
choices. Contesting different views is the realm of politics. MSPs are a place for this contesting. MSPs 
are one way of ensuring that political tussles include evidence and exploration of different values 
and perspectives.
Another elusive concept is power. It can be seen as the ability to shape the context and conduct 
of others. This is helpful, but it only gets you so far. It is useful also, and very relevant to MSPs, to 
think of power in terms of assets and power relations (see Figure 3.3).27 Thinking of both can help in 
understanding the context.
“WHEN SCOPING AN MSP IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER POLITICS 
AND POWER EXPLICITLY”
MSPs are likely to be more influential if they are endowed with adequate helpings of ‘assets’ 
including: resources, participants in strategic positions, individuals with leadership ability, and a rich 
inflow of ideas.
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For some, politics and therefore political analysis, is focused on an analysis of power – identifying 
and interrogating its distribution, exercise and consequences. How power relations are manifested 
is just as important as whether particular actors have power – ‘power to act’, power with others’, 
‘power over’ and ‘power to lead’28 – all are important, as with the invocation of the wax, wick and 
flame metaphor in Box 2.1 in Chapter 2. MSPs are more likely to be agents of constructive engage-
ment if the power relations manifested are a healthy mixture of these different forms. Perhaps most 
important and integral to the success of MSPs is fostering the acceptance by many participants that 
there is new and additional power in collectively working with others.
Figure 3.3: Assets that shape power and power relations
3.3 Elements of good process
MSPs earn legitimacy, at least in part, by demonstrating high-quality process. To do so requires 
attaining and maintaining high standards of deliberation, facilitation, inclusiveness, information 
exchange and communication with the participants and wider constituency.
3.3.1 Deliberative
Deliberation is integral, by which we mean: ‘deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at pro-
ducing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in 
light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants. Although consensus 
need not be the ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their interests, 
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an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as justification to all affected) 
ideally characterizes deliberation’. 
MSPs are rooted in a belief in the value of ‘authentic deliberation’29 between people with differ-
ent perspectives. In this way, MSPs give privilege to the power of argument, explanation and reason 
over other types of power. Therefore, it is important to note that stakeholders who do not have 
language and communication skills can be disadvantaged, unless adequately represented.
“MSPs GIVE PRIVILEGE TO THE POWER OF ARGUMENT,
EXPLANATION AND REASON OVER OTHER TYPES OF POWER”
3.3.2 Facilitated
To enable deliberation, good facilitation is an essential characteristic if MSPs are to reach their 
potential. Ideally in a group of MSP facilitators, there would be a mixture of men and women of 
varying cultural backgrounds, united by having open minds. These facilitators need to possess a rea-
sonable share of the following traits:
Listener: Ability to listen and create an atmosphere where others will listen (not just talk).
Enabler: Ability to see who is participating and who is not, and to find ways to enable all participants 
to contribute in an authentic way. This includes stopping any particular individual or group from 
dominating an MSP.
Linker: Willingness to prepare by thinking through the programme and backgrounds of participants, 
anticipating what might happen. It is important the facilitator link the steps in the MSP process, 
maintaining some direction/focus, whilst also being adaptable to the needs of participants.
Respectful: Respect and empathy for different people and the different world views that they hold. 
This includes respect for different forms of knowledge – engineering, agriculture, ecology, economic, 
cultural, social, national politics, local villagers.
Energetic: To maintain the enthusiasm of the participants to persist and work through what may be 
difficult tasks, the facilitator usually requires large reserves of personal energy.
Familiarity with appropriate ‘facilitator techniques’: There are many techniques to encourage cre-
ative expression, such as buzzing, mind mapping, rich pictures. A skilful facilitator can draw on these 
as components of the MSP method.30
“TO ENABLE DELIBERATION, GOOD FACILITATION IS AN ESSENTIAL 
CHARACTERISTIC”
3.3.3 Inclusive
MSPs should enable representation of a wide range of stakeholders and their disparate interests 
via a flexible process which may have many different facets. Inclusiveness implies being respectful of 
diverse ethics, ways of reasoning, world views and priorities of actors.
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3.3.4 Informed and communicative
MSPs should use and share the best available information, building the knowledge base. MSP 
participants should become familiar with other relevant fora, plans, agendas etc. The MSP also 
needs to communicate effectively with the wider public sphere if it wishes to create and maintain 
a constituency.
3.4 Desirable MSP content
MSPs are not all the same. Figure 3.4 provides a practical example of a hypothetical MSP which 
shows a plausible flow from acknowledgement of a concern through to deliberation and agreement 
on next steps.
MSPs may involve regular meetings between core participants. These might be informal gather-
ings beside an irrigation canal, next to a wetland, or on the banks of a river. There might also be 
conferences/discussions open to the wider public, locally hosted field visits, electronic exchanges, 
government briefings, films, plays, historical texts, testimony, or commissioned research.
Despite differences in the way they are set up and implemented, examples of desirable content 
can be suggested.
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Figure 3.4: Timeframe and sequence of hypothetical MSP 31
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3.4.1 Setting-up
Setting up refers to the practical steps that must be taken in establishing an effective MSP.32 
Essential steps include:
•	 establishment	of	an	interim	MSP	steering	group
•	 articulating	clear	rationale	for	the	MSP
•	 building	a	constituency	for	the	MSP
•	 preliminary	examination	of	the	wider	MSP	context
•	 assessing	potential	MSP	designs	and	mandates
Establishment of an interim MSP steering group
There are now hundreds of examples around the world of water-related MSPs. To get going 
has usually required an interim MSP steering group. Some say ‘interim’, others ‘initial’ or ‘informal’. 
Some prefer ‘working group’ or ‘committee’ to steering group. It’s important, though, not to get 
hung up at this early stage. The key is to start somewhere. Final convening, management and coor-
dination responsibilities for the MSP are sorted out and adjusted during the setting-up phase (see 
Case 3.4).
Case 3.4: Improving agricultural knowledge, science and technology
A prominent recent example of an MSP was the International Assessment of Agricultural Science and 
Technology for Development (IAASTD). This was a five-year process from 2003–2008. Whilst not focused on 
water, it is nevertheless an excellent example.
In the beginning a Steering Committee of 40 representatives from governments, agencies, industry, farmers 
and other rural producers, consumers, environmental and other NGOs produced a basic document in August 
2003 calling for the International Assessment. They chose to address this question: How can we reduce hun-
ger and poverty, improve rural livelihoods, and facilitate equitable, environmentally, socially and economically 
sustainable development through the generation, access to, and use of agricultural knowledge, science and 
technology?
A design process soon followed. The first meeting of the parties (governments), five co-sponsoring UN agen-
cies, the World Bank and civil society representatives took place in 2004. The government representatives (45 
countries present) decided to go ahead with the Assessment. They agreed on the content and scope of the 
Assessment and adopted outlines and procedures, a timetable and a budget of US$ 10.7 million.
The process became a UN inter-governmental process, which means the participating member State repre-
sentatives made the final decisions and were asked to adopt the final report. The initial Steering Committee 
morphed into a multi-stakeholder Bureau of 60 representatives of governments (30), civil society (22) and 
international institutions (8) to oversee the process.
The IAASTD then undertook a comprehensive global assessment that included five more detailed sub-global 
reports, of the role of agricultural science and technology in development, culminating in a final plenary in 
Johannesburg in April 2008 at which synthesis reports and summaries for decision makers were presented to 
all stakeholders.
Articulating clear rationale for the MSP
The need for an MSP has to be explained and accepted before people will agree to invest time 
and	effort.	What	problems	or	opportunities	will	the	MSP	seek	to	address?	How	will	an	MSP	fill	a	gap,	
or	add	value,	to	the	existing	efforts	being	made?
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Diverse goals have catalyzed recent local, national, regional and global MSPs, including:
•	 Bringing	 some	 element	 of	 public	 deliberation	 into	 decision	 making	 about	 possible	 links	
between 37 major rivers across India (see Case 3.6).
•	 Micro-watershed	 equitable	 sharing	 of	 irrigation	 water	 in	 the	 Lingmutey	 Chu	 Watershed,	
Bhutan (see Case 3.7 Companion Modelling).
•	 Combining	maintenance	of	the	character	of	natural	floods	with	hydropower	generation	in	the	
negotiation of ‘environmental flows’ in the Senegal River Basin (see Case 3.9).
•	 Energy	future	–	using	national	follow-up	to	the	World	Commission	on	Dams	to	address	con-
troversies about building large dams in Nepal (see Case 3.10).
•	 Better	use	and	care	for	ground	water	in	Umatilla	County,	USA.33 
•	 Improving	cooperation	among	interest	groups	and	negotiating	a	water	charter	to	guide	land	
on water management in the Komadugu Yobe Basin of Lake Chad, northern Nigeria.34
“THE NEED FOR AN MSP HAS TO BE EXPLAINED AND ACCEPTED 
BEFORE PEOPLE WILL AGREE TO INVEST TIME AND EFFORT”
Building a constituency for the MSP
To reach its potential an MSP needs a constituency of diverse supporters. Providing early oppor-
tunity for involvement is important. Although people may constructively engage for different rea-
sons, most will want to be convinced that the MSP is a genuine and worthy effort to search for fair 
and effective ways forward. Building a constituency means building a base of MSP supporters who 
are committed to engaging in a collective process. It is far more than ‘engaging with stakeholders’ 
or undertaking a ‘stakeholder analysis’ (see section 3.4.2). 
“TO REACH ITS POTENTIAL AN MSP NEEDS A CONSTITUENCY OF 
DIVERSE SUPPORTERS”
Preliminary examination of the wider MSP context
The interim steering group needs to ensure that the wider MSP context is understood. Some call 
this the ‘operating environment’ or the wider ‘political economy’. It is important to get a basic over-
view of the present and relevant history, including an initial understanding of the range of perspec-
tives of the MSP stakeholders. This will provide guidance on the areas to be explored in more detail.
Assessing potential MSP operating structures
There are usually various choices for an MSP operating structure which will determine function, 
legitimacy and credibility. Links to existing authority structures need to be clear. For example, what is 
to	be	the	link	to	existing	levels	of	government	(if	any)?	Taking	the	time	to	investigate	and	introduce	
an appropriate structure is vital.
Assessing MSP designs and mandates
In the words of one expert: ‘MSPs, by any other name, are currently ‘hot’ in the water sector’ 
attracting diverse actors to operate collectively – at least for a time – in a ‘weird and wonderful pan-
orama’ of different multi-stakeholder processes.35
That said, there are many choices for the design of an MSP, which must match the purpose and scope. 
The design includes operating structures and plans for carrying out the MSP. The setting-up phase 
is critical in negotiating appropriate designs and mandates, so that the particular MSP can serve the 
needs of the part of society grappling with a particular issue, hoping to make water governance 
fairer and more effective via a well-intentioned platform.
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3.4.2 Stakeholder analysis
Stakeholder analysis is essential to properly design and implement an MSP. It helps to clarify 
who to involve in an MSP and in what way. It should provide a foundation and plan for participa-
tion throughout the MSP making it easier for stakeholders to engage, be respected, and learn from 
each other. 
MSP drivers – that is, the convenors, or steering group – must agree on criteria for determining 
stakeholders. For many MSPs, the 4Rs are a useful starting point. What are the benefits and who may 
be	involved	in	reaping	a	reward	or	bearing	a	cost?	What	are	the	risks	and	who	are	the	voluntary	or	
involuntary	risk	bearers?	Who	has	or	may	claim	a	right	to	be	involved,	recognizing	that	some	will	
always	say	their	‘right	to	participate’	is	greater	than	others?	Who	has	a	responsibility	to	be	involved	
– legal or perhaps because of ‘civic duty’ – given the insights they possess and may be able to con-
tribute?
List all the people and organizations that might fit the criteria. The list may need to be revisited 
several times to ensure that all key groups and people are given the opportunity to engage, either 
directly or via representatives. Allowing stakeholders to self-nominate can also ensure that those 
with an interest are not excluded. Decisions need to be taken on how best to involve people. It is 
sensible to hear from all parties likely to be interested in the MSP so as to hear how they think they 
can be optimally involved in different ways.
Various tools can be used to learn about stakeholders and their relationships, such as: brainstorm-
ing, actor mapping, interviews with key informants or producing ‘rich pictures’ with focus groups.
It can be helpful to make a stakeholder matrix with the stakeholders along one axis and 4Rs 
criteria along the other (see Table 3.1). In complex situations, it is often the case that there are con-
testing views. It can help to use the 4Rs to research the roles of different stakeholders in the MSP 
key issues.
Cross-checking with different people can lessen the risk of oversights or bias. If not too provoca-
tive, it can also be useful to prepare preliminary summaries of the influence and authority of differ-
ent actors. Recognizing the dynamism of actor relationships, it can also help to use the 4Rs to reflect 
on the power (influence and/or authority of different stakeholders).
Photo 3.1 Dams and Development Dialogue meeting (Nepal).
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           Examples of the rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities which should be explored during 
stakeholder analysis
Locally affected 
people
Developer
Expert
NGO representative
Financier
Government official
Rewards:
Potential benefits
4Rs
Stakeholders
(Examples)
• Local rewards need 
to be assessed. They 
could include: equitable 
access to quality water 
or related resources; 
compensation for loss 
of access to resources; 
cessation or redesign 
of project with impacts 
that are too negative. 
• Profit from construction 
or operation of a new 
facility.
• Fees, sometimes future 
profit share.
• Often negligible, but as 
with others, this should 
be examined. Inclusion 
of issues they feel are 
important.
• Return on investment.
• Benefits should be 
restricted to those to 
be enjoyed by wider 
citizenry.
Risks:
Risks voluntarily 
being taken or invol-
untarily borne
• May be involuntary 
risk bearers. Examples 
include: negative 
impacts related to 
reduced quality or 
quantity of water or 
ecosystems; threatened 
livelihood security etc. 
• Construction cost over-
runs, or unprofitable 
operation.
• Borrowing and invest-
ment risks.
• Minimal, except for 
reputational if shown to 
be incorrect.
• Risk of being marginal-
ized from the political 
or legal process if not a 
directly affected person.
• Reputational, if seen to 
be engaging in a less 
than ideal MSP or of 
making too great con-
cessions.
• Loss of investment.
• Minimal, except for 
reputational if shown 
to support unwise or 
unfair development.
Rights:
Rights claimed
• Right to free prior 
informed consultation. 
(Right to withhold con-
sent is contested vigor-
ously by State officials).
• Right to be made bet-
ter off, or at least not 
worse off.
• As per authorized con-
tracts.
• Right to provide unbi-
ased advice for con-
sideration by decision 
makers.
• Right to explore, ques-
tion and present their 
ideas and opinions.
• To lend within the 
spaces provided within 
the law.
• To discharge their 
duties as authorized 
and employed citizens.
Responsibilities:
Formal or informal 
responsibilities
• Recognition of the 
rights of others to try 
and improve their lives.
• Follow the laws.
• Full disclosure of all 
anticipated impacts.
• Construction and 
operation as per agree-
ments.
• To operate within their 
fields of expertise, and 
to provide clear and 
impartial advice.
• Political accountability 
to their stakeholder 
constituency.
• Due diligence, adher-
ence to internal and 
industry policies, includ-
ing codes of conduct.
• Adjudicate wisely and 
fairly, upholding the 
spirit of just laws and 
guiding regulations.
Table 3.1: Stakeholder analysis using the 4Rs in a hypothetical water project
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3.4.3 Social contract between participants
The social contract is a summary of the rules of engagement in the MSP. A social contract 36 needs 
to be established between the convenors and all stakeholder representatives, which requires reach-
ing some workable agreement on purpose, scope, political space, resources, time and process so that 
participants in an MSP understand the roles and responsibilities of all.
Social contracts – which are also usually negotiated – should make the ‘participation promise’ 
clear, to lessen the chance of a mismatch between reality and expectations. For example, are stake-
holder representatives being invited to:
•	 Come	together	primarily	to	build	relationships	and	share	information?
•	 Set	the	agenda	for	subsequent	public	or	private-sector	action?
•	 To	brainstorm	and	problem	solve?
•	 Join	a	consensus-building	initiative?
•	 To	provide	recommendations,	or	to	take	decisions?
The social contract needs to be unambiguous and documented, such as for the global Hydropower 
Sustainability Assessment Forum (see Case 3.5).
“THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS A SUMMARY OF THE RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT IN THE MSP”
Case 3.5: The ‘social contract’ of the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum
In 2004, the International Hydropower Association (IHA) adopted Sustainability Guidelines, followed in 2006 by 
the adoption of a Sustainability Assessment Protocol (SAP). During 2008–2009, the Hydropower Sustainability 
Assessment Forum (HSAF)37 examined whether it is possible to establish a broadly endorsed sustainability 
assessment tool to measure and guide performance in the hydropower sector, based on the IHA’s SAP. The 
HSAF included on-ground assessments and meetings in USA, Zambia, China, Brazil, Iceland and Turkey. In 
August 2009 it released its draft Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAP).
The Forum membership included representatives of developed and developing countries involved in hydro-
power as well as from the NGO, finance and industry sectors. At the beginning of the Forum, participants 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding and agreed to detailed ‘Communications and Operating Procedures’ 
including, for example, that:
•	 The	HSAF	will	be	transparent,	conducted	with	goodwill,	and	will	search	for	consensus.
•	 Where	a	 consensus	 cannot	be	 reached,	 the	differences	will	 be	 recorded	and	acknowledged	 in	 all	HSAF	
documentation.
•	 The	HSAF	will	only	use	the	name	and	brand	of	participants	in	public	communication	after	obtaining	their	
permission.
•	 The	decision	on	endorsement	of	the	final	product	will	be	taken	by	each	participant	at	the	end	of	the	pro-
cess, after consultation with their respective constituencies.
•	 Participants	 reserve	 the	 right	 to	withdraw	 from	 the	MSP	during	 the	process.	 If	 this	 action	 is	 taken,	 the	
withdrawing participant will provide a written explanation to the Chair.
“THE SOCIAL CONTRACT NEEDS TO BE UNAMBIGUOUS AND
DOCUMENTED”
001-120_ARP.indd   51 17.2.2010   8:44:44
ANU page 183
52
3.4.4 Comprehensive assessments
There are many deliberation-support tools that can be helpful when negotiating water-related 
resource use and further development. It is axiomatic that MSPs should strive to ensure a compre-
hensive, meaning ‘sufficiently thorough’, assessment of issues, informed by all stakeholders, and 
ultimately of use to them all. There is now extensive experience in undertaking MSPs that have a 
substantial knowledge-assembly, contesting and building component.
Case 3.6: Civil society-led dialogue assessing river-linking schemes in India
River	 diversions	 and	 basin	 transfers	 are	 some	 of	 the	 most	 contested	 water	 issues	 globally.	 India’s	 mega	
Interlinking	of	Rivers	(ILR)	project	has	proposed	to	provide	173	billion	m3 of water to irrigate 37 million hectares 
through 31 links in Himalayan and peninsula rivers and associated large dams, reservoirs and canals.
Proponents argue the merits of diverting water from ‘surplus’ rivers to ‘deficit’ rivers to increase irrigation and 
thereby food grain production, mitigate floods and droughts, and reduce regional imbalance in the availability 
of water. Critics cite the negative ecological, economic and social costs, and argue for more effective ways to 
address food security. 
A coalition of civil society groups, led by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), initiated an MSP in 2003 to 
comprehensively assess the benefits and risks of the project, and explore alternatives to river linking. An initial 
working group, including civil society, government representatives, political leaders and media, spent eight 
months negotiating the set-up of the forum, and especially its members. The resulting ‘National Civil Society 
Committee’ (NCSC) was comprised of eminent persons representing diverse views. The NCSC was expected 
to: generate public debate; facilitate and improve information sharing between civil society and government; 
make available past knowledge and experience; and generate new knowledge about the project through 
independent studies.
The NCSC successfully raised public debate on the issue and influenced government to rethink its procedures 
and actions. Although the establishment of the forum took longer than anticipated, the credibility and legiti-
macy of the process was largely due to the diversity of perspectives represented and the comprehensiveness 
of the analysis.38
3.4.5 Scenarios
Scenarios are stories that outline possible futures. For complex situations with associated uncer-
tainty, scenario building in an MSP can help all participants think laterally and learn about each oth-
ers’ different interests, values, priorities, assumptions, constraints and options.
Scenario analysis has a history going back to the 1960s in the military and business. In recent 
times, as both the pace of change and uncertainty has increased, there has been renewed interest in 
scenario analysis and planning.
The basic principle of scenario planning is to try and understand plausible future trends to help 
make strategic decisions based on an analysis of the possible consequences. Some form of scenario 
analysis is highly relevant to many MSPs (see Box 3.2).
Scenarios are an interpretation of the present as well as an image of a possible future. Qualitative 
scenario storylines should be internally consistent and describe paths from the present to the possible 
futures. Where data exists, quantitative modelling is a way of making scenarios more explanatory 
and coherent by making important connections more explicit.
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“SOME FORM OF SCENARIO ANALYSIS IS HIGHLY RELEVANT TO 
MANY MSPs”
Box 3.2: Steps used in scenario building
Step 1: Identify driving forces – from whatever source: politics, economics, social or ecological change,   
  technical breakthroughs etc.
Step 2: Identify predetermined factors – assessing what is inevitable about the future.
Step 3: Identify critical uncertainties – assessing those areas where the future is uncertain, which can be  
  prioritized according to importance and degree of uncertainty.
Step 4: Develop scenario storylines – a series of plausible alternative futures.
Step 5: Assess the implication of different scenarios – for the issue(s), organization(s), place(s) or   
  sector(s) of concern.
Step 6: Identify and use indicators – to enable continual reassessment and adaptation.
Formats and settings can be experimented with creatively. The Georgia Basin Futures Project, for 
example, drew on expert knowledge and community inputs to build tools and a game for explor-
ing what-if-type scenarios for a basin on the west coast of Canada. Visioning is commonly used in 
scenario building and decision making, for example by policy makers and youth in Europe,39 and for 
much longer by indigenous people grappling with water sharing in the High Atlas mountains and 
Negev desert.
Role-playing games can also help stakeholders explore each others’ perspectives on water man-
agement options. Case 3.7 introduces Companion Modelling, which combines role-playing games 
with computerized modelling to explore scenarios.
“VISIONING IS COMMONLY USED IN SCENARIO BUILDING AND
DECISION MAKING”
Case 3.7: Companion Modelling
Companion Modelling combines role-playing games with computer model simulations to facilitate shared 
learning and explore scenarios in order to assist with collective decision making.
The approach has been successfully applied to resolve conflict amongst villagers on water allocation for rice 
irrigation in Bhutan and Thailand. Farmers in the Lingmutey Chu watershed in Bhutan played several sessions 
of the game to see the outcomes of various water-sharing strategies when applied both within their village and 
also	 in	a	collective	approach	between	villages.	Role	swapping	was	particularly	effective	 in	building	common	
understanding amongst participants of the situations of other parties. 
The computerized multi-agent model allows rapid simulation of a more comprehensive set of scenarios of 
water-sharing rules. It examines the interactions among different actors (or ‘agents’) and between these actors 
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and	the	common	resource	to	be	shared.	Researchers	and	participants	can	discuss	 the	outcomes	of	 the	sce-
narios, and adapt the model so that scenarios genuinely reflect the on-the-ground situation. 
Participants initially engaged in the games as an exercise, but soon realized the power of the tools for joint 
analysis of complex issues. Plenary discussions amidst the gaming sessions took the deliberations from simu-
lation to reality. Villagers in Bhutan concluded their sessions with a formal agreement on how to allocate 
water more fairly, including the creation of a water management committee and steps to develop rules and 
procedures.40
Case 3.8: Scenarios in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA)41 assessed the consequences of ecosystem change for human 
wellbeing. From 2001–2005, the MA involved the work of more than 1,360 experts worldwide. Their findings 
provide a state-of-the-art scientific appraisal of the condition and trends in the world’s ecosystems and the 
services they provide, as well as the scientific basis for action to conserve and use them sustainably.
The MA Scenarios Working Group considered scenario development as a tool to explore possibilities for the 
future that cannot be predicted by extrapolation of past and current trends.
The MA considered the possible evolution of ecosystem services during the 21st century by developing four 
global scenarios exploring plausible future changes in drivers, ecosystems, ecosystem services, and human 
wellbeing:
•	 The	Global	Orchestration	scenario	depicted	a	worldwide	connected	society	in	which	global	markets	are	well	
developed and where there is a high degree of global cooperation.
•	 The	Order	from	Strength	scenario	examined	a	regionalized	and	fragmented	world	preoccupied	with	security	
and protection.
•	 The	Adapting	Mosaic	scenario	explored	a	fragmented	world	resulting	from	discredited	global	institutions,	in	
which local ecosystem management strategies are evolved and adopted by strengthened local institutions.
•	 The	TechnoGarden	scenario	was	characterized	by	a	globally	connected	world	relying	strongly	on	technology	
and highly managed and often-engineered ecosystems to deliver needed goods and services.
Wetlands and water was a key part of the MA analysis, and many evidence-based key messages were distilled 
for policy makers. For example, noting and exploring the policy decisions that have to be made involving 
trade-offs between agricultural production and water quality, land use and biodiversity, water use and aquatic 
biodiversity, and current water use for irrigation and future agriculture production.
3.4.6 Selective use of tools
There are many tools to support water negotiations, including the previously introduced stake-
holder analysis, comprehensive assessments and scenarios. Other tools are explored in companion 
books to NEGOTIATE, such as FLOW, PAY, SHARE and RULE.42
FLOW introduces the user to the essentials of environmental flows. Implementing ‘environmen-
tal flows’ requires establishing water flow regimes which recognize ecosystem needs whilst trying 
to satisfy social and economic demands (see Case 3.9). FLOW explores how societies define flow 
requirements, modifications that might be necessary to infrastructure design and operation, finance 
and incentives, policy and legal frameworks, and the necessity to generate and maintain political 
momentum. Environmental flows work requires the integration of a range of disciplines includ-
ing engineering, law, ecology, economy, hydrology, political science and communication. An MSP 
approach is very suitable for informing the negotiations and decision making about how humans 
interfere with natural flow regimes.
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Case 3.9: Negotiating environmental flows in the Senegal River Basin
Transboundary	cooperation	in	the	Senegal	River	Basin	is	led	by	OMVS	(The	Senegal	River	Basin	Development	
Organization) which provides a forum for joint efforts by Mali, Mauritania and Senegal (and recently, 
upstream Guinea) to respond to development challenges while operationalizing integrated water resource 
management.
In 2002,	the	OMVS	member	countries	adopted	the	first-ever	River	Basin	Water	Charter	in	sub-Saharan	Africa,	
which was preceded in 2000 by the establishment of an Observatory of the Environment responsible for moni-
toring the state of the environment in the basin and impacts of development interventions. The Charter and 
Observatory were the culmination of a two-decade-long process marked by studies and debates on optimal 
ways of managing the river waters and investing in major water infrastructure projects. 
The	objective	of	the	Charter	is	to	provide	for	efficient	allocation	of	the	waters	of	the	Senegal	River	among	many	
different sectors, such as domestic uses, urban and rural water supply, irrigation and agriculture, hydropower 
production, navigation, fisheries, while paying attention to minimum stream flows and other environmental 
matters. It also establishes a process for approving new projects that may have significant impacts on those 
sectors, based on the provision of information to, and consultation with, all riparian stakeholders including 
local users.
The Charter drew on comprehensive analysis of the effects of the Diama and Manantali dams and exploration 
of alternatives to their current operation. The studies revealed the considerable and diverse benefits of the 
natural flood system – in terms of wetlands, fisheries, agriculture, livestock, forestry and groundwater recharge 
– benefits which needed to be factored into the operation of the dams and in planning of future development 
interventions. This was particularly essential since the majority of those affected rely heavily on the exploitation 
of water-dependent natural resources (traditional agriculture, fisheries, livestock, and exploitation of forest 
and wetland products). 
As a result, the Water Charter includes specific provisions for the release of water from the dams to help restore 
the floodplains and generate an annual flood, thereby recognizing the value of the floodplain ecosystem and 
traditional livelihood strategies.43
“WORKABLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FORWARD ACTION
MUST BE SOUGHT”
3.4.7 Action recommendations
MSP content must provide action recommendations. There is no need to manufacture consensus 
if it cannot be reached, but workable recommendations for forward action must be sought, other-
wise the MSP might end up being nothing more than an interesting discussion. If empowered to do 
so, the MSP might also take and implement decisions, but this is dependent on the extent of the 
mandate.
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) (see Case 3.10) is an example of an MSP that provided 
extensive action recommendations, without claiming decision-making authority.
Case 3.10: World Commission on Dams
Don’t plan, build, protest, operate, decommission, propose, oppose or discuss a dam without it! By 2000, the 
world had built 45,000 large dams to irrigate a third of all crops, generate a fifth of all power, control floods 
in wet times and store water in dry times. Yet, in the last century, large dams also disrupted the ecology of 
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over half the world’s rivers, displaced over 40 million people from their homes and left nations burdened with 
debt (Earthscan advertizing material promoting the WCD report)
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was a high-profile MSP which emerged from increasing public criti-
cism of large dams. It aimed to undertake a rigorous, independent review of the development effectiveness 
of large dams, to assess alternatives and propose practical guidelines for future decision making. The WCD 
attempted to conduct an ideal, deliberative multi-stakeholder learning process. Government participated, but 
with the same standing as civil society. There were many actors involved at the local, regional and international 
level – dam ‘practitioners’, economists, sociologists, ecologists, political scientists and the media. The process 
received enormous publicity and international recognition. In its own words it ‘provided a unique arena for 
understanding complex choices facing societies in meeting their water and energy needs’.
The WCD commissioners produced a ‘consensus’ report, an informed and negotiated contribution, which 
was launched in a blaze of publicity in 2000, evoking a range of responses.44 The ‘WCD decision-making 
framework’ has since been evaluated for use as both an implementation and advocacy tool. It is complex. The 
framework includes three grounding global norms, five core values, five key decision points, seven strategic 
priorities, 33 associated policy principles, and 26 guidelines. The task of trying to figure out how to combine 
these pieces of advice remains a challenge for post-WCD activity.
Following the release of the WCD report, there were numerous follow-up activities, including MSPs, under-
taken around the world. The Dams and Development Dialogue in Nepal45 is just one example where diverse 
stakeholders assembled and persisted over several years to explore sensitive large dam issues in the Nepal 
context.
3.5 Outcomes and impact
There is a suite of desirable outcomes possible from MSPs that successfully manage to read and 
respond to the context, establish a fair and safe process, and generally display the desirable charac-
teristics outlined in the preceding sections.
In some places, the MSP approach has already become routine behaviour, but in other places an 
MSP is a new possibility. In an example from Peru, it is claimed that an MSP has provided a positive 
and ‘unprecedented’ experience: ‘The multi-stakeholder platform is an unprecedented mechanism 
in the country. Throughout its history, Peru has developed a culture based on confrontation rather 
than one based on negotiation. Therefore, experiences such as that of Yakunchik imply ‘learning 
to negotiate’ after a long tradition of domination, submission and violence’. (The MSP ‘Yakunchik’, 
after the Quecha word for ‘our water’, was established at the end of 1998 in the central highlands of 
Peru). It was further claimed that: ‘As a result of the platform’s initiatives, irrigation has been placed 
on the regional agenda, and has led to the discussion of other issues such as the rural-urban rela-
tionship, conflict negotiation, organizational and institutional water management-related problems, 
and rural development. In other words, the platform is contributing not only to the development of 
a new social fabric, but also to activating the agenda of regional development’.
There is no attempt here to claim that all MSP experiences have been positive, but lessons have 
been learned, and there is sufficient evidence from around the world to conclude the following:
•	 MSPs	can	lead	to	the	expansion	of	representation	and	participation	of	stakeholders	in	gover-
nance, potentially increasing the legitimacy of public decisions.
•	 MSPs	can	provide	greater	opportunity	for	discourses	and	norms	to	be	launched	and	contested,	
ensuring that new and old perspectives are examined on their merits.
•	 MSPs	can	assist	in	the	recognition	and	understanding	of	interdependencies.	Societal	learning	
about interdependencies is vital among stakeholders who will often have different values, 
motivations, perceptions and priorities.46
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•	 MSPs	enable	 reflection	by	 representatives	of	 various	 constituencies,	 clarification	of	existing	
accord and differences among stakeholders, and collective sense making.
•	 MSPs	can	help	deliberation	become	routine,	enabling	complex	 issues	to	be	more	rigorously	
examined.
•	 MSPs	increase	the	prospects	of	negotiations	being	more	informed.
•	 By	providing	a	pathway	for	deliberation,	MSPs	can	lead	to	better	decisions,	agreements	and	
implementation.
MSPs can be a valuable, collaborative addition to water governance when the issues are complex. 
It needs to be stressed that MSPs are a complement to other forms of governing, not a replacement, 
and not a panacea. There is potential for their wider use.
Establishing the link between the policy-informing and decision-searching processes of an MSP, 
and policy making and decision taking, remains a skilled task. However, by favouring deliberation, 
MSPs can give people of goodwill a better chance to constructively influence decisions that affect 
their lives.
Chapter 4 provides guidance on consensus building, an elusive but key element of MSPs. The 
construction and operation of MSPs, and the pursuit of consensus building, are central pillars of 
constructive engagement, improving negotiations, and a move towards fairer, more effective water 
governance.
“MSPs ARE A COMPLEMENT TO OTHER FORMS OF GOVERNING, 
NOT A REPLACEMENT, AND NOT A PANACEA”
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Chapter 13
Mekong Region Water-Related MSPs –
Unfulfilled Potential
John Dore
Introduction
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) are a technology for democratic governance 
which can assist society to reflect on the wisdom of past actions, more 
comprehensively explore and assess future options, and more openly negotiate 
workable strategies and agreements. The central ingredient is informed debate 
which gives ample opportunity for learning and possible reshaping of opinion.
This may lead to the creation or strengthening of bridges of understanding between 
actors representing wide-ranging interests, and the satisfactory resolution of at 
least some differences. The MSP may also bring into sharper focus substantive 
differences of approach and priorities that may not be easily reconcilable. Either 
way, by articulating these differences in the public sphere, an MSP can contribute 
to a sounder basis for charting a forward path.
The vision for MSPs put forward in this chapter is for important transboundary 
water-related governance, affecting Mekong Region livelihoods and ecosystems, 
to be more informed and influenced by public deliberation. In this vision MSPs 
would be accepted as a legitimate element of governance, providing a mechanism 
for many different stakeholders in the State-society complex to explain, defend 
and potentially adjust their perspective.
This is not a utopian vision constructed in ignorance of the daunting 
Mekong Region political context where many substantive decisions are made 
without an airing in the public sphere. The power relationships embedded in 
this context, within and between countries, undoubtedly influence the extent 
that meaningful MSP participation and negotiation is possible. But, it is noted 
that there are some inspirational examples of MSPs at the local and national 
scales. The contention is that regional water-related MSPs could also display 
desirable characteristics, more conducive to socially just and ecologically 
sustainable development.
This chapter unfolds in the following way. First, the Mekong Region is 
introduced. Second, the relationship between governance and MSPs is made clear.
Third, the existing diversity of regional water forums in the Mekong Region is 
shown, but no claim is made that all ‘earn the label’ of MSP. Some of the most 
prominent forums are discussed. Some issues are of region-wide significance, 
still others: transboundary, transborder, crossborder, or interbasin. This chapter 
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uses the term ‘regional’ to encompass any issue involving at least one of these 
characteristics. Fourth, some key challenges for MSPs are identified, evident 
from current practice and debate. Finally, I point to several major infrastructure-
heavy, mega-projects with transboundary dimensions. These include current 
plans for large-scale hydropower development in China’s Yunnan Province, a 
hydropower-reliant energy grid being promoted via the Association of South 
East Asian Nations and the Asian Development Bank, a multi-faceted water grid 
being explored by the Government of Thailand, and a ‘regional water stategy’ 
being developed by The World Bank. The governance of each would be enhanced 
by a high-quality, transboundary MSP. 
The core argument is that MSPs have unfulfilled potential in the Mekong 
Region, within but also well beyond the realms of water-related governance.
The Mekong Region
The Mekong Region comprises the five countries of Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam – plus China’s Yunnan province (see Table 13.1 
and Figure 13.1). The territorial area is 2.3 million km2, which is home to a 
rapidly growing population of about 255 million people. Since the early 1990s 
the region is enjoying an unprecedented period of relative peace between the 
countries. This is remarkable, given the tumultuous recent history of the region, 
and becomes particularly relevant to regional governance and the prospects for 
regional MSPs.
The present dynamic of the Mekong Region is heavily influenced by its shared 
and overlapping regional history. As with elsewhere in the world, the borders of the 
modern nation States do not neatly subdivide cultural affiliations. The numerous 
indigenous cultures of the region were heavily influenced by a fusion of Indian and 
Chinese (Han) culture beginning two thousand years ago. The Mon, the Karen, 
the Chin, the Burmese, the Kachin, the Khmer, the Tai, the Viets, etc. had their 
languages, religions and other customs heavily shaped, whilst of course retaining 
their own distinctive elements.
Significant parts of the region were isolated for much of the latter half of the 
twentieth century as a result of a series of wars and internal turmoil. In the last 70 
years the Mekong Region has been a battlefield for the Second World War, post-
Second World War independence struggles against colonial powers, ideological 
struggles between the communists of Vietnam-Cambodia-Lao PDR (and their 
allies, including at different times the former Soviet Union and China) versus other 
parts of Mekong societies and the USA (who had another wide range of ‘allies’).
New nation States were created in Myanmar in 1948, China in 1949, Vietnam and 
Lao PDR in 1975, and (effectively) Cambodia in 1993.
In the last 25 years there have been various invasions and skirmishes between 
Cambodia and Vietnam, China and Vietnam, Thailand and Lao PDR, and Thailand 
and Myanmar. These and the earlier conflicts have left many scars and continue 
to influence regional perceptions. For example: Thais are constantly reminded of 
their wars with the Burmese, people from Lao PDR remember various interfering 
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Figure 13.1 Mekong Region
Source: United Nations map number 4112, Revised January 2004.
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forces which made for a long hard revolutionary road, Cambodians remember 
the Vietnamese territory encroachments and military invasions (or liberation from 
the Khmer Rouge), and the Vietnamese remember Thailand providing air bases 
for enemy bombers during their struggle with the USA. Sometimes these past 
enmities are unnecessarily stirred by elites appealing to nationalism for various 
political purposes.
Current social and economic conditions, ethnicity, intra-regional and international 
negotiating powers all vary enormously. Aggregated national statistics do not 
adequately reflect the cultural and political diversity of the region, nor the gender 
and environmental complexity, but they do highlight some obvious similarities and 
differences (see Table 13.1).
The Mekong Region is taken to encompass the territory, ecosystems, people, 
economies and politics of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and 
China’s Yunnan Province.
In the Mekong Region, disparate regionalisms have emerged from desires 
related to peace, poverty reduction, disease control, infrastructure installation, 
drugs, wealth-seeking, and preference for ecoystem approaches, all of which 
Table 13.1 Mekong Region country overview
Cambodia Chinaa Lao PDR Myanmar Thailand Vietnam
Area
(x 1,000km2) 181 9,561 237 677 513 330
Population
(millions)
13.4 1,285.0 5.4 48.4 63.6 79.2
GDP
($ billion) 3.4 1,159.0 1.8 4.7b 114.7 32.7
GDP per 
head ($ 
in PPP)c
1,790 3,950 1,540 1,500b 5,230 2,070
Median age 17.5 30.0 18.5 23.4 27.5 23.1
a The data concern China as a whole (minus Hong Kong and Macau). Yunnan has a 
population of approx. 43 million people (2000 census) of which more than one third 
are ethnic minorities. It is the 8th largest province in China, covering an area of 
394,100 km2. It shares 4,060 km of border with Myanmar, Lao PDR and Vietnam. 
Whilst the Yunnan economy is growing fast, the province remains relatively poor 
compared to China’s eastern and coastal regions. In 1997 36% of the population was 
classified by China’s government as still living in poverty (annual income less than 
USD 77).
b An estimate as official Myanmar economic data are unavailable or unreliable.
c PPP refers to purchasing power parity, which adjusts for cost of living 
differences.
Source: The Economist (2004). Data refer to the year ending 31 December 2001.
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may favour a regional logic which transcends State borders. These are reflected 
in various political solidarities between actors in the State-society complex – 
whether governments, bureaucrats, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the 
private sector, militaries, ethnic minorities, or lobby groups.1 These are manifested 
in an array of regionalisations, identifiable via many regional organisations, 
initiatives, networks and coalitions. Actors in old and new regionalisations are 
learning how to co-exist, compete or combat with each other.2
Water Concerns
One of the key social challenges for the region is to negotiate the reasonable 
and equitable utilisation of water.3 The major river basins of the region – from 
west to east – are the Irrawaddy, Salween, Chao Phraya, Mekong and Red (see 
Table 13.2).4 Conflicts exist and others are looming,5 over many, often-connected 
issues, such as: growth in water and energy demand, interference with natural 
flows via dams, timing of dam releases for energy or irrigated production, water 
diversions, altered sediment and nutrient loads, and reshaping rivers to rivers to 
make navigation easier and safer.
1 The concept of the State-society complex resonates well in the Mekong Region. It 
transcends the more simplistic notion in which actors have often been classified as either 
State, business, or civil society. Such a classification ignores many other key groups, such as 
the military and donors/funders, implies homogeneity within groups, and ignores multiple 
roles. For example, business or military actors may dominate government.
2 The conceptual difference between regionalisms and regionalisations is elaborated 
by Schulz et al. 2001. The point has been made that ‘the identification of new patterns of 
regionalisation (co-existing with older forms) is more relevant than attempting to identify a 
new era of regionalisation’ (Hettne 1999, 8). The later section distinguishing between Tracks 
1–4 is an attempt to do just that.
3 There are many other challenges which transcend Mekong Region borders, such 
as: pressures on forests and biodiversity, ethnic minority marginalisation, labor migration, 
human trafficking, HIV-AIDS, narcotics, dealing with the pressure to embrace agriculture 
biotechnology including genetically modified crops, and other impacts of international 
economic integration (see Mingsarn Kaosa-ard and Dore 2003).
4 The Salween, Mekong and – to a lesser extent – the Irrawaddy have their flow 
influenced by the annual Himalayan/Tibetan snow melt, in addition to the monsoon rains. The 
Chao Phraya and Red are shorter rivers which originate below the snowline, hence their flow 
is dependent on the monsoonal climate. Across the region, there are also countless sub-basins, 
natural lakes, aquifers, and human-built dams and reservoirs. Plus there are many coastal river 
basins, some of which are quite large. Collectively, they comprise the visible and accessible 
freshwater ‘life source’ or ‘resource’.
5  I agree with the view that non-violent ‘conflict is not necessarily bad, abnormal or 
dysfunctional’, but rather an inherent element of human interaction (Moore 1986) due to the 
common incompatibility of goals, interests, perceptions or values. However, many Mekong 
actors prefer to speak of disputes, or differences, as the English word conflict is tainted by bad 
memories of the particularly troubled, not too distant past.
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Table 13.2 Major river basins of the Mekong Region
River basin Unit Irrawaddy Salween Mekong Chao 
Phraya
Red
Countries
in basin
China,
Myanmar
China,
Myanmar, 
Thailand
Cambodia,
China,
Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, 
Thailand,
Vietnam
Thailand China,
Vietnam
Basin area km2 413,710 271,914 805,604 178,785 170,888
Ave. water 
yield
Million
m3/ y
410,000 151,000 475,000 29,800 177,000
Average 
population
density
people
/ km2
79 22 71 119 191
Water 
supply
m3 / cap 
/ year
18,614 23,796 8,934 1,237 3,083
Large cities 
in the basin
>100,000
people
6 1 9 3 3
Source: Water Resources e-Atlas (WRI, UNEP, IWMI, IUCN), and Mekong Region 
Environment Atlas (ADB and UNEP 2004)
Governance and MSPs
Although the English word ‘governance’ has been in existence since at least the 
14th century, its use was limited and for a lengthy time rather unfashionable. In the 
latter part of the 20th century the word had been widely resurrected ‘as something 
of a catch-all’ (Mehta et al. 1999, 18) helping explain a more complex world, 
where there is:
… a growing role of active and skillful publics and their protests ... [and] greater salience 
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), corporations, professional societies … 
[and] many other new actors now crowding the global stage (Rosenau 2004, 11).
MSPs are just one part of governance where actors with either a right, risk or 
general interest (stakeholders) are identified, and usually through representatives, 
invited and assisted to interact in a deliberative forum, aiming for all participants 
to learn, understand alternative perspectives, and possibly negotiate workable 
strategies and agreements (see Figure 13.2). An MSP may involve regular 
meetings between core participants, conferences/discussions open to the wider 
public, locally hosted field visits, electronic exchanges, government briefings, 
films, plays, historical texts, testimony, or commissioned research. MSPs (the 
term Dialogues is also commonly used; this is synonymous with the platform 
conception) have been defined as:
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…a contrived situation in which a set of more less interdependent stakeholders in some 
resource are identified, and, usually through representatives, invited to meet and interact 
in a forum for conflict resolution, negotiation, social learning and collective decision 
making towards concerted action’ (Röling 2002, 39).
Figure 13.2 Key concepts of MSPs
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But, a problem with Röling’s definition is the inclusion of decision making in the 
remit. Many MSPs are not vested with, nor do they claim, decision-making authority.
To claim such authority may invite resistance and be counter-productive. Hemmati 
is aware of the danger of including decision-making. She has described MSPs as a 
‘political phenomenon’ which: ‘… aim to bring together all major stakeholders in a 
new form of communication, decision finding (and possibly decision making) on a 
particular issue’ (2002, 63). Supporters of MSPs believe:
… there is integral value in messier, participatory arenas which value negotiating and 
social learning within a more open democratic process which encourages exploration and 
bounded conflict (Dore et al. 2003, 176).
An important characteristic of MSPs is that they be a site of ‘authentic deliberation,6
meaning debate between people with different world views and prioities which 
‘induces reflection upon preferences in non-coercive fashion’ (Dryzek 2000, 2). But,
there is a range of other desirable characteristics for each of context, process and 
outcomes which are introduced in Figure 13.2 and elaborated in Table 13.3.
Water Governance Forums in the Mekong Region
In all the waters of the Mekong Region, local communities, governments, civil 
society organisations (local, national, regional and international), business interests, 
donors and international agencies have interests which they wish represented in 
governance. Few would claim that historical or current regional water governance 
is adequate, which partly explains the interest of some actors – but not all – to make 
‘genuine’ MSPs part of regional governance orthodoxy. There is a hope that using 
MSPs may contribute to greater transparency, and more informed, and equitable 
decisions.
For now, there are many regional water-related governance forums, but few 
MSPs. How might they be better understood? While some of them are ‘old’ style, 
State-centric and grounded in State interventions, others are qualitatively different 
and ‘new’ with lead roles being taken by non-State actors. The new wave of younger 
regionalisations is coexisting with older types. The terminology of tracks 1–4 is one 
6  To the deliberative democrat, John Dryzek, deliberation is ‘multifaceted interchange 
or contestation across discourses within the public sphere’ (2001, 652) where discourses are 
seen as ‘shared sets of assumptions and capabilities embedded in language that enables its 
adherents to assemble bits of sensory information that come their way into coherent wholes’ 
(1999, 34). MSPs provide a mechanism for such ‘contestation across discourses’. In so doing, 
they are in accord with the social learning perspective, the ‘building blocks’ of which are: the 
constructivist paradigm, an orientation towards reflection and action, and commitment to a 
holistic approach (Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 2002, 70–75). Just as MSPs are diverse in their 
purpose and emphasis, so is the ‘broad church’ (Hay 2002:208) of constructivism which ‘both 
seeks and serves to restore politics and agency to a world often constituted in such a way as to 
render it fixed and unyielding’ (2002, 201). So it can be seen that deliberative democrats, the 
social learning school, and constructivists have much in common. Each approach emphasises 
the role of ideas as significant in reshaping the world.
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way of differentiating the forums. Track 1 depicts the ‘old’ type of forum. But the 
spectrum in the Mekong Region has widened to now include more examples akin to 
tracks 2, 3 and 4.
Each of the Tacks 1–4 can be discerned at the local/national scale, and also 
the regional scale. Each can adopt an MSP approach to address any particularly 
complex problem. However, at the regional scale in the Mekong Region, Track 1 
has shown little inclination to use an MSP approach, mostly remaining hostage to 
the ‘traditional’ political norms manifested in international diplomacy and national 
conventions where State actors see themselves as the only legitimate representatives 
of a country’s citizens – in water issues, self-interested State approaches dominate.
Table 13.4 Goverance forums – Tracks 1–4
Track 1 Track 2 Track 3 Track 4
Summary Formal and 
informal
processes of 
governments
and associated 
bureaucracy, 
including
inter- and 
intra- State 
forums. In 
the eyes of 
States these 
are ‘official’ 
and most 
legitimate.
Governance
processes
involving
State, UN 
family, 
donor/lender, 
civil society, 
interactive
forums but 
led by an 
actor closely 
aligned with 
States ensuring 
States remain 
privileged
actors.
Research,
dialogue and 
advocacy
efforts led 
by civil 
society, less 
impeded by or 
subordinate to 
State actors.
Civil society 
organisations 
supporting
(where
possible)
locally-led
governance
processes.
In eyes of 
States
Official Semi-official Unofficial Unofficial
Dominant
logic
For the most 
part, still 
implicitly
accepting the 
dominance
of rational, 
self-interested
behaviour, 
particularly in 
international
affairs.
Trying to 
enhance the 
effectiveness 
of States by 
widening the 
field of ideas 
and influences.
Activist,
optimistic
about the 
potential of 
MSPs to find 
and assist 
negotiate
better ways 
forward for 
society.
Activist,
localist; low 
expectations of 
State capacity 
and intent; 
more explicit 
concerns
about power 
imbalances,
domination
and cooption.
Source: Adapted from Dore (2003: 412)
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Track 2 and track 3 are more likely to take an MSP approach to tackle regional 
issues. Track 4 users are more likely to see regional platforms as advocacy stages.
As with track 1, in track 4 the multi-stakeholder and deliberative elements tend to be 
downgraded, with other political strategies and approaches being considered more 
effective (see Table 13.4). 
To illustrate the present situation, in the next few pages I will refer to a sample of 
the wide array of regional water governance forums in the Mekong Region.7 There 
is plenty of room for improvement, and no shortage of regional opportunities to 
experiment more with an MSP approach.
Track 1
There are many Track 1 water-related governance forums in the Mekong Region 
(see Table 13.5). Within countries the State government and bureaucracies dominate 
water governance. There are also many bilateral negotiations between government 
representatives which are pure Track 1, vitally important, but not the focus of 
this chapter. The comments here are restricted to the most obvious transboundary 
example, that being the Mekong River Commission (MRC) which has a State 
government mandate in the Lower Mekong Basin (the territory of the Mekong River 
Basin, excluding  Myanmar and China).
The 1995 Mekong River Agreement (Governments of Cambodia-Lao PDR-
Vietnam-Thailand 1995) created a formal inter-government forum committing 
signatories to cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilisation, 
management and conservation of the water and water-related resources of 
the Mekong River Basin, including but not limited to irrigation, hydropower, 
navigation, flood control, fisheries, timber floating, recreation and tourism. The 1995 
Agreement put water utilisation negotiations and basin development planning on 
the agenda. Amongst others, a third agenda item which has emerged is the need for 
transboundary environment assessment in the Mekong Region. Various dialogues 
– relatively exclusive – are occurring around each of these tasks. None resemble 
ideal-type MSPs.
Thus far, all have been primarily the domain of State agency officials, international 
donor representatives, many international consultants, and just a few local consultants.
If you believe that these actors will adequately represent the interests of all Lower 
Mekong country citizens, such exclusiveness may be untroubling. However, many 
local and international actors do not have such confidence and are pressing the MRC 
secretariat to be more inclusive, meaning greater involvement of civil society, and to 
allow for more open to alternative knowledge and ideas. This is not so easy for the 
secretariat to do, as to a large extent their scope is set by their governing Council, 
7  Whilst this chapter is focused on the regional scale, it is not meant to deny or 
overshadow the existence of an equally diverse plethora of water governance forums focused 
on the national and sub-national scales. Tracks 1, 2, 3 and 4 are also discernible at these scales. 
To acknowledge these, some promising national/sub-national MSP examples are included in 
the section discussing Track 3. These examples are provided partly to inspire transboundary 
efforts which could be similarly motivated and constructed.
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and most of the staff – from either riparian countries, or international recruits – are 
understandably cautious about moving out of synch with national processes. There 
is insufficient political support from the member States for the MRC to be proactive 
in controversial areas. Member States continue to act unilaterally whenever possible, 
and either bilaterally (stronger members – Thailand and Vietnam) or multilaterally 
(weaker members – Lao PDR and Cambodia) as a last resort. Nevertheless, some 
complex interdependencies and donor support keep the MRC cooperation alive.
The fact that China and Myanmar are not members of the MRC further cripples 
the organisation, particularly at a time when China is building a substantial cascade 
of dams on the upstream portion (Dore and Yu Xiaogang 2004). A united front from 
MRC member countries towards effective dialogue with China has also been scuttled, 
at least in part by effective bilateral diplomacy by the Chinese circumventing and 
undermining the MRC forum. China has demonstrated considerable power and 
influence over downstream countries to stop protests emanating from MRC.
Indicative of the marginalisation of the MRC within some of its own member 
States, the commission was also excluded from playing any role in the track 1 forum 
which negotiated the signing of a commercial navigation agreement for the Mekong 
River, between the four upstream riparian countries (Governments of China-Lao 
PDR-Myanmar-Thailand 2001). The signatories, from transport and communication 
ministries, have since presided over the installation of Chinese-funded extensive 
new navigation aids, and blasting of rocky navigation impediments. Improving 
the navigability of the river, and the alteration to the natural flows – depending 
on the operations of the hydropower dams – will come at a cost to the integrity 
of the ecosystem, with as yet unquantified livelihood costs for river-dependent 
communities.
It would be reasonable to expect some level of protest, or at least enquiry, from 
downstream government elites via their river basin commission. However, Cambodia 
has pragmatically accepted Chinese offers for railway support in exchange for 
muting its disquiet. Similarly, the Thailand government and associated bureaucracy 
has also refrained from supporting the MRC to become more proactively involved, 
accepting boat-building and river transport contracts from the Chinese, whilst at the 
same time continuing with plans for more tributary interventions of their own. Lao 
PDR is caught in the middle of the navigation project between China and Thailand, 
unempowered and with few obvious benefits to the country.
The MRC will not proactively lead any MSP process relating to Thailand’s 
resurgent plans for water resources development, which have Mekong (and other) 
basin implications. Thailand’s reluctance to publicly share its national water 
resources development agenda with neighbours caused a crisis in the Mekong River 
cooperation in the early 1990s (Bui Kim Chi 1997, 302–316). More than ten years 
later the MRC secretariat is still unable or unwilling to provide any comment on 
the the basin-wide, cross-basin and cross-border implications of various Thailand 
development possibilities. Of course, influential actors in Lao PDR, Vietnam – and 
to a lesser extent Cambodia – have plans of their own which are already substantively 
changing the river basin.
The MRC has also struggled to sustain a proactive role in a recent high profile 
conflict between Cambodians and Vietnamese caused by loss of life and other 
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problems stemming from the operation of the Yali Falls dam, situated on a stretch of 
the Se San River in Vietnam’s territory. In theory, MRC would be able to play a key 
role in fostering deliberative processes which could lead to more informed decision 
making. In practice, due to a lack of political support, it has not yet been possible 
for the MRC secretariat to countenance leading MSPs which are fully informed and 
holistically assess all options.
Track 2
Relevant to the Mekong Region are the Track 2 forums led or inspired by groups 
such as the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP), that have convened meetings exchanging information on issues such 
as water allocation policies and practices in Asia-Pacific, including all Mekong 
countries (ESCAP 2000). Between 2000 and 2005 ESCAP has continued leading 
national ‘strategic water planning’ processes in partnership with others, such as 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Slightly less formal have been the track 2 
regional forums held under the auspices of the Global Water Partnership, namely the 
Southeast Asia Regional Dialogue on Water Governance in 2002, and the ensuing 
South East Asia Water Forum in 2003. Both the ESCAP and GWP forums mostly 
involve government officials, UN agencies, natural sciences technical experts and 
international NGOs. Thus far there has been virtually no participation by local civil 
society (see Table 13.5).
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is also initiating track 2 
water governance initiatives as the key component of its new ‘Asia-Pacific’ (but 
Mekong Basin focused) Regional Environmental Governance program, attempting 
to play the role of honest broker facilitating between governments, communities and 
different interest groups, and/or capacity building others (such as the various parts 
of the Mekong River Commission) to do the same. UNDP have yet to prove they can 
catalyse and sustain Mekong Region MSPs, but they now have another chance.
The most important of the Track 2 regional initiatives is the ‘Greater Mekong 
Subregion’ (GMS) economic cooperation initiative facilitated by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). This GMS programme has brought together the six 
countries to focus on the coordinated development of infrastructure (ADB 2001, 
2002). Many ‘master plans’ have been completed which are unrealistic dreams, or 
visionary guides, depending upon your point of view.
The GMS program was endorsed at the November 2002 summit meeting 
of the political leaders from each of the Mekong Region countries. The forward 
workplan at that time outlined ‘flagship projects’ requiring more than $900 million 
in investment financing and almost $30 million in technical assistance. The flagships 
are intended as multi-disciplinary, large-scale interventions with high visibility and 
significant economic impact on the GMS economies. There are 11 projects relating 
to: north-south, east-west and southern economic corridors (roads plus associated 
infrastructure); completion of a regional telecommunications ‘back bone’; 
regional power grid completion plus power trading arrangements; private sector 
‘participation and competitiveness’ boosting; cross border trade and investments 
support; implementing a region-wide Strategic Environmental Framework (SEF) 
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(SEI et al. 2002); and supporting country efforts to control floods and ‘manage’ 
water resources; and tourism.
The main participants in the GMS initiative are State government representatives, 
ADB bank officials and consultants. A significant role is also played by shareholder 
member governments that contribute financially to the Bank, principally USA and 
Japan. The latter augments its influence via extra mechanisms such as the Japan 
Special Fund. A primary aim is to entice the private sector to become more involved 
either supplying funds (eg. money market) or implementing projects. In recent years 
civil society has taken an active role on the periphery of this Bank-led process eg. 
parallel forums coinciding with the annual meeting of the Bank’s Board of Governors 
etc. Civil society has faced the question of whether to become more involved with 
ADB or to maintain its critical advocacy from outside. Critical advocacy has resulted 
in changes to the ways in which the GMS program operates, in particular with regard 
to transparency, expansion into social areas such as health, and willingness to engage 
Table 13.5 Recent regional water-related governance forums (Tracks 1–2)
Track 1 Track 2
Mekong River Commission 
inter-government processes 
between Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Thailand and Vietnam.
Negotiations between transport 
ministries leading to signing of 
Navigation Agreement between 
China, Burma/Myanmar, Lao 
PDR and Thailand 2000, and 
subsequent river modifications.
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
Leaders Summit 2002 which signed 
an agreement to establish an electricity 
grid between Mekong Region and 
some other ASEAN countries.
ASEAN Mekong Basin Development 
Cooperation 1996+, thus far 
focused on railway, not water.
Bilateral negotiations between 
governments, such as:
□ Thailand with its neighbours 
over proposed water diversions and 
associated dam and tunnel constructions
□ Vietnam and Cambodian 
governments formal meetings 
over Se San River dams 
downstream impacts 2000+
ESCAP technical meetings about water 
allocation policies, GMS development 
cooperation 2001–2009 etc.
Global Water Partnership regional 
‘dialogues’, such as the Chiang Mai 
1st South East Asia Water Forum 
2003, and Bali 2nd South East 
Asia Water Forum 2005, building 
on earlier national dialogues.
UNDP Asia-Pacific regional 
environmental governance initiatives 
2004+ inc. support to Mekong 
River Commission and crossborder 
local community ‘dialogues’.
Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) processes, such as:
□ the GMS program of economic 
cooperation activities 1992+
□ development of the Strategic 
Environment Framework 
(SEF) for the GMS 2001+
□ fostering establishment of Tonle Sap 
lake/basin management authority 2004+
□ review of ADB policy on 
decision-making about large scale 
water resources projects 2005+
ANU page 210
Mekong Region Water-Related MSPs 219
with non-State actors. However, insiders admit that the ADB still struggles to initiate 
and sustain dialogue efforts which in any way resemble MSPs.
Track 3
Lack of faith in Tracks 1 and 2 by parts of civil society has led to the emergence of 
Tracks 3 and 4, both of which may proceed with or without direct State involvement.
In the eyes of States, track 3 is ‘unofficial’ but this does not, and should not, deter 
activists optimistic about the power of discursive forums to enhance the quality of 
problem identification and solving, or, more positively, goal-setting and attainment.
There is an increasing number of examples in Mekong Region countries of civil 
society led governance forums in water and water related areas, such as energy and 
fisheries. At the local/national level these include MSPs about Se San hydropower, 
Cambodian fisheries law, and community-led research and watershed management 
(see Table 13.6).
There are also many track 3 initiatives focused on the regional scale. Again, 
space precludes doing more than discussing one example, with its couple of 
offshoots. World Resources Institute (WRI) and Stockholm Environment Institute 
(SEI) were the drivers of the Resource Policy Support Initiative (REPSI) – mostly 
via a WRI office in northern Thailand, at which I was based. My role was to 
support the construction and facilitation of a two year dialogue on environmental 
governance which emerged from a meeting about cooperation on international 
rivers, held in Yunnan in 1999 (He Daming et al. 2001). A wide range of regional 
actors were recruited/invited to participate in a process intended to learn about, 
and where necessary challenge, the ways in which decisions are made about 
‘environment’ issues in Mekong Region countries (Badenoch 2001).8 The Regional 
Environment Forum (REF) is a WRI-led evolution from REPSI which has a more 
explicit role for local organisations in the management of the initiative, with 
Thailand Environment Institute (TEI) and Cambodian Institute for Cooperation 
and Peace (CICP) taking leading roles. Despite this supposed local independence 
the initial outputs of this forum (REF participants 2002) have closely mirrored the 
general WRI environmental governance agenda, exemplified in the The Access 
Initiative (Petkova et al. 2002), which closely parallels the European Århus 
Convention (UNECE 1998). In 2004 WRI has closed its regional office, and SEI is 
now countering with its own new network initiative. Of the two, SEI in particular 
sees a niche for itself as a ‘boundary organisation’ occupying a mediating space 
between science, policy, business (Guston 1999, 2001) and perhaps even civil 
society advocacy groups.
IUCN – The World Conservation Union is increasingly using its convening 
capacity in the Mekong Region to focus on significant water-related governance 
challenges. An example was a recent ‘high-level roundtable’ at the 2004 World 
Conservation Congress held in Bangkok. IUCN is an unusual hybrid organisation 
8  Whilst to funders REPSI was focused on the uplands, to encourage the participation 
of a wider range of regional actors it was necessary to broaden the geographic scope to 
encompass the Mekong Region.
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Cambodian fisheries law dialogue
The adoption of Cambodia’s Community Fisheries Sub-decree, drafted between 2000 and 
2004, is critical if there is to be non-violent and ‘sustainable’ accessing of the extraordinary 
Tonle Sap fishery. The drafting has involved an MSP including small-scale fisher 
representatives, plus local and national officials. Critical facilitation has been provided by 
NGOs such as Oxfam Great Britain and the local Fisheries Action Coalition Team. The 
MSP has been supported by various international organisations such as the Environmental 
Justice Foundation, other Oxfams and the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation. Critical 
context for the MSP was the political support provided by Prime Minister Hun Sen since 
2000. Progress has been made in a process shaped by civil society actors working with 
sympathetic government officials.
Thai Baan action research and dialogue
Villager-led research groups are now operating in northern and northeast Thailand. This 
movement is commonly referred to as the Thai Baan research. The villagers are the researchers.
Those helping them are research assistants. Thus, traditional research hierarchies are being 
turned upside down. Thai Baan is boosting the understanding of communities and government 
officials of the links between rivers, wetlands and rural livelihoods. Thai Baan groups are 
being supported by partnerships between local organisations such as the Chieng Khong 
Conservation Group, regional NGOs such as the South East Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN), 
tambon and provincial officials, and other organisations such as IUCN and Oxfam America.
This chain of MSPs is focused on the local scale. Thai Baan has rapidly gained credibility 
by ‘bringing in’ and respecting the knowledge of local fishers and farmers, and effectively 
communicating their knowledge to other actors through photo exhibitions, Thai and English 
booklets and videos.
Se San hydropower dialogue
The Se San Protection Network (see (Hirsch and Wyatt 2004) is an initiative of ‘downstream’ 
Cambodian villagers in the Se San River Basin seriously affected by operations of Vietnam’s 
Yali Falls dam. The network is gradually succeeding in working cooperatively with formal 
State actors such as the Cambodian National Mekong Committee Secretariat, and the 
Cambodian Standing Committee for Coordination on Dams and Canals along Cambodia – 
Lao PDR, Vietnam, Thailand Borders. External support to the network is being provided by 
NGOs such as Both Ends, the Oxfams, and the Australian Mekong Resource Centre. Civil 
society groups have created and are sustaining their efforts to lead a constructive MSP.
Yunnan community-based watershed management
The Lashi watershed management committee in Yunnan Province brings together local 
communities and government officials in an MSP to aid watershed decision making 
(Igbokwe et al. 2002, Lazarus 2003). The establishment process has been facilitated by 
Green Watershed, a local Chinese NGO, with support from Oxfam America. The MSP 
started in sixteen villages with awareness raising through watershed management trainings, 
participatory rural appraisal activities, gender training, historical reviews and trust building 
among two ethnic minority groups. It has now advanced to tackle more difficult subjects, 
such as an upcoming county-level project to raise the level of the small dam (dike) to 
increase the water flow to Lijiang town and the potential impacts on local livelihoods (such 
as loss of fisheries, water, agricultural crops and land). Having established a solid base it is 
now scaling up to be more relevant to other townships and the whole of the watershed and 
is seen by parts of the Chinese government as a model learning site.
Box 13.1 Recent civil society-led local/national MSPs
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being a union of some 80 state government and 1000 non-state organisation 
members. IUCN’s secretariat can use its membership base as a justification for 
a discussion format quite unlike the normal inter-government meetings on offer.
Engaging in the Bangkok deliberation were Ministers from 5 of the 6 Mekong 
countries (excluding Burma/Myanmar), and many non-State representatives, some 
of whom delivered focused presentations on substantive and controversial issues 
such as Nu-Salween river development in China, Burma/Myanmar and Thailand; 
water basin diversions, with special reference to Thailand; and threats to the 
Tonle Sap freshwater lake in Cambodia. IUCN is committed to supporting water-
related MSPs at different scales throughout the Mekong Region, in part as the 
regional manifestation of its global Water and Nature Initiative (WANI) (see www.
waterandnature.org). They recognise that MSPs need to have a diverse, but robust, 
knowledge base. For this reason IUCN remains keen to continue its support to 
local research institutions in the Mekong Region. Many of these institutes are now 
collaborating in a water governance network whose joint activities are undertaken 
via M-POWER (Mekong Program on Water Environment and Resources) which 
is coordinated from Chiang Mai University’s Unit for Social and Environmental 
Research (www.sea-user.org).
Track 4
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between Track 2 and Track 3 forums, but 
Track 4 is quite different. It reflects the position of what are often called ‘localists’, 
increasingly prominent in water governance. In general, civil society localists assert 
the significance of the rural community and local governance as an opposition to 
discourses propounding economic growth, urbanisation and industrialism (Hewison 
2001, 22). They usually have a greater emphasis on self sufficiency and lower 
expectations of government, often believing that States and dominant elites are 
neither sufficiently legitimate, competent or inclined to adequately represent local 
communities. Suffice to say that there are numerous localists in the Mekong Region 
acting constructively in communities where the State is largely absent, until such 
time as large projects or resource extraction opportunities arise.
A recent, high-profile Track 4 water governance forum was the ‘Dialogue on River 
Basin Development and Civil Society in the Mekong Region’ embodied in forums 
held in Australia and northeast Thailand. The forums included policy researchers, 
government agencies from Mekong countries, Mekong River Commission, 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission, NGOs and other advocates, farmers, fishers, 
plus representatives from many different people’s movements and campaigns. The 
dialogue took a critical look at the types of knowledge included in decision making 
processes and the development paradigms of States. It aimed to shake up the Track 
1 river basin management commissions. The meeting in Thailand, in particular, 
provided a stage for airing the grievances of local communities negatively affected 
by some of the development in the region (Local people 2002). The Vietnamese 
National Mekong Committee (VNMC) attended and issued the first public apology 
from Vietnamese government officials to those affected by the Yali dam tragedy (see 
Table 13.6). 
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The Ubon Ratchatani and Brisbane events did not emerge from a vacuum, and 
should be seen as just a part of an ongoing political struggle led by those opposed 
to the dominant water resources development paradigm. They were moments when 
stakeholders with different views and interests came together, but these actors are 
already, and will remain, involved in the highly political, often polarised, governance 
processes surrounding Mekong Region development decision making. Each 
participant has a history shaped by and shaping past events, represents particular 
views and has different objectives and preferred strategies for interacting and 
negotiating (or not).
The 2nd International Meeting of Dam Affected People and their Allies was also 
held in northeast Thailand the following year. Again a localist discourse dominated 
Table 13.6 Recent regional water-related governance forums (Tracks 3–4)
Track 3 Track 4
Forums of the Mekong Learning 
Initiative 1998+, concentrating on 
community based natural resources 
management, and transboundary 
learning partnerships between a group 
of Mekong Region universities.
Forums of the Oxfam Mekong 
Initiative and its partners which 
have concentrated on trade, poverty 
reduction strategies, infrastructure 
and capacity building.
Annual meeting of the Regional 
Environmental Forum 2002+, driven 
by World Resources Institute, focused 
on environmental governance.
Mekong Region water governance 
network 2003+ focusing on 
crossborder research partnerships 
and dialogue about water and food, 
water and energy, water and nature 
via M-POWER (Mekong Program on 
Water Environment and Resources).
Southeast Asia consultations in 
World Commission on Dams, and 
follow-up, such as IUCN-supported 
Dams and Development dialogues 
in Mekong countries 2001+
IUCN-convened Mekong Region 
roundtable at World Conservation 
Congress, Bangkok 2004.
Dialogue on River Basin Development 
and Civil Society in the Mekong 2002 
run by coalition of NGOs including 
Towards Ecological Recovery and 
Regional Alliance (TERRA) and the 
Australian Mekong Resource Centre.
NGOs partnering in campaigns 
challenging the sensibility of 
the energy paradigm embedded 
in the ASEAN/GMS electricity 
grid proposal, as at 2004.
Meetings of the Dam Affected 
People and their Allies – Rasi 
Salai, Thailand 2003.
International Rivers Network 
advocacy against projects such as 
Nam Theun 2 dam in Lao PDR.
Probe International advocacy 
against the approach being taken 
in projects such as the GMS/
ASEAN electricity grid.
Activities of the Rivers Watch 
East and Southeast Asia (RWESA) 
network which focuses on linking 
communities and advocacy efforts 
related to dams and river development.
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(Dam affected people and their allies 2003). This is not meant to infer that track 4 
leaders/participants only ‘support’ their own forums and ‘reject’ others. Rarely are 
issues so clearly cut. For example, the declaration from Rasi Salai expressed clear 
support for the track 3 World Commission on Dams process. However, regional-
scale track 4 forums in the Mekong Region have thus far been more associated 
with assembling and profiling public testimony for lobbying purposes and discourse-
shaping, and less optimistic or interested in engaging in any genuine deliberation 
with most actors representing either developmental States or business interests.
Issues Concerning MSP Prospects in the Mekong Region
An investigation of water forums, seeking an understanding of MSP prospects, turns 
up many issues. In this section just a few will be discussed. Comments are made 
about some of the issues related to context, process and outcomes.
Context – Windows of Opportunity
Proponents of MSPs have no magic formula to sweep away the many hurdles to 
trying the approach more widely in the Mekong Region. The countries are now 
ruled by various forms of multi-party, single-party and military junta systems of 
government. Cambodia is a pseudo-democracy, trending back to authoritarianism, 
with internal violence on the increase. China is a single party system, but there is 
increasing political space permitted for questioning leadership decisions, and the 
media is increasingly opening up. Lao PDR is a single party system, led by mostly 
military figures, where no internal public dissent about national policies is permitted 
– although it should be noted that very recently new types of citizen organisations 
are being allowed to form. The Burma/Myanmar government is a military junta 
which strictly controls internal media, and suppresses dissenting views as a threat to 
national security (or regime survival). Thailand’s citizens have hard-won democratic 
freedoms. Vietnam is a single party system, but where recently there has been a 
substantial expansion of political space. The dominant political culture does not 
provide the most supportive setting for regional MSPs to realise their potential, 
however, already at the local/national level there have been some praiseworthy MSP 
efforts which provide a basis for cautious optimism.
Advocates of ‘well motivated dissent’ have also been encouraged by particular 
events in 2004 which may have opened the door for the MSP approach to be more 
seriously incorporated into regional water governance. In China, Premier Wen 
Jiabao responded to extensive domestic lobbying and suspended plans to develop 
the Salween River hydropower cascade until a more complete impact assessment 
of the proposed development is undertaken. In the following year more than 60 
projects were halted in China by the State Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) 
and ordered to go through an impact assessment process, which has at least some 
deliberative character. These positive moves have been offset by a reassertion at the 
provincial level of the power of government officials, many of whom resent any 
interference by central government or civil society actors.
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In Thailand, protests resulted in the government altering its privatisation plan 
for the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) which is a major 
regional water resources development actor. In Cambodia, the government has 
finally joined the chorus of concerns from local and international actors about 
the future of the Tonle Sap Lake fishery in the Mekong River Basin, which is 
threatened by upstream dams (and local over fishing). In Lao PDR, debate about 
whether to build the Nam Theun 2 dam spilled over regional borders, with the 
World Bank feeling compelled to conduct multi-stakeholder briefings, albeit in an 
attempt to ‘sell’ the benefits of the now-approved project. All of these examples 
are connected threads of the Mekong Region water and energy web. Key actors 
are now engaging more openly in a battle for transnational discursive legitimacy 
in which regional MSPs could play a valuable role.
In any regional MSPs, there is a need to clarify the scope for negotiations. In 
water governance the need to negotiate is integral due to ‘the mundane fact that 
modern societies are complex, multicultural, and populated by individuals who are 
often quite sensitive about their personal rights’ (Baber 2004, 333). However, formal 
negotiations are not an essential element of MSPs, as MSPs may not have any formal 
decision making or formal negotiating mandate. Far from being problematic, this 
may actually give participants more space to explore options and propose workable 
agreements.
A concern for some people heavily committed to the learning possibilities of 
MSPs is that widening the scope to allow negotiation encourages MSP actors to act 
in a self-interested manner. This is seen as regressive by those committed to MSP 
participants being completely impartial, and MSPs being a-political ‘time-outs’ from 
an external world where all negotiations should take place. But, MSPs do not have to 
unrealistically deny that actors have interests that they will continue to pursue, inside 
or outside the MSP. Nor do MSPs have to function as an impartial jury. It is quite 
plausible for ‘parallel learning and negotiation trajectories (to be) taking place 
at more or less the same time’ (Leeuwis 2000:950) either in the same or separate 
forums. MSP facilitators need to be quite explicit about all this.
There are some general preconditions before substantive negotiations can take 
place: divergence of actors’ interests; actors’ recognition of mutual interdependence 
in resolving problems; and actors capability of communicating with each other 
(Leeuwis 2000:951). At the regional scale, the first condition is invariably met – 
actors do have different interests. Mutual interdependence is another matter – in 
reality there is often independence-dependence. For example, an upstream water 
user such as China or Vietnam is able, with relative impunity, to act independently 
of dependent downstream neighbours, such as in Lao PDR or Cambodia. The final 
point about communication is central to MSPs. A platform without effective modes 
of communication will be an MSP failure.
Process – Legitimacy from Representation and Political Responsibility
Legitimacy has been usefully defined as ‘moral justifications for political and social 
action’ (Atack 1999:855). A key aspect of MSP legitimacy relates to the inclusiveness 
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of an MSP process. This relates to notions of accountability, representation and 
political responsibility.
For many commentators, actor participation in an MSP is only legitimate if they 
are, or are formally representing, a ‘direct’ stakeholder. Agents of the State, such 
as government or bureaucracy officials, have a formal constituency whom they 
can usually claim to represent. Similarly, company executives are, or should be, 
accountable to shareholders they are entrusted to represent. However, this framing 
is often used to deny bestowing legitimacy on actors who do not claim to represent 
others, whose status as a stakeholder may be contested, but who have much to offer 
in improving the quality of public debate. Civil society groups in the Mekong Region 
are often challenged in this way.
Political responsibility is a normative concept that differs slightly from 
accountability in that accountability has formal obligations embedded within 
its definition (Jordan and Van Tuijl 2000, 2053). The concept of political 
responsibility offers a way forward through the ‘legitimacy’ impasse encountered 
when some actors challenge an actor’s accountability, and right to be involved 
in an MSP.
The NGO Focus on the Global South (FOCUS – http://www.focusweb.org), 
active in the Mekong Region, is an illustrative example. FOCUS is neither bound 
– nor empowered – by an external mandate. In the absence of a formal legitimising 
mechanism such as membership endorsement, they have to clearly define their 
position. FOCUS’s commitment to addressing the marginalisation of large numbers 
of people throughout ‘the South’ has defined their constituency; however, they do 
not claim to ‘represent’ these diverse peoples, as they recognise they have no such 
mandate. But, they do have their own accountability mechanisms, linked to political 
responsibility for particular interests. This argument has been persuasively made by 
an NGO member:
… the right to speak claimed by NGOs is not necessarily derived from a strict or formal 
notion of direct representation of particular group interests but rather from a commitment 
to a set of values and insights which form the basis for an analysis of particular situations 
and a strategy to act on that analysis. Sometimes these are best expressed as impacts on 
local people or environments… (For example) there would be no inherent contradiction 
for an NGO to make submissions and arguments relating to a proposed big dam even 
when no ‘local’ group shares those views – the arguments should be taken up in public 
debate and dealt with on their own merits (Greeff 2000, 75).
In the absence of formal accountability to constituents, and without necessarily 
claiming to represent another, the notion of political responsibility is sufficient to 
claim legitimacy as a social actor wishing to participate in regional MSP.
Outcomes – Consensus, Consent, Consultations
In many MSPs, where diverse representation has been obtained, there is confusion 
about whether the goal is consensus. For example, the WCD sought ‘consensus’, 
at least between the commissioners, driven by a view that ‘without consensus, a 
commission will be seen to have reproduced divisions among stakeholders, rather 
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than transcending them’ (Dubash et al. 2001, 4). However, if consensus is ‘unanimous 
agreement not just on a course of action, but also on the reasons for it’ it follows 
that ‘in a pluralistic world consensus is unattainable, unnecessary and undesirable. 
More feasible and attractive are workable agreements in which participants agree 
on a course of action, but for different reasons’ (Dryzek 2000, 170). Using this 
definition, failure by an MSP to reach a complete consensus should not be seen as a 
disappointment, provided that progress is made in the search for an acceptable and 
workable agreement.
Fundamental disagreements about rights will remain problematic. This is part 
of the MSP context, and is not a criticism of the approach. For example, water-
related MSPs are still grappling with diverging opinions about the principle of free 
prior informed consent (FPIC) which is often now included in generic international 
declarations. If accepted, FPIC explicitly recognises indigenous and tribal 
peoples’ rights to give or withhold their consent to activities affecting their land 
and water resources. FPIC holds that consent must be freely given, obtained prior 
to implementation of activities and be founded upon an understanding of the full 
range of issues implicated by the activity or decision in question (MacKay 2004).
In MacKay’s view, articulated in a briefing note for the World Bank’s Extractive 
Industries Review (EIR), but applicable also to the water resources development 
debate:
Decisions about when, where and how to exploit natural resources are normally justified 
in the national interest, which is generally interpreted as the interest of the majority. The 
result is that the rights and interests of unrepresented groups, such as indigenous peoples 
and others, will often be subordinated to the majority interest: conflict often ensues and 
the rights of indigenous peoples are often disregarded (MacKay 2004).
The issue is whether the rights of local resource users/occupiers have primacy? If so, 
FPIC is a right to veto development. The final EIR report supported FPIC. The Bank 
response was that they too support FPIC, but they ‘stole’ the acronym and redefined 
it as free prior informed consultation! (World Bank 2004 annexed responses – points 
15–16). FPIC was also a hot issue for the World Commission on Dams (WCD).
Adoption of ‘gaining public acceptance’ as a strategic priority recommendation of the 
final WCD report represented a compromise by the commissioners and a restriction 
of the FPIC principle. FPIC becomes critically important to any MSPs which is 
mandated with decision making powers. Non-acceptance of FPIC significantly 
reduces the negotiating power of local resource users/occupiers.
FPIC is closely related to the concept of ‘meaningful participation’. Both are 
highly relevant to MSPs. According to Goodland (2004), ‘meaningful participation’ 
became mandatory in World Bank assisted projects from the late 1980s and early 
1990s. He claims the Bank interpreted this to mean the people being consulted about 
a proposal had a right to say no. If this was the case, it would appear that the trend is 
now in reverse. As with Dryzek, the international financial institutions (IFIs) seem 
to be accepting that consensus is just not always possible. The ADB provides a good 
example of what is at stake. Their current policy for large water resources projects 
says (ADB 2004):
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Paragraph 32: ADB will adopt a cautious approach to large water resource projects – 
particularly those involving dams and storage – given the record of environmental and 
social hazards associated with such projects. All such projects will need to be justified in 
the public interest, and all government and non-government stakeholders in the country 
must agree on the justification. Where the risks are acceptable and ADB’s involvement 
necessary, ADB will ensure that its environmental and social impact assessment procedures 
are rigorously applied. Any adverse environmental effects will be properly mitigated, the 
number of affected people in the project area will be minimised, and those adversely 
affected will be adequately compensated in accordance with ADB’s policy on involuntary 
resettlement. In line with its energy sector policy, ADB will continue to extend its 
support for technically and economically feasible hydropower projects that form part of 
a country’s least-cost energy development plan, provided their environmental (including 
impact on fisheries) and social effects can be satisfactorily managed in accordance with 
ADB policies.
The Bank now sees this policy as unworkable because of (in the Bank’s words) the 
‘impractical requirement for all stakeholders to agree on the justification of large 
water resources projects’. In 2004 ADB proposed the following revision (italics 
added):
… All such projects will need to be justified in the public interest and stakeholders must 
be provided the opportunity to comment regarding the justification with their views 
considered. The ADB will promote the participation of government, civil society and other 
stakeholders in the country towards this end. Where the risks are acceptable…
This is a significant shift in approach by both the World Bank and the ADB. They
have backed away from endorsing MSPs which have negotiating mandates. They 
now support only consultative/advisory MSPs. For a brief period, MSP policy of the 
IFIs had strengthened the negotiating positions of less powerful actors. However, 
the IFIs are now reaffirming the priority they attach to the decisionmaking authority 
of governments.
Whilst noting the oscillation of the IFIs, it should be clearly noted that even a 
shift towards accepting consultative/advisory MSPs in the Mekong Region would be 
a significant step forward, as at present regional water governance is largely devoid 
of multi-stakeholder deliberative processes.
Opportunities
Something needs to be done to lift the standard of regional water governance in the 
Mekong Region. Despite many types of regional water forums, large-scale water 
resources development is still deficient with negative domestic and transboundary 
impacts consistently ignored or outweighed by decision makers. Important next 
steps for the region would be to add robust regional MSP elements – giving space 
for the airing and scrutiny of all perspectives – to the governance of, for example: 
the Salween in China, Burma/Myanmar, and Thailand; the GMS/ASEAN electricity 
grid impacting on all six Mekong coutries, and Thailand’s nebulous water grid, plans 
for which directly affect several of its neighbours. 
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Salween River – Prioritising Big Business, Natural Heritage or Human Rights? 
Substantial hydropower expansion is part of Chinese national planning and Yunnan’s 
role is key.Yunnan is seen as having 24% of China’s hydropower potential for ‘medium’ 
and ‘large’ sized projects (He Jing 2002). In late 2003 much more information filtered 
into the public domain outlining extensive hydropower development proposed for 
the Salween which flows from China into Burma/Myanmar. The upper watersheds 
of the Salween, Mekong and Yangtze are known as the Three Rivers region, declared 
a UNESCO World Heritage site in July 2003.
There are advanced plans for a cascade of thirteen dams on the Chinese reaches 
of the presently undammed Salween River, which, if built, would have a profound 
impact. The China Huadian Corporation is one of the ‘big 5’ power generation 
companies receiving assets from 2003 onwards which were previously ‘owned’ by 
the giant State Power Corporation. The ‘right to develop’ the Salween River is seen 
by Huadian as one of the transferred ‘assets’ now in their portfolio. Since major 
energy industry reforms were announced late 2002 there has been a stampede by 
the ‘big 5 + 1’ – not forgetting the Three Gorges development group – to secure 
their assets, principally coal-related, and move to develop their new assets, including 
‘rivers for hydro’ in various types of partnership with local authorities (Dore and Yu 
Xiaogang 2004).
The decision-making and approvals processes were initially far from transparent.
The economic justification unspecified, and the ecological and cultural risks 
downplayed (both in China and further downstream). Moreover, the lines between 
public and private interest and ownership have become increasingly blurry as the 
energy companies blend State authority with private sector competitive opportunism.
Remarkably, as the plans entered the public domain, broader civil society – beyond the 
usual officials, business operatives and ‘experts’ – became much more involved.
There are five other dams being promoted downstream of China, including Ta 
Sang – planned to produce 7,000 megawatts. The Ta Sang dam, involving many 
actors including the Bangkok-based MDX company, is already controversial due to 
numerous reports of human rights abuses of the Shan people in the dam area by the 
Burma/Myanmar military. Another two are planned for further downstream where 
the Salween forms the border between Burma/Myanmar and Thailand. Without any 
public debate, officials from both those countries have supposedly already committed 
in August 2004 to jointly ‘develop’ the river (Pradit Ruangdit 2004).
All this has major implications for local livelihoods in each of these countries and 
a proposed regional electricity grid (see below). The situation is ripe for a regional 
MSP to ensure the driving assumptions, proposed development benefits, tradeoffs 
and transboundary impacts are more fully considered.
GMS/ASEAN Electricity Grid – The Best Option?
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Electricity Generating Authority 
of Thailand (EGAT) are the major promoters of two overlapping schemes known 
as: the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Power Interconnection and Trade, 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Power Grid. An inter-
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governmental agreement forming an electricity grid was signed in 2002 by the 
leaders of the six Mekong Region countries. ADB has prepared a list of USD 4.58 
billion worth of loans and grants for financing 32 grid and grid-related projects in the 
Mekong Region (Ryder 2003:3). A further USD 43 billion would be needed for the 
twelve hydropower dams and the transmission system (IRN 2004:10). Proponents 
cite the logic of ‘no alternative’. Opponents challenge the economic and technical 
justification. Embodied in the plan is a massive change in the way in which water 
resources are developed throughout the region.
In the last 10 years of planning, there has been practically no involvement by 
civil society in any related governance process. This is now changing as local, 
national, regional and international actors are becoming involved. For the ADB, 
the grid should become a test case of their Strategic Environment Framework (SEI 
et al. 2002), intended to guide bank investments in the Mekong Region water and 
transport sectors. A properly conducted, regional MSP focused on the electricity grid 
would be a very constructive governance intervention.
Thailand Water Grid – For Irrigation, Agribusiness Transformation or Urban 
Supply?
At present contained primarily within the domestic political arena of Thailand, are 
the intra-government negotiations concerning the demand and distribution aspects 
of Thailand’s proposed, but somewhat vague (at least in its publicly presented form) 
national water grid. A key driver for the grid is the increasing water scarcity in the 
Chao Phraya River Basin which is the principal food bowl of Thailand, and provides 
much of the water for the capital city of Bangkok. Many parts of the ‘grid’ have 
been previously conceived, designed and touted in the past. Recently, new life has 
been breathed into quite a few of the old plans but publicly available information is 
scarce.
Numerous potential diversions have implications for the river dependent 
communities in Lao PDR, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam. The future of 
millions of Thai farmers is also unclear as the only way of funding such a scheme is 
if water pricing policies are introduced and agribusiness contract farming is given 
access to the ‘new water’. So is it water for a new ‘war on poverty’, or water for 
agribusiness, or water for Bangkok? Whose water is it anyway? Many wish to shift 
the debate about the water grid into the public sphere. A regional MSP about the 
Thailand water grid would allow these types of questions to be addressed.
The World Bank’s Mekong Region Water Resources Assistance Strategy 
The World Bank is now back into funding large-scale water resources infrastructure.
This is evidenced in the contents of the Bank’s Water Resources Assistance Strategy 
(WB 2004), the substantial forward budget allocations, and the subsequent burst 
of efforts to develop national and/or regional strategies in places such as Pakistan, 
India and China. The Mekong Region is one of the places designated to receive a 
regional strategy. In 2004 there was a pseudo-consultative process involving donors, 
governments and civil society. The blueprint is being developed and is scheduled for 
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release in 2005 or 2006. The implications for the region could be very significant.
Again, it would seem that a more genuine MSP could lead to more informed public 
deliberation and choices.
Conclusion
MSPs are rooted in a belief in the added value provided by deliberation which is 
inclusive, information-rich and flexibly facilitated, actively promoting analysis 
of different views. However, MSPs are seen by some as disrespectful of, and at 
times subversive to, existing public decision making structures. MSPs in the 
Mekong Region led by civil society have been accused of being undemocratic, and 
too empowering of interest groups with policy positions which may differ from 
dominant policy positions within State governments or parts of their associated 
bureaucracy. Advocates claim the opposite, that in fact these types of processes 
are complementary to formal State decision making processes, serving as a counter 
weight to many undemocratic water-related governance forums and, thus actually 
‘deepen democracy’.
There is some new political space in the Mekong Region created by globalisation, 
and corresponding ‘new regionalisms’ which is providing oxygen to MSP approaches.
However, proponents will invariably continue to meet resistance from State actors 
and others with vested interests reinforced by the status quo. Many State actors still 
believe, or at least rhetorically pretend, that domestic-led criticism is unpatriotic, 
and – despite an emerging body of international water law – crossborder enquiry/
criticism of water resources development plans is an unacceptable encroachment on 
hard-won State sovereignty. This political resistance to MSP approaches, grounded 
in self-interest and transboundary geopolitics, should not be underestimated. Other 
forms of advocacy will remain important to encourage more and less powerful actors 
to give MSPs a chance to fulfill their regional potential by being sites for authentic 
deliberation, learning by all actors, and (possibly) negotiation.
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Abstract Understanding the politics of deliberation,
scales, and levels is crucial to understanding the social
complexity of water-related governance. Deliberative pro-
cesses might complement and inform more conventional
representational and bureaucratic approaches to planning
and decision-making. However, they are also subject to
scale and level politics, which can confound institutional-
ized decision-making. Scale and level contests arise in
dialogues and related arenas because different actors
privilege particular temporal or spatial scales and levels in
their analysis, arguments, and responses. Scale contests
might include whether to privilege administrative, hydro-
logical, ecosystem, or economic boundaries. Level contests
might include whether to privilege the subdistrict or the
province, the tributary watershed or the international river
basin, a river or a biogeographic region, and the local or the
regional economy. In the Mekong Region there is a
recurrent demand for water resources development projects
and major policies proposed by governments and investors
to be scrutinized in public. Deliberative forms of engage-
ment are potentially very helpful because they encourage
supporters and critics to articulate assumptions and rea-
soning about the different opportunities and risks associ-
ated with alternative options, and in doing so, they often
traverse and enable higher-quality conversations within
and across scales and within and between levels. Six case
studies from the Mekong Region are examined. We find
evidence that scale and level politics affects the context,
process, content, and outcomes of deliberative engagement
in a region where public deliberation is still far from being
a norm, particularly where there are sensitive and far-
reaching choices to be made about water use and energy
production.
Keywords Water governance ! Politics of scale !
Deliberation ! Mekong region ! Hydropower ! Dialogue !
Multistakeholder ! Facilitation ! Participation
There is no single, correct area for managing freshwaters.
Within the Mekong Region the spaces corresponding to
formal systems of representation or administrative author-
ity over water and land uses typically have different
boundaries and are part of separate hierarchies of respon-
sibility and accountability (Hirsch 2001; Lebel and others
2005; Molle 2007b; Sneddon 2002). These, in turn, rarely
correspond to simple, hydrological notions of basins,
subbasins, watersheds, aquifers, or lakes.
Interbasin diversions and transfers, groundwater extrac-
tion, tidal barriers, and virtual water in trade increasingly
make it hard to manage water solely at the level of the basin,
which in recent times has become the dominant level in the
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) dis-
course. A subdiscourse has emerged around Integrated
River Basin Management (IRBM) further privileging the
basin level in the hydrological-scale hierarchy.
Key ecological processes, from the life cycles of aquatic
organisms through major nutrient cycles and sediment
transport and deposition, are often complex and require
careful consideration of both spatial and temporal scales
and levels (Sidle and others 2006; Sneddon 2007). As a
consequence, the goods and services arising from resources
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and flows of water and associated ecosystems are often
multiscale and multilevel. Different users and uses become
more closely associated with different scales and levels,
both of which are key features of freshwater politics in a
region that transcends national and basin boundaries.
In the Mekong Region, local impacts, uses, and man-
agement actions are often rendered invisible by the ways in
which key state agencies enumerate benefits, burdens, and
risks. When objectives in development are articulated in
terms of monetary flows through national or provincial
governments, it is the grand, or ‘‘mega,’’ projects that are
emphasized and promoted (Bakker 1999; Molle and Floch
2008). Large dams for hydropower, massive diversion
schemes for irrigation and urban supply, and long walls for
flood protection are promised as ways to solve water
management problems, securing energy, food, and urban
supply, and alleviating poverty. Whereas if development
objectives are framed in terms of livelihood security of
households dependent on seasonal river flows and wetland
inundation, then alternative priorities and options emerge.
With this latter framing, more importance is given to
maintaining the production from seasonal wetlands, for-
aging, fisheries, and local riverside farming. Technologies
that can be locally accessed and controlled—like small
weirs, canals, and pumps—are emphasized and valorized.
The objectives and means of water resources manage-
ment and development need to be debated. Different per-
spectives on developing regional waters need to be
compared, for instance, with how they might affect social–
ecological resilience, which social values they prioritize
and the understandings upon which they are based. The
proposals of national leaders and investors need to be
scrutinized in public for the benefits and risks they involve
both within and across borders (Dore 2007). Deliberation is
an important process because it requires supporters of
policies and projects to articulate their reasoning and
identify which interests they serve or risks they create.
This is both a need and a challenge in theMekongRegion.
All countries share recent histories of highly centralized
authorities and remain, at best, semidemocracies. Access to
information through normal channels remains uneven.
International banks and private firms have often had better
access to information from, and stronger accountability
relationships with, national governments than a country’s
own citizens. In these circumstances there are expectations
and hopes that various alternatives arising out of direct action
by citizens, including farmers and fishers, or structured
assessments, joint fact-finding, multistakeholder dialogues,
and other forms of deliberative engagementwill lead to fairer
water allocation and investment. Given the significance of
scale and level issues inwater politics in theMekongRegion,
it is inevitable that deliberative forms of engagement will
have to grapple with the associated challenges. Thus, the
main question addressed by this article is the following: How
have efforts at deliberative engagement been affected by,
and responded to, the politics of scales and levels?
Deliberative Engagement
Deliberative engagement in this article refers to structured
and informed conversations in which various stakeholders
‘‘are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new
information, and claims made by fellow participants’’
(Chambers 2003). A key feature is that there is time and a
process that enables consideration of different issues, evi-
dence, and arguments. Deliberation can help people learn
about others’ interests, problems, and shared resource con-
straints (Dryzek 2000; Leeuwis and Pyburn 2002). It might
also expand acceptance of decisions and outcomes and, thus,
effectiveness of negotiation and implementation efforts
(Dore and Lebel 2010). It is a legitimate element of gover-
nance, providing opportunity for many different stakehold-
ers in the state–society complex to explain, defend, and
potentially adjust their perspectives (Dore 2007).
Deliberative engagement can be catalyzed or convened
by state, multilateral, private, or community organizations.
Such efforts can privilege or depart from different scales:
management cycles driven by strategic planning periods,
such as 5-year plans; administrators seeking to clarify their
jurisdictions and responsibilities; and experts adopting
frames of reference based on their disciplinary training—
for example, hydrology or ecology or economics.
Deliberative engagement also takes place at different
levels. Water-related exchanges might range from local
watershed groups negotiating about allocation practices
and the validity of claims about causes of shortages, to
national water committees debating priorities between
national basins and sectors, or to international meetings,
perhaps seeking consensus about ‘‘reasonable and equita-
ble’’ water utilization between sovereign states. Delibera-
tions should also confront questions about the appropriate
scale and levels of assessment and policy responses
(Pingree 2006).
Deliberative engagement can and does take place
between different scales and levels, driven by or drawing in
actors whose views or positions are shaped by their roles in
the many organizations and interest groups in society.
Water-related policy and decisions can be driven by local
livelihoods intimately tied to local ecosystems, but also by
regional economic planners making energy production and
investment choices with shorter or longer time frames.
Deliberative engagement can and does take place
simultaneously with actions and counteractions being taken
by multiple actors operating within or via many different
governance nodes that are tied strongly or loosely to
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different scales or levels. Not surprisingly, deliberative
engagement, therefore, might be part of, help shape, and be
subject to the politics of scales and levels to which we now
turn.
Politics of Scale and Level
For our purposes, the politics of scale and level refers to the
tensions when and where actors cooperate, compete, or
conflict as they endeavor to exercise their influence on the
present and future of water resources use and further
development—with an emphasis on the scale and level
aspects. Our Mekong water-related study of these politics
is about scrutinizing the actors and institutions, priorities,
and decisions of those coming from or privileging one or
another scale or level.
Scale is defined as the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or
analytical dimensions used to measure, or rank, and study
any phenomenon (Gibson and others 2000) and levels as
the units of analysis that are located at different positions
on a scale (Fig. 1). Scales of interest in water management
often have, or imply, hierarchy (Lebel and others 2005).
Thus, choosing a scale implies constraining and often
specifying a particular set of levels.
Scale represents a class of key choices, commitments,
and constraints (Cox 1998; Lebel 2006; Swyngedouw
1997). Some actors are free to select their vantage or
participation points, whereas others are restricted by
mandates to engaging in water resources and management
from a particular level. Actors contest scales and levels,
overtly through debates, media releases, lobbying and
protests, and, more subtly, through use and control of
technologies, indicators, measurements, and controlling the
channels of contestation (Lebel and others 2005). Thus,
some actors push for hydrological scales with levels that
correspond to manageable units in the models or infra-
structure they operate. Others promote conventional, area-
based administrative hierarchies, arguing that this is where
capacity, accountability, and legitimacy already exist.
Differences between administrative and hydrological scales
are a common source of tension in water resource gover-
nance. An obvious example of this in the Mekong Region,
as elsewhere, is when national interpretations of sovereign
rights to develop national territory and waters intersect
with transnational river basins and notions of shared
responsibilities and risks embedded in soft law constructs
such as ‘‘reasonable and equitable utilization: (UN 1997)
for all riparian people.
Scale contests also arise in dialogues, assessments, and
other forms of deliberative engagement because different
actors privilege particular temporal and spatial scales in
their analysis, arguments, and responses (Lebel 2006;
Lebel and others 2005). Actors will push short- or long-
term actions depending on their drivers. They might push
to privilege the sometimes competing scales of adminis-
tration, hydrology, ecosystems, and economy. Level con-
tests also arise when actors push to privilege—for example,
with economic arguments—different territory and econo-
mies at local, provincial, national, or regional levels.
Fig. 1 Some examples of typical levels on five different scales (one temporal and four spatial). Examples of cross-level and cross-scale
interactions are also given for a pair of spatial scales
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However, scales and levels cannot be adjusted or shifted
entirely at whim. There are logics to different choices.
Seasonal dynamics of flow regimes are important to fish
(and thus, fishers) on different temporal levels than the
operational and planning drivers for hydropower genera-
tion, irrigation and flood risk management (Sneddon and
others 2002). The most appropriate ecological levels
depend on what landscape, waterscape, and ecosystem is
the subject of debate (Lebel and others 2008). Ultimately,
the scales and levels in use are a joint product of bio-
physical and social processes; they are not unambiguously
defined by the physics of flows, the dynamics of ecosys-
tems, or social institutions.
Conveners of deliberative processes should take steps in
inviting participants and formatting to ensure that there are
constructive exchanges and debates between voices repre-
sentative of different scales and levels. Rarely does a single
scale or level have the sole claim to legitimacy. A key
strength of deliberation is that it can ensure that different
scale and level perspectives are heard and competing logics
are examined. Water-related decision-making is often
complex and necessarily should take into account many
different scale and level perspectives; deliberation is a way
of coping with this complexity and contributing to ensuring
that negotiations and policy making is better informed than
might otherwise be the case (Dore and others 2010).
Methods
Our approach is to analyze a set of six case studies of
deliberative engagements (Table 1) concerned with water
resources development and management within the Mekong
Region. As we will discuss later, there are many Mekongs
(Dore 2003), but here the Mekong Region is taken to
encompass the territory, ecosystems, people, economies,
and politics of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand,
Vietnam, and China’s Yunnan Province (Fig. 2).
Cases have been selected to demonstrate different
modes of engagements—some more deliberative than
others—and aspects of the politics of scale and levels that
illustrate the challenge for those actors committed to
understanding and improving Mekong Region water gov-
ernance. The first two cases relate specifically to the
Mekong River Commission (MRC). The others center on
other actors in the Mekong Region. The cases are not
independent of each other; sometimes the overlapping
processes driven by different actors with their own interests
and focus become intertwined. Not all interrelationships
among the cases can be fully explored in this article, but a
few key connections and disconnects are highlighted.
For the case on negotiating the 1995 Mekong Agreement
case, we drew on information from secondary sources,
supplemented by interviews with key actors. For four of the
cases—basinized planning, regionalized banking, region-
alized energy and power, and Tonle Sap management
experimentation—we had the benefit of direct observations
as participants in some of the associated processes, sup-
plemented by secondary sources of documentation and
interviews. For the multilevel water dialogues we examine,
the authors were intimately involved as members of the
convening group.
The six case studies map to different levels on two
spatial scales—hydrological and administrative–territo-
rial—and overlapping time or planning scale. These cases,
plus a few of the key organizational actors convening the
associated processes are shown in Fig. 3.
In the Mekong Region there are many water-related
state agencies, watershed or river subbasin organizations,
irrigation districts, and water-user groups associated with
dialogue processes important for water management at
finer time scales (Fig. 3). Depending on the powers they
are given, national water committees—where they exist—
also inform, influence, or make decisions about long-term,
large-scale infrastructure as well as shorter-term seasonal
decisions about water allocation and flood diversions for
major national river basins. These other actors and arenas,
although just as important and with their own scale and
level politics stories, are not explored in this article.
Creation of the Mekong River Commission
The history of ‘‘lower’’ Mekong River cooperation efforts
stretches back to the 1950s and have been given extensive
treatment elsewhere (ESCAP 1997; Hori 2000; Ojendal
2000). An important new phase of negotiation culminated
in the signing of the 1995 Mekong ‘‘Agreement on the
Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the
Mekong River Basin’’ (Governments of Cambodia-Laos-
Vietnam-Thailand 1995) that established the MRC, which
has also been the subject of much analysis (Dore and
Lazarus 2009; Hirsch and Morck-Jensen 2006). Our focus
here is the actual negotiation of the 1995 Agreement.
The negotiation was difficult because, without the active
engagement of China, the incentives to cooperate were
perceived by Thailand to be less than for Laos, Cambodia,
or Vietnam (Radosevich 2000). Thailand, like China, had
the resources and interest in making bilateral deals to meet
growing water and energy needs (Dosch and Hensengerth
2005). The interventions of the United Nations Develop-
ment Program (UNDP) were critical, as initial maneuver-
ing by Thailand and Vietnam threatened to prematurely
end negotiations (Browder 2000). It took a series of
meetings, first agreeing on the terms and procedures and
then moving through multiple rounds of revisions of a
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single negotiating text (Radosevich 2000). It was not
multistakeholder in the sense that it only involved state
actors and some experts, but it was highly deliberative and
carefully facilitated over many months.
With an eye to the future possibilities for dams and
diversions, the most difficult negotiations centered on
Articles 5 and 6 (Radosevich 2000). The text negotiators
finally agreed to embed a principle of ‘‘reasonable and
Fig. 2 Map of the Mekong Region. Source: The United Nations Cartographic Section, New York, Map No. 4112, Rev. 2. January 2004
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equitable utilization,’’ subsequently also adopted in inter-
national water law (UN 1997). It was agreed that different
rules were to apply for the Mekong mainstream than for the
tributaries. It was also agreed that some interventions
would require only notification of all members; more
substantial interventions with possible transboundary
impacts required prior consultation (Ma and others 2008).
The 1995 Agreement was less constraining for Thailand
than the earlier ones of 1957 and 1975, as it no longer
included a veto power on Mekong River mainstream
development by any members (Browder 2000).
Although it was the best that could be negotiated at the
time, the final agreement resulted in an important rescaling
of what was deemed transboundary. It effectively scoped
out China. The existence of the Agreement has not thus far
tangibly influenced the extensive hydropower damming
projects on the mainstream in China’s Yunnan Province. It
turned projects like Thailand’s Khong-Chi-Mun interbasin
transfer scheme and the controversial Pak Mun dam (Foran
2006), which began life as internationally driven exemplars
but became the subject of huge challenge to their sensi-
bility, into ‘‘national’’ projects with ‘‘local conflicts’’
(Sneddon and Fox 2006). For many years, any engagement
by the MRC in Lao PDR’s or Vietnam’s tributary planning
and construction, or in hydropower at all was kept off the
MRC’s agenda. In recent times, this has changed, in part
because of the increasing apparent absurdity of a situation
in which the MRC had nothing to say about these projects
that are transforming the region’s waterscapes (Molle and
others 2009) and the insistence of external actors that MRC
must surely engage.
How did this happen? By design, the MRC is an
amputated river basin organization. Despite the holistic
sound of the title of the Agreement, which implies whole-
of-basin mandate and cooperation, in practice its headwa-
ters have been lopped and tributaries pruned. This first step
toward regionalism has been anchored—and, therefore,
hindered—by national interests. Moreover, the Agree-
ment’s focus on equitable utilization among states has
helped render fishers, and other water users who rely on
local services, less visible (Bakker 1999; Sneddon and
Fox 2006).
Nevertheless, under the 1995 Agreement, the negotiat-
ing states agreed to ensure acceptable minimum monthly
flows, enable natural wet season reverse flow of the Tonle
Sap/Great Lake in Cambodia, and to not exacerbate floods.
Given China’s nonparticipation, these ambitions were
always going to be hard to achieve. Given China’s dam-
building program, the issue of minimum monthly flows
might become a nonissue, as there will be increased dry
season flows. Each of these is a complicated story and will
not be further explored here. It was further agreed that the
details—such as defining what is ‘‘acceptable’’—would
need to be worked out subsequently in the formulation of a
basin development plan (Article 24) and the establishment
of rules for water utilisation and interbasin diversions
(Article 26). Both of these endeavors have since consumed
substantial time and resources and at the time of writing,
15 years after the signing of the 1995 Agreement, remain
unfinished.
The 1995 Agreement established the MRC as the imple-
menting agency with a separate Council at the Ministerial
Fig. 3 Examples of
deliberative engagements in the
Mekong Region mapped onto
the primary spatial and temporal
scales and levels. Those in bold
are case studies explored in
detail in this article
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level, a Joint Committee (JC) of senior bureaucrats and the
MRC Secretariat (MRCS) (Fig. 4). Each of the countries
separately established National Mekong Committees
(NMCs) and Secretariats headed by their representatives on
the JC. Subsequently, for example, Thailand found it easy to
weaken its MRC links, commitments, and presence by
appointing anNMCmarginalized from real decision-making
and water resources development planning and investment
within the country. Since 2002 administrative reforms, the
Thailand NMC and NMCS have been closely affiliated with
the Department of Water Resources in the Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environment. The department and
NMCS remains weakly connected to other ministries and
lack influence over more powerful agencies like the Royal
Irrigation Department and the Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand. These circumstances persist because
it has suited Thailand to scope-down the role of MRC, its
territorial mandate, and the sector interests on which it has
focused. These disconnects are both cause and consequence
of the scale and level politics at play.
The interests of donors and multilateral agencies in the
‘‘basinization’’—saying regionalization would give the
wrong impression—of one of the Mekong Region’s inter-
national rivers were critical to the establishment of the
MRC. This influence has continued with most of the
MRC’s budget for work activities coming from donors.
The financial independence from the member countries has
its merits and drawbacks. On the one hand, it can mean
assessment and research activities going ahead without
being easily blocked by member states withholding fund-
ing; on the other hand, this also makes it easier for gov-
ernments to disown and externalize MRC’s work if it is not
seen as being in their interpretation of sovereign interests.
The negotiations that culminated in 1995 are an example
of a deliberative process among governments promoted by
international actors, shaped by national concerns, but
cognizant of basin-level issues, that ended in agreement to
cooperate. Subsequent negotiations on the specifics of
planning basin development and water allocation rules
have been difficult and the tasks set for the MRC remain
unfinished. True cooperation remains elusive.
Basinized Water Resources Planning
Article 24 of the 1995 Mekong Agreement mandated the
MRC to prepare a Basin Development Plan (BDP). Com-
mencing the process took 7 more years, in part because of
insufficient donor funds (Browder 2000) but also because
the MRC member countries and secretariat were wonder-
ing what to do and how to do it. For some, it was seen as
something they had to do, as a legacy of the 1995 Agree-
ment, not necessarily something they wanted to do. By the
time the BDP commenced, the process for establishing
rules for water utilization, known as the Water Utilization
Program (WUP)—the task set by Article 26—had already
Fig. 4 Organizational structure
of the Mekong River
Commission
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been underway for 2 years, for no particular reason other
than that the World Bank arranged for funds from the
Global Environment Facility (GEF) faster than the Gov-
ernment of Denmark provided its principal support to the
BDP.
BDP1, the first phase, began in 2002. National govern-
ments were viewed as the primary stakeholders in MRC
negotiations: Governments were described as ‘‘internal’’
and nonstate actors were described as ‘‘external.’’ In the
BDP1 process, external stakeholders became involved
through forums at country, basin, or subarea levels. These
happened relatively late in the process, but by early 2005, a
series of forums had been completed (MRC 2005). The
consultations resulted in more than 400 project proposal
ideas. Many were at relatively local levels, whereas the
BDP’s mandated focus has been on basinwide development
projects and national projects with potential transboundary
impacts (MRC 2006). Among the lessons acknowledged
were that there were important differences among member
countries over how they perceived and incorporated public
participation in planning. Deliberative norms were obvi-
ously still far from being widely accepted, with water
bureaucracies continuing to privilege internal expert and
politician-led assessment of options and decision-making.
The MRC BDP group also thought that transboundary
multisector dialogues were more difficult to conduct than
those within a country about a single sector (MRC 2005).
Pech and Sunada (2006) predicted that major disconnects
between conversations in the MRC structures and those
within countries were likely to persist and thus prevent real
integration of basin-level and national-level development
plans. In any event, BDP1 achieved very little substance,
other than the aforementioned wish list of projects. Most of
those involved were disappointed with the limited
achievements of the first phase; nevertheless, plans were
soon put forward for a second phase.
The initial plans for BDP2 were striking in their lack of
recognition of other efforts being made throughout the
lower Mekong Basin to better understand and evaluate
multiple visions of future development and analysis to
support one or other points of view. The BDP2 agenda was
revised several times but was finally approved by the MRC
Council in 2005. It strongly emphasized investment but
was later revised again as a result of donor calls for a more
balanced view of development before it would be funded.
According to the MRCS, the second phase (2007–2010)
was designed to institutionalize the participatory planning
process established during the first phase of the basin
development planning venture (BDP1)—though there is
little evidence to suggest that BDP1 reached beyond the
immediate parts of the MRC involved in implementation.
Nevertheless, it is true that the second phase, BDP2, from
2007–2010 has made substantially greater effort to bring in
state actors from national and provincial line agencies.
BDP2 has also sought to provide more opportunity for
nonstate actor voices to be heard. That said, BDP2 has been
dominated by the production and airing of extensive
modeling of various hydropower and irrigation expansion
possibilities. This has been largely sensitivity analyses—
without a hint of exploring more radical alternative futures.
In March 2008 the MRC organized a stakeholder con-
sultation forum on BDP in Vientiane, Lao PDR (MRC
2008). Members from the water governance network
M-POWER provided suggestions on the draft agenda and
facilitation support. Several experts in the network also
participated in a follow-up workshop to review draft
working papers on the proposed development scenarios and
an ‘‘IWRM-based Basin Development Strategy.’’ In these
discussions, questions frequently arose about choices of
levels and scales at which indicators and model outputs
should be evaluated.
In any case, events were overtaking plans. On paper, the
MRC has a role as a convener, but in practice it has, until
2008, scrupulously avoided contentious issues and dis-
putes. It has often been absent from, or silent about, major
bilateral or national government proposals for, and deci-
sions on, water resources development in the basin (Dore
and Lazarus 2009; Jacobs 2002; Osborne 2004). For
example, as mentioned earlier, in the first decade of its
operation, the MRCS had little involvement in, and usually
very limited information about, the hydropower develop-
ment on the Mekong River mainstream in China and on
tributaries in Lao PDR and Vietnam. Its Initiative on
Sustainable Hydropower first agreed to in 2001 only
secured funding in 2006, and in September 2008, it held its
first regional multistakeholder consultation. Since 2008, to
be fair, it has made significant progress in a very short time,
ramping up engagement, from a zero base, with ministries
responsible for hydropower in all member countries.
Indicative of the MRCS’s marginalization in the past
from significant national water resources agendas were its
sidelining from negotiation of an agreement among the
four countries of the upper Mekong—namely China,
Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Thailand—to implement a navi-
gation improvement project that involved the blasting of
several rapids along a 900-km stretch of the river between
Jinghong in China to Chiang Saen in northern Thailand. In
the past, it has also been excluded from speculations about
possible Lao–Thai water transfers and diversions from the
Mekong to irrigate more of northeast Thailand (Molle and
Floch 2008). It distanced itself from the environmental
impact assessment process for Sesan dams and operational
incidents that have affected downstream communities
(Wyatt and Baird 2007).
Although it has not been able to engage when it prob-
ably should have, the MRCS has begun to emerge as a
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significant knowledge broker. A combination of consul-
tants, external to the region, and appointed researchers,
within the region, has produced a significant body of
knowledge that could inform public deliberations on many
aspects of water resources development and management.
Unfortunately, until 2008 the wider dissemination and use
of data, models, and other research findings was often very
restricted. Out-going communications were filtered by
centralized information management practices within the
MRCS (Hawkesworth and others 2007). The MRCS argued
then, as now, that it is not an independent organization and
is bound to respect member countries wishes, especially on
sensitive information. This lack of transparency has fre-
quently been raised by critics in dialogue (e.g., IUCN and
others 2007a) and has undermined the credibility of the
organization (Hawkesworth and others 2007). If claiming
the role of broker, knowledge needs to be disseminated
more widely; doing so will strengthen, not weaken, the role
of the MRC in facilitating and supporting deliberative
engagements.
The first phase of the core MRC program on BDP1 was
largely a donor-funded sideshow; its impact on negotia-
tions within and between countries has been slight, if
measurable at all. At the time of writing, the influence of
BDP2 is yet to be determined. Level politics is part of the
explanation of why BDP1 deliberations did not influence
joint planning decisions. Other actors—in particular,
national governments, banks and investors—were meeting,
in other arenas, and debating and forwarding water
resource development agendas without any regard for the
BDP process. However, there was also a scale aspect to
the problem; the focus of the BDP—at least until 2009—on
the hydrological scale has led to those searching for sub-
stantive deliberation about social, ecosystem, and multi-
level economic impacts of different options to shift the
locus of their debating efforts to other nodes of possible
influence.
Basinized Banking by the World Bank
The release of the World Bank’s Water Resources Sector
Strategy (2003) signaled its intention to reengage in water
resources infrastructure funding of high risk–high reward
projects. In the Mekong Region, the new push was seen as
arising from World Bank dissatisfaction with the perfor-
mance of the MRC, seeing it as unable or unwilling to
facilitate investment by multilateral development banks.
The World Bank global strategy needed to be regionalized
or basinized to give it traction in the Mekong Region.
Regionalizing might have put the World Bank in direct
competition with Asian Development Bank’s (ADB)
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) initiative, although
water was not at that time on the GMS agenda. Region-
alizing would have also been difficult given the need to
include China, which was not part of the World Bank’s
conceptualization of the ‘‘Mekong Region.’’ On the other
hand, claiming a convening role at the basin level was
always going to pit it against the MRC. Offsetting this risk
was the World Bank’s intention to develop national-level
investment portfolios independent of any engagement with
the MRC.
The two multilateral banks soon found a way to coop-
erate. In June 2006 they coauthored a working paper for an
assistance strategy for water resources development in the
Mekong Region (World Bank and Asian Development
Bank 2006). The paper reaffirmed the World Bank’s (2004)
Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy, which used
the hydrological models in the MRC’s Decision Support
Framework to justify further investments in dams based on
the argument that they have acceptably low impacts on
hydrology at larger spatial levels. Other scales that bring in
transboundary ecological or local livelihood issues were
not a part of the analysis. The joint paper argues for the
potential for development of Mekong water resources and
claims the ‘‘basin has flexibility and tolerance’’. It also
called for abandonment of the ‘‘precautionary approach of
the past decade that tended to avoid any risk associated
with development, at the expense of stifling investments’’
(World Bank and Asian Development Bank 2006). These
strategies were important topics in an independently con-
vened dialogue (see the section on water dialogues below)
because various civil society organizations did not feel
there had been sufficient public input during their original
formulation, and they contested their conclusions.
Regionalized Energy Planning and Power Trading
Although it might be true to say that, to a certain extent, all
regions are imagined, it is clear that the Mekong ‘‘region’’
is increasingly becoming an institutionalized reality for
both state and other actors. There are several notions of
‘‘‘region.’’ In the previous two cases we focused on the
Mekong River Basin, or the ‘‘lower’’ basin—excluding
China and Myanmar territory—as it has been constructed
for and by the MRC. In this case we explore the deliber-
ative elements of initiatives driven by the ADB-led con-
struct of the GMS that has recently further expanded its
definition of GMS within China to include the Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region (ADB 2007).
The GMS economic cooperation was established in
1992 with financial support from the ADB to emphasize
transboundary expansion of trade, investment, and infra-
structure among six countries—Cambodia, China, Lao
PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam—an idea found
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attractive to their national governments. The profile of the
ADB–GMS has grown in recent years with a series of
intergovernmental summits between Heads of State.
‘‘Regional waters’’ were initially left off the GMS agenda
to ensure that the developing cooperation on a range of
other fronts was not destabilized. It has been consistently
justified by disingenuously claiming that this was the role
of MRC. However, this does not mean water resources
development has not been on the agenda of the ADB.
Behind the leaders’ summits are numerous ministerial and
expert group meetings and negotiations. In more recent
years, many of these have dealt with energy security and
cooperation (Yu 2003), often providing entry points to
water resources development issues.
Multilateral banks have played a role in constructing a
narrative of a Mekong Region in which more investments
in hydropower are likely. In 2005 the World Bank
approved loan guarantees for the Nam Theun 2 dam in Lao
PDR, making it possible for the financing of almost USD
1.6 billion to go ahead, the largest single investment in the
country’s history. Both the World Bank and ADB have
opportunities to guide investments through conditionality
on loans, technical expertise, and political connections.
Looking to the future, the political influence and leverage
of the multilateral banks might be on the wane, as a more
diverse group of commercial banks and other investors
have entered the region, with often lower standards of
safeguards and many less conditions on loans. This will
create new challenges for coordination and transparency.
Ensuring responsible corporate practices in these circum-
stances will require adherence to transnational codes of
conduct for the private sector, such as the Equator Princi-
ples for the finance industry and the International Hydro-
power Association’s Sustainability Assessment Protocol
for the hydropower industry.
The ADB organized three regional consultation work-
shops in Bangkok on the GMS Energy Strategy between
July 2006 and June 2008 to discuss the findings of their
energy strategy study. The first workshop included senior
government officials from the GMS countries and repre-
sentatives from academia, civil society, development
organizations, and the private sector (ADB 2006). At the
workshop there was broad agreement that ‘‘a participatory
approach would be essential in strengthening ownership
among GMS countries, facilitating consensus building, and
ensuring the sustainability of the regional energy strategy’’
(ADB 2006). Representatives from civil society groups
argued the importance of assumptions and quality data, as
these could greatly effect outcomes of the modeling work
and the need to improve transparency of energy planning
processes at the national level. Another area of concern and
of divergent views was on what were the realistic expec-
tations for renewables in future energy mixes (ADB 2006).
The draft strategy document (ADB 2008) tabled at the third
workshop argues strongly in favor of regional integration
of energy supply infrastructure from an economic per-
spective but gives much less attention to political and
financial risks.
For more than a decade, a discourse of the Mekong
Region as underdeveloped has been used by multilateral
banks to regionalize—which is akin to changing the
dominant level—plans for how resources should be man-
aged for capital-intensive development. The main argu-
ments in favor of this approach highlight the benefits and
economies of integration and the naturalness of the region
(Bakker 1999; Molle and Floch 2008). Conventional
hydropower technology fits neatly with notions of region-
alizing and internationalizing development. Large projects
still need international investment and expertise. Although
size makes these projects conspicuous; technical com-
plexity often keeps the planning and decision-making
processes out of the public domain and well beyond the
reach of many local communities that would ultimately be
affected by such projects (Bakker 1999). Moreover,
hydropower converts a water service to electricity that
serves distant consumers, outside the basins and even
beyond national borders where the infrastructure is located
and impacts are felt. This rescaling brings with it changes
in groups of state-level or international stakeholders that
must be dealt with (Hirsch 2001).
Multilateral, and increasingly other large commercial,
banks through loan agreements, technical support, and
teams of consultants have a huge influence over large and
long-time-frame project cycles because these require
money and human resources. Multilateral banks are cre-
ating an investment region; other actors now need to
mobilize to make sure those investments are adequately
scrutinized.
Multilevel Water Dialogues
Transnational public consultation by the MRC and multi-
lateral banks has historically been very limited. Most
decision-informing meetings have been dominated by
states and their officials, multilateral development banks,
and the private sector. As a result, several groups have
launched parallel activities to query and propose alterna-
tives. In November 2002, for example, a meeting on
‘‘Dialogue on River Basin Development and Civil Society
in the Mekong Region’’ held in Ubon Ratchathani, Thai-
land concluded with calls for much greater civil society
involvement (Dore 2003). Another meeting convened by
the nongovernmental organization Towards Ecological
Recovery and Regional Alliance with other partners in
November 2004 drew similar conclusions and called for
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the establishment of a Mekong People’s Council (Won-
gruang and Samabuddhi 2004). A National Water Dialogue
held in Lao PDR in 2005 illustrates some of the challenges
for civil society-led events: Half of the knowledge inputs
were banned the night before the event. The National
University of Laos was informed that any papers that
specifically mentioned China were considered inappropri-
ate for discussion in Vientiane at that time.
In this section, we focus on the activities of one network
that the authors helped establish and have been closely
involved in. M-POWER—or the Mekong Program for
Water Environment and Resilience—began in 2004 as the
Mekong Water Governance Network (M-POWER 2008).
M-POWER made a deliberate choice to focus on the wider
region, including several international and many domestic
river basins, rather than to overly focus on the Mekong
River Basin and thereby frame too much ‘‘in’’ or too much
‘‘out’’ of different political arenas. M-POWER activities
are supported by a network of about 30 partner organiza-
tions. Most members are from academic and nongovern-
mental organizations but also belong to international
organizations and government agencies. The network has
funding from several sources, including Echel Eau and
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
through the Challenge Program for Water and Food for its
activities but relies mainly on the diverse voluntary con-
tributions of its partners.
In November 2004, the Water and Nature Initiative of
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
convened a high-level roundtable on ‘‘Using Water, Caring
for Environment: Challenges for the Mekong Region’’
at the World Conservation Congress in Bangkok. The
M-POWER network provided facilitation support and
speakers. The event included ministers from five Mekong
countries (all but Myanmar) as well as nongovernmental
actors. Some sensitive issues, like interbasin diversions,
Nu-Salween infrastructure, and threats to the Great Lake-
Tonle Sap ecosystem were discussed. This 2004 event was
the first step towards ‘‘Exploring Water Futures Together,’’
to which we now turn.
In July 2006, IUCN with other partners, including the
Thailand Environment Institute (TEI), the International
Water Management Institute (IWMI), and M-POWER,
hosted the ‘‘Mekong Region Waters Dialogue: exploring
water futures together’’. The event, held in Vientiane,
covered governance issues in several sectors and at several
levels (IUCN and others 2007a, b). The dialogue was
intended to be ‘‘a regional multi-stakeholder platform
organized to provide an opportunity for high-quality, multi-
faceted, debate and learning that will contribute to
improving water governance in the Mekong Region.’’ One
part of the meeting and report specifically asked partici-
pants to evaluate the role and governance performance of
the World Bank, ADB, and MRC. Other parts reviewed
their strategic plans for the region, providing commentaries
and suggestions.
The multiple and changing roles of MRC and its sec-
retariat were hotly debated. Some stakeholders would have
liked to see it involved more in investment facilitation,
others in regulation, and yet others more as a knowledge
broker or convener of dialoguelike activities. As described
in the earlier case studies, the MRC has had some diffi-
culties with each of these roles individually. It has strug-
gled to take information that it has in hand or needs about
ecological processes at multiple levels into planning. It has
also struggled with simultaneously considering water-
related services derived from the basin and used at different
levels and scales. Overall, the deliberative engagement
stressed the need for greater transparency and stakeholder
participation, consistent with some of the promises in the
draft 2006–2010 Strategic Plan (IUCN and others 2007a).
The critique of the ADB and World Bank’s Mekong
Water Resources Assistance Strategy covered many areas,
including issues of process, like the need to make available
all relevant documents sufficiently in advance of consulta-
tions, preferably with local language summaries, so they
can be properly reflected on during dialogue activities
(IUCN and others 2007a). The discussions also questioned
some of the key assumptions about development needs and
river basin management capacities. Although there was no
consensus reached in these debates, they were important in
helping different stakeholders learn about the limitations of
their own understanding and analyses as well as the some-
times very different perspectives of other stakeholders.
The dialogue event was followed up by exchange of
correspondence between conveners and these agencies that
were included in the final report (IUCN and others 2007a).
‘‘Exploring Water Futures Together’’ demonstrated again,
as had the joint Ministerial–civil society engagements in
Bangkok at the World Conservation Congress, that mul-
tistakeholder deliberation about sensitive water resources
development is possible. The Vientiane dialogue contrib-
uted to subsequent downplaying by The World Bank and
ADB of their Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strat-
egy that died soon after. It also helped trigger greater
interest and demonstrated how to conduct a multistake-
holder platform, at different levels—whole-of-basin and
national. It is no coincidence that in 2008 the MRC BDP2
and a new MRC Initiative for Sustainable Hydropower also
demonstrated their new approach to multistakeholder
engagement, for good reasons but also to wrest back the
convening role for deliberation that they had never previ-
ously claimed.
A set of follow-up national-level and language dialogues
then took place in Lao PDR and Cambodia. The activities
in Cambodia, for example, were organized through the
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Cambodian Water Working Group, which represents more
than 30 nongovernmental, international, and other organi-
zations. The working group is facilitated by the Cambodian
Center for Study and Development in Agriculture
(CEDAC)—CEDACwas also one of the founding members
of M-POWER—and places a strong emphasis on irrigation
and its interaction with other water uses and users. Between
November 2005 and February 2007 the working group held
12 meetings and 2 study tours.
A 2-day dialogue event was also held in October 2006 in
Chiang Mai, Thailand to specifically follow up discussions
at the Vientiane event on the ADB-facilitated North–South
Economic Corridor (Foran and Lebel 2007). This meeting
was notable for its diverse participation, including repre-
sentatives from Myanmar as well as the ADB. The event
focused on exploring development assumptions through
building scenarios at local, regional, and global scales.
Networks and organizations with flexible and diverse
links with governments, firms, and civil society are in a
good position to convene and facilitate dialogues on sen-
sitive but important topics for development in the Mekong
Region. The outcomes of these are not primarily in terms
of decisions on projects, policies, or institutional reform
(Table 1) but rather in making sure that alternatives are
assessed, rights, risks, and responsibilities acknowledged,
and mutual understanding improved (Dore 2007). On the
other hand, such processes might lack the coherence and
continuity that well-funded and institutionalized relation-
ships bring with them. Thus, by 2009 the Water Futures
dialogue process appeared to be splitting into several rel-
atively independent threads. IUCN and M-POWER, for
example, were planning to convene and follow up different
parts of the agenda, whereas other actors like the MRC
have been increasingly taking on convening roles for
consultation-style events. At more local levels within
countries, parallel experiments are underway—in particu-
lar, with river basin organizations of various sorts and at
different levels, often premised on notions that they would
support engagement with various stakeholders within and
beyond government (Molle 2007a; Thomas 2005). A
deliberative turn is underway.
Tonle Sap Management in Cambodia
The fisheries of the Tonle Sap-Great Lake (TS-GL) eco-
system are crucial to the diet and livelihoods of the popu-
lation of Cambodia (Kummu and others 2006, 2008; Pech
and Sunada 2006). More than 60% of the floodwater of the
TS-GL comes from theMekong River; the remainder comes
from the catchment areas of the lake. At full flood, the
TS-GL temporarily stores about 15% of the average annual
discharge of the Mekong River (MRC 1998). Although
estimates vary, one finding puts the present annual fish catch
from TS-GL at 235,000 ton, depending on the season (van
Zalinge and others 2001), an indication of the lake ecosys-
tem’s extraordinary productivity (Lamberts 2006).
The Tonle Sap Basin Organisation (TSBO) was set up
with funding from ADB as a dialogue forum among line
agencies and local government under the Cambodian
National Mekong Committee (Wright and others 2004). At
a meeting on the ADB’s Tonle Sap Basin Strategy in
Phnom Penh in March 2004, Olivier Serrat (2004), a senior
economist, said that
Natural resources do not recognize administrative
boundaries and decisions in one part of a basin can
have significant impacts on natural resources else-
where… it stands to reason that the Tonle Sap basin’s
natural resources would be best managed through the
mechanism of long-term plans developed collabora-
tively by local, provincial and national stakeholders.
However, practice has unfolded differently. The extent
of opportunities for public participation in its operations
and future planning roles appear modest with representa-
tion on committees by ‘‘selected’’ nongovernmental orga-
nizations. The original plan called for subbasin institutions
(Milner 2005), but these have not yet been linked or cre-
ated, as the parent itself continues to lurch and find its way.
From the outset, limited financial resources, technical
skills, and inadequate representation from a diversity of
stakeholder interests have constrained the effectiveness of
the basin organization (Pech and Sunada 2006).
The lake looms large in national politics in Cambodia by
its sheer size and importance as food and income sources,
but when development discussions are scaled up to regio-
nal development, these values are often downplayed in
assessing other metrics—like counting potential megawatts
of hydropower electricity generation and more recently the
size of oil reserves.
Scientific assessments give grounds for concern about
the local social and environmental impacts of upstream
dams and diversions on natural flood regimes and sediment
transport (MRC and WUP-FIN 2007). Looking up a level,
attempts to manage the lake area without reference to
planned interventions elsewhere in the Mekong River Basin
make no sense. Looking down a level, there has been no
effort to integrate the organization’s basinwide manage-
ment actions with preexisting local arrangements (Middle-
ton and Tola 2008). In Pech and Sunada’s (2006) view, the
proliferation of institutions, within Cambodia and interna-
tionally, is a barrier to problem solving because of frag-
mentation and compartmentalisation of responsibilities.
In October 2007, the donor-driven TSBO was sum-
marily replaced with a new entity—the Tonle Sap Basin
Authority (TSBA)—by the Cambodian government (Royal
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Government of Cambodia 2007). The Royal Decree that
established the authority was prepared quickly and without
broad public consultation (Middleton and Tola 2008). The
30 or so members of the new Authority came largely from
various central ministries and provincial governors. The
Cambodian National Mekong Committee has one member.
No positions were available for fishers or farmers or civil
society organizations. Some press articles have claimed
that a primary motivation of this new agency was to
coordinate the exploration of oil (Associated Press 2007).
In the Mekong Region, integrated water resources
management at the basin level through the creation of river
basin organizations has again and again proven much more
difficult in practice than plans and promises would suggest
(Biswas 2005; Molle 2008). Linking institutions at differ-
ent levels has been hard, in part, because none of the
individual levels are secure or functional. The Tonle Sap
management case study again underlines that claims about
stakeholder participation and dialogue in basin initiatives
need to be treated with skepticism. Very often what is
meant is the participation of different central government
agencies and more local government structures (e.g., pro-
vincial) and integration means little more than trying to
achieve some modest degree of coordination.
Deliberation Bridging Scales and Levels
Ecological processes, actors, and social institutions rele-
vant to governance of water resources in the Mekong
Region map to different levels on multiple scales (Fig. 2).
This creates opportunities and tensions in which scale and
level choices and consequences come to the fore in polit-
ical contests for resources and influence.
In this section we delve into more, but by no means all,
important aspects of context, process, content, and out-
comes. This is informed by our use of scales and levels
lenses in previous sections when touring examples of
Mekong water-related governance processes.
Context: The Importance of the Convener
The broader context and scale-level aspects of the cases
were outlined previously. Here we wish to draw attention to
conveners—those who call people together and collectively
engage in an issue. As our case studies show, there are
many possible conveners for a water-related dialogue. Our
Mekong region/basin/country examples included the
UNDP, MRC, World Bank, ADB, and a coalition of IUCN/
TEI/IWMI/M-POWER. Credibility and competence are
essential. Credibility is linked to the ‘‘social capital: of the
convener or convening coalition and their capacity to build
new or upon existing relationships. Without competence,
conveners will not be able to maintain a constituency or
lead effective, deliberative engagement.
There are multiple motivations for convening. It can be
a strategic position that might give an actor leverage,
opportunity, authority, or prestige. In each of the cases,
actors have used their convening role to shape the conduct
and context of others, either directly or indirectly. The
following diverse examples illustrate the point.
The UNDP sought to influence the shape of the 1995
Mekong Agreement, or at least ensure that a commonly
acceptable agreement was negotiated, after early negotia-
tions had stalled. Its triumph was self-acclaimed soon after
by an insider of the organization (ESCAP 1997). It sees
itself as a parent of the MRC, and rightly so, via its various
interventions and support since the 1950s. In the last
10 years or more, however, the UNDP has played no role
whatsoever in MRC operations, having handed back its
convening/facilitating role in 1995 and thereafter having
withdrawn.
After many years of not taking up the role for which it is
mandated, the MRC has, since 2008, finally taking a pro-
active approach to secure for itself a role as a convener of
development debates. It is constrained by the boundaries of
the Mekong River Basin and, more particularly, to the
Lower Mekong due to the nonmembership of China and
Myanmar. It is, however, reaching upward to China and
outward to the hydropower industry, as it seeks to build its
credibility. There are deliberative gains and losses to this
new approach. As the convener of the Lower Mekong BDP
process, the MRC has framed implementation in a way that
builds in assumptions about the range of choices open to
Lower Mekong countries. Scenarios are less diverse and
resemble sensitivity analyses of a particular development
pathway—more or much more hydro, more or much more
irrigation—rather than explorations of quite different
future possibilities.
The World Bank—later joined by the ADB—sought, via
its convening of the Mekong Water Resources Assistance
Strategy (MWRAS) process, to usurp the MRCS and pro-
vide their own vision of essential water resources devel-
opment interventions at a time when the MRCS was
relatively inactive. This coincided with the need perceived
by the World Bank for them to step forward and ‘‘subglo-
balize’’ (whether basinizing or regionalizing did not really
matter) their global Water Resources Sector Strategy
(World Bank 2003) and this, at least partly, drove the
MWRAS process, with or without the MRC being on-board.
The ADB’s convening role of the GMSWorking Groups
also provides it with the opportunity to direct the agenda, as
the GMS Energy Strategy example clearly demonstrates.
The power and influence of their convening role is ampli-
fied by the ability to provide grants and loans to support the
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development agenda that emerges from the Working Group
deliberations. They are not, however, alone in their desire to
set the regional energy agenda. In September 2009, US
embassies led the convening and hosting of a GMS energy
conference (US Department of State 2009), a tentative step
as it repositions its engagement in Mekong geopolitics
under the Obama administration.
The IUCN/TEI/IWMI/M-POWER decided to convene
‘‘Exploring Water Futures Together’’ in 2006 to expand a
transboundary water-related deliberative space at a time
they judged that many perspectives were still being
excluded from consideration, such as in either MWRAS
2004? or the BDP1. This represented an expansion of a
previous coalition between IUCN and M-POWER from
2004 that focused on getting substantive transboundary
issues—Thailand water grid, Salween hydropower devel-
opment, and domestic and international threats to Tonle
Sap—into the public space for discussion between senior
government officials and nonstate actors.
After effectively removing the ADB from its convening
role in shaping a Tonle Sap basin organisation, a dominant
faction within the Cambodian government directed the
creation of the TSBA. Those appointed to it interpreted its
mandate as entitling it to convene and dictate terms to
various government agencies, such as the Ministry of
Water Resources and Meteorology (MOWRAM), Ministry
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), and the
Ministry of Environment (MOE). By mid-2009 it was clear
that it did not have the support of the constituency it
sought, its formal powers were reduced, and it was repo-
sitioned lower down in the institutional hierarchy, under
the oversight of MOWRAM. Its reinvention is now
underway and it might yet establish influence in Cambo-
dian policy making in and around the Great Lake—that is,
at a lower level (subnational) and lower scale (lake and
surrounds, rather than entire Tonle Sap Basin, which covers
a large proportion of Cambodia).
Each of the cases shows that convening has its advan-
tages and so the flux will likely continue, as different actors
press for such a role.
Process: Social Contracts, Participation,
and Facilitation
The process aspects we will focus on are the social con-
tract, who participates, and facilitation.
Social contracts
The social contract is a summary of the rules of engage-
ment. A social contract needs to be established among the
conveners, facilitators, and all stakeholder representatives,
which requires reaching some workable agreement on
purpose, scope, political space, resources, time, and pro-
cess so that participants in a deliberative process under-
stand the roles and responsibilities of all.
Social contracts should make the participation promise
clear, to lessen the chance of a mismatch between reality
and expectations. For example, are stakeholder represen-
tatives being invited to come together primarily to build
relationships and share information, to set the agenda for
subsequent public or private sector action, to brainstorm
and problem-solve, to join a consensus-building initiative,
to provide recommendations, or to make decisions?
Each of the cases examined offered a different social
contract, recognizing that differences matter. The UNDP
was inviting states to continue their efforts to establish a
transboundary river basin organization with a decision-
making mandate. Once established, the MRC in operation
offers different invitations depending on the status of the
intended participant in MRC processes. After the events,
nonstate participants in 2008 and 2009 multistakeholder
consultations for the MRC BDP2 ‘‘basinized planning’’
remained unsure as to whether they had been brought in for
tokenism, to be shown and impressed by the status of work-
in-progress, or to provide recommendations on methodol-
ogy. No invitation to join decision-making was offered,
that much was clear, but the connection of the BDP itself to
national decision-making remains unclear.
The MWRAS and ADB GMS energy planning pro-
cesses did not offer any social contract beyond invitations
to being an observer at the World Bank’s own attempts at
basin planning and investment prioritization.
‘‘Exploring Water Futures Together’’ endeavored to
broaden the transboundary public debate in 2004 by
expanding the public agenda, but in 2006, it still needed to
focus on bringing people together to build relationships and
share information as a precondition to constructive delib-
erative engagement at the regional level.
In each of the examples, the social contracts among the
conveners, key participants, and invited others were being
stretched or renegotiated between levels and scales, as
actors sought to increase their space and influence.
Participation
Scale and level politics defines and limits who participates
and with what roles in deliberations. The Mekong Agree-
ment negotiations were driven by tensions between inter-
national agencies and a few donor countries interested in
regionalizing development and rather disparate state
interests. One consequence was the exclusion of the upper
basin countries China and Myanmar, neither of which had
much to gain from joining and potentially more to lose.
Another was a rather narrow focus on state-level interests.
At one level lower, the Tonle Sap case study documented
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similar winnowing processes at work determining who
participates. Deliberation here took place largely among
central and provincial state agencies. There was little
opportunity to deal with important transboundary issues
related to international developments in the basin or to
engage with local-level institutions already in place within
the basin. These two example show how deliberation at,
and about, some levels might be hindered by scale politics.
The BDP process inherited many constraints from the
initial Mekong Agreement, especially the emphasis on
state-level interests and transboundary impacts within the
lower basin. Nevertheless, the MRC responded to criti-
cisms about the lack of wider engagement with stakeholder
consultation meetings in the latter half of phase 1 and from
the beginning of phase 2. This created opportunities for
information about ecological processes important to more
local-level livelihood interests to be tabled. This is an
example of leveling, as it drew attention to different levels
at which water resources and related services are used and
managed. It is still too early to see if these decisions by
conveners will have any influence on national planning or
practices.
In the Mekong Region governments are still seen by
many as the actor that needs to be convinced or changed to
solve water governance problems in the region at all levels,
from international through to local. But research and
practices suggest a much more complex mix of actors are
involved in water governance (Lebel and others 2007).
Moreover, the array of firms and banks and, to a lesser
extent, local water-user groups, and environmental and
social development advocates are not without strategies
and skills in deploying various institutions of the state at
the levels at which they work best.
Multistakeholder engagement requires careful attention
to participation. One lens that is helpful in identifying sets
of interests and stakes in water management is scale. Many
water-related services have level-dependent elements or
are subject to strong cross-scale interactions, which, if
taken into consideration through representation, might lead
to more constructive politics in deliberative arenas. Thus, if
a disadvantaged group with strong level-dependent inter-
ests and stakes is being ignored or sidelined in policy and
negotiations, it makes sense for conveners to find ways to
include them.
Facilitation
Quality facilitation of meetings is crucial to give fair
opportunities for everyone present to meaningfully partic-
ipate and to ensure that claims and arguments can be
queried, verified, or countered. Many sessions in dialogues
and consultations with stakeholders remain dominated by
formal presentations by the conveners and their selected
resource people; opportunities to query and discuss key
issues in-depth are contained to short periods before breaks
after a Powerpoint tsunami. Facilitators in the Mekong
context need to not just consider language but also power
and influence associated with positions, and in response to
deploy tactics to allow different stakeholders to engage
without being crushed by the articulate or influential.
Scale and level politics has shaped the format, venues,
and procedures of dialogues and assessments. The basini-
zation efforts in the Mekong Agreement, Basin Develop-
ment, and hydropower cooperation cases have been
challenged by farmers, fishers, and civil society organiza-
tions as not giving sufficient attention to local place-spe-
cific impacts, interests and concerns. Such groups have
used the mass media and created alternative events to
comment and provide their perspectives on development.
Venue and language choices empower different stake-
holders. For the cases we studied, however, physical
venues continue to be largely convention halls, government
offices, or large hotels in capital cities. Interests aligned
with large spatial levels are usually favored by such set-
tings. In the Mekong Region, several of the case studies
described illustrate the value of allowing periods for dis-
cussion and reflection in native languages as these improve
content and level of engagement in discussions.
Conveners and their facilitators have also tried to
respond to debilitating effects of some form of scale poli-
tics. In the ‘‘Exploring Mekong Water Futures Together’’
dialogue process, the main regional dialogue focusing on
transboundary issues and multilateral agencies and was
held separately from several national-level events, but with
some cross-participation. One of the rationales for these
activities was to try to create more direct conversations
among actors with strengths and capabilities at different
levels. Some conveners and facilitators will adopt tactics
like keeping some groups of stakeholder of very even
capacity, power, or highly polarized positions in separate
events or tables during part of the process.
Most of the cases we studied indicate the need for, but
challenges in, carrying out meaningful multilevel conver-
sations without undermining credibility, salience, or legit-
imacy. In deliberative engagements, some actors, including
conveners, continue to exercise power through controlling
where, when, and how deliberative engagement takes
place, what decisions are on the table for scrutiny and
discussion, and which are taken as given.
Content
Scale and level politics have shifted agendas and the sub-
stantive content of deliberations. The processes of
scaling and leveling have been prominent. On the one
hand, leaders in government, business, and financing focus
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incessantly on regional geometries—growth quadrangles
and corridors, water and energy grids. A pertinent example
is the promotion of a Thai Water Grid by the then Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand in which diver-
sions and withdrawals from neighboring states were glos-
sed over by labeling as a national project because it was
convenient to do so (Molle and Floch 2008). These dis-
cursive practices shift agendas to larger interest levels and
associated technologies and projects. The rescaling of
regions via large infrastructure projects renders some levels
more visible than others. Local uses of water resources for
irrigation and fishing are simply made invisible by a high,
regional vantage point and the statistics or policies oper-
ating at that level. Our case on cooperation in energy and
water is a strong example of this form of scale politics
affecting the content of conversations. The Mekong
Agreement case is another, in that the focus on allocation
among states has made invisible many of the intrastate
allocation issues.
Problems with access to, and the quality of, scientific
knowledge has been an important constraint in several of
the cases we examined. Until recently, the MRC, for
instance, had a history of suppressing access to reports,
preventing its own scientists from speaking about their
findings in regional events and avoiding disclosure of
information that it felt might be ‘‘sensitive’’ to member
governments. On the one hand, this is seen as careful
management and, on the other, it is seen as a lack of
transparency. The tensions between international and state
level as well as state and more local levels is part of the
explanation for these constraints on the content of delib-
erative engagements in the region.
Even so, new understanding or awareness of issues from
increasingly independent research capacities in the region
is countering efforts that would seek to compress issue
management into a particular scale and level. For example,
the river basin scale might suit surface water flows but be a
poor fit for aquifer management issues that arise as
groundwater exploitation increases. Likewise, climate
change requires action within, but also beyond, the
boundaries of any subglobal polity.
Some conveners have tried to create constructive dis-
cussions about cross-level and cross-scale issues through
structuring who speaks in which session and the mix of
topics covered in meeting agendas. ‘‘Exploring Water
Futures Together’’ had, for example, a multilevel scenario-
building exercise that encouraged participants to grapple
with development issues at several spatial levels, first
separately and then together (Foran and Lebel 2007).
Deliberative engagement activities like dialogues and
roundtables can help deal with scale issues by querying
choices of scales and levels. They might be particularly
important when they draw attention to vulnerable and
disenfranchised stakeholders with limited access and
influence via other political channels.
Outcomes Matter: Sought After Versus Actual
Scale and level politics has altered the outcomes of
deliberations from what was sought to what is actually
discernible with the benefit of hindsight. The conveners of
the effort to create the MRC sought acceptance of inter-
dependency by all Mekong countries concerning their
water resources development pathways and agreement to
fully cooperate in exploring development possibilities and
jointly managing the precious, water-related resources of
the basin. The actual outcome was a partial ‘‘whole-of-
basin’’ organization that has taken many years to become
modestly influential. Nevertheless, the rise of water,
hydropower, and climate change adaptation to the top of
the political agenda was evidenced by the 1st Mekong
River Summit in April 2010, which brought together the
prime ministers of the four Lower Mekong countries, with
very senior representation from China and Myanmar. After
more than 50 years of cooperation to greater and lesser
extents and 15 years after the signing of the Mekong
Agreement, this was a high point for MRC to show, finally,
that it can convene substantive deliberations at the highest
political level about ‘‘whole-of-mainstream’’ development,
even if still not ‘‘whole-of-basin.’’
The MRC’s restricted mandate to the Lower Mekong
Basin has hampered its efforts to develop an agreed and
effectively adhered to plan for water resources develop-
ment of the area within its purview. The reluctance of
members and nonmembers to candidly exchange views has
been a mighty deliberation challenge, but clear progress
has been made. Nevertheless, the actual influence on
national water resources development agendas has yet to be
seen.
The sought-after outcome of World Bank’s efforts to
basinize banking was to be a widely supported MWRAS.
The global water resources strategy of the Worl Bank had a
clear vision, but the Mekong version was a pale imitation
and seemed to focus more on building a constituency for
future World Bank technical assistance and infrastructure
investments. The actual outcome was an unsupported,
unimpressive strategy that by 2010 has disappeared and
was never widely circulated and not even rating a mention
in the World Bank Water Strategy mid-term progress
report (World Bank 2010).
Convergence and divergence between sought-after and
actual outcomes across the case studies (Table 1) can be
partly explained by how well scale and level politics were
addressed by deliberative engagements. The ADB-led ini-
tiative to regionalize energy planning and power trading
seeks an outcome in which energy production and
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transmission is optimized. The outcome of the ADB-GMS
decision to ‘‘leave water to the MRC’’ has resulted in
energy planning being very disconnected from water
resources planning. Institutionalized agreements are mov-
ing forward for power trading among countries to enable
efficiencies.
M-POWER and partners have been clear about the
outcome sought since the early days of its dialogue activ-
ities, that being more rigorous public examination of the
comparative opportunities and risks of various develop-
ment scenarios. This persistent effort to demonstrate how
to go about, and normalize, multistakeholder deliberation
has contributed to measurable success.
An objective of the Tonle Sap management experi-
mentation in Cambodia has been, since the 1990s, to
establish some type of functional government oversight
and control of the way in which the land and water-related
resources of the lake are used. This objective, however, has
been lost or overtaken by power struggles among the ADB,
actors within the newly created (and soon downsized and
disempowered) Tonle Sap Basin Authority, MOWRAM,
and other parts of national government. In 2009 the TSBA
leadership was removed, the organization was renamed
Tonle Sap Authority, signaling the downsizing of its ter-
ritorial mandate. At the same time, greater control was
exercised over it by MOWRAM. At the time of writing, the
mandate is still being contested and the added-value to
water management is difficult to discern.
Deliberative engagement among diverse stakeholders
cannot be expected to reach consensus or address all the
challenges in making policy and institutional changes.
However, it should at least improve mutual understanding
among actors, allow exploration of alternative options, help
define rights, risks, and responsibilities, and have some
constructive influence on future behavior (Dore 2007).
Some disconnects will persist in part because of scale- and
level-dependent interests and power.
Overall, attributing, or attempting to measure, the
impacts of deliberative engagement on policy-making
processes, negotiation outcomes, and institutional forms is
not a straightforward exercise; making strong claims about
level-sensitive variations is even more difficult. Additional
conceptual work is needed on how to best delimit delib-
erative activities into meaningful units of analysis and to
characterize their features so that their evolution can be
clearly described and alternative initiatives can be com-
pared (Pingree 2006). More work is also needed on using
scale as a lens to describe political interactions in more
mechanistic ways (Lebel and others 2005; Young 1994).
This work can build on the findings here that show that
important scale politics is not only evident among the
formal institutional arrangements but also found in the less
formalized and often loosely connected world of dialogues,
consultations, and roundtables that make up the essence of
many deliberative engagements.
Conclusions
In the Mekong Region, water governance is multiscale and
multilevel, with many connections but also many discon-
nects. Actors draw on both formal and informal institutions
as well as more ad hoc arrangements at different scales and
levels, as issues move between relatively exploratory and
more decision-oriented arenas and practices. Actors also
push and pull issues between scales and up and down levels
to political and territorial arenas where they have more
influence and power—in processes of rescaling or releveling.
There are many ‘‘Mekongs’’: river, river basin, and
various regional framings. The interests of investors, offi-
cials in government agencies, and small, local users of
water, such as fishers and farmers, or distant city dwellers
needing energy are visible or not depending on how
Mekong arenas and their boundaries are set. Likewise,
there are many ‘‘waters’’. From flood protection and energy
production services through to meeting needs of farmers in
the dry season and securing valuable fisheries, there are
correspondingly very different ways of valuing and prior-
itizing uses and users.
Scale and level politics contribute to the context and
influences the process, content, and outcome possibilities
from deliberative engagements. Informed multistakeholder
deliberations that are sensitive to multiscale and multilevel
interests appear crucial to influencing powers, challenging
the way issues and stakes are framed, and negotiating for or
protecting the interests and needs of minorities, women,
migrants, and diverse groups of the poor. Such delibera-
tions also appear crucial to navigating the complex contests
over rights to, and responsibilities for, regional water-
related resources that are invariably difficult to contain
within the boundaries of a basin drawn at a particular level
and scale.
Many important decisions about water in the Mekong
Region are still made in nontransparent ways. Meaningful
public deliberation is still the exception rather than the rule.
Among early efforts, deliberative engagements vary hugely
in inclusiveness, quality of content, structure, and how they
are facilitated. As a result, the quality and influence of
those conversations and relationships varies. Dialogues—
good and bad, broad and narrow—might all influence
negotiations that help shape decisions that are crucial to
improving water governance, but more needs to be done if
they are to contribute to their full potential.
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In this paper we present a framework for analysing transboundary water governance complexes, illus-
trated in the Mekong Region. In this region, the sharing of waters between countries adds a critical
dimension to decision making about producing food and energy, maintaining vital ecosystems, and sus-
taining livelihoods. Hydropower, dams, diversions, expanding cities and irrigation schemes are all in the
mix. The key elements of the framework are: context, drivers, arenas, tools, decisions and impacts. The
use of deliberation, technical and advocacy tools is explored and normative governance improvements
are suggested.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Water governance can be understood as a social process of dia-
logue, negotiation and decision-making; or, instrumentally, as a
means to achieve pre-determined objectives. In this paper, we
present a framework for analysing transboundary water gover-
nance complexes (Fig. 1).
The framework portrays the importance of, and connections be-
tween: context, drivers, arenas, tools, decisions and impacts. There
are many different water governance actors dealing with a variety
of issues influenced by their individual and shared contexts. Actors
engage in multiple arenas, depending on opportunity, necessity
and choice. Drivers are what influence and motivate actors. We
suggest three are key: interests, discourses and institutions. Actors
employ tools to establish and legitimise their positions, inform de-
bate and influence negotiations; or resist, reinforce and reframe
perspectives. We define tools broadly and categorise them as being
predominantly for deliberation, technical support, or advocacy.
Decisions emerge from arenas. We separate the decisions that
emerge as being primarily about framing, supply and demand.
Ultimately, we are interested in the impacts of decisions in terms
of the fairness and sustainability of water allocation, that reshapes
the water governance context. We define allocation broadly to in-
clude water use, related investment and sharing arrangements.
In our heuristic framework, we recognise that some elements of
our categories can overlap. We illustrate the framework with our
experiences in Mekong transboundary water governance with
emphasis, in this paper, on highlighting the diversity of actors
and the role of decision tools in allocation decision-making. We
draw on the research and engagement findings of a regional net-
work on water governance known as M-POWER (Lazarus et al.,
2011; Lebel et al., 2007; Molle et al., 2009b), especially a project
that explored the tools used in water allocation in Mekong coun-
tries (Dore et al., 2010a).
2. Research method
The aim of the project was to contribute to water allocation pol-
icy and practice that results in more optimal and equitable use of
water by society. This aim was pursued by research across the Me-
kong Region and active engagement with policymakers. We exam-
ined the use of a wide range of decision-support tools, in many
decision-making arenas. In doing so, the research team sought to
understand decision contexts and drivers, and also build capacity
to undertake governance research.
0022-1694/$ - see front matter  2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2012.07.023
⇑ Corresponding author. Address: AusAID Laos, Locked Bag 40, Kingston, ACT
2604, Canberra, Australia. Tel.: +856 20 55514815; fax: +856 21 353831.
E-mail address: johndore@loxinfo.co.th (J. Dore).
1 Senior Water Resources Advisor – Mekong Region.
2 Director.
3 Senior Scientist.
Journal of Hydrology 466–467 (2012) 23–36
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of Hydrology
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate / jhydrol
ANU page 249
Author's personal copy
The team explored how tools have been used in different places
and political arenas in the Mekong Region to govern water. The
tools examined included: multi-stakeholder platforms, scenario
building, cumulative impact assessment, strategic environmental
assessment, environmental flows, hydrological modelling, and lob-
bying campaigns.
This paper is drawn largely from the project but only covers
part of the research findings in the 26 working papers, most of
which are proceeding through to formal publication (including:
Dore, 2010; Dore and Lebel, 2010; Floch and Blake, 2011; Johnston
and Kummu, 2012; Keskinen, 2012; Keskinen et al., 2012; Lazarus
et al., 2012; Suhardiman et al., 2012). The project involved 52
researchers from 15 countries, including five Mekong countries.
3. The Mekong transboundary water governance complex
3.1. Context
Water resources lie at the heart of development in the Mekong
Region (Fig. 2). This region refers to: the territory, ecosystems, peo-
ple, economies and politics of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand,
Vietnam and China’s Yunnan Province (Kaosa-ard and Dore, 2003)
and is home to about 260 million people. Future quality of life in
the region is strongly linked to the choices made about sharing,
developing and managing water to: produce food and energy,
maintain vital ecosystems, and sustain livelihoods. Many water re-
source projects have been completed, are underway, or are being
planned. Dams, river diversions, inter-basin transfers, thirsty cities
and irrigation expansion are all in the mix. While some projects
have been celebrated, others are subject to disputes and protests.
The transboundary and interconnected nature of the Mekong’s
waters adds a critical dimension.
There are many rivers in the Mekong Region, but the iconic Me-
kong River can be used to illustrate many water governance issues.
It is the epicenter of contemporary debates about water resource
development in the wider region. It is the longest river in Southeast
Asia with an estimated length of nearly 4900 km. The Mekong is
the eight largest (in terms of the amount of water), and twelfth
longest river in the world. The Mekong River is an international riv-
er. It begins in mountains on the northeastern rim of the Tibetan
Plateau in wetlands situated about 5000 m above sea level. For
nearly 2200 km it flows through Chinese territory in Qinghai, Tibet
and Yunnan. During its first 1000 km the river travels in a south-
erly direction in rough parallel with the Salween and Yangtze riv-
ers which originate in the same highlands. By the time the river
leaves China the altitude has fallen to about 400 m above sea level
(Daming and Kung, 1997; Hori, 2000). The river then winds its way
for just over 2700 km through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia
and Vietnam, before spilling into the South China Sea.
Leaders of Mekong countries are aware their countries’ desti-
nies are entwined and will be partly shaped by the way increased
cooperation of the past 20 years is extended into the realm of
water resources development on the Mekong River (MRC,
2011b), but also on other transboundary rivers, such as the Irra-
waddy, Salween and Red. The Mekong Region’s waterscapes are
being contested (Molle et al., 2009c) evincing a confrontation of
interests and worldviews that are hard to reconcile despite a fresh
rhetoric of tradeoffs, benefit sharing and win–win solutions. Dams
that are ‘‘powering progress’’ and publicly justified by reference to
development aspirations and poverty alleviation might well,
simultaneously, jeopardise food security and the livelihoods of
the poorest by harming the extraordinarily bountiful wild fisheries
(Barlow et al., 2008).
A major challenge for Mekong water governance is the com-
plexity of societies, economies and ecologies, in a region ‘‘where
nothing is as it seems’’ (Hinton, 2000). In contrast, analysis and
planning is often based on ‘‘state simplifications’’ (Scott, 1998) that
are confounded as people continue to make autonomous decisions,
wherever possible. Spatial differences in wealth, job opportunities,
resource endowments, environmental degradation, business regu-
lation, law enforcement and political freedom result in flows of
people and capital. These flows reshape societies and economies
and usually add further pressure to natural resources, including
rivers and ground water. Understandings of ecological processes
are incomplete. For example, in the Mekong River there is limited,
albeit increasing, understanding of fish migration and reproduc-
tion, and the relationships between sediment and nutrients (Sarkk-
ula and Koponen, 2010). This makes it difficult to pre-determine
the impacts of major interventions, such as the aforementioned
dams, diversions and expansions of urban and irrigated areas.
There is additional uncertainty from external forces that shape
the future of the region. For example, climate change is expected to
affect river flows and agricultural potential (Hoanh et al., 2010a;
Mainuddin et al., 2010; Rerkasem, 2011). Global economic growth
and contraction will also influence the final outcome of many Me-
kong-made decisions. Dealing with uncertainty is the fate of most
decision-makers, not only of those taking water resources deci-
sions. Yet, because of the way it interconnects people’s livelihoods
and ecosystems, ‘‘the complexity of water’’ (Dore and Smith, 2010)
has particular importance.
Fig. 1. Framework for analysing transboundary water governance complexes.
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3.2. Drivers
A recent treatment of primary drivers in the Mekong Region fo-
cused on demographic changes, human development needs, en-
ergy and food security concerns, increasing investment and trade,
and climate change (Grumbine et al., 2012). For our decision
analysis purpose here, we address the more generic drivers of
interests, institutions and discourses. We devote more space to illus-
trating the latter.
Interests are what underlie stated positions and provide insight
into needs, wants, desires, concerns, hopes, fears and values
(Vernon et al., 2010). All actors have a variety of interests which
Fig. 2. Mekong Region SOURCE: Based on Map No. 4112, Rev. 2. January 2004. United Nations Cartographic Section, New York, US.
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is what can make water governance so socially complex. Different
interests manifest themselves within and between different cate-
gories of actors. Moreover interests are entwined and change
through time.
National interest is a term regularly invoked in transboundary
water governance, often simplistically. At least in the Mekong,
the term is used in two main ways; first ‘‘to identify assumed ben-
efits, or avoided costs, to a particular country that are distinguish-
able from the well-being of other countries’’ and second ‘‘to assert
a greater good at the nation-state level, often where sacrifices are
required of a smaller group within that same country’’ (Hirsch
and Morck-Jensen, 2006). For example, national interest is ascribed
to China in seeking to improve navigation of the Upper Mekong
River mainstream for trade, to Lao for wanting to produce and ex-
port electricity, to Thailand for its plans to divert Mekong main-
stream waters into northeast Thailand, to Cambodia for wanting
to protect its freshwater fishery, and to Vietnam for wanting to
maintain the productivity of its part of the Mekong delta. There
is some truth in each of these claims but the national position of
each country depends on who is representing that view, and how
they weigh the diverse interests of many actors that resist being
fused into singular national policy positions.
Institutions are rules and norms, both formal and informal, that
provide structure for behaviour and relationships in a society
(Handmer and Dovers, 2007; North, 1990, 1993). Water decisions
in the Mekong Region, as elsewhere, reflect the outcome of con-
tests and interplay between entwined and evolving interests and
discourses, governed by institutions.
A prominent transboundary water governance institution is the
1995 Mekong River Agreement that articulates an inter-govern-
ment decision-making and management mandate for the main-
stream, tributaries and lands of the basin within the territories of
the Lower Mekong countries (Browder, 2000; Governments of
Cambodia Laos Vietnam Thailand, 1995). This Agreement is the
most recent institutionalisation of a cooperation that has been
evolving, with ups and downs, since the 1950s (Bui, 1997; ESCAP,
1997). Article 1 of the Agreement commits the four member coun-
tries to cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilisa-
tion, management and conservation of the Mekong River Basin in
fields such as irrigation, hydropower, navigation, flood control
and fisheries. Another regional institution, with great implications
for water governance, is the Inter-Governmental Agreement on Re-
gional Power Trade in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) (Gov-
ernments of Cambodia China Laos Myanmar Vietnam Thailand,
2003). The power agreement and subsequent implementation
agenda impacts water resources development in many ways,
including the incentive it creates for hydropower expansion to feed
into crossborder transmission grids.
Discourses are shared sets of concepts, categories and ideas that
provide adherents with a framework for making sense of situa-
tions, embodying judgments, assumptions, capabilities, disposi-
tions and intentions (Dryzek, 2006). Work by this team (Dore,
2001; Molle et al., 2009c) has illustrated the importance of dis-
courses in Mekong transboundary water governance – actors
weaving narratives, labelling people, framing debates, and bran-
dishing meta-justifications. Actors align themselves with dis-
courses such as ‘fighting poverty’, ‘good governance’, ‘sustainable
development’, ‘water security’, ‘energy security’, ‘food security’,
‘national security’, ‘integrated water resources management
(IWRM)’ and the ‘water–energy–food (WEF) nexus’.
Discourses are powerful. For example, northeast Thailand is
consistently portrayed as a poor and parched inhospitable place,
begging for more irrigation (Molle et al., 2009a), wild capture
fisheries are said to be doomed from over-exploitation (Friend
et al., 2009). With this backdrop, infrastructure projects in the
Mekong Region have been presented as solutions to fight poverty,
and opponents derided as anti-development or more interested in
environmental protection than people.
Discourse dominance is highly sought after and a noticeable
part of Mekong Region politics. Once captured, dominance is main-
tained by ‘‘disallowing or marginalising alternatives’’ (Shore and
Wright, 1997). The advent of IWRM provided common ground
and an initial consensus; adopted by the international water com-
munity – ‘‘Just like participation, IWRM appears as something
desirable and uncontroversial, and official documents suggest that
governments can resort to it abundantly and at ‘no cost’. It thus be-
comes a coveted discursive currency that is therefore also likely to
be hijacked by state, sectoral or private interests seeking to legiti-
mise their agendas’’ (Molle, 2008).
Recently the WEF nexus discourse has emerged, globally, and in
the Mekong Region. Whilst already on the research agenda of
some, 2011 has seen a WEF emphasis in Davos (Waughray,
2011), Bonn (Hoff, 2011)4 and Phnom Penh.5 The trend is continuing
in 2012 with WEF being the core of a GMS 2020 conference in Bang-
kok6 facilitated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and a Mekon-
g2Rio event in Phuket facilitated by the Mekong River Commission
(MRC)7. The WEF framing has gained momentum at the expense of
IWRM which has ‘‘tended to stay within the domains of the water,
agriculture and environment professionals and not had much trac-
tion with energy sector professionals’’ (Bird, 2012). WEF is proving
useful as more actors are identifying with the interdependence of
water resource management, with food and energy production.
Within this WEF discourse, many actors see a logical, sectoral entry
point for themselves in compelling, new, multi-sector, interdisciplin-
ary and transboundary deliberations.
Discourse shifts also flow through to funding shifts. For exam-
ple, ADB’s Water Financing Partnership Facility work plan for
2012 calls for ‘‘projects and activities that seek to address the
water-food-energy nexus’’, which as the program document says
will require ‘‘tightening the link of water to food and energy’’ that
is ‘‘particularly crucial in responding to climate change’’(ADB,
2012). Success and timing matter. It is unlikely the rhetorical
(and financial) turn to WEF would have been so swift without
the late 2009 failure of the United Nations Climate Change Confer-
ence in Copenhagen.
Discourse dominance is also reflected in the naming of institu-
tions. The international language of the sustainable development
discourse became embedded in the 1995 Mekong Agreement title
and text, perhaps partly basking in the afterglow of the 1992 Earth
Summit era during which it was negotiated. If the negotiations for
the Mekong Agreement had been concluded in 2005, rather than
1995, it may have been titled an agreement on the integrated man-
agement of water and water-related resources – that is, defacto
IWRM – rather than an agreement on the sustainable development
of the Mekong River Basin.
3.3. Arenas
In our framework we conceptualise decisions as emerging from
arenas that vary from very restricted to wide open. Arenas are sat-
urated with politics and power, obviously; yet both are elusive
concepts. Long ago, Miller (1962) suggested that: ‘‘Politics is a nat-
ural reflex of the divergences between members of a soci-
ety. . . [where]. . . there is a variety of perpetual disagreements
which arise from fundamental differences of condition, status,
power, opinion, and aim’’. For the authors of some World Water
4 http://www.water-energy-food.org/en/bonn_2011_process.html.
5 http://mekong.waterandfood.org/portal/whats-on/82-mekong-citizens-engaged-
in-dialogue.
6 http://www.gms-eoc.org/events/international-conference-gms2020.
7 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/events/mekong2rio/.
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Council literature, politics includes ‘‘the whole area of power rela-
tions during the identification of a problem and possible solutions,
the consultation and decision making processes that follow and
further on into the public action phase’’.8 These definitions explic-
itly recognise political and decision-making domains beyond states
and the government sector of society. With this we agree, hence
our efforts below to illustrate the variety of actors in water gover-
nance. What is less convincing about the WWC definition of politics,
is the casual invocation of power. Power is defined in many different
ways, often loosely. Lukes’ ‘‘faces of power’’ (1974) drew attention to
the ability to set agendas, take decisions, or shape preferences. More
nuanced, Hay (1997) speaks of ‘‘ability to shape the context and con-
duct of others’’ and Vermeulen (2005) as ‘‘ability to achieve a wanted
end in a social context, with or without the consent of others’’.
Ideas, leadership, positions and resources can all be seen as
power assets. The case for ideas is succinctly put by North: ‘‘His-
tory demonstrates that ideas, ideologies, myths, dogmas, and prej-
udices matter’’ (1993). Leaders also matter. Leaders that obtain
credibility, can engender trust, inspire commitment and be very
influential, for better or worse (Avolio and Yammarino, 2003; By-
man and Pollack, 2001; Graham, 2006). Positions matter, for exam-
ple, being high up in a hierarchy or holding a strategic position
gives an actor particular leverage, opportunity or authority – such
as royal leaders, political leaders, religious leaders, and those in
coordinating nodes in networks. And finally, resources matter.
For water-related power, the extent and quality of the physical
water resource is obviously central. However, financial and human
resources also serve to constrain or empower. Resource availability
changes, for example, with ‘‘new water’’ in the dry season from
dams, or more finance influenced by swings in global and regional
economies and the emergence of new donors and patrons that
changes the quantum of funds available.
Arenas are primarily defined by the actors that take part in their
processes. Arenas can be socially constructed to focus on particular
scales and levels. Scale is defined as the spatial, temporal, quanti-
tative, or analytical dimensions used to measure, or rank, and
study any phenomenon (Gibson et al., 2000). Examples of temporal
scale are management and electoral cycles. Spatial scales include
domains of administration, hydrology, economy and ecosystem.
Levels are the units of analysis located at different positions on a
scale. For example, the administration scale can have district, pro-
vincial, national and regional levels. Whereas, levels of interest to a
hydrologist will more likely be watershed, aquifer, sub-basin, na-
tional river basin, and international river basin. Elsewhere, two of
the authors have provided a fuller treatment of scales and levels,
in relation to deliberative water governance (Dore and Lebel,
2010). Multi-level and multi-scale interactions test the strength,
and expose the limitations of many arenas. For example, hydrolog-
ical and ecological cross-level interactions make local, basin, na-
tional and transboundary levels interdependent, with policy
repercussions. As a result, the cumulative impact of policies
emerging from, say, provincial arenas in the Mekong delta may
prove incompatible with modifications of the water regime
brought about by upstream development or climate change (Hoa-
nh et al., 2010b). Indeed, in Mekong transboundary water gover-
nance there are ‘‘scalar disconnects’’ (Suhardiman et al., 2012).
In the Mekong Region, as elsewhere, there is a plethora of actors
jostling for space in decision-making arenas. They have very
different powers, diverse approaches, and varying degrees of influ-
ence. Understanding them and the overall governance framework
within which they operate is useful. The multi-faceted nature of
particular organisations defy simple designations, nevertheless,
an attempt has been made here to identify and group water gover-
nance actors to assist sense-making (Fig. 3). We have categorised
actors as: local, state, United Nations, non-government organisa-
tions (NGOs), media, business, financiers, policy research insti-
tutes, universities and networks.
Across the Mekong Region there are, of course: men, women,
old, young, ethnic minorities and majorities, rich, poor, urban
and rural. Not surprisingly, the people’s movements, grassroots
groups and local government across the region reflect this cultural
diversity. Related to water governance, different movements and
groups have emerged around issues such as contested infrastruc-
ture and access rights, for example, the Assembly of the Poor in
north east Thailand (Missingham, 2004). There are also other local
structures, including mass organisations, such as Farmer Water
User Groups in Cambodia, and formal local government more clo-
sely linked to states.
State actors are of obvious importance in water governance,
most notably national and sub-national governments’ executives,
judiciaries and parliaments, for example, the six national govern-
ments of Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam;
and others such as China’s Yunnan provincial government. Public
sector agencies, utilities, state holding companies and militaries
are more specific parts of the state, relevant to water governance,
and include China’s Ministry of Water Resources, Electricity Gener-
ating Authority of Thailand, Lao Holding State Enterprises, and
Myanmar’s military Tatmadaw. Regional inter-government organ-
isations such as MRC, Association of South-East Asian Nations, East
Asia Community, their secretariats, summits and working groups,
are also a part of the institutional tapestry. Non-Mekong govern-
ments also influence the waterscapes of the Mekong through their
foreign policies and their participation in regional and bilateral
relationships that involve geopolitics, positioning, donation,
investment, lending and trading. For example: Japan, China, United
States of America, South Korea, Singapore etc.. . .who engage in or
catalyse various bilateral and multilateral processes such as Japan’s
Mekong Initiative (that excludes China), and United States’ Lower
Mekong Initiative (that excludes China and Myanmar).
A caucus of non-Mekong (and Mekong) governments is the Uni-
ted Nations. In addition to peak councils, it has some influence via
the UN family of organisations. For example, Food and Agriculture
Organisation, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific
and the United Nations Development Program all engage in Me-
kong water governance via a plethora of initiatives.
The umbrella term NGO does not express the complexity of
function, origins, funding, motivation, priorities and agendas of ac-
tors lumped into this category. With that caveat, NGOs can be
broadly divided into three types – local (principally operating
within a particular country or loosely definable area), regional,
and international. Actively engaged in Mekong water governance
are national NGOs such as: Green Watershed (Yunnan), the 3S Riv-
ers Protection Network (Cambodia); Water and Energy Working
Group (Laos); Assembly for the Poor, and Living River Siam (Thai-
land); Vietnam Rivers Network – and their members, which may
be other NGOs or grassroots peoples’ movements. There are also
regional NGOs such as Focus on the Global South (FOCUS) and To-
wards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA) whose
births were catalysed by a sense of disenfranchisement, threats
to local livelihoods and the realisation of the importance and use-
fulness of the regional scale. Key actors in their formation process
were prominent leaders of local NGOs. Associated actors include
people’s movements, local NGOs, activists and international
funders. The two examples mentioned, FOCUS and TERRA, are very
8 http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/water_politics/. The World Water Council
hosted a workshop in Marseilles, France on February 26–27, 2004, which brought
together water practitioners, political scientists and politicians in charge of deciding
and implementing water ‘reforms’, such as implementing the somewhat flexible
agendas of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) proponents. It aimed at
identifying priority areas to be investigated and priority action. In particular, it asked
what could be learned from political science.
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different, but they each aim to provide effective facilitation, coordi-
nation and space for political representation of diverse civil society
interests in national, regional and international forums. Interna-
tional NGOs also engage prominently in Mekong water gover-
nance. These include World Wildlife Fund, International Union
for Conservation of Nature, the Oxfams, and International Rivers.
The media in the Mekong Region plays an important role (Gar-
den and Nance, 2007). Whether controlled or independent, in-
formed or uninformed, sensationalist, shallow or analytical, it
cannot be ignored. Print media remains a part of the mix. That said,
radio remains an important communication tool, whether man-
aged by community, government or commercial providers. How-
ever, the discussion groups and information networks of the
internet and social media are now increasingly prominent in the
region and an important and strengthening counter to a shrinking
pool of mainstream media owners.
Business is another central actor in the Mekong Region. These
include local businesses; state actors in business, whether govern-
ments, military or politicians; consultants; transnational corpora-
tions; private financiers (the commercial banking sector); deal
arrangers and insurers (often multilateral public financiers and
their credit guarantee arms). In the Mekong these include local
water-pumping entrepreneurs and nation-wide actors such as
Vietnam’s irrigation and drainage management companies. Rang-
ing across boundaries are corporate titans like Italian–Thai con-
struction group and China’s quasi-state Lancang Hydro, the latter
building and operating hydropower dams on the Upper Mekong.
All influence water resources decision-making.
There are many financiers that play roles in Mekong water
governance. Local money lenders and cooperative micro-credit
providers are at one end of the spectrum. Private banks are also
very active in larger water resources development, especially
from China, Thailand and Vietnam. Multilateral public financiers
active in the Mekong include the ADB and the World Bank family
– International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-
national Development Association, International Finance Corpora-
tion, and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. Bilateral
public financiers include aid organisations from Japan, United
States, Sweden, Australia, Germany, etc. There are also bilateral
giants such as Japan Bank for International Co-operation, China’s
Exim Bank, and their respective export credit guarantee agencies.
Philanthropists such as MacArthur Foundation, Blue Moon
Fund, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation are active in
grant-making; plus development assistance subsidiaries of
non-Mekong political parties such as the German Green Party’s
Heinrich Boell Foundation; There are also distributor funds with
Mekong windows, for example, the Critical Ecosystems Partnership
Fund. All these groups have their interests reflected in their fund-
ing focus and criteria.
There are many Mekong policy research institutes, such as:
Cambodia’s Supreme National Economic Council and the Cambo-
dia Development Resources Institute. In China, the Institute for
International Economic Research takes an active interest in Me-
kong affairs as part of the powerful National Development and
Reform Commission. The Institute of Geographic Sciences and
Natural Resources Research, part of the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences, focuses on natural sciences, and has a team studying Me-
kong ecosystems. In Bangkok, the Thailand Development
Research Institute is influential in economic policy, and the Thai-
land Environment Institute has done extensive work across the
Mekong Region on environmental governance. Vietnam’s Insti-
tute of Meteorology Hydrology and Environment, part of the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, leads research
examining impacts of more irrigation and dams on the produc-
tivity of the Mekong Delta.
There are also a large number of institutes from outside the re-
gion that are active inside. These include International Water Man-
agement Institute, that hosts the CGIAR Challenge Program on
Water and Food; Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Indus-
trial Research Organisation, Sweden’s Stockholm Environment
Institute, Stimson Centre from the United States, and the Danish
Institute for International Studies.
Universities, research and/or advocacy networks also play
important roles, although their influence on decision-making
varies greatly between Mekong Region countries. There are
universities located inside and outside the region which have a
Mekong-focus. There are also networks of research organisations
participating in joint research efforts aiming to better understand
various Mekong issues, such as M-POWER. And there are various
other organisations operating as research and advocacy networks,
such as: Wetlands Alliance, Mekong Energy and Ecology Network,
3S Rivers Protection Network (Cambodia), Burma Rivers Network
(Myanmar/Thailand), Living Rivers Siam (Thailand); plus networks
of universities, policy research institutes, and NGOs. All contribute
to water-related policymaking in the region.
Arenas are socially complex, and by definition are multi-actor.
For example, members of the East Asia Community take part in
the arena of the East Asia Summit but, clearly, many other actors
are involved in either central roles, or on the margins. MRC creates
and convenes arenas focused on the Mekong River Basin, many of
which engage multiple actors, but other actors can and do move to
create alternative arenas, even at the same scale and level, that
Fig. 3. Water governance actors in the Mekong Region.
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operate with different rules and establish new hierarchies between
participants. Even arenas can have typologies. Track 1 arenas are
state-centric, official inter-government forums. Track 2 privileges
states, but provide explicit space and roles for non-state actors.
In track 3, civil society (NGOs, business etc.) leads, less impeded
by and subordinate to states. In the Mekong there are also track
4 arenas and processes, imbued in localism, with low expectations
of states, focused on supporting local communities (Dore, 2003).
3.4. Decisions
Arenas yield or shape decisions. Framing decisions refer to the
strategies, frameworks, policies and legal regulation, which shape
the environment in which other decisions will be taken. Supply
decisions include major infrastructure investments that physically
modify the hydrology of a system. Demand decisions include the
creation of regulations and incentives to influence allocation
through changes in water users’ behaviour.
Framing decisions relevant to Mekong transboundary water
governance include water, food and energy policies. A national
illustration is Vietnam’s Power Development Plan for 2011–2020
(Dao and Hawkins, 2011) with its targets for hydropower, thermal,
gas, renewable and nuclear energy production. Another, amongst
many, is Cambodia’s Paddy Production and Rice Export Policy, with
expansion targets by 2015, requiring more irrigation and agricul-
tural intensification (Sok, 2010). A basin-wide example is provided
by the IWRM-based Basin Development Strategy (MRC, 2011b)
that articulates transboundary, water resources development risks
requiring impact assessment and mitigation. A regional example of
influence has been the strategic framework for the GMS economic
cooperation programme 2002–2012 (ADB, 2002), recently re-
newed for 2012–2022 (ADB, 2011). Related framing decisions in-
clude the adoption of other GMS strategies that incentivise the
context for power trading, new highways, bridges and ‘‘economic
corridors’’ (ADB, 2010a,b,c), all of which have implications for
water governance.
Supply decisions may be concerned, for example, with: storage,
hydropower and irrigation projects; intra- and inter-basin diver-
sions; and urban water delivery. For example, a dominant current
issue in the Mekong is the rapid increase in new hydropower pro-
jects and proposals. A recent count found 82 existing and 179 po-
tential hydropower projects in the wider region (King et al., 2007),
many on Mekong River tributaries, where construction is now
accelerating. There are over 17–19 projects either built or under
serious consideration on the mainstream in China (Magee, 2012),
with the feasibility of yet another cascade under consideration
for the uppermost reach. A further twelve Lower Mekong main-
stream projects (ICEM, 2010) have now emerged on the agenda
of developers from China, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand who
are currently negotiating with the Governments of Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand and Vietnam.
Demand decisions also abound. They can relate to abstraction
licenses, volumetric allocation rules, water user fees, metering
and monitoring, and quests for increased efficiency of use. These
decisions might be taken by, for example, water supply utilities
and various rural and urban user groups.
3.5. Impacts
When introducing the framework, reference was made to
sought after impacts of fairness and sustainability in water re-
sources-related allocation. These need to be put into operation.
One way to do this is to explore the rewards, risks, rights and
responsibilities (4Rs) associated with water-related decision mak-
ing. Our aspirations are for: rewards to be fairly shared, risks (and
costs) minimised and fairly apportioned; rights to be agreed and
respected; and actor responsibilities to be clarified and discharged.
Using the 4Rs can be useful to illustrate some recent Mekong
transboundary water governance deficiencies. For example, dams
proposed for the Salween River in Myanmar’s Karen State, and oth-
ers proposed in Kachin State, and further upstream in China have
not been subject to a public analysis of the rewards, or justifica-
tions, for the projects. Impact assessments when done, are not in
the public domain. Rights of affected people to be involved in
life-changing decisions have been habitually ignored. Risks remain
relatively unexplored and unaddressed.
In the Vietnam stretch of the Se San River – a major Mekong
tributary – the risks to downstreamwere externalised by the devel-
opers and subsequently by the operators of the Yali Falls dam. The
official Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), undertaken in the
1990s, adopted a narrow definition of the project impact area,
extending only 6 km downstream, totally ignoring the possibility
of transboundary impacts to neighbouring Cambodians who were
‘‘never informed, consulted or officially given a copy of the EIA’’
(Wyatt and Baird, 2007).
In general, in the case of dams across the Mekong Region, invol-
untary risk bearers, especially project affected people, are claiming
rights of access to information, participation and justice about deci-
sions which affect their lives. These rights are enshrined, within a
single-state paradigm, in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration
(UNCED, 1992), since embodied at the regional scale in Europe’s
Aarhus Convention (UNECE, 1998), and of potential significance
to the Mekong Region in an international watercourses convention
(UN, 1997). As yet they are not inculcated into Mekong transboun-
dary practice.
When considering options for a Thailand water grid to further
irrigate its northeast provinces (Molle et al., 2009a), the Govern-
ment of Thailand continues to ignore the spirit of its responsibilities
by only minimally sharing its plans with the MRC. Under the terms
of the key agreement and the subsequently negotiated procedures,
all substantial water resources development projects in the Me-
kong River Basin are to be reported to the MRC secretariat so that
all parties to the 1995 Mekong Agreement can understand and as-
sess possible impacts of proposals. In practice, ambiguity about
‘‘significance’’ results in notification being minimal and delibera-
tion about the grid with neighbours non-existent.
Despite this recent background of shallow transboundary coop-
eration about water resources development, constructive engage-
ment between Mekong countries has increased substantially in
the past 20 years. From 1999 to 2008 the five countries and two
provinces that comprise the GMS had economic growth double
that of the world economy, with international trade growth 25%
higher than world trade, intra-GMS trade more important in all
GMS countries and poverty reduced significantly (CIE, 2010). The
complexity and sensitivity about transboundary waters has made
it a difficult agenda item. However, new decision-support tools
are being used in transboundary water governance, providing
prospects for more informed and informing exchanges between
Mekong countries.
4. Use of decision-support tools in Mekong transboundary
water governance
In our framework we assign tools as being predominantly delib-
erative, technical, or advocatory in their orientation and use. Delib-
eration tools should assist the exploration of options, examination
of technical outputs and contestation of discourses. Technical tools
should bring scientific knowledge into decision-making processes.
Advocacy tools underpin campaigns supporting, opposing or other-
wise seeking to influence decisions.
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4.1. Deliberation
Tools that should be explicitly rooted in deliberation include
multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs), environmental flows (E-
flows) and scenario-building. An example Mekong MSP began with
a high-level roundtable entitled ‘Using Water, Caring for Environ-
ment: Challenges for the Mekong Region’ convened at the 2004
World Conservation Congress in Bangkok. This initial event in a
multi-step MSP included ministers from five Mekong countries
(all but Myanmar) as well as non-governmental actors. Sensitive
issues were tabled for discussion – inter-basin water diversions
into Thailand, Salween hydropower development in China’s Yun-
nan province, and threats to the Tonle Sap ecosystem that would
be disastrous for Cambodia. At the time this was a significant
achievement, specifically, bringing China and Lower Mekong gov-
ernments, and non-state actors, within the same arena. The event
served to register the Salween hydropower, Thailand grid and Ton-
le Sap threats as transboundary issues of high importance, that de-
served to be the subject of multi-country, multi-stakeholder
deliberation.9
Subsequent steps included the ‘Mekong Region Waters Dia-
logue: Exploring Water Futures Together’, covering governance is-
sues in several sectors and at several levels. In short this MSP was
intended to be ‘‘a regional multi-stakeholder platform organised to
provide an opportunity for high-quality, multi-faceted, debate and
learning that will contribute to improving water governance in the
Mekong Region’’ (IUCN et al., 2007). It gave a boost to proponents
of transparency and deliberation.
MSPs can help routinise deliberation, enabling complex water
issues to be more rigorously examined in better informed negotia-
tions (Dore et al., 2010b). This is not to say that MSPs are a panacea.
For example, we have observed that MSPs can be captured by play-
ers who are able to frame and control the debate and keep it con-
fined within the limits of their choice. We have also seen MSPs
permitted to engage many stakeholders in good faith, but be ig-
nored in subsequent decision-making (Hall and Manorom, 2010).
Despite these caveats, we have found that networks and organisa-
tions with flexible and diverse links with governments, firms and
civil society have been useful to convene and facilitate dialogues
on sensitive but important topics for development in the Mekong
Region (Dore, 2007; Dore and Lebel, 2010; Manorom, 2011). The
outcomes of these are not primarily in terms of direct decisions
on projects, policies or institutional reform; but rather, in making
sure alternatives are considered and assessed, a diversity of views
and arguments recognised and mutual understanding improved.
E-flows are another tool that can be employed in interactive
ways conducive to social learning (Dyson et al., 2003; Lazarus
et al., 2012). Discussing and setting E-flows regimes require the
integration of a range of disciplines from across the social, political
and natural sciences. Above all, it requires processes of cooperative
negotiation between various stakeholders that help bridge their
different and often competing interests over water. Hence, E-flows
are well-suited to MSP approaches. There have been few applica-
tions of E-flows in the Mekong Region, but some with which the
authors are very familiar include rapid E-flows assessments of
the Huong River in Vietnam (IUCN, 2005), Songkhram River in
Thailand (Blake et al., 2010), and Integrated Basin Flow Manage-
ment (IBFM) project of Lower Mekong River (MRC, 2006), each of
which have been recently reviewed (Lazarus et al., 2012). E-flows
processes have substantial potential in the Mekong Region to assist
river basin managers as they grapple with competing demands,
including the need for environmental sustainability (Blake et al.,
2010; Lazarus et al., 2012). At present, however, the tool has only
been used in academic or technical settings and has not yet been
internalised into MSPs or influential decision-making arenas.
Deploying scenarios can enhance MSPs, E-flows and other delib-
erative forums. Scenarios should improve understanding of uncer-
tainties not hide them. The goal of formal scenario analysis is to
generate contrasting stories of what the future of a geographical
area, or a policy sector, or an organisation might look like, depend-
ing on plausible combinations of known, but uncertain social and
environmental forces. The analyst and others participating in the
process should gain insight in the contrast between alternative sto-
ries. Good scenarios are rigorous, self-reflexive narratives: they at-
tempt to be internally coherent, to incorporate uncertainties, and
to be explicit about assumptions and causality (Lebel, 2006).
Mekong organisations have been experimenting with scenario-
building. A project review was critical of the high-profile use of
scenarios by the MRC in its Basin Development Planning Phase 2,
being surprised by the absence of supporting storylines for model-
ing work that made it hard to gauge the possible sequencing of
events, to explore assumptions and alternatives, and consider the
responses of people to be affected by the infrastructure expansion
at the core of the basin planning considerations (Lebel, 2010). The
reviewer was concerned that the scenarios ‘‘are not plausible sto-
ries of the future, but little more than alternative model runs’’
using too few variables; and moreover, that ‘‘another limiting fea-
ture is the lack of attention given to uncertainties, exactly the type
of analysis for which scenario planning is most suited’’. The MRC
scenarios (MRC, 2011a) initially had a narrow concentration on
more, or much more, hydropower and irrigation expansion. Over
time the surrounding narrative became richer (MRC, 2011b), aided
by the deliberative force of independent panels of experts (Interna-
tional POE, 2010; Regional POE, 2010); M-POWER fielded the re-
gional panel of experts in response to the findings of PN67.
Our scenarios research (Foran, 2010b; Lebel, 2010) found that
more deliberative use of scenarios in the Mekong Region could im-
prove the accountability of major private and state actors involved
in water resources development and management in several ways.
First, by encouraging actors to be more explicit about the key
assumptions they make regarding causal connections, benefits
and risks. Opportunities need to be created for this to happen,
either in discussions around a table, or through periods where re-
ports and findings are open for scrutiny and comment; or, by forc-
ing actors to explore timeframes beyond typical planning horizons,
and considering alternatives beyond familiar comfort zones and, in
so doing, help generate creative water-related use and investment
solutions.
4.2. Technical
Transboundary water governance in the Mekong evidences the
use of various technical tools that claim to influence decision mak-
ing. Here we consider the entwined practices of cost–benefit anal-
ysis, impact assessment and several types of modeling (some of
which underpin scenario-building processes).
Given that development projects inevitably have numerous and
varied impacts, formal approval processes require cost–benefit
analyses, monetisation of values, and compensation recommenda-
tions. Cost–benefit analysis produces estimates of Net Present Va-
lue and Internal Rate of Return comparisons; but, is prone to
externalising factors that can’t be easily monetised. At the strategic
level for a sector such as hydropower, a tool such as least-cost
expansion planning is also vital (Maunsell and Lahmeyer Interna-
tional, 2004). Cost–benefit analysis and least-cost planning will al-
ways be important, but are now complemented by EIA, social
impact assessment, strategic environmental assessment (SEA),
cumulative impact assessment (CIA), vulnerability assessment, etc.
9 Impromptu filming of the entire event by a bold Chinese NGO, and dialogue
transcription by Earth Negotiations Bulletin (http://www.iisd.ca/enbvol/enb-back-
ground.htm) further assisted the semi-official registration of the topics.
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Environmental impact assessments are commonly undertaken
in the Mekong Region, usually with a project focus and are often
seen as the final step in a pre-ordained approvals process. In the
project we were more interested in the recent arrival of other im-
pact assessment tools, such as CIA and SEA. There have only been a
few experiences with these tools in the Mekong Region. A CIA of
the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project in Laos (ADB, 2004), was
technically strong, but remarkably disconnected from the Nam
Theun 2 approvals process. The tool was deployed, but its findings
were hardly deliberated, as the decision to proceed was already
locked in. Another major effort was undertaken to prepare a CIA
of the Nam Ngum 3 hydropower project (ADB, 2008). This is just
one of a cascade of up to 14 dams being planned for Nam Ngum
river basin, also in Laos. As with Nam Theun 2, the deployment
of the tool was driven by the requirements of the Asian Develop-
ment Bank. Again, there has been little discussion of the CIA’s find-
ings in Laos, due to the restrained opportunities for deliberation.
But, the requirements of public financiers such as ADB and the
International Finance Corporation, coupled with the creation of a
new Nam Ngum River Basin Committee, may yet see this CIA assist
decision-making about cascade management by providing an ob-
ject around which to catalyse discussions.
SEAs are gaining in popularity. In Vietnam, hydropower expan-
sion has been assessed within the context of provincial hydro-
power plans (ICEM, 2008), and the national power development
plan (Soussan et al., 2009). There are now efforts by the Asian
Development Bank to progress the production of a rolling GMS en-
ergy strategy, after first applying an SEA filter,10 however, at time of
writing the extent of the buy-in by the lead energy sector represen-
tatives in each country is questionable, with Lao government repre-
sentatives being the most vocal in their scepticism.
A review of the application of CIA and SEA in the Mekong Region
(Keskinen and Kummu, 2010; Keskinen et al., 2012) found that
they are often used in a limited way, for example, with the strate-
gic element missing, and as a political patch, in an attempt to depo-
liticise and technically justify development decisions. To be most
useful and aligned with their strategic purpose possibilities, these
tool need to be employed early, providing stakeholders with
opportunities and context to participate in a meaningful way in
decision-making arenas.
The way problems are framed – as investigation of the transfor-
mation of the Mekong waterscape by large hydro-infrastructure –
as opposed, for example, to a detailed investigation of Mekong
livelihoods transformation – ensures assessments still rely heavily
on hydrological modelling. These only provide macro-level
estimates of expected flows at particular nodes in a river basin,
however, and cannot properly represent local complexity. They
do not capture daily water level fluctuations or water quality
changes and their relationships with aquatic ecosystems, most
notably fisheries, and livelihoods. Hydrological analysis has fo-
cused on average monthly flow regime changes instead of the
extreme years and events when hydropower impacts can drive
natural systems over critical thresholds. Under the guise of sophis-
tication, simple models have been used to legitimate interests, for
example, by supporting a powerful narrative that a basin is ripe for
further exploitation of its water resources: ‘‘the Mekong river
system has significant tolerance for development, including of
hydropower and water diversion for irrigation’’ (WB and ADB,
2006). It has been necessary to point out that ‘‘a river is more than
a hydrograph, and the hydrological impacts (if the models are
accurate) are not a proxy for drawing conclusions about ecological
and social impacts’’ (IUCN et al., 2007).
Johnston and Kummu (2012) have reviewed various hydrologi-
cal modelling activities in the Mekong Basin. Not many have given
much support for a holistic and integrated approach in develop-
ment impact assessment. Emerging plans for Mekong mainstream
dam construction have highlighted the increasing need for infor-
mation about ecosystem and social impacts and, consequently,
are stimulating significant advances in modelling approaches to
meet the ‘‘what if?’’ demands of inquiring observers.
Models can do more. A quest for greater coupling of hydrologi-
cal and ecological systems (Richey et al., 2000) has gained momen-
tum in the last decade. For example, models are being developed
for Cambodia’s Tonle Sap that predict how altered hydrological
and sediment/nutrient regimes will affect riparian vegetation and
the fisheries productivity of the lake (Kummu et al., 2006; Lam-
berts and Koponen, 2008; Sarkkula and Koponen, 2010). Climate
and land use change are also being linked to water flows (Costa-
Cabral et al., 2008; Hoanh et al., 2010a). There has also been pro-
gress in modelling sediment. An example of this work projects that
more than 50% of total basin sediment load will be trapped annu-
ally by the Mekong mainstream hydropower cascade in Yunnan
(Kummu et al., 2010). Existing and proposed dams in the Lower
Mekong Basin would trap even more of the fertile sediments, pos-
sibly even 90% (Sarkkula and Koponen, 2010), with substantial
likely negative impacts on Cambodia, including the entire Tonle
Sap system, and parts of the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. A more ro-
bust and comprehensive sediment accounting for the entire sys-
tem is yet to be done. More holistic models – including the
MRC’s Decision Support Framework, a watershed IWRM model,
and a 3D flood, sediment and water quality model – have been
integrated into an MRCModelling Toolbox. Following this progress,
a key next step is enhanced visualisation of the interactions in
complex systems. In 2011, the MRC was able to launch a new por-
tal system that brings a huge repository of decision support data
into life. The Virtual Mekong Basin will likely catalyse rapid further
development of integrated modelling applications.
In summary, we have found that the application of technical
tools is seldom a neutral and scientific exercise insulated from pol-
itics and power relationships. For example, preparation of a strate-
gic sector plan or an impact assessment can quickly transform into
a political process where facts mingle with values and interests.
4.3. Advocacy
Campaigns can be considered a vehicle for the application of
suites of advocacy tools, such as: lobbying, protesting, advertising,
debating etc. Oppositional advocacy in (parts of) the Mekong Re-
gion is well-developed. Local, national or transnational networks
of activists that are organised to resist dominant institutions, inter-
ests and discourses can play a large role in decision-making or
decision-influencing processes (Dryzek, 2001). Wide-ranging anal-
ysis of advocacy has been provided, for example: exploring indig-
enous people’s lobbying in the international arenas of the United
Nations (Tauli-Corpuz, 1998); questioning whether global civil
society is an opportunity or obstacle for democracy (Scholte,
2007); and documenting activist engagement in processes such
as the World Commission on Dams (Briscoe, 2010; McCully,
2001; WCD, 2000). A subject of regular analysis is the controversial
issue of the extent to which the ‘‘free, prior and informed consent’’
of project-affected people should guide project decision-making
(Carino and Colchester, 2010). All these topics, as well as legiti-
macy and civil society strategies, are all highly relevant in the Me-
kong water context, as the following examples illustrate.
A major conflict in Thailand since the 1990s has been the battle
over the construction, operation and consequences of the Pak Mun
Dam, located in the northeast of the country, on the Mun River,
near its tributary with the Mekong (Foran, 2006, 2010a; Foran
10 See ADB Regional Technical Assistance project #7764 ‘Ensuring sustainability of
GMS Regional Power Development’.
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and Manorom, 2009; Missingham, 2004; Amornsakchai et al.,
2000). Project affected people at Pak Mun have learnt to mobilise,
often in diverse coalitions, and capture public arenas of delibera-
tion by undertaking, compiling and publishing their own data
and research.
Under the slogan of ‘‘Our River Feeds Millions’’, the Save the
Mekong campaign has been catalysed and galvanised by the resur-
gent interest in planned dams for the Lower Mekong mainstream.
Campaign supporters argue that these dams pose extraordinary
threats to local livelihoods, biodiversity and natural heritage as
the flip-side to energy and income benefits. The campaign has suc-
cessfully raised the profile of dam decision-making by Mekong
governments through the strategic use of photography, media, let-
ter-writing, and direct representation. For example, more than
23,000 signatures were attached to a petition warning of the neg-
ative consequences of Lower Mekong mainstream dams, sent to
the Prime Ministers of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam on
19 October 2009. Word of the campaign also reached distant par-
liaments in places such as the United States (The Straits Times,
2011) and Australia.
The Save the Mekong campaign is an example of using advocacy
tools to influence decision-making processes and arenas. In a short
time, it has succeeded in heightening the understanding of risks to
ecosystems and livelihoods, and is pressing governments – both in
and outside the Mekong Region – to take their responsibilities for
project affected people, and nature, seriously. A major achievement
of the campaign has been to succeed, despite available science
being inconclusive, in reframing the perceived dams threats from
environmental protection to food security and the potential for
‘‘irreversible economic catastrophe’’ (Brown, 2011). This has con-
tributed to greatly elevating the issues in the minds of regional
and international policymakers.
Resistance can be fertile (Dryzek, 2001), but can also be danger-
ous. If perceiving decisions or plans over water as unfair, people
can choose to resist through protest, or refuse to take the actions
demanded of them (Scott, 1985). This can be a high-risk action in
parts of the Mekong Region. Those with more power can choose
suppression, to enforce or overturn decisions. Water resources
development disputes can fuel or be a source of conflict, especially
where there are wider tensions in society. Pak Mun had violent
times. But, Myanmar is currently the most extreme case in the re-
gion, where resistance has spilled over into violence. There is mil-
itary-led and resistance-led violence associated with several
recently completed hydropower projects and others under con-
struction (Burma Rivers Network, 2011; Environment News Ser-
vice, 2011). For example, fighting erupted around the Chinese
Tarpein Dam in northeast Myanmar in June 2011 between Kachin
militia and government forces, with reports of at least 10,000 peo-
ple displaced (Strangio, 2011). The Myitsone Dam, also in Kachin
State, is another project being resisted, fueling substantial anti-
Chinese sentiments, as this and other projects are seen as destroy-
ing local natural and cultural treasures whilst exporting energy
and benefits to China (Din, 2011).
Resistance to these decisions will continue, particularly in the
absence of any deliberation or negotiation opportunity. A decision
in October 2011 by the Government of Myanmar to suspend the
Myitsone project is being hailed as a triumph by local civil society
campaigners, but the truth is more complex as the shifting geopo-
litical interests of the Government of Myanmar have also come into
play. Of course lobbying can also be in the opposite direction. Many
in China want the Myitsone dam to be re-started as for some it is a
‘‘bellwether on other major Chinese investments’’, such as oil and
gas pipelines (Kemp, 2012). Inevitably, it will be a protracted strug-
gle, with accusations and counter accusations being made. Already
foreigners and local greens are being targeted, with claims that
‘‘with the support of foreign funding, extremist environmentalists
were creating rumours and tricking people’’ (Boting, 2012). Deci-
sions as large as Myitsone are complex. We simply argue that using
our explanatory frameworkmight usefully guide those trying to re-
search and understand the detail of the shifting situation.
5. Discussion
5.1. Mekong water governance
The arenas in which tools are introduced in the Mekong Region
are complex. Interests are diverse and capabilities of different ac-
tors to control agendas and shape decision-making processes are
unevenly distributed. Many arenas are closed to key stakeholders,
and those which are open may be irrelevant to decision-making. In
general, decision-making unfolds in arenas characterised by de-
bates and overlapping or antagonistic view points. Contested dis-
courses (and associated options, ideas, values, narratives etc.),
can be observed in confrontations at meetings, public hearings,
and multi-stakeholder platforms, as well as in written texts and
the media.
Rhetoric of participation is not always matched in practice. For
example, Floch and Blake (2011), also part of the project, under-
took transboundary water diversion research by examining a sup-
ply decision about whether or not to transfer ‘‘untapped’’ water
from the ‘‘water-rich’’ Nam Ngum Basin in Laos, across the Mekong
to the ‘‘water-stressed’’ northeast of Thailand. The researchers
joined in a public hearing with a carefully selected audience of gov-
ernment officials, Thai scholars, and representatives from main-
stream civil society organisations. The consultant team intended
to test their working hypothesis on the practicality of the project,
but discussions were disrupted by a group of protesters that took
centre stage and demanded their voices be heard, that people
‘‘be informed about the project’’, and ‘‘the water transfer between
Thailand and Laos be cancelled’’. In tracing the process, Floch and
Blake found a wide gap between the rhetoric adopted both in na-
tional and international mainstream publications advocating more
participatory practices and the real politik of water resources plan-
ning that seek to keep a lid on dissenting views.
Many decisions are taken on political grounds, by administra-
tive fiat, or according to a particular, often narrow, web of interests.
Hall and Manorom (2010) document numerous cases across the
Mekong Region, such as Yali Falls, Pak Mun and Theun Hinboun
dams, where scientific research was commissioned, ostensibly for
decision-making purposes, only to be ignored by politicians mak-
ing critical water infrastructure construction or operating
decisions.
We observe that core decision-making processes about water in
the Mekong Region are still often opaque to all but privileged insid-
ers. Meaningful public deliberation is still the exception rather
than the rule. Nevertheless, more recently, we observe a delibera-
tive turn and hopeful signs of water governance change, for exam-
ple: vibrant elements in the Chinese media interested in
understanding and reporting the water-related perspectives of
neighbouring countries (Xing et al., 2010); an increasingly inquis-
itive National Assembly in Laos; bold inputs to public policy-
making debates by Vietnamese scientists; increased space for civil
society analysts in Cambodia to engage in state irrigation policy
debates; peoples’ environmental impact assessment in Thailand
(Manorom, 2011) building on villager-led Tai Baan participatory
action research (Srettachau, 2007); and, improvements in MRC for-
ums resulting in more participatory analyses of project merits.
Lower Mekong mainstream dams are now being examined
more openly. This is a result of many factors, including the MRC
SEA process (ICEM, 2010), and the subsequent, formal, prior con-
sultation process facilitated by the MRC, that has yielded various
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technical contributions (MRC, 2011c), and opened an inter-govern-
ment window for more informed discussions between Lower Me-
kong countries. Each of these processes has been improved by
advocacy from civil society, science, academia and governments.
Across the Mekong Region we see River Basin Organisations
(RBOs) being created ostensibly to address all types of land and
water resources challenges. Thailand has created RBOs across the
country. Vietnam has also experimented with the establishment of
RBOs in several places, including the Red River (Molle and Hoanh,
2009), the Sre Pok, and has recently committed to another for (at
least) theVietnamportionof the Se San. In2010, the Laogovernment
also enacted a decree to establish RBOs and is proceeding to do just
that. In 2011, Cambodia debated a river basin management sub-
decree that will also establish RBOs across the country. This wave
of RBOs are obvious candidates to experiment with the application
of deliberation and technical tools as a way of enriching the multi-
actor engagement they are supposed to encourage and facilitate.
More generally, we note that among early efforts, deliberative
engagements vary hugely in inclusiveness, quality of content,
structure, and how they are facilitated. As a result, the quality
and influence of those conversations and relationships varies. Dia-
logues, good and bad, broad and narrow, may all influence negoti-
ations and decisions that are crucial to improving water
governance – but, clearly, more needs to be done to improve their
implementation if they are to contribute to their full potential.
In the Mekong Region more informed and informing, multi-
stakeholder deliberations, that are sensitive to different scale and
level interests, appear crucial to off-setting power imbalances,
and increasing transparency and accountability within the politics
of water. A shift to a more constructive and deliberative water pol-
itics would be assisted by the fostering of a community of water
governance practitioners, analysts and policymakers that under-
stand the influence of context and drivers, and the potential and
limitations of decision-support and -exploration tools.
5.2. Benefits and observations from using the framework
The framework we have developed for analysing transboundary
water governance assists our understanding of engagement anddeci-
sion-making involving sociallycomplexwater. Eachheadingandsub-
heading in the frameworkacts as a prompt to the analyst to take stock
of the situation being assessed and reflect on key aspects. The frame-
work acknowledges the centrality of power and politics but is not
subsumed by these topics. Context, drivers, arenas, tools, decisions
and impacts all matter. The benefit of using the framework is to keep
all these elements within the realm of the analysis.
Though it may be power that enables, the framework reminds,
and our experiences shows, that it is drivers that shape actors.
Interests are often reflected in the preferred discourses and institu-
tions that actors privilege. Drivers also influence tool selection. For
example, adherents to discourses that trumpet transparency and
accountability will tend to agree to the deployment of deliberation
tools, and use of technical tools in more deliberative ways. On the
contrary, adherents to scientific rationalism may have a natural
tendency to deploy technical tools, such as modelling, in efforts
to find techno-answers rather than as stimulants for more deliber-
ative modes of scenario-building and debate.
Tools can become boundary objects of debate within arenas. We
have found that, used in a deliberative setting, technical tool po-
tential can be unlocked when their process or product becomes a
boundary object, serving as an interface among different commu-
nities of practice (Guston, 2001; Star and Griesemer, 1989). Effec-
tive boundary objects help bring together different types of
expertise – scientific, managerial and political. Boundary objects,
as devices supporting research-action arenas (van Kerkhoff and
Lebel, 2006) and assessments (Cash and Moser, 2000), can help
bring different forms of knowledge together and lead to co-produc-
tion of new knowledge. The ambiguity and flexibility of boundary
objects allows different parties to continue conversation and nego-
tiation without having or requiring identical understandings or
objectives. For example, in our Mekong illustration, the SEA of
Lower Mekong mainstream dams (ICEM, 2010) became a boundary
object. In committing to a participatory process, the tool-wielders
found themselves in the middle of a multi-sided debate where
both facts and values were in dispute. The SEA process provided
a space for debate that had not previously been available. The
SEA product was also a critically important knowledge input for
the subsequent, MRC secretariat’s review of the Xayaburi dam pro-
posal (MRC, 2011c).
Tools can contain or further empower actors. For example, use of
a deliberation or advocacy tool can be a counter to obvious power
imbalances. In situations where power assets are unequally shared,
a campaign that successfully targets particular issues or opponents,
can level the playing field. The Save the Mekong campaign provides
another illustration. The campaign has competently reframed the
debate about Lower Mekong mainstream dams via its multi-
pronged efforts that include: use of the local and internationalmed-
ia, regional and international politicians; and behind the scenes
support for legal challenges that aim to ensure claims and counter
claims are tested in the deliberative arena of the Thai court system.
In summary, the framework provides multiple points of entry to
an analysis and can be used to map complex water governance
situations. Used in this way it can assist those seeking both an
overview and an understanding of specific aspects that are
inter-related.
6. Conclusions
In the Mekong we have found evidence that water resources-re-
lated allocation choices can be improved by bringing into arenas
different perspectives and fostering deliberation to inform and
shape negotiations and decisions. Specifically, we suggest that
water governance practice will be improved when:
– . . . multi-stakeholder platforms exploring alternative
futures, are deployed to build trust and cooperation needed
for actors to work together to help resolve water allocation
issues;
– . . . environmental flows assessments are used to improve
effective knowledge for water allocation, by clarifying risks
and benefits of different flow regimes on different water
users and ecosystems;
– . . . scenario building, with the participation of marginalised
peoples’ representatives, is used to improve transparency
in water resources-related allocation by clarifying and
probing actors’ assumptions and motivations;
– . . . strategic environmental assessment is used to explore
the broad impacts of existing, proposed and alternative
development policies and plans early on;
– . . . holistic modeling is used to quantitatively assess
impacts of scenarios and development policies and to gen-
erate base information for EIAs, SEAs and CIAs;
– . . . oppositional advocacy pressure is maintained to ensure
that political space is available for civil society and con-
cerned actors to safely contest and contribute to policies,
proposals and decisions;
– . . . prior to making major infrastructure investments, that
scenario building, impact assessments, multi-stakeholder
dialogue and transparent negotiations become a part of
normal practice;
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– . . . negotiation processes retain both elements of competi-
tion and collaboration, realising they will never attain per-
fect consensus, but having an emphasis on coming to fair
and workable agreements.
Within and beyond the Mekong, a multitude of diverse actors
wrestle with drivers and tools within arenas that produce or influ-
ence water-related decisions. Appreciation of actor and arena
dynamics is required. The framework for analysing transboundary
water governance complexes assists our understanding of deci-
sion-making that is saturated with politics and the exercise of
power. In addition to highlighting connections, the heuristic
framework also includes desirable attributes of decision impacts.
Policymakers and practitioners should pay full attention to the
fairness and sustainability of allocation and associated investment
choices. Ideally decisions will be the result of an informed and
negotiated process that has assessed options and impacts, re-
spected rights, accounted for risks, acknowledged responsibilities
and sought to fairly distribute rewards – the essence of delibera-
tive water governance.
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12. Conclusions 
Water governance in the Mekong Region can be made fairer and more effective by 
expanding the opportunities for new, and improving the quality of existing, deliberation 
arenas.  A deliberation-deficit in the Mekong Region has led to poor decisions and 
unfair distribution of benefits, burdens and risks.  But, recently, there also promising 
examples of quality deliberation and political shifts that are enhancing water 
governance. 
The five journal articles and five book chapters presented in this thesis have explored 
the principal research question: How can water governance be fairer and more effective 
in Mekong Region and beyond?  In this final section and chapter (Part D, Chapter 12), I 
present a synopsis of the research findings and lessons.  Next I articulate my vision for 
Deliberative Water Governance.  Finally, I reflect on the research process and point to 
worthy areas for future endeavour. 
I refer the reader to the key diagram in Chapter 1 (Figure 3) that illustrates the logic of 
the thesis and my journey, firstly assessing water governance in the Mekong Region, 
before focusing on the existing use and potential of deliberative processes. 
In Part B (Chapters 2-5), contested waterscapes were explored in chapters focused on 
the complex tapestry of Mekong regionalisms and governance, hydropower expansion, 
and a marginalised Mekong River Commission.  Chapter 2 was an initial exploration to 
ascertain the general state of water-related governance in the Mekong Region.  Due to 
its magnitude, opacity and potential for transboundary impact, the need became obvious 
to better understand Yunnan hydropower status and governance, hence the research and 
production of Chapter 3.  It was clear by 2008 that Lower Mekong mainstream dams 
were back on the agenda for Lower Mekong governments, and that it was a major 
foreign policy issue for all Mekong countries and their external development partners, 
hence the research for Chapter 4.  The role of the Mekong River Commission as a 
transboundary water governance actor warranted closer examination that yielded 
Chapter 5.  In combination, the Part B analysis confirmed that significant scope exists 
for improving regional water governance, and that deliberation has been in short supply. 
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Part C comprised six chapters (Chapters 6-11).  Deliberation deficits observed and 
reported in Part B provoked exploration of deliberative processes in Part C as a potential 
pathway to improving water governance.  I examined firstly international practice, 
including still-topical issues from the World Commission on Dams, and the potential of 
multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs).  Fair and effective ways to ‘gain public 
acceptance’ are central to each of Chapters 6-8.  By then I had also examined Mekong 
practice and the efficacy of MSPs as a governance tool, noting their unfulfilled potential 
in Chapter 9.  Having examined the context and made a case for MSPs in the previous 
chapters, Chapter 10 focused on the politics of deliberation, scales and levels in a series 
of Mekong Region examples.  My research to this point had forced me to think more 
about the interplay within transboundary water governance complexes, which led to the 
articulation of an explanatory framework, and illustration in the Mekong Region. 
This chapter distills and analyses a range of governance challenges, and provides 
evidence that deliberative processes – inserted into political arenas – have made water 
governance fairer and more effective, by reducing power imbalances among 
stakeholders and assisting negotiations to be more transparent and informed. 
12.1 Synopsis of Part B Contested Waterscapes 
Ch 2 sub-question: What is the general state of water-related governance 
in the Mekong Region? 
In the research for this chapter I explored recent changes in the Mekong Region and 
concluded that they could be better understood using new conceptual frameworks for 
governance and regionalism – such as nodal governance, and the ‘new regionalisms 
approach’ – which recognise that the social geography has altered, and that state-centric 
modes of analysis no longer suffice, if indeed they ever did.  I found that the regional 
governance landscape is being substantially reshaped by the efforts of many different 
actors, including an emerging critical civil society.  Four tracks of regional governance 
fora were examined – Track 1 inter-government; Track 2 interactive state-civil society; 
Track 3 civil society leading, less impeded by and less subordinate to states; Track 4 
civil society supporting local communities, with low expectations of states – each with a 
different, dominant logic (Chapter 2, Table 1). 
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Despite this diversity, it is acknowledged that states in the Mekong Region still 
dominate governance, but some states more than others.  Regional governance in the 
Mekong – to the extent that water-related governance is a good indicator – is inadequate 
to equitably or effectively govern far-reaching regional change. 
My inquiry pathways for assessing governance were a further set of questions that used 
power, sustainability, holism, participation, transparency, equity and accountability for 
enquiry.  I found a dominance of national interest and the much vaunted Mekong ‘spirit 
of cooperation’ between countries to be optimistically over-stated.  The research for this 
chapter also revealed: a great reticence by states to do anything that could be construed 
as ceding sovereignty; an absence of holistic approaches to examine options and 
impacts; restricted access to information within and between states; and restricted space 
for civil society engagement.  Regarding the latter, I concluded: 
Within an often oppressive context, finding mechanisms in each country to allow civil 
society to genuinely participate in decision making remains a significant challenge.  
Whilst slow change is evident, states still prefer top-down approaches which are often 
formal and intimidating to all but the most self assured.  Nevertheless, as a tribute to 
persistence, and aided by some aspects of globalisation, there has been an emergence of 
a critical civil society in the Mekong Region.  It is playing an important role in 
challenging and contesting governments of the region to improve and more robustly 
scrutinise each others’ performance and approaches (Dore, 2003:435). 
The chapter makes several contributions to theory and practice.  Firstly, in the 
characterisation of new regionalisms and governance tracks, as illustrated in the 
Mekong Region.  Secondly, in the governance assessment questions.  Thirdly, in the 
detailed analysis of Mekong Region governance processes, including: Mekong River 
water use negotiations, the Mekong River ‘channel improvement’ project, and an initial 
exploration of the Lancang (Upper Mekong) hydroelectric dams in China. 
Ch 3 sub-question: What is driving hydropower expansion in Yunnan and 
what are associated governance issues arising? 
In this chapter I explored the drivers of hydropower expansion in Yunnan, including 
energy sector reforms across China.  Yunnan has over 600 rivers forming six major 
river basin systems: Dulong (Irrawaddy), Nu (Salween), Lancang (Mekong), Jinsha 
(Yangtze), Zhu (Pearl), Yuan and Lixian (both flow into the Red in Vietnam).  The 
province has 24% of China’s hydropower potential.  The Nu, Lancang and Jinsha are 
each in China’s top six rivers for hydropower potential.  The province already provides 
about 10% of China’s hydropower, but a large increase in generation is planned to feed 
into national and regional grids. 
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This chapter provided an update on the status of hydroelectric dam building in Yunnan 
– looking at the Nu, Lancang and Jinsha rivers – and then situated this within the wider 
context of China’s changing political economy.  Key drivers for Yunnan hydropower 
expansion were found to include the ongoing push drive for economic growth, China’s 
associated energy security concerns, the Western Region Development Strategy and a 
political environment in which energy entrepreneurs have strong incentives to increase 
the size of their businesses. 
At the time of this research many important governance issues had arisen.  There is a 
blurring of roles in public-private partnerships that makes it difficult to determine or 
separate public and private interest.  There is increasing dissatisfaction with the non-
transparency of decision making, approvals and compliance processes which makes 
accountability difficult.  There are concerns about the interests and types of knowledge 
that are being privileged and the process limitations which hinder presentation of 
alternative viewpoints.  Moreover, many social and ecological costs are externalised 
from ‘return on investment’ equations, and the competitive need for companies – in the 
new business operating environment – to retain market share and steadily expand 
generating capacity. 
The research identified the need for China to revisit its energy policy, including the 
hydropower component.  It also identified the need to overhaul energy development 
governance processes, such as: option formulation, debate, evaluation, negotiation and 
monitoring. 
A contribution of this chapter is its exploration of the connections between economic 
globalisation and the creation of quasi-public entities with state rights but lacking state 
accountabilities.  A further contribution is the detailed analysis of Yunnan hydropower 
expansion – to that point, opaque to China outsiders – on the Nu, Lancang and Jinsha 
rivers.  This chapter was first published as a working paper in 2004 at a time when 
Yunnan hydropower plans and data were tightly held, and not available for public 
discussion, either within or beyond China.   
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Ch 4 sub-question: What is driving hydropower in Lower Mekong and 
what are associated transboundary governance challenges? 
The cumulative effects of the Lower Mekong hydropower projects – if built, and 
together with existing Chinese dams – will transform the Mekong by altering natural 
flow patterns and disrupting fisheries and other ecosystem services, to the detriment of 
the millions of people who depend on the river for their livelihoods.  Proposals for new 
dam construction are driven by several factors, including changing human 
demographics and development needs, energy and food security concerns, economic 
cooperation, and climate change.  The chapter links these social, ecological, economic, 
and political forces to ongoing regional governance issues and discusses how to 
improve the quality of Mekong hydropower decision making in a complex, 
transboundary setting. 
The scale of Mekong hydropower expansion makes it a critical driver of change in the 
Lower Mekong in its own right.  The first mainstream dam in the Lower Mekong 
proposed by Laos, the Xayaburi Dam, was drawn on to highlight several more specific 
drivers of change in action.  First, the governments of Lower Mekong countries are 
recognising increased opportunities to proceed with large-scale development because of 
their decreasing dependence on multilateral funding provided by international 
institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.  So far, most 
private hydropower investors have demonstrated limited commitment to environmental 
review, mitigation, or human livelihood safeguards, though this is slowly changing.  
Second, although there are considerable differences between individual countries, in 
general, all Lower Mekong countries have substantial room for improvement in filling 
knowledge gaps and in implementing legal regimes and other public policies.  
Compliance with national environmental regulations is often lax, and current 
transnational private-sector protocols are mostly advisory, non-binding, and 
experimental. 
The research undertaken for this chapter found that impact assessments in the region are 
often confined to the focus country, with ecological and social risks typically 
downplayed.  Moreover, public policy decisions are often taken that serve narrow 
economic interests without seeking substantive input from those segments of society 
that will be most affected.  High-quality, integrated assessments and associated 
deliberative processes involving all stakeholders are still the exception rather than the 
norm. 
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A contribution of this chapter is the identification of inter-connected large-scale drivers 
of change and their linkage to specific drivers of hydropower and associated governance 
challenges.  A further contribution is in quantifying these drivers in the Lower Mekong 
context, and providing a concise update on the Xayaburi Dam based on my participation 
in the international policy dialogue surrounding the project, and my interviews with key 
actors in government, banking, the hydropower industry, and oppositional civil society. 
Ch 5 sub-question: What is the transboundary water governance practice 
and potential of the Mekong River Commission? 
This chapter reflects on the practice and potential of the Mekong River Commission 
(MRC), an inter-governmental organisation, at a time when all Mekong governments 
need to make informed decisions about whether, or how, to proceed with major projects 
that will have dramatic, transformative, national and transboundary impacts.  My 
departure point was reference to a series of major transboundary water governance 
controversies where the MRC has been marginalised. 
The chapter traces some of the tensions manifest within the MRC.  Article 1 of the 
Mekong Agreement is clear that the territorial domain of the MRC is the entire Mekong 
River Basin.  And yet, tributary development has usually been omitted from MRC 
Council and Joint Committee discussions.  Typically, MRC has been subdued about the 
risks associated with many development projects.  Notably, the first mention of the 
Precautionary Principle was in 2010 following completion of a strategic environmental 
assessment examining the potential impacts of Lower Mekong mainstream dams 
(ICEM, 2010).  Debates continue about the extent of the MRC constituency and its 
primary roles.  Also traced is the MRC’s ambiguous role in a proposed hydropower 
project at Don Sahong in southern Laos where many of these tensions became apparent. 
The chapter explains some of the nuances resulting in the deliberation deficit associated 
with transboundary water resources development: 
This is partly because proponents meet resistance from actors who prefer to reinforce 
contexts that are unfriendly to deliberation and favourable to pursuance of their vested 
interests.  Many actors still believe, or at least rhetorically pretend or are instructed, that 
domestic criticism of public policy is unpatriotic.  There is often an unhelpful 
conflation whereby dissent is mistakenly seen as synonymous with disloyalty.  Enquiry 
or criticism of water resources development plans, which impact across state borders, is 
seen by some as encroachment on hard-won state sovereignty and legitimate national 
security concerns.  Hence, the resistance to transnational deliberative politics should not 
be underestimated (Dore and Lazarus, 2009:358). 
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That said, new flow regimes will have to be negotiated on Mekong River tributaries 
and, perhaps, the mainstream.  Relatively little attention is being paid to how river flows 
will be ‘managed’ post-construction.  There are a multitude of possible scenarios.  I 
argued that state and non-state actors need to become more familiar with flow 
negotiation tools and approaches that have the potential to ensure that all relevant issues 
and perspectives are taken into account in the inevitable negotiations ahead.  In 
particular, I emphasised that MRC must increase its engagement in these issues. 
My research concluded the following: 
The MRC has deservedly received criticism for its performance thus far; but there 
remain many optimistic, latent supporters of the MRC initiative, hoping ‘the family’ 
will be enabled to capably respond to the current challenges. This will require the 
member governments, at the highest level, to ‘de-marginalize’ the MRC and its 
implementing parts, allowing them to make their best contributions (Dore and Lazarus, 
2009:378). 
The contribution of this chapter includes my early signalling of my vision for more 
deliberative water politics and governance, which I develop in the subsequent chapters.  
Moreover, my identification of MRC tensions is of interest to transboundary water 
governance scholars and practitioners from other regions.  A contribution to real world 
practice has been a prolonged effort to assist MRC experiment with deliberative 
processes in my work with IUCN, M-POWER and AusAID. 
12.2 Synopsis of Part C Deliberation Deficit 
Ch 6 sub-question: Is the World Commission on Dams still relevant? 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was an experiment in multi-stakeholder 
dialogue and global governance concerned with a subject area – large dams – that was 
fraught with conflict and controversy.  The WCD Report, Dams and Development: A 
New Framework for Decision-Making, was published in 2000 and accompanied by 
hopes that broad-based agreements would be forged on how to better manage water and 
energy development.  Ten years later, I co-edited a special issue of the Water 
Alternatives journal to revisit the WCD and its impacts, was second author of the guest 
editors’ synthesis (Chapter 6) and lead author of one of the papers in the set (Chapter 7). 
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The guest editors’ paper distilled the themes emerging from the special issue, namely: 
diverse perspectives about water and energy futures; new drivers of dam development, 
including climate change and new financiers; the continued pursuit of environmental 
and social justice; new assessment tools; advances in participation and accountability; 
negotiation, and the role of multi-stakeholder platforms for informing and shaping 
agreements. 
Drawing from messages repeated by many, but not all, contributed papers and 
viewpoints, we concluded: 
Based on the diverse perspectives across a range of topics, the changing drivers of dam 
development, and the new financiers of dams emerging, the papers and viewpoints in 
this special issue demonstrate the need for a renewed multi-stakeholder dialogue at 
multiple levels.  This would not be a redo of the WCD, but rather a rekindling and 
redesigning of processes and forums where mutual understanding, information-sharing, 
and norm-setting can occur (Moore et al., 2010:12). 
Ch 7 sub-question: What are the critical issues in ‘gaining public 
acceptance’ for key decisions? 
This chapter concentrates on gaining public acceptance (GPA), the first strategic 
priority recommended by the World Commission on Dams.  The core idea is that 
"public acceptance of key decisions is essential for equitable and sustainable water and 
energy resource development" (WCD, 2000:215).  GPA remains a central, thorny 
challenge for all parties interested in how society makes decisions about the 
development of water resources, the provision of energy, and the maintenance of 
ecosystems, whilst striving for social justice.  The WCD’s GPA is largely about issues 
of procedural justice (e.g. inclusion and access) and proposes process-related principles.  
Distributional justice is also important (e.g. equitable sharing of benefits; and, avoiding 
unfair and involuntary risk-bearing).  To earn legitimacy and more likely acceptance of 
important public decisions the paper suggests a comprehensive set of ‘gold standard’ 
state-society attributes for improving governance, and also argues the case for multi-
stakeholder platforms to be deployed. 
The chapter was written to assist the debate on large dams move forward with the GPA 
concept by acknowledging and exploring different points of view and suggesting other 
ways to pursue reasonable acceptance.  The contributions to theory include: clarifying 
the relationship of GPA to other WCD strategic priorities (Chapter 7, Figure 1); 
expanded justice principles for GPA (Chapter 7, Figure 2); and, ideal state-society 
elements conducive to GPA (Chapter 7, Figure 3). 
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The contribution to practice is in the analysis of problematic public participation issues.  
The chapter makes several arguments.  Differences in development and sustainability 
orientations are apparent in debates on dams and need to be explicitly considered rather 
than glossed over.  Politics and power imbalances pervade participatory processes, and 
require much more attention than they receive.  The accountability and legitimacy of 
state and non-state actors are crucial but complex as there are many ways to build public 
trust.  The arguments are reinforced with explanations and lessons gleaned from around 
the world. 
Ch 8 sub-question: What is the practice and potential of water-related 
multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs), globally? 
As Warner notes: “Multi-Stakeholder Platforms, by any other name, are currently ‘hot’ 
in the water sector.  As a recent phenomenon, they attract NGOs, national governments 
and multilateral development agencies under the same banner” (2007: Preface). 
In this chapter I present a synthesis of my research findings in theoretical and practical 
exploration of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs).  Choices about water often involve 
contesting facts and values.  MSPs are an approach to constructive engagement and 
learning about complex water problems.  In an MSP, deliberation is fostered among 
multiple, diverse stakeholders to help them make joint analysis prior to decisions.  
Differences are respected – or at least tabled, and hopefully, better understood – while 
pursuing fair and effective, workable agreements about complex issues. 
I have found that setting up an MSP requires good design and process led by credible 
and competent convenors.  The purpose and scope of an MSP must be clear, with 
appropriate scales and levels for deliberation and analysis (for example watershed 
versus river basin, or local district versus national).  There should be sufficient human, 
financial and information resources, political support and enough time available for 
deliberations to be completed.  Explicit recognition of politics and power should be 
incorporated into the MSP design and process.  
Moreover, I argued that high quality process, enabling effective deliberation, is key to 
MSPs earning legitimacy.  MSPs need high standards of deliberation, facilitation, 
inclusiveness, information exchange and communication with the participants and wider 
constituency. 
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Practical steps for organising an MSP must keep in mind the final goal of producing 
workable recommendations for forward action.  To commence, a steering group is often 
established and the rationale for an MSP is explained to help build a constituency of 
support for the process.  Convenors identify relevant stakeholders using stakeholder 
analysis and, as they come together, convenors and participating stakeholder 
representatives agree on rules of engagement, and roles and responsibilities.  A 
sufficiently thorough assessment of contested issues is needed that is informed by and 
of use to all stakeholders.  Deliberation tools such as scenario building help participants 
create options for workable recommendations based on learning about each others’ 
different interests, values, priorities, assumptions and constraints.  MSPs might also take 
and implement decisions, depending on the extent of their mandate.  
MSPs help deliberation to become routine, enabling complex water issues to be more 
rigorously examined in better informed negotiations.  MSPs can lead to a variety of 
desirable outcomes.  They can expand representation and participation of stakeholders 
in governance.  They encourage learning and greater understanding of 
interdependencies among stakeholders and ways of resolving contested issues.  By 
providing a pathway for deliberation, MSPs can lead to better decisions and water 
agreements that can be more successfully implemented. 
A key contribution of this chapter is my further elaboration of my conceptual 
framework for MSPs (first elaborated in Chapter 9, when focusing in the Mekong 
Region) with an emphasis on context, process, content and outcomes.  Moreover, I 
recommend institutionalising the practice of deliberative examination of options 
through the analytical lenses of: the rewards being sought from the use and further 
development of water resources, and the possible distribution of the full spectrum of the 
possible rewards/benefits/costs of various options; quantification of involuntary and 
voluntary water-related risks; clarification and protection of water-related rights; and 
acknowledgement of various water-related responsibilities of state and non-state actors. 
Concentrating on the 4Rs can ‘keep it simple’.  In putting them forward I am building 
on the ‘rights and risks’ approach taken by the World Commission on Dams: 
We believe there can no longer be any justifiable doubt about the following: … By 
bringing to the table all those whose rights are involved and who bear the risks 
associated with different options for water and energy resources development, the 
conditions for a positive resolution of competing interests and conflicts are created 
(WCD, 2000:xxviii). 
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The ‘rights and risks’ approach has been subsequently elaborated to ‘rights, risks and 
responsibilities’ (Bird et al., 2005; 2006).  In this chapter, and in the framing chapter for 
the Negotiate book (Dore and Smith, 2010) I extended the approach further still, 
bringing in ‘rewards’. 
Ch 9 sub-question: What is the practice and potential of MSPs in the 
Mekong Region? 
In this chapter I explore the existing diversity of regional water forums in the Mekong 
Region, whilst making no claim is made that all ‘earn the label’ of MSP.  Key Mekong 
challenges for MSPs are identified, evident from current practice and debate.  I point to 
several major infrastructure-heavy, mega-projects with transboundary dimensions.  
These include the hydropower development proposed for the Salween River, a 
hydropower-reliant energy grid being promoted by the Association of South East Asian 
Nations and the Asian Development Bank, a multi-faceted water grid explored by the 
Government of Thailand, and a ‘regional water strategy’ developed by The World Bank 
and Asian Development Bank.  I conclude that the governance of each project would be 
enhanced by a high-quality, transboundary MSP. 
The core argument is that MSPs have unfulfilled potential in the Mekong Region, 
within but also well beyond the realms of water-related governance.  In 2006 steps had 
been taken by IUCN and M-POWER, with other partners, to realise this potential via 
the launching of a Mekong Region Waters Dialogue (Annex D). 
The contribution to theory of this Mekong-focused chapter is my early 
conceptualisation of MSPs and articulation of their desirable characteristics to best 
contribute to water negotiations.  This chapter was published in a book led by the social 
learning school at Wageningen University that examined critically “the weird and 
wonderful panorama of multi-stakeholder processes from around the world” (2007: 
Preface).  The theoretical basis of MSPs is further advanced in Chapter 8. 
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Ch 10 sub-question: How do the politics of deliberation, scales and levels 
influence water-related governance? 
This chapter argued that understanding the politics of deliberation, scales, and levels is 
crucial to understanding the social complexity of water-related governance.  
Deliberative processes might complement and inform more conventional 
representational and bureaucratic approaches to planning and decision-making.  
However, they are also subject to scale and level politics, which can confound 
institutionalised decision-making.  Scale and level contests arise in dialogues and 
related arenas because different actors privilege particular temporal or spatial scales and 
levels in their analysis, arguments, and responses.  Scale contests might include whether 
to privilege administrative, hydrological, ecosystem, or economic boundaries.  Level 
contests might include whether to privilege the sub-district or the province, the tributary 
watershed or the international river basin, a river or a biogeographic region, and the 
local or the regional economy. 
In the Mekong Region there is a recurrent demand for water resources development 
projects and major policies proposed by governments and investors to be scrutinised in 
public.  Deliberative forms of engagement are potentially very helpful because they 
encourage supporters and critics to articulate assumptions and reasoning about the 
different opportunities and risks associated with alternative options.  In doing so, they 
often traverse and enable higher-quality conversations within and across scales and 
within and between levels.  Six case studies from the Mekong Region are examined 
using the context-content-process-outcomes framework I have devised and presented 
earlier in Chapter 8.  In this chapter I have presented evidence that scale and level 
politics affects the context, process, content, and outcomes of deliberative engagement 
in the Mekong Region where public deliberation is still far from being a norm.  This is 
particularly so where there are sensitive and far-reaching choices to be made about 
water use and energy production. 
The research contributions of this chapter include a framework depicting temporal and 
spatial scales and levels.  Other contributions of note include mapping examples of 
deliberative engagements in the Mekong Region onto the primary scales, and the 
examination of the six cases: creation of the MRC, basin-based water resources 
planning, basin-based banking, regionalised energy planning and power trading, multi-
level water dialogues, and Tonle Sap management in Cambodia. 
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Ch 11 sub-question: How can transboundary water governance complexes 
be better understood? 
In this chapter I have led the development and illustration of a heuristic framework for 
analysing transboundary water governance complexes.  The framework portrays the 
importance of, and connections between: context, drivers, arenas, tools, decisions and 
impacts.  There are many different water governance actors dealing with a variety of 
issues influenced by their individual and shared contexts.  Actors engage in multiple 
arenas, depending on opportunity, necessity and choice.  Drivers are what influence and 
motivate actors.  The chapter presents three as being key: interests, discourses and 
institutions.  Actors employ tools to establish and legitimise their positions, inform 
debate and influence negotiations; or resist, reinforce and reframe perspectives.  The 
chapter defines tools broadly and categorises them as being predominantly for 
deliberation, technical support, or advocacy.  Decisions emerge from arenas.  The 
framework separates the decisions that emerge as being primarily about framing, supply 
and demand.  Ultimately, I am interested in the impacts of decisions in terms of the 
fairness and sustainability of water allocation, defined broadly, that reshapes the water 
governance context. 
The research for this chapter found that core decision-making processes about water in 
the Mekong Region are still often opaque to all but privileged insiders, and that 
meaningful public deliberation is still the exception rather than the rule.  Nevertheless, 
more recently, there has been a deliberative turn and hopeful signs of water governance 
change, for example: vibrant elements in the Chinese media interested in understanding 
and reporting the water-related perspectives of neighbouring countries; an increasingly 
inquisitive National Assembly in Laos; bold inputs to public policy-making debates by 
Vietnamese scientists; increased space for civil society analysts in Cambodia to engage 
in state irrigation policy debates; peoples’ environmental impact assessment in Thailand 
building on villager-led Tai Baan (villager-led) participatory action research and, 
improvements in MRC forums resulting in more participatory analyses of project 
merits.  In the research for this chapter I found further evidence that water resources-
related allocation choices can be improved by bringing into arenas different 
perspectives and fostering deliberation to inform and shape negotiations and decisions. 
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The contribution of this chapter to theory is the explanatory framework.  The 
contribution to practice is the illustration of the framework in Mekong transboundary 
water governance, with emphasis on highlighting the diversity of actors and the role of 
decision tools in water allocation decision making.  Though it may be power that 
enables, the framework reminds, and the research showed, that it is drivers that shape 
actors.  Interests are often reflected in the preferred discourses and institutions that 
actors privilege.  Drivers also influence tool selection.  For example, adherents to 
discourses that trumpet transparency and accountability will tend to agree to the 
deployment of deliberation tools, and use of technical tools in more deliberative ways.  
On the contrary, adherents to scientific rationalism may have a natural tendency to 
deploy technical tools, such as modelling, in efforts to find techno-answers rather than 
as stimulants for more deliberative modes of scenario-building and debate. 
12.3 Vision for Deliberative Water Governance 
Recently, John Dryzek has noted in Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative 
Governance (2010) that deliberative turns are being observed around the world in 
institutional studies, systemic observations, practical and experimental initiatives, and 
empirical examinations and explanations.  I have been engaging with the theory and 
practice of deliberative democracy and water governance in the Mekong Region since 
2000 and can make the following observations.  A patchy, systemic deliberative turn in 
the macro-politics of the Mekong Region is underway.  For example, in the Burmese 
Spring where there is a flourishing of political freedoms, and creation of new spaces for 
deliberation in Myanmar (Osnos, 2012), and in Laos where a strengthening National 
Assembly is seeking to scrutinise development projects and government expenditure.  
Between countries, cautious and realist diplomacy still prevails in Track 1 fora, but 
there is an increase in Track 2 deliberative exchanges.  The latter includes more regular 
convening of mini-publics deliberating about Mekong water resources development in 
various dialogues and roundtables, some of which are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10.  
There is new use of governance tools, such as strategic environment assessment (for 
example, see ICEM, 2010), that when deployed become boundary objects (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989) around which debates surge, discussed in Chapter 11. 
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Empirical analysis of these deliberative turns in the Mekong Region is evident, though 
immature.  This thesis has made contributions to assist structured assessments, for 
example: the ‘gold standard’ of ideal state-society elements conducive to fairer and 
effective governance (Chapter 7, Figure 3), the MSP conceptual framework and 
desirable characteristics (Chapter 8, Figure 3.1) elaborated in the Negotiate book, and 
the framework for analysing transboundary water governance complexes (Chapter 11). 
During my research I have investigated and analysed water governance practice, and 
have interrogated normative and explanatory theory to develop my understanding.  I 
have either convened or participated in many water governance processes, more and 
less deliberative in their character, have distilled practical challenges, made conceptual 
contributions, and advanced informed suggestions.  This section articulates a vision for 
Deliberative Water Governance, a new frontier in the field of deliberative governance, 
and a final research contribution of this thesis.   
My aspirational vision of Deliberative Water Governance would define it as: 
Constructive engagement that enables fairer and more effective water governance 
through inclusive, deliberative processes that emphasise different perspectives, 
learning, analysis and institution-building. 
The vision is inspired by theory and promising examples, from the Mekong Region and 
elsewhere, examined in the thesis chapters, which demonstrate the need for and added-
value provided by deliberation when it is inclusive, information-rich and flexibly 
facilitated, and actively promotes analysis of different views. 
I now explain each part of my definition. 
Constructive engagement 
In the Negotiate book (Annex C) the case is made for constructive engagement as a 
preferred path when negotiating about complex water: 
Stakeholders can contribute to, endorse or contest decisions through a variety of routes.  
If perceiving decisions or plans over water as unfair, stakeholders can choose 
resistance.  They can protest or refuse to take action demanded of them.  Those with 
more power can choose suppression, to enforce or overturn decisions.  Both responses 
can sometimes escalate to include aggression and violence, with the result that water 
disputes can fuel or be a source of conflict, especially where there are wider tensions in 
society.  Constructive engagement is an alternative path aiming to improve the fairness 
and effectiveness of complex decisions over water via peaceful, informed and inclusive 
processes (Vernon et al., 2010:23) 
The complexity of water governance is neatly captured by Neils Roling from 
Wageningen University who has observed: 
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We are caught between the equally desirable goals of productivity, equity, 
sustainability and stability.  But they do not add up.  In fact, achieving more of the one 
is likely to reduce the chances of reaching the other.  The only way out is politics.  At 
the level of natural resource management, goal conflicts require bringing together 
multiple, and increasingly interdependent stakeholders (with their multiple perspectives 
and interests) to negotiate and agree on collective or concerted action with respect to 
the sustainable use of fresh water and other resources and ecological services 
(2002:27). 
Negotiation approaches, more explicitly accepting of bounded conflict (Lee, 1992) are 
critical for complex water governance where there is, more often than not: a divergence 
of interests between actors who also recognise there is a degree of mutual 
interdependence in resolving problems (Leeuwis, 2000:951). 
Deliberation 
As the name suggests, deliberation is core to Deliberative Water Governance. 
Deliberation is not a new concept; it has long featured in history since it was a 
foundation of ancient Greek politics (Elster, 1998:4-5).  Democratic theorist Simone 
Chambers has provided a precise definition of deliberation, with which I agree: 
Deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed 
opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, 
new information, and claims made by fellow participants.  Although consensus need 
not be the ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their 
interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as 
justification to all affected) ideally characterizes deliberation (Chambers, 2003:309) 
In ideal-type deliberative processes, participants are open to changing their opinions 
through persuasion; rather than as a result of straight interest-based bargaining, 
coercion, manipulation, manufactured consent or deception.  Such processes are also 
characterised by respect, sharing of information and allowing all actors to freely 
participate and capably communicate their views (Dryzek, 2000:1-2).  There are hurdles 
to achieving legitimate and authentic deliberation (Sanders, 1997; Cooke, 2000; 
Parkinson, 2003; Fung, 2004; Ryfe, 2005) but this does not mean that pursuit of the 
ideal-type does not have merit.  I concluded in Part B that there is a problematic, 
deliberation deficit in the Mekong Region and that an infusion of high-quality deliberate 
would improve regional water governance. 
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My understanding of deliberation owes much to the transnational, discursive and 
deliberative democratic theory developed of Dryzek (1990; 1999; 2000; 2006) who 
argues that deliberative democracy is vital if societies are to approach widespread 
understanding of complex issues and perceptions.  Dryzek’s conception of deliberative 
and discursive democracy is: “about communication as well as voting, about social 
learning as well as decision making” (2006:25); pluralistic “in embracing the necessity 
to communicate across difference without erasing difference”; reflexive “in its 
questioning orientation to established traditions”; and dynamic, being responsive to 
“ever-changing restraints upon and opportunities for democratisation” (2000:3). 
Critical hydropolitical analysis 
Deliberative Water Governance explicitly brings in ‘the political’ and in so doing must 
acknowledge its debt to critical political analysis (Hay, 2002) discussed in Chapter 1, 
and hydropolitics (Elhance 1999, Turton 2002, Sneddon and Fox 2006).  Elhance 
defines hydropolitics as a research field focused on “the systematic study of conflict and 
cooperation between states over water resources that transcend international borders” 
(1999:3).  However, I concur with Turton’s conceptual expansion to encompass a wider 
field of issues, actors and institutions, that leads him to define hydropolitics as the 
authoritative allocation of values with respect to water (2002:13-17).  For this African-
based governance scholar, the range of hydropolitics issues is extensive, including: 
… conflict and its mitigation, states and non-state actors, water service delivery, water 
for food, the social value of water, the psychological value of water, water demand 
management, water as a target of aggression, water as an instrument of peace, water 
and gender, water and ecosystems, and water as a critical element in sustainable 
development (Turton, 2002:17). 
Moreover, Turton argues that hydropolitical analysis is pertinent at all levels “from the 
individual, to the household, village, city, social, provincial, national and international” 
(2002:17).  This thesis has focused on the regional level, but has explored different scale 
and level aspects of political water governance.  For example, Chapter 10 discusses the 
“push to privilege the sometimes competing scales of administration, hydrology, 
ecosystems, and economy” (Dore and Lebel, 2010:62) and the level contests that can 
also arise when actors promote different territorial or economic levels.  In the Mekong 
these contests are between inter-mingling actors engaged in “multiple networks of 
political-economic, discursive and ecohydrologic processes” within which there are 
“alternative imaginings” of Mekong futures (Sneddon and Fox, 2006:184). 
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I agree with Sneddon and Fox (2006) that more critical hydropolitics is vital to making 
Mekong regional water governance fairer and more effective.  I see it as an important 
element of Deliberative Water Governance, normalising ethical scrutiny of governance 
precepts and practice (Lambropoulos, 1996) and providing space for alternative 
perspectives. 
Social learning 
Deliberative Water Governance is further enhanced by explicitly incorporating a social 
learning perspective, the elements of which are: the constructivist paradigm, an 
orientation towards reflection and action, a concern for people and their environment, 
and commitment to a holistic approach (Maarleveld and Dangbegnon, 2002:70-74).  
That said, what sort of learning are we seeking in deliberative processes about water? 
Huitema et al. searched for empirical evidence of cognitive, normative and relational 
learning in a Dutch water management citizens’ jury.  Their cognitive enquiry sought 
evidence of factual learning, without changing underlying norms, values or belief 
systems.  They also searched for signs of normative learning, encompassing a change in 
norms, values or beliefs, and relational learning, evidenced by enhanced trust and 
improved understanding of the mindsets of others (Huitema et al., 2010).  More work is 
needed in the Mekong Region to evaluate the learning outcomes from increased 
deliberation and the policy impact.  But it is clear that the complex regional water 
context means that the learning process involves multiple actors with multiple 
perspectives and so relational learning is critical, and it is here where deliberation and 
dialogue have much to offer. 
To slightly digress for a moment, a concern is that acknowledging the need to negotiate, 
implies an acceptance actors will continue, at least to some extent, to act strategically 
and rationally in pursuing their interests.  This can be seen as a regression from the 
ideal-type constructivist, social learning approach embedded in the dominant rationale 
underlying deliberative processes such as MSPs.  However, given my own observations 
(Dore et al., 2010) and reports from others (Warner, 2007), I agree with the view that it 
is quite possible for “parallel learning and negotiation trajectories (to be) taking place 
at more or less the same time” (Leeuwis, 2000:950).   
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Building institutions 
Discursive democrats have an emphasis on theorising or demonstrating democratic 
processes which may have influence without necessarily having authority, whereas 
cosmopolitan democrats focus their efforts on the establishment of formal institutions 
with decision-making authority and establishing models of democracy (Dryzek, 
2006:158).  Deliberative Water Governance, as I am describing it, is concerned with 
creating political space for influence, via democratic processes and networks, but is also 
concerned with the establishment and conferring of authority. 
Networks are an example of actor interaction that can have influence without 
necessarily having any formal authority.  Networks focused on policy, civil society 
action, research, or campaigns are increasingly part of the governance fabric (Kickert et 
al., 1997; Rhodes, 1997; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; Kumar, 2000; Reinicke et al., 
2000; McCully, 2001; Sorensen and Torfing, 2005).  Accusations of illegitimacy can be 
levelled at networks if it is felt they have over-reached.  For example, Briscoe (2010) 
levelled this charge at some of the non-state actor networks that participated in the 
World Commission on Dams, arguing they had no authority to be dictating to states. 
Part of the influence of agents of deliberation – including network members, via their 
networks – can be in shaping the construction or evolution of, and providing a 
constituency for, authoritative institutions to overcome at least some of the present 
deficiencies in regional water governance.  To be clear, I adhere to the following 
working definition for institutions: 
Institutions are persistent, predictable arrangements, laws, processes or customs serving 
to structure transactions and relationships in a society.  These transactions are political, 
social, cultural, economic, personal, legal and administrative.  Institutions may be 
formal or informal, legal or customary, and in terms of function may be economic, 
cultural or informational, highly visible and regulatory, or alternatively, difficult to 
discern and relying on tacit understanding and adherence.  Institutions allow organised, 
collective efforts around common concerns, and reduce the need for constant 
negotiation of expectations and behavioural contracts.  Although persistent, institutions 
constantly evolve and adapt (Handmer and Dovers, 2007:30). 
Ken Conca noted in an examination of water-related transnational politics and global 
institution-building that new and authoritative institutions may be quite different from 
those of the traditional, state-centred variety: 
The presumption that states, and only states, are the authoritative agents of governance 
holds constant, at one extreme end of the spectrum, a key group of variables related to 
the constitution, distribution, and legitimisation of authority.  We can conceive of 
institutions that construct more complex, heterogeneous, or fluid spaces for the exercise 
of authority, but such institutions would not be regimes as typically designed by 
diplomats, understood by participants, or interpreted by scholars (Conca, 2006:46). 
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The establishment in the Mekong Region of an atypical, nascent, transboundary 
deliberative regime – with independent nodes led by diverse actors, such as Mekong 
River Commission secretariat, IUCN, Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional 
Alliance, M-POWER network and others – is an illustration of what Conca has 
envisaged.  Fitting the criteria of Guston’s boundary organisations (2001:400-401), 
different actors are taking on the role of multi-stakeholder convenor, encouraging the 
use of technical and deliberative governance tools, and mediating at the frontier of 
politics and science. 
12.4 Final reflections 
A deliberative turn is underway in the water politics of the Mekong Region.  
Deliberative processes – inserted into political arenas – have already improved regional 
water governance, by reducing power imbalances among stakeholders and assisting 
negotiations to be more transparent and informed.  There is a fresh momentum for 
deliberation across the region that opponents will find difficult to quell. 
Deliberative Water Governance is a relevant and promising approach for several 
reasons.  When practiced: extra political space is created, that transcends boundaries; 
representation and participation of stakeholders is expanded, potentially increasing the 
legitimacy of public policymaking; discourses and norms are more freely launched and 
contested; and political analysis is provided to increase transparency, and deepen 
exploration of interests, agendas, past decisions, and current options.  Importantly, there 
would be greater learning opportunity for the regional Mekong polity where 
considerable mistrust, misinformation and misunderstanding still prevail.  The 
conclusions section in Chapter 11 articulates some of the ways to put deliberation into 
practice. 
John Dore 
283 
My future research agenda will assess the extent and influence of Deliberative Water 
Governance at three governance levels.  First, across the Mekong Region, I will embark 
on a fresh assessment of systemic change at the regional level using Dryzek’s proposed 
tests of the capacity of deliberative systems (2010:10-12), further exploring political 
spaces and arenas, and the organisation and influence of deliberation.  Second, focusing 
on an individual decision, I will apply the framework for analysing transboundary water 
governance complexes (presented in Chapter 11, Figure 1) to the Xayaburi dam project 
in Laos: detailing and explaining the interplay between: context, drivers, tools, arenas, 
decisions and impacts.  Third, focusing on the efficacy of multi-stakeholder platforms, I 
will apply my framework for guiding and assessing multi-stakeholder platforms 
(presented in Chapter 8) in tracking the progress of a series of deliberative processes 
soon to be launched in South Asia’s international rivers emerging from the Himalayas, 
focusing on MSP context, content, process and outcomes. 
In summary, via its action research orientation and progressive publishing this thesis has 
contributed uniquely to both the theory and practice of Deliberative Water Governance.  
By actively engaging in governance practice and experimentation, and periodically 
publishing my analysis, I have benefited from feedback which, in turn, stimulated new 
lines of enquiry.  With my past and future research agenda, I hope my work will be 
judged as a constructive and productive contribution to water governance scholarship, 
bringing in deliberative, analytical, learning and institutional perspectives to inform the 
practice and possibilities in the Mekong Region and beyond. 
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